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GCRI · グローバルな課題

システミック・リスクと連鎖的リスク

Systemic risk is the risk that a shock in one part of a connected system spreads, amplifies and disrupts the whole. A drought travels through water, energy, food prices, budgets and health. A financial failure halts payments that hospitals and utilities rely on. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) traces where shocks cross systems, where they amplify and where they can be stopped. Part of global challenges.

02Key ideas

リスクがシステミックになる特徴は 4 つある。

Systemic risk is not a separate hazard. It is a property of how systems are connected, which is why it is often invisible to assessments made one sector at a time.

結合

Tight connections

電力、水、物資、データ、資金の流れでつながるシステムは、ストレスを速やかに伝える。

増幅

フィードバック・ループ

価格の急騰、買いだめ、パニック、強制売却は、ショックが広がるにつれてその規模を拡大させかねません。

Common mode

Shared points of failure

One asset, supplier or assumption underneath many services can fail them all at once.

Non-linearity

Thresholds and tipping points

システムは、ある限度まではストレスを吸収できますが、その後、急激に状態が変化することがあります。

03Terms and measures

システミックリスクが実際に何を意味するのか、そして何を測定できるのか。

Two definitions anchor the work. The International Risk Governance Center describes systemic risks as risks to the functioning of a system that arise from the interactions of its parts. Their effects reach well beyond the point of origin. The UNDRR Global Assessment Report of 2019 adds that such risk is often embedded in a system without being recognised as a risk, until a shock reveals it.

概念記述する内容How it is measured
相互依存A two-way state relation between systems; Rinaldi and colleagues distinguish physical, cyber, geographic and logical linksDependency matrix of services and assets; share of a service’s inputs that come from each other system
カスケード他の箇所で障害を引き起こす障害で、数時間、数週間、あるいは数季にわたって順次発生することもあるものFraction of nodes or services failed after propagation; time from first failure to last; time to recover in days
増幅ショックが広がるにつれてそれを拡大させるフィードバック:投げ売り、退蔵、価格急騰、信認の喪失モデル実行における初期損失に対する総損失の比率。範囲を付して報告する
集中度Many functions resting on one asset, supplier, route or assumption供給者または経路のシェア、ハーフィンダール・ハーシュマン集中度指数、単一障害点の数
Critical transition閾値を超えた時点での、状態間の急激な移行Rising variance and lag-one autocorrelation in long series, read as a possible warning, not a forecast
04手法とその限界

専門家が連関するリスクに用いるモデルと、それぞれが機能しなくなる点。

手法What it answers行き詰まる点
Network contagion models, including DebtRank (Battiston and others, 2012)エクスポージャーの網の中で、どの機関や資産がショックを最も遠くまで伝えるかExposure networks are rarely complete or public; missing links change who looks central
Interdependent network percolation (Buldyrev and others, 2010)Why coupled networks can collapse abruptly where a single network would degrade graduallyStylised: real operators reroute, shed load and repair, which the theory leaves out
Input-output and inoperability modelsHow lost output in one sector reduces output in sectors that buy from itFixed technical coefficients allow no substitution; results overstate losses over longer horizons
エージェントベースモデルHow behaviour such as hoarding, panic or switching suppliers shapes spreadパラメータが多く検証データが少ないため、結果は探索的なものであり、感度とともに公表されます
Storylines and compound stress scenariosWhat a physically and economically coherent bad sequence looks like, step by step確率は付与されません。その価値は、各システムの専門家が各段階を検証するかどうかによります

Haldane and May showed in 2011 how homogeneity and tight coupling made a banking system fragile in ways no single bank’s risk model could see. The same lesson holds for water, power and food systems: the property that matters belongs to the network. Every model result here carries its assumptions, its range and the label Modelled or Scenario.

05Data and its status

The evidence on connected risk is thinner than the evidence on single hazards.

エビデンス提供するもの現状について正直に
National supply and use tables, and inter-country input-output tables (OECD ICIO)伝播モデル向けの、セクター間・国間のフローPublished with a lag of several years; sector detail too coarse for many infrastructure questions
災害損失データベース(EM-DAT、DesInventar Sendai)Recorded direct losses by event and placeIndirect and cascading losses are rarely recorded; small events are under-reported
Infrastructure dependency data held by operatorsどの資産がどのサービスを支えているかMostly restricted for security reasons; public studies work with permitted or synthetic topology
監督当局の金融エクスポージャーデータ機関間の二者間エクスポージャー監督当局が保有しており、公開された研究は集計値と再構築されたネットワークに依拠している

データが主張を裏づけられない場合、ページには、その主張はまだできないと明記します。空白は空白として示し、もっともらしい数値で埋めることはしません。

06GCRI’s part

GCRI がここで行うこと、Reports への届け方、そして皆さまにできる支援。

GCRI is a research, development and policy institution. On systemic risk it develops and tests methods, helps national teams map their own dependencies on their own data, and publishes what review supports. It does not regulate, supervise, fund or approve projects, and every decision on a system stays with the authority or operator that runs it. Work is organised through the Systemic Risk Management platform and the Systems Science and Modelling platform.

Findings are designed to reach the Global Systems Risk and Resilience series and the Scenario and Stress-Test series. Under the proposed Nexus Standards, each dependency record and indicator series would carry a record identifier (NS-3) and each model a model card (NS-12). A reader could then trace a result back to its inputs.

  • 各段階に出典を付した、文書化されたカスケード。帰属が不確かな段階も含みます。
  • A critique of a propagation method, with the case where it failed.
  • Permitted dependency data for a city or sector, offered under stated terms through the Secretariat.
07GCRI の取り組み方

連関するリスクのための手法。

  1. 01

    Map the system

    Dependencies across sectors and borders with network science and contagion.

  2. 02

    Simulate propagation

    Complex systems and agent-based models that show how behaviour shapes spread, with assumptions stated.

  3. 03

    Stress-test

    Compound scenarios using scenario design and stress testing, labelled as scenario evidence.

  4. 04

    統制点を見つける

    Interventions that cut or buffer transmission, with their trade-offs and limits.

08次に進む先

プラットフォーム、分野、カウンターパート。

Field work runs through the Systemic Risk Management platform and the Systems Science and Modelling platform, and the risk management and systemic risk field gateway. The Global Risks Forum (GRF) examines all-hazards governance. The Global Risks Alliance (GRA) examines systemic stability in finance. Worked illustrations: risk transmission examples.

A model of systemic risk is a tool for understanding, not a prediction. Every result states its assumptions and uncertainty.

10質問

質問と回答。

How is systemic risk different from ordinary risk?
Ordinary risk analysis looks at one hazard and one system. Systemic risk analysis looks at how connections spread and amplify a shock, so the whole can fail even when each part looks sound.
Can systemic risk be measured with one number?
単一の数値ではすべてを捉えられません。GCRI は、NXS-GRX 固有の指標を、その出典と不確実性とともに用い、依存関係の地図とシナリオ結果を併せて示します。
この成果は誰が利用しますか。
Ministries, regulators, operators, researchers and financial institutions that need to see across sector boundaries. Decisions remain with them.
How do countries take part?
Through a national programme, which starts with an exploration led by an accountable national contact. The Secretariat and regional desks receive those enquiries.
Can systemic risk be eliminated?
No. Connection brings efficiency and reach as well as exposure. The aim is to understand where coupling creates fragility, to add buffers and alternatives where they matter most and to recover faster when shocks occur.
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グローバル・リスク・イノベーション・センター(Global Centre for Risk and Innovation)

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