GCRI · 글로벌 과제
시스템 리스크와 연쇄 리스크
Systemic risk is the risk that a shock in one part of a connected system spreads, amplifies and disrupts the whole. A drought travels through water, energy, food prices, budgets and health. A financial failure halts payments that hospitals and utilities rely on. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) traces where shocks cross systems, where they amplify and where they can be stopped. Part of global challenges.
기록에 남은 체계적 리스크와 연쇄 리스크.
- 01기관글로벌 리스크 혁신 센터(Global Centre for Risk and Innovation, GCRI)
- 02Key ideasFour features make a risk systemic
- 03Terms and measuresWhat systemic risk means in practice, and what can be measured
- 04방법과 그 한계전문가가 연결된 리스크에 사용하는 모델과 각 모델이 한계에 이르는 지점
- 05Data and its statusThe evidence on connected risk is thinner than the evidence on single hazards
- 06GCRI’s partWhat GCRI does here, how it reaches Reports, and how you can help
- 07GCRI의 접근 방식연계 리스크를 위한 방법
Four features make a risk systemic.
Systemic risk is not a separate hazard. It is a property of how systems are connected, which is why it is often invisible to assessments made one sector at a time.
Tight connections
Systems linked by flows of power, water, goods, data and money pass stress along quickly.
피드백 루프
Price spikes, hoarding, panic and forced sales can make a shock larger as it spreads.
Shared points of failure
여러 서비스의 기반이 되는 자산, 공급업체 또는 가정 하나가 그 서비스 전체를 동시에 무너뜨릴 수 있습니다.
Thresholds and tipping points
Systems can absorb stress up to a point and then change state abruptly.
What systemic risk means in practice, and what can be measured.
Two definitions anchor the work. The International Risk Governance Center describes systemic risks as risks to the functioning of a system that arise from the interactions of its parts. Their effects reach well beyond the point of origin. The UNDRR Global Assessment Report of 2019 adds that such risk is often embedded in a system without being recognised as a risk, until a shock reveals it.
| 개념 | 설명하는 내용 | How it is measured |
|---|---|---|
| 상호 의존성 | A two-way state relation between systems; Rinaldi and colleagues distinguish physical, cyber, geographic and logical links | Dependency matrix of services and assets; share of a service’s inputs that come from each other system |
| 캐스케이드 | A failure that triggers failures elsewhere, possibly in sequence over hours, weeks or seasons | Fraction of nodes or services failed after propagation; time from first failure to last; time to recover in days |
| 증폭 | 충격이 확산되면서 그 규모를 키우는 피드백: 투매, 비축, 가격 급등, 신뢰 상실 | Ratio of total to initial loss in a model run, reported with its range |
| 집중도 | Many functions resting on one asset, supplier, route or assumption | Supplier or route shares; Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index; count of single points of failure |
| Critical transition | An abrupt shift between states once a threshold is crossed | Rising variance and lag-one autocorrelation in long series, read as a possible warning, not a forecast |
The models experts use for connected risk, and where each breaks down.
| 방법 | What it answers | Where it breaks down |
|---|---|---|
| Network contagion models, including DebtRank (Battiston and others, 2012) | Which institutions or assets carry a shock furthest through a web of exposures | Exposure networks are rarely complete or public; missing links change who looks central |
| Interdependent network percolation (Buldyrev and others, 2010) | Why coupled networks can collapse abruptly where a single network would degrade gradually | Stylised: real operators reroute, shed load and repair, which the theory leaves out |
| 투입산출 모델과 작동 불능(inoperability) 모델 | How lost output in one sector reduces output in sectors that buy from it | Fixed technical coefficients allow no substitution; results overstate losses over longer horizons |
| 에이전트 기반 모형 | How behaviour such as hoarding, panic or switching suppliers shapes spread | Many parameters and few validation data; results are explorations, published with their sensitivity |
| Storylines and compound stress scenarios | What a physically and economically coherent bad sequence looks like, step by step | Carry no probability; their value depends on whether experts in each system test each step |
Haldane and May showed in 2011 how homogeneity and tight coupling made a banking system fragile in ways no single bank’s risk model could see. The same lesson holds for water, power and food systems: the property that matters belongs to the network. Every model result here carries its assumptions, its range and the label Modelled or Scenario.
연계 리스크에 관한 근거는 단일 재해에 관한 근거보다 빈약합니다.
| 증거 | 제공하는 것 | 정직한 현황 |
|---|---|---|
| National supply and use tables, and inter-country input-output tables (OECD ICIO) | 전파 모델을 위한 부문 간, 국가 간 흐름 | Published with a lag of several years; sector detail too coarse for many infrastructure questions |
| 재난 피해 데이터베이스(EM-DAT, DesInventar Sendai) | Recorded direct losses by event and place | Indirect and cascading losses are rarely recorded; small events are under-reported |
| 운영 주체가 보유한 인프라 의존성 데이터 | 어떤 자산이 어떤 서비스를 뒷받침하는가 | Mostly restricted for security reasons; public studies work with permitted or synthetic topology |
| 감독 당국의 금융 노출 데이터 | Bilateral exposures between institutions | Held by supervisors; public work relies on aggregates and reconstructed networks |
데이터가 주장을 뒷받침하지 못하는 경우, 페이지는 아직 그 주장을 할 수 없다고 명시합니다. 공백은 공백으로 표시하며, 그럴듯한 수치로 채우지 않습니다.
What GCRI does here, how it reaches Reports, and how you can help.
GCRI is a research, development and policy institution. On systemic risk it develops and tests methods, helps national teams map their own dependencies on their own data, and publishes what review supports. It does not regulate, supervise, fund or approve projects, and every decision on a system stays with the authority or operator that runs it. Work is organised through the Systemic Risk Management platform and the Systems Science and Modelling platform.
Findings are designed to reach the Global Systems Risk and Resilience series and the Scenario and Stress-Test series. Under the proposed Nexus Standards, each dependency record and indicator series would carry a record identifier (NS-3) and each model a model card (NS-12). A reader could then trace a result back to its inputs.
- A documented cascade with a source for each step, including the steps where attribution is uncertain.
- A critique of a propagation method, with the case where it failed.
- Permitted dependency data for a city or sector, offered under stated terms through the Secretariat.
연계된 리스크를 위한 방법론.
- 01
Map the system
Dependencies across sectors and borders with network science and contagion.
- 02
Simulate propagation
Complex systems and agent-based models that show how behaviour shapes spread, with assumptions stated.
- 03
Stress-test
Compound scenarios using scenario design and stress testing, labelled as scenario evidence.
- 04
Find points of control
Interventions that cut or buffer transmission, with their trade-offs and limits.
플랫폼, 분야 및 대응 기관.
Field work runs through the Systemic Risk Management platform and the Systems Science and Modelling platform, and the risk management and systemic risk field gateway. The Global Risks Forum (GRF) examines all-hazards governance. The Global Risks Alliance (GRA) examines systemic stability in finance. Worked illustrations: risk transmission examples.
시스템적 리스크 모델은 이해를 위한 도구이며 예측이 아닙니다. 모든 결과에는 가정과 불확실성이 명시됩니다.
Where this page’s references lead.
이 페이지를 읽을 때 기준이 되는 기구와 문서. 상태와 판은 바뀌며, 각 링크는 발행 기구로 연결됩니다.
- IRGC 시스템 리스크 거버넌스 지침(EPFL 국제리스크거버넌스센터, 2018)
- 2019 재난위험경감 글로벌 평가 보고서, 시스템 리스크 판(UNDRR, 2019)
- OECD 중대 리스크 거버넌스에 관한 이사회 권고(OECD, 2014)
- Haldane and May, Systemic risk in banking ecosystems, Nature 469 (2011)
- Battiston and others, DebtRank: too central to fail?, Scientific Reports 2 (2012)
- Buldyrev 외, Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464 (2010)
- Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly, Identifying, understanding and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21 (2001)
- Scheffer and others, Early-warning signals for critical transitions, Nature 461 (2009)
- OECD 국가간 투입산출표 및 부가가치 무역 데이터베이스
- NS-3, NXS-GRX(표준 데이터, 출처 이력 및 리스크)는 UNI를 기록하며, 제안된 표준입니다
- NS-12, 소프트웨어, 모형, AI/ML 산출물, 제안된 표준
질문과 답변.
How is systemic risk different from ordinary risk?
Can systemic risk be measured with one number?
이 작업은 누가 활용하나요?
How do countries take part?
시스템 리스크를 제거할 수 있습니까?
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