Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Executive summary

The edition on a few pages: the abstract, the key messages, the headline finding and what each steward reads in it.

8 min read1 figure0 tables18 notesNR-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
    1. S.1 Abstract
    2. S.2 Key messages
    3. S.3 Headline finding
    4. S.4 At a glance
    5. S.5 What each steward reads in it
    6. S.6 What this edition is, and is not
  3. 1MENA’s risk is carried by power, water and one export route
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Hot season with peak desalination load and a disrupted export route
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

S.1Abstract

MENA, as the series reads it, is two member countries (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) whose electricity is mostly fossil, whose fresh water comes largely from the sea and from stored groundwater, and whose economies sell fuel through one narrow strait. Saudi Arabia had 35.3 million residents in 2024 and the United Arab Emirates 11.3 million23. Their greenhouse gas emissions excluding land use were 838.9 and 264.1 Mt CO₂e in 2024, or 18.5 and 18.3 tonnes of CO₂ per person56. Fossil fuels produced 98.5% of Saudi electricity and 70.1% of Emirati electricity in 20247. Renewable capacity in Saudi Arabia reached 12,332 MW in 2025, up about 87% on 2024, and the United Arab Emirates added 1,054 MW910. Renewable internal freshwater was 74.6 cubic metres per person in Saudi Arabia and 14.9 in the United Arab Emirates in 202211, and desalinated seawater supplied about half of Saudi distributed water in 202314. In March 2026 the Strait of Hormuz was declared closed35, and fuel made up 78.7% of Saudi merchandise exports in 202522. The effect on 2026 real output is not bound at the close. This Baseline Edition fixes the 2026 reference state from sources that could be read at evidence close. Where a regional dataset could not be read, it shows as a designed empty state that names the source and the blocker. The edition decides nothing and ranks no member country.

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the MENA baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

  1. Saudi Arabia emitted 838.9 Mt CO₂e and the United Arab Emirates 264.1 Mt in 2024, excluding land use. Per person both are near 18 tonnes of CO₂.56

    Where do emissions stand?Reported

  2. Fossil fuels produced 98.5% of Saudi and 70.1% of Emirati electricity in 2024. Saudi renewable capacity grew about 87% in 2025.79

    How is electricity supplied?Reported

  3. Renewable internal freshwater is 74.6 m³ per person in Saudi Arabia and 14.9 m³ in the United Arab Emirates. Desalination supplied about half of Saudi distributed water in 2023.1114

    How scarce is water?Reported

  4. Food imports were 12.3% of Saudi merchandise imports in 2025. Reserves and cereal import dependence are not bound.16

    How exposed is food supply?Reported

  5. The 2024 Hajj saw 1,301 deaths reported. No heat-death series by member is bound.19

    How severe is heat?Reported

  6. The effect on 2026 output is not bound at the close. The strait was declared closed in March 2026.35

    What did the 2026 export disruption do to output?Not bound

  7. No official assessment of damage to energy or water assets was opened.34

    Which assets were damaged?Not bound

  8. Peak power demand, desalination load and a disrupted export route coinciding in a hot season. SCN-MEN-HOT-01

    What will Q1 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

Not boundEQL 1NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-FIN-006

The 2026 change in real GDP in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is not bound at the close. The Strait of Hormuz was declared closed in March 2026, and fuel made up 78.7% of Saudi merchandise exports in 2025 and 68.2% of Emirati exports in 2023.

Figure S.1Fuel share of merchandise exports (%)
ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
Saudi Arabia, 202578.7
United Arab Emirates, 202368.2

Source: World Bank series22. The two values are for different years.

The shock moved through trade first. A route loss reaches public budgets and the power and water systems that those budgets support22. The strait was declared closed in March 2026 and about 150 ships were stranded35. No release dated on or before 30 September 2026 that gives the effect on output was opened. IMF and World Bank releases of October 2026 are held as post-close, context only2934.

S.4At a glance

48.5million

combined population of the two members, 20251

1,103Mt CO₂e

combined emissions excluding land use, 20245

34,537US$

Saudi GDP per person, 202524

50,274US$

Emirati GDP per person, 202424

40.3 · 74.0%

international migrants in the Saudi and Emirati populations, 202426

2members

Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

S.5What each steward reads in it

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports a coupled reading of MENA risk: heat, power, water and trade act on each other.

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most residents risk arrives as a hot week, a water or power interruption or a price change.

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Fuel-export dependence and the Saudi fiscal projection show where finance-readiness evidence will matter, and post-close IMF remarks of 1 October 2026 advise temporary and targeted support, held as context only.

NEXUS

Synthesis

MENA publishes strong macro and energy statistics through international databases.

S.6What this edition is, and is not

What this edition is

A baseline: the state of MENA’s water, energy, food, health and biodiversity systems in 2026 read across Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates. It reads the shared basins and grids that no single member controls, and sets out the questions the operational series will answer.

What it is not

Not a regional risk assessment, an official warning or a rating. It decides nothing about any institution or asset. Competent authorities keep every mandate they hold, and each member’s ownership of its own edition is unaffected. It does not stand for the European Union, which is a separate subject in the series.

What comes next

Q1 2027 opens the operational series with a sealed Foundry evidence cut. Each later edition reports what changed against this baseline: new observations, source revisions, method changes, scenario updates and corrections.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 2Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Programme (ed.), Saudi Arabia: Population by nationality (Saudi, non-Saudi), sex and age group, 2024 (table compiled from General Authority for Statistics data; total 35,300,280). GLMM, Gulf Research Center. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 3Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Programme (ed.), UAE: Total population residing in the UAE, by sex, 2000 to 2024 (table compiled from Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Centre data; total 11,294,243). GLMM, Gulf Research Center. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 5DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Total greenhouse gas emissions excluding LULUCF, Mt CO2e (EN.GHG.ALL.MT.CE.AR5), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 6DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Carbon dioxide emissions excluding LULUCF, total and per capita (EN.GHG.CO2.MT.CE.AR5 and EN.GHG.CO2.PC.CE.AR5), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 7DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Electricity production from oil, gas and coal sources, oil sources and natural gas sources, % of total (EG.ELC.FOSL.ZS, EG.ELC.PETR.ZS, EG.ELC.NGAS.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 9Zawya Projects (ed.), Saudi Arabia renewables capacity jumps 87% to 12.3GW in 2025 (press report on IRENA capacity statistics; 12,332 MW). Zawya, Dubai. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 10Zawya Projects (ed.), Saudi leads GCC renewables growth as Oman, Qatar post fastest gains in 2025 (press report on IRENA data; United Arab Emirates addition of 1,054 MW read from the subheading, the rest of the page was behind a sign-up wall). Zawya, Dubai. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 11DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita, cubic metres (ER.H2O.INTR.PC), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 14Arab News Pakistan (ed.), Saudi Arabia boosts desalinated water supply to 50% in Vision 2030 push (press report of the General Authority for Statistics water accounts, 5 January 2025; desalinated water 50% of distributed supply in 2023, 44% in 2022). Arab News. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 35Al Jazeera (ed.), Shutdown of Hormuz Strait raises fears of soaring oil prices (report, 3 March 2026; about one fifth of oil and LNG; Revolutionary Guard commander declared the strait closed; about 150 ships stranded). Al Jazeera Media Network, Doha. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 22DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Fuel exports, % of merchandise exports (TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN), and exports of goods and services, % of GDP (NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS), Saudi Arabia (2025) and United Arab Emirates (2023), World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 16DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Food imports, % of merchandise imports (TM.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN), Saudi Arabia (2025) and United Arab Emirates (2023), World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 19Gulf News (ed.), Hajj 2024: Saudi Arabia says 1,301 deaths, mostly unregistered pilgrims (report of the Saudi Minister of Health announcement and the Saudi Press Agency, 23 June 2024; 83% unauthorised; no cause breakdown on the page). Gulf News, Dubai. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 34POST-CLOSE, context only: International Monetary Fund (ed.), Managing Director’s remarks at the meeting of the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 1 October 2026 (GCC economy expected to contract in 2026; near closure of Hormuz sharply curtailed oil and gas exports; damage to energy facilities reduced production capacity). IMF, Washington DC. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 29DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: International Monetary Fund (ed.), Real GDP growth, annual percent change (NGDP_RPCH), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Economic Outlook database, October 2026, DataMapper interface. IMF, Washington DC. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 1DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 24DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), GDP, current US$, and GDP per capita, current US$ (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD, NY.GDP.PCAP.CD), Saudi Arabia (2025) and United Arab Emirates (2024), World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 26DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), International migrant stock, % of population (SM.POP.TOTL.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this summary

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Executive summary: Executive summary. In MENA Regional Systems Risk and Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition, The State of MENA’s Interdependent Systems. (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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