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MENA’s risk is carried by power, water and one export route

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It assesses no authority and ranks no member country.

10 min read2 figures2 tables22 notesNR-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1MENA’s risk is carried by power, water and one export route
    1. 1.1 The questions this part answers
    2. 1.2 The argument
    3. 1.3 Twenty couplings between five systems
    4. 1.4 Reinforcing loops
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Hot season with peak desalination load and a disrupted export route
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is MENA’s risk concentrated, and in which systems?
  • Which couplings carry shocks across member borders?
  • Which capabilities hold under compound stress, and which are only documented?
  • What must the 2027 programme measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Member system cards
  • Shared basins and grids
  • Hub list
  • Regional pathway
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • Scenario
  • Three lenses
  • Portfolio

1.2The argument

Saudi Arabia had 35.3 million residents in 2024, and the United Arab Emirates 11.3 million23. The World Bank series gives 37.0 million and 11.5 million for 2025, and growth of about 4.6% in both14. Migrants made up 40.3% of the Saudi population and 74.0% of the Emirati population in 202426. This baseline reads MENA as a region of two members that share a coastline, a grid logic and an export route, so that a shock at one point reaches both.

The forcing layer is heat, dust and rare extreme rain. Asia was 1.04 °C above the 1991 to 2020 average in 2024, and heat waves were reported in the Middle East20. The United Arab Emirates recorded 259.5 mm of rain in 24 hours, one of its most extreme events since records began in 194920. Fine-particle exposure was 73.5 micrograms per cubic metre in Saudi Arabia and 57.2 in the United Arab Emirates in 202321. About 26.7% of Emirati residents lived in areas below 5 metres of elevation in 2015, against 3.2% in Saudi Arabia28.

Heat adds a health layer. The Saudi health minister reported 1,301 deaths during the 2024 Hajj, 83% of them unauthorised pilgrims19. The report did not give causes, and this edition does not treat the figure as a heat-death count.

The water layer is a supply-side problem. Renewable internal freshwater is 74.6 m³ per person in Saudi Arabia and 14.9 m³ in the United Arab Emirates11. Withdrawals are 974% and 1,510% of internal resources12. About half of Saudi distributed water was desalinated seawater in 202314. Agriculture took 81.6% of Saudi withdrawals and 51.2% of Emirati withdrawals in 202213.

The energy layer is fossil-fired and export-facing. Fossil fuels produced 98.5% of Saudi and 70.1% of Emirati electricity in 20247. Per person, the two countries used about 6,700 and 8,800 kilograms of oil equivalent in 202427. Oil rents were 23.7% of Saudi GDP and 15.7% of Emirati GDP in 202123. In March 2026 a Revolutionary Guard commander declared the Strait of Hormuz closed, and about 150 ships were stranded35. A fire broke out at the Fujairah energy hub from falling drone debris36. Post-close, context only: on 1 October 2026 the IMF Managing Director said the near closure sharply curtailed oil and gas exports and that damage to energy facilities reduced production capacity34.

This edition therefore reads MENA’s risk as a property of the couplings between these forces. The matrix, risk objects, capability ladder and scenario that follow ask two questions: where does a shock travel next through power, water and trade, and who holds the capability to stop it?

Figure 1.1How much electricity comes from fossil fuels? Share of electricity production, 2024 (%)

Fossil fuels produced 98.5% of Saudi electricity in 2024, with oil at 40.8% and gas at 57.7%7. In the United Arab Emirates they produced 70.1%, almost all from gas7. The remaining 29.9% of Emirati electricity is not broken down in the series read here. Renewable shares in the same World Bank database stop at 2021, when they were 0.07% in Saudi Arabia and 4.2% in the United Arab Emirates8. Saudi renewable capacity has grown since9.

ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
Saudi Arabia, all fossil98.5
Saudi Arabia, natural gas57.7
United Arab Emirates, all fossil70.1
United Arab Emirates, natural gas69.6

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2024.

Figure ID FIG-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-01-003

98.5%

fossil share of Saudi electricity, 20247

70.1%

fossil share of Emirati electricity, 20247

12,332MW

Saudi renewable capacity, 20259

1,054MW

renewable capacity added in the United Arab Emirates, 202510

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The MENA matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the starting graph that the Q1 2027 Foundry cut will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings between the five systems

Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.

  • Strong
  • Moderate
  • Weak

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT Water·STRONG
hydro · thermal cooling		STRONG
irrigation · rain-fed yield		STRONG
safe water · sanitation		STRONG
flows · wetlands
ENE EnergyMODERATE
pumping · desalination		·STRONG
fuel · fertiliser · cold chain		STRONG
air pollution · cooling		MODERATE
land use · mining
FOO FoodSTRONG
≈70% of withdrawals		WEAK
bioenergy feedstock		·STRONG
nutrition · food safety		STRONG
land conversion
HLT HealthWEAK
workforce		WEAK
workforce		MODERATE
labour · disease		·WEAK
residues
BIO BiodiversitySTRONG
regulation · filtration		MODERATE
biomass · hydrology		STRONG
pollination · soils		MODERATE
zoonoses · medicines		·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    CLI → HLT

    Heat raises illness and deaths and loads health services.

    Inferred Hajj 202419; cause not given

  2. 02

    ENE → WAT

    Power loss or fuel shortage reduces desalination output.

    Inferred about half of Saudi water desalinated14; no event bound

  3. 03

    TRD → FIN → ENE

    A lost export route cuts income that funds power and water.

    Inferred closure reported in March 202635; output effect not bound

  4. 04

    INF → ENE → all

    Damage to an energy hub spreads to power, water and ports.

    Reported Fujairah fire 202636; losses not bound

  5. 05

    CLI → INF

    Rare extreme rain floods roads, power and drainage.

    Inferred UAE rain 202420; losses not bound

1.4Reinforcing loops

A shock entering either system of a loop can return amplified through the other.

Table 1.2Pairs of systems where both directions are rated strong
LoopFirst directionSecond direction
WAT and FOOWater to food: irrigation · rain-fed yieldFood to water: ≈70% of withdrawals
WAT and BIOWater to biodiversity: flows · wetlandsBiodiversity to water: regulation · filtration
FOO and BIOFood to biodiversity: land conversionBiodiversity to food: pollination · soils
A causal-loop reading of the matrix (Sterman, Business Dynamics, 2000): structural, from estimated strengths, not a measured feedback.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 2Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Programme (ed.), Saudi Arabia: Population by nationality (Saudi, non-Saudi), sex and age group, 2024 (table compiled from General Authority for Statistics data; total 35,300,280). GLMM, Gulf Research Center. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 3Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Programme (ed.), UAE: Total population residing in the UAE, by sex, 2000 to 2024 (table compiled from Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Centre data; total 11,294,243). GLMM, Gulf Research Center. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 1DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 4DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Population growth, annual % (SP.POP.GROW), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 26DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), International migrant stock, % of population (SM.POP.TOTL.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 20World Meteorological Organization (ed.), Rising temperatures and extreme weather hit Asia hard (press release on the State of the Climate in Asia 2024, 23 June 2025; 1.04 °C above 1991 to 2020; 259.5 mm in 24 hours in the United Arab Emirates). WMO, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 21DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), PM2.5 air pollution, mean annual exposure, micrograms per cubic metre (EN.ATM.PM25.MC.M3), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 28DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Population living in areas where elevation is below 5 metres, % of total (EN.POP.EL5M.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2015. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 19Gulf News (ed.), Hajj 2024: Saudi Arabia says 1,301 deaths, mostly unregistered pilgrims (report of the Saudi Minister of Health announcement and the Saudi Press Agency, 23 June 2024; 83% unauthorised; no cause breakdown on the page). Gulf News, Dubai. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 11DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita, cubic metres (ER.H2O.INTR.PC), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 12DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Annual freshwater withdrawals, total, % of internal resources (ER.H2O.FWTL.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 14Arab News Pakistan (ed.), Saudi Arabia boosts desalinated water supply to 50% in Vision 2030 push (press report of the General Authority for Statistics water accounts, 5 January 2025; desalinated water 50% of distributed supply in 2023, 44% in 2022). Arab News. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 13DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Annual freshwater withdrawals by sector: agriculture, domestic and industry, % of total (ER.H2O.FWAG.ZS, ER.H2O.FWDM.ZS, ER.H2O.FWIN.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 7DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Electricity production from oil, gas and coal sources, oil sources and natural gas sources, % of total (EG.ELC.FOSL.ZS, EG.ELC.PETR.ZS, EG.ELC.NGAS.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 27DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Energy use, kg of oil equivalent per capita, electric power consumption, kWh per capita, and net energy imports, % of energy use (EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE, EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC, EG.IMP.CONS.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 23DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Oil rents and total natural resources rents, % of GDP (NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS, NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 35Al Jazeera (ed.), Shutdown of Hormuz Strait raises fears of soaring oil prices (report, 3 March 2026; about one fifth of oil and LNG; Revolutionary Guard commander declared the strait closed; about 150 ships stranded). Al Jazeera Media Network, Doha. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 36Oman Observer (ed.), How the war is choking off the world’s oil and gas (report, 5 March 2026, citing a New York Times analysis of Kpler data; fire at the Fujairah energy hub from falling drone debris; Qatar halted LNG output). Oman Observer, Muscat. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 34POST-CLOSE, context only: International Monetary Fund (ed.), Managing Director’s remarks at the meeting of the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 1 October 2026 (GCC economy expected to contract in 2026; near closure of Hormuz sharply curtailed oil and gas exports; damage to energy facilities reduced production capacity). IMF, Washington DC. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 8DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Renewable electricity output, % of total (EG.ELC.RNEW.ZS), and renewable energy consumption, % of final energy (EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 9Zawya Projects (ed.), Saudi Arabia renewables capacity jumps 87% to 12.3GW in 2025 (press report on IRENA capacity statistics; 12,332 MW). Zawya, Dubai. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  22. 10Zawya Projects (ed.), Saudi leads GCC renewables growth as Oman, Qatar post fastest gains in 2025 (press report on IRENA data; United Arab Emirates addition of 1,054 MW read from the subheading, the rest of the page was behind a sign-up wall). Zawya, Dubai. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 1: MENA’s risk is carried by power, water and one export route. In MENA Regional Systems Risk and Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition, The State of MENA’s Interdependent Systems. (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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Sector signature

The sectors behind MENA.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

Select corners · hover lines6 / 15 relations

Signature

Water and its partners

Water gives irrigation to food (0.8), cooling water and hydropower to energy (0.6) and environmental flows to biodiversity (0.6).

W · E · I · F · H · B

Sectors
4 of 6
Relations
6 of 15
Coupling
0.43 share of total

Strongest relations in play

  • Food → Biodiversity · land conversion0.6
  • Water → Energy · cooling water and hydropower0.6
  • Water → Food · irrigation0.8
  • Water → Biodiversity · environmental flows0.6
Teaching values for a typical city-region, not measurements for any place. Coupling is the summed strength of the relations in play, as a share of all fifteen.
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