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Key findings

Twelve findings carry the baseline. They are grouped by system, never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

7 min read1 figure0 tables21 notesNR-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1MENA’s risk is carried by power, water and one export route
  4. 2Key findings
    1. 2.1 Headline finding
    2. 2.2 Climate forcing
    3. 2.3 Health
    4. 2.4 Energy
    5. 2.5 Water
    6. 2.6 Finance
    7. 2.7 Food
    8. 2.8 Systemic
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Hot season with peak desalination load and a disrupted export route
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

2.1Headline finding

Not boundEQL 1NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-FIN-006

The 2026 change in real GDP in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is not bound at the close. The Strait of Hormuz was declared closed in March 2026, and fuel made up 78.7% of Saudi merchandise exports in 2025 and 68.2% of Emirati exports in 2023.

Figure 2.1Fuel share of merchandise exports (%)
ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
Saudi Arabia, 202578.7
United Arab Emirates, 202368.2

Source: World Bank series22. The two values are for different years.

Implication

The shock moved through trade first. A route loss reaches public budgets and the power and water systems that those budgets support22. The strait was declared closed in March 2026 and about 150 ships were stranded35. No release dated on or before 30 September 2026 that gives the effect on output was opened. IMF and World Bank releases of October 2026 are held as post-close, context only2934.

What would move it

Shipping volumes through the strait, damage assessments for energy and water assets, and a release that gives the 2026 change in output would each move this finding. Damage to assets is not bound.

2.2Climate forcing

  1. ReportedEQL 5NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-CLI-001

    Greenhouse gas emissions excluding land use were 838.9 Mt CO₂e in Saudi Arabia and 264.1 Mt in the United Arab Emirates in 2024, or 18.5 and 18.3 tonnes of CO₂ per person.56

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-CLI-009

    Asia was 1.04 °C above the 1991 to 2020 average in 2024, and the United Arab Emirates recorded 259.5 mm of rain in 24 hours, one of its most extreme events since records began in 1949.20

2.3Health

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-HLT-002

    Saudi Arabia had 35.3 million residents in 2024 and the United Arab Emirates 11.3 million; both populations grew by about 4.6% in 2025 on the World Bank series.1234

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-HLT-008

    The Saudi health minister reported 1,301 deaths during the 2024 Hajj, of which 83% were unauthorised pilgrims; a cause breakdown was not given.19

  3. ReportedEQL 4NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-HLT-010

    Mean annual exposure to fine particles (PM2.5) was 73.5 micrograms per cubic metre in Saudi Arabia and 57.2 in the United Arab Emirates in 2023.21

2.4Energy

  1. ReportedEQL 5NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-ENE-003

    Fossil fuels produced 98.5% of Saudi electricity (oil 40.8%, gas 57.7%) and 70.1% of Emirati electricity (gas 69.6%) in 2024.7

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-ENE-004

    Saudi renewable capacity reached 12,332 MW in 2025, up about 87% on 2024, and the United Arab Emirates added 1,054 MW.910

2.5Water

  1. ReportedEQL 5NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-WAT-005

    Renewable internal freshwater was 74.6 m³ per person in Saudi Arabia and 14.9 m³ in the United Arab Emirates in 2022, and annual withdrawals were 974% and 1,510% of internal resources.1112

2.6Finance

  1. Not boundEQL 1NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-FIN-006

    The 2026 change in real GDP in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is not bound at the close. The Strait of Hormuz was declared closed in March 2026, and fuel made up 78.7% of Saudi merchandise exports in 2025 and 68.2% of Emirati exports in 2023.2235

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-FIN-011

    Fuel made up 78.7% of Saudi merchandise exports in 2025 and 68.2% of Emirati exports in 2023; Saudi general government balance is projected at −6.5% of GDP in 2026.2231

2.7Food

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-FOO-007

    Food was 12.3% of Saudi merchandise imports in 2025 and 5.0% of Emirati imports in 2023; arable land covers 2.0% and 0.8% of land area.1617

2.8Systemic

  1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

    The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a hot season in which peak power demand, desalination load and a disrupted export route coincide. §9.3

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 22DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Fuel exports, % of merchandise exports (TX.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN), and exports of goods and services, % of GDP (NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS), Saudi Arabia (2025) and United Arab Emirates (2023), World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 35Al Jazeera (ed.), Shutdown of Hormuz Strait raises fears of soaring oil prices (report, 3 March 2026; about one fifth of oil and LNG; Revolutionary Guard commander declared the strait closed; about 150 ships stranded). Al Jazeera Media Network, Doha. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 29DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: International Monetary Fund (ed.), Real GDP growth, annual percent change (NGDP_RPCH), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Economic Outlook database, October 2026, DataMapper interface. IMF, Washington DC. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 34POST-CLOSE, context only: International Monetary Fund (ed.), Managing Director’s remarks at the meeting of the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 1 October 2026 (GCC economy expected to contract in 2026; near closure of Hormuz sharply curtailed oil and gas exports; damage to energy facilities reduced production capacity). IMF, Washington DC. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 5DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Total greenhouse gas emissions excluding LULUCF, Mt CO2e (EN.GHG.ALL.MT.CE.AR5), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 6DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Carbon dioxide emissions excluding LULUCF, total and per capita (EN.GHG.CO2.MT.CE.AR5 and EN.GHG.CO2.PC.CE.AR5), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 20World Meteorological Organization (ed.), Rising temperatures and extreme weather hit Asia hard (press release on the State of the Climate in Asia 2024, 23 June 2025; 1.04 °C above 1991 to 2020; 259.5 mm in 24 hours in the United Arab Emirates). WMO, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 1DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 2Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Programme (ed.), Saudi Arabia: Population by nationality (Saudi, non-Saudi), sex and age group, 2024 (table compiled from General Authority for Statistics data; total 35,300,280). GLMM, Gulf Research Center. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 3Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Programme (ed.), UAE: Total population residing in the UAE, by sex, 2000 to 2024 (table compiled from Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Centre data; total 11,294,243). GLMM, Gulf Research Center. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 4DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Population growth, annual % (SP.POP.GROW), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 19Gulf News (ed.), Hajj 2024: Saudi Arabia says 1,301 deaths, mostly unregistered pilgrims (report of the Saudi Minister of Health announcement and the Saudi Press Agency, 23 June 2024; 83% unauthorised; no cause breakdown on the page). Gulf News, Dubai. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 21DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), PM2.5 air pollution, mean annual exposure, micrograms per cubic metre (EN.ATM.PM25.MC.M3), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 7DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Electricity production from oil, gas and coal sources, oil sources and natural gas sources, % of total (EG.ELC.FOSL.ZS, EG.ELC.PETR.ZS, EG.ELC.NGAS.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 9Zawya Projects (ed.), Saudi Arabia renewables capacity jumps 87% to 12.3GW in 2025 (press report on IRENA capacity statistics; 12,332 MW). Zawya, Dubai. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 10Zawya Projects (ed.), Saudi leads GCC renewables growth as Oman, Qatar post fastest gains in 2025 (press report on IRENA data; United Arab Emirates addition of 1,054 MW read from the subheading, the rest of the page was behind a sign-up wall). Zawya, Dubai. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 11DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita, cubic metres (ER.H2O.INTR.PC), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 12DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Annual freshwater withdrawals, total, % of internal resources (ER.H2O.FWTL.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 31DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: International Monetary Fund (ed.), General government net lending and borrowing, and gross debt, % of GDP (GGXCNL_NGDP, GGXWDG_NGDP), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Economic Outlook database, October 2026, DataMapper interface. IMF, Washington DC. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 16DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Food imports, % of merchandise imports (TM.VAL.FOOD.ZS.UN), Saudi Arabia (2025) and United Arab Emirates (2023), World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 17DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), Arable land, % of land area (AG.LND.ARBL.ZS), and agriculture, forestry and fishing value added, % of GDP (NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS), Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, World Development Indicators database, last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 2: Key findings. In MENA Regional Systems Risk and Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition, The State of MENA’s Interdependent Systems. (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-REGIONAL-MEN-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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