- Saudi Arabia 2026
- Chapter 1
Saudi Arabia’s risk is heat, water and supply at once
Part I describes systems and their couplings. It assesses no authority and ranks no region.
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Saudi Arabia’s risk is heat, water and supply at once
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Summer heat peak with a mass gathering
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
1.1The questions this part answers
Key questions
- Where is Saudi Arabia’s risk concentrated, and in which systems?
- Which couplings carry shocks from one system to the next?
- Which capabilities hold under compound stress, and which are only documented?
- What must the 2027 programme measure first?
In this part
- Narrative
- Headline finding
- Lead figure
- Five system chapters
- Twelve-domain reading
- Sector screens
- Dependency matrix
- Risk objects
- Capability ladder
- Scenario
- Three lenses
- Portfolio
1.2The argument
Saudi Arabia is a hot desert country with very little rain, a young and growing population, and an economy that still rests on hydrocarbon exports. This baseline reads its exposure as four forces acting together: extreme heat, scarce water, a power system that runs on gas and oil, and a dependence on imported food and on oil revenue26.
The climate layer is rising. Temperatures rose by about 0.6 °C a decade between 1978 and 2019, and the rise has speeded up in recent decades17. Regional climate studies project that heat and humidity around the Gulf could approach the limit of human adaptability late in the century under high emissions1819. Rain is rare but violent: Jeddah recorded 179 mm in one day in November 202210. The National Center for Meteorology described 2025 as within normal ranges, without a published annual anomaly9.
Water is the binding constraint. Non-renewable groundwater was 62% of the natural supply in 2023 and agriculture was the largest user13. Satellite gravity data show groundwater storage falling by about 13 km³ a year between 2006 and 201615. Desalination supplies the cities: the national submission puts it at around 70% of potable water, while the GASTAT accounts give 50% of distributed water, and the two measures differ213.
The energy layer links water, heat and emissions. Gas and oil gave 98% of electricity in 2024 and solar and wind 2%38. Renewable capacity connected to the grid reached 12.3 GW by the end of 2025, with 57.5 GW tendered27. Power also runs desalination, so a summer peak is a water question as well as an energy question.
Beneath these sits dependence on imports and on oil. FAO forecast 15 million tonnes of cereal imports for 2026/275, and oil and oil products were 69% of main products and exports6. Heat reaches people directly during the Hajj: 1,301 deaths were reported in 2024, most of them unauthorised pilgrims11.
Gas generation grew from 224 TWh in 2019 to 288 TWh in 2024, a rise of about 29%. Connected renewable capacity reached 12.3 GW by the end of 2025, so the 2025 mix is likely to differ and is not bound237.
| Item | Bar, scaled to the largest value | Value |
|---|---|---|
| Gas | 63 | |
| Oil | 35 | |
| Solar and wind | 2 |
Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2024.
Figure ID FIG-COUNTRY-SAU-2026-BASELINE-01-003
1.3Twenty couplings between five systems
The Saudi Arabia matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the starting graph that the Q1 2027 Foundry cut will test.
Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.
- Strong
- Moderate
- Weak
Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.
| From, to | WAT | ENE | FOO | HLT | BIO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WAT Water | · | STRONG nuclear cooling · hydro | STRONG irrigation · rain-fed yield | MODERATE drinking water | STRONG flows · wetlands |
| ENE Energy | MODERATE pumping · treatment | · | STRONG fuel · fertiliser · cold chain | STRONG facility power · cooling | MODERATE reservoirs · land use |
| FOO Food | MODERATE withdrawals · nutrients | WEAK biofuel feedstock | · | STRONG nutrition · food safety | STRONG land conversion |
| HLT Health | WEAK workforce | WEAK workforce | MODERATE labour · disease | · | WEAK residues |
| BIO Biodiversity | STRONG regulation · filtration | MODERATE fire on lines · biomass | STRONG pollination · soils | MODERATE zoonoses · smoke | · |
| Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A. | |||||
Transmission paths
- 01
CLI → ENE → WAT
A heat peak raises power demand, and desalination needs the power.
Inferred summer peak; not bound for 2025
- 02
CLI → HLT
Heat loads health services and mass gatherings.
Reported Hajj 202411
- 03
CLI → INF
A single rain event closes roads and schools in a city.
Reported Jeddah 202210
- 04
WAT → FOO
Fossil groundwater supports irrigated farming.
Reported accounts 202313
- 05
TRD → FIN
Oil export revenue carries the national budget.
Reported IMF 20266
1.4Reinforcing loops
A shock entering either system of a loop can return amplified through the other.
| Loop | First direction | Second direction |
|---|---|---|
| WAT and BIO | Water to biodiversity: flows · wetlands | Biodiversity to water: regulation · filtration |
| FOO and BIO | Food to biodiversity: land conversion | Biodiversity to food: pollination · soils |
| A causal-loop reading of the matrix (Sterman, Business Dynamics, 2000): structural, from estimated strengths, not a measured feedback. | ||
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 2Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (ed.), Second Nationally Determined Contribution. Submission to the UNFCCC, Riyadh, 31 December 2025. Observation year 2025.back
- 6International Monetary Fund (ed.), “IMF Executive Board Concludes 2026 Article IV Consultation with Saudi Arabia,” press release 26/267. IMF, Washington DC, 29 July 2026. Observation year 2025–2026.back
- 17M. Almazroui, “Changes in temperature trends and extremes over Saudi Arabia for the period 1978–2019,” Advances in Meteorology, article 8828421, 2020. Observation years 1978–2019.back
- 18J. S. Pal and E. A. B. Eltahir, “Future temperature in southwest Asia projected to exceed a threshold for human adaptability,” Nature Climate Change, vol. 6, pp. 197–200, 2016. Observation year projection.back
- 19J. Lelieveld, Y. Proestos, P. Hadjinicolaou et al., “Strongly increasing heat extremes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the 21st century,” Climatic Change, vol. 137, pp. 245–260, 2016. Observation year projection.back
- 10National Center for Meteorology (ed.), rainfall record for Jeddah, 24 November 2022, reported in “Jeddah receives 179mm of rainfall, higher figure than 2009 peak,” Arab News, Riyadh, November 2022. Observation year 2022.back
- 9National Center for Meteorology (ed.), statement that the 2025 climate was moderate, reported in “NCM: Saudi Arabia experienced a moderate climate in 2025,” Riyadh Daily, 30 November 2025. Observation year 2025.back
- 13General Authority for Statistics (ed.), Water Accounts 2023, reported in “Per capita water consumption falls by 10% to 102 litres a day,” Arab News, Riyadh, 5 January 2025. Observation year 2023.back
- 15A. Mohamed, K. Abdelrahman and A. Abdelrady, “Application of time-variable gravity to groundwater storage fluctuations in Saudi Arabia,” Frontiers in Earth Science, vol. 10, article 873352, 2022. Observation years 2002–2016.back
- 3Center for Global Sustainability, University of Maryland (ed.), 2035 NDC Assessment: Saudi Arabia. UMD CGS, College Park, 2026, quoting the Biennial Transparency Report of Saudi Arabia (2024) and electricity data. Observation year 2021 for emissions, 2024 for electricity.back
- 8Ember (ed.), Saudi Arabia: electricity data page, updated 22 April 2026. Ember, London, 2026. Observation year 2024.back
- 7International Renewable Energy Agency (ed.), Renewable Capacity Statistics 2026. IRENA, Abu Dhabi, March 2026, read through a Zawya report of the Saudi Arabia figure. Observation year 2025.back
- 5Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (ed.), GIEWS Country Brief: Saudi Arabia, reference date 7 July 2026. FAO, Rome, 2026. Observation year 2026.back
- 11Ministry of Health of Saudi Arabia (ed.), statement of the Health Minister on deaths during the 2024 Hajj, reported by The National, Abu Dhabi, 24 June 2024. Observation year 2024.back
