Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

The 2027 agenda

Eight bounded questions open the 2027 lifeline systems agenda. Each comes from a baseline finding, names the initiative that will carry it and the first output due in the 2027 lifeline systems edition.

5 min read0 figures6 tables3 notesNR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Lifelines fail together
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
    1. 7.1 Questions for the operational series
    2. 7.2 Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment
    3. 7.3 The pathway
    4. 7.4 Universe 2027: evidence pack for the lifeline systems candidate mission
    5. 7.5 Handoffs and routing
    6. 7.6 Feeds and signal register
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

7.1Questions for the operational series

  1. L-01

    How would a regional power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure spread through water, health and transport at the same time?

    INI-SR02-PWR-01 · power and telecom compound loss; first output: dependency analysis for six regions.

  2. L-02

    Which shared dependencies (power, telecoms, software, positioning) sit behind the most services?

    INI-SR02-DEP-02 · shared dependencies; first output: dependency register.

  3. L-03

    How long do lifeline services take to return after major outages, and what limits recovery?

    INI-SR02-RST-03 · restoration times; first output: restoration table.

  4. L-04

    Where are subsea links and repair capacity thinnest?

    INI-SR02-CBL-04 · subsea links; first output: link and repair map.

  5. L-05

    How do ageing assets and investment gaps coincide with hazard exposure?

    INI-SR02-AST-05 · asset condition and exposure; first output: exposure overlay.

  6. L-06

    Which operators and states publish incident data on a comparable basis?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: coverage note.

  7. L-07

    How do conflict and sabotage threats change protection priorities for water and power?

    To be admitted in 2027; first output: scoping note.

  8. L-08

    Which lifeline capabilities have been tested in real outages, and which are only planned?

    Lifeline capability register; first output: rung evidence for 15 functions.

7.2Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment

Five initiatives and one Universe mission candidate are proposed for the 2027 lifeline portfolio. They are programme objects: no partner, funder or member is attached to them in this edition.

Table 7.1Objects proposed for the first operational quarter
IDObjectKindQuestionState
INI-SR02-PWR-01Power and telecom compound lossInitiativeL-01PROPOSED
INI-SR02-DEP-02Shared dependenciesInitiativeL-02PROPOSED
INI-SR02-RST-03Restoration timesInitiativeL-03PROPOSED
INI-SR02-CBL-04Subsea links and repair capacityInitiativeL-04PROPOSED
INI-SR02-AST-05Asset condition and exposureInitiativeL-05PROPOSED
MSN-SR02-2027-01Power and telecom loss Universe missionMissionL-01Candidate

7.3The pathway

The lifeline systems edition reads national infrastructure chapters, sector editions and the global edition through one governed evidence graph. At baseline the federation is designed and its first editions are drafted. This page states what exists today and what comes next.

  1. 01

    National infrastructure chapters

    lifeline reading in each national edition

    IN PREPARATION · national baselines

  2. 02

    Sector editions

    power, water, cyber, transport

    PLANNED · sector Baseline Editions

  3. 03

    Lifeline systems model

    the global lifeline system of systems

    v0 SPECIFIED · v1 with federation evidence

  4. 04

    Strategic links

    SR-01 · SR-03 supply chains · SR-10 digital public infrastructure

    PLANNED · strategic baselines

  5. 05

    Universe

    annual proving environment

    CANDIDATE MISSION · mandate in 2027

  6. 06

    Lifeline Systems Report

    this series

    BASELINE DRAFT · 2027 annual edition

  7. 07

    Evidence and correction

    one graph, many projections

    OPEN · first correction cycle in 2027

7.4Universe 2027: evidence pack for the lifeline systems candidate mission

  1. 01

    Mandate

  2. 02

    Core Build · 1 month

  3. 03

    Action · 1 week

  4. 04

    Evidence seal

  5. 05

    Portfolio correction

  6. 06

    Next mandate

Table 7.2Universe 2027: evidence pack for the lifeline systems candidate mission
ItemRecordStateTiming
F1Annual mandate recordPLANNEDafter the Q2 2027 alignment
F2Core Build recordPLANNEDone month before the exercise
F3Exercise evidencePLANNEDduring the Action week
F4Decision packetsPLANNEDexercise state only
F5Proof receiptsPLANNEDscoped to each recorded check
F6After-action reportPLANNEDwithin one quarter
F7Upgrade docketPLANNEDrouted to the Portfolio
F8Portfolio renewalPLANNED2027 lifeline systems annual edition
F9Public synthesisPLANNEDpublic-safe extracts only

Mission

ID
MSN-SR02-2027-01 · Power and telecom loss Universe mission
Role spine
Leadership sponsor · Institutional anchor · Mission lead: drawn from national pathways
Receiving actors
to be identified with the mandate

7.5Handoffs and routing

Where the baseline’s findings go next. A handoff routes a finding for awareness, review or work; it transfers no authority.

Table 7.3Handoffs and routing
FindingRouted toPurposeClass
INF-001 · grid failureregional consortiagrid constraint overlayPUBLIC
CYB-002 · pre-positioningINI-SR02-DEP-02shared dependenciesPUBLIC
DAT-004 · software failureINI-SR02-DEP-02shared dependenciesPUBLIC
INF-005 · asset conditionINI-SR02-AST-05asset condition and exposurePUBLIC
INF-006 · subsea linksINI-SR02-CBL-04subsea links and repair capacityPUBLIC
DEV-008 · disruption costINI-SR02-RST-03 · key F reviewrestoration timesPUBLIC
CON-009 · war damagesector editionsrecovery needsPUBLIC
SYS-012 · compound pathwayMSN-SR02-2027-01Universe candidateCONSORTIUM
Table 7.4Routing rules by publication class
ClassWhere it goesWho can see it
PUBLICthe published edition and its evidence bundleanyone
CONSORTIUMgoverned rooms of the federationconsortium members under agreement
CONTROLLEDneed-to-know channelsnamed competent actors only

7.6Feeds and signal register

Table 7.5Feeds watched from 2027
FeedProducerLatencyFeeds into
Incident and advisory feedsCISA and partner agenciesper eventCYB-002
EU threat landscapeENISAannualCYB-003
Transparency platform for the continental gridENTSO-EhourlyINF-001
Cable fault and repair dataTeleGeography and industryper eventINF-006
Disaster loss dataUNDRR and reinsurersannualCLI-007
Outage analysisUptime InstituteannualDAT-004
Damage assessmentsWorld Bank, UN and EUannualCON-009

Escalation routes

  • none · keep monitoring
  • research question
  • project
  • risk object
  • annual publication
  • signal report
Table 7.6Signals at baseline
IDSignalCorroborationSystemsRoute
SIG-SR02-001Single-vendor software outage in 20244CORROBORATEDDAT · INFrisk object RSK-SR02-DAT-003
SIG-SR02-002Multi-year pre-positioning reported in four sectors2CORROBORATEDINF · DATresearch question L-02
SIG-SR02-003Strikes on co-located power and water plants in 202613PARTIALENE · WATresearch question L-01

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 13UNVERIFIED, not opened: press and think-tank reports on strikes on power and desalination plants in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, March to July 2026 (including The National, Arab News and the Arab Center Washington DC), taken from search-result summaries; no official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 7: The 2027 agenda. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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Sector signature

The sectors behind Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

Select corners · hover lines6 / 15 relations

Context

Infrastructure and its partners

Infrastructure gives pipes, dams and treatment works to water (0.6), transmission and fuel logistics to energy (0.6) and access to care to health (0.5).

W · E · I · F · H · B

Sectors
4 of 6
Relations
6 of 15
Coupling
0.46 share of total

Strongest relations in play

  • Energy → Infrastructure · power for transport and telecoms0.8
  • Water → Energy · cooling water and hydropower0.6
  • Infrastructure → Water · pipes, dams and treatment works0.6
  • Water → Health · drinking water and sanitation0.7
Teaching values for a typical city-region, not measurements for any place. Coupling is the summed strength of the relations in play, as a share of all fifteen.
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