Data appendix
The indicator set with its sources, the source registers, the licences of every kind of material and the formats of the edition.
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Lifelines fail together
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
B.1The indicator set
| Indicator | Value | Unit | Year | State | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subsea cable faults, average | 199 | a year | 2010 to 2023 | Reported | 7 |
| Faults from external aggression | ≈ two thirds | share | 2010 to 2023 | Reported | 7 |
| ENISA incidents analysed | 4,875 | incidents | Jul 2024 to Jun 2025 | Reported | 3 |
| Windows devices affected | 8.5 | million | 2024 | Reported | 4 |
| Longest reported intrusion persistence | ≥ 5 | years | 2024 | Reported | 2 |
| US overall infrastructure grade | C | letter grade | 2025 | Reported | 6 |
| US ten-year investment gap | 3.6 | USD trillion | 2025 | Reported | 6 |
| Annual loss to infrastructure, three hazards | >250 | USD billion | 2025 | Reported | 10 |
| Annual disruption cost, LMICs | ≥ 390 | USD billion | 2019 | Reported | 11 |
| Return on resilient options | ≈ 4 | USD per USD 1 | 2019 | Estimated | 11 |
| Ukraine recovery needs, ten years | 587.7 | USD billion | to Dec 2025 | Reported | 12 |
| Ukraine energy needs, ten years | ≈ 91 | USD billion | to Dec 2025 | Reported | 12 |
| Direct damage, energy and extractives | 24.8 | USD billion | to Dec 2025 | Reported | 12 |
| Share of US electricity growth from data centres | ≈ 50 | % | 2025 | Reported | 9 |
| Operators reporting outage cost above USD 100,000 | 57 | % | 2025 | Reported | 14 |
B.2Global source register
The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.
Domains bound by the register
- INF
- ENE
- DAT
- CLI
- FIN
- WAT
- HLT
- AIC
- MIN
- TRD
| Source | Category | Coverage | Period | Cadence | Role |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENTSO-E final report1 | operators’ association | Continental Europe | 2025 | one-off | grid failure |
| CISA advisory AA24-038A2 | national agencies | US and partners | 2024 | per event | cyber access |
| ENISA Threat Landscape3 | EU agency | EU | 2024 to 2025 | annual | incidents |
| Microsoft statement4 | vendor | global | 2024 | one-off | software failure |
| NIST CSF 2.05 | national standards body | global use | 2024 | periodic | cyber framework |
| ASCE Report Card6 | professional body | US | 2025 | four-yearly | asset condition |
| TeleGeography7 | market analyst | global | 2010 to 2023 | ad hoc | cable faults |
| UNDRR GAR 202510 | UN agency | global | 2025 | biennial | hazard losses |
| World Bank Lifelines11 | multilateral bank | LMICs | 2019 | one-off | disruption cost |
| RDNA512 | multilateral | Ukraine | 2025 | annual | damage and needs |
B.3Regional reading, ten regional clusters
Map plates follow with the regional Baseline Editions, when boundary sources and public-safe resolutions are bound. This page gives the regional reading in table form and ranks no region.
| Region | Principal hazards | Systems most exposed | Baseline evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| North America | ageing assets; hurricanes; data-centre load | power, water, telecoms | ASCE report card6; IEA9 |
| South America | hydropower dependence; floods | power, transport | regional statistics (not bound) |
| Europe | grid stability; cable incidents; cyber | power, telecoms | ENTSO-E1; ENISA3 |
| Eurasia | conflict damage; grid attacks | power, heat | RDNA512 |
| Middle East and North Africa | strikes on co-located plants; desalination reliance | water, power | press reports13 |
| Africa | maintenance and financing gaps | power, transport | Lifelines11 |
| South Asia | cyclones and floods | power, ports | GAR 202510 |
| East Asia | earthquake and typhoon exposure; cables | power, telecoms | GAR 202510; cable analysis7 |
| ASEAN | cyclones; subsea links | telecoms, ports | cable analysis7 |
| Oceania-Pacific | island links; cyclones | telecoms, power | cable analysis7 |
B.4Regional card: Continental Europe grid
- region
- grid
- synchronous area
- cross-border
- Systems in view
- power, telecoms, water, hospitals
- Defining events
- blackout in Spain and Portugal on 28 April 20251
- Couplings
- ENE → INF → HLT; ENE → WAT
- Capability evidence
- restoration and a published expert report1
- Gaps
- cross-border flows; data on pre-event generation tripping
- Agenda items
- L-01 · L-03
The final report names oscillations, voltage and reactive power control gaps and generator disconnections as interacting factors [1].
POWER
Interacting factors
Service returned after the event; the time to restore each lifeline is not consolidated here.
RECOVERY
Restoration
The expert panel report is an analysis of causes and recommendations, not an attribution of liability [1].
LEARNING
A public report
B.5How countries appear in the global edition
Countries enter the lifeline systems edition through the infrastructure chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never placed in a league table.
| Card field | What it shows | Source |
|---|---|---|
| WEFH+B state | each core system against peer distribution bands | national edition |
| Couplings | the national dependency matrix | national edition |
| Risk objects | the national risk portfolio | national edition |
| Capability rungs | the national capability ladder | national edition |
| Evidence age | oldest and newest source dates | national source register |
Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme
26national
countries and unions
10regional
clusters
16global
flagship and sector
14strategic
systems reports
20frontier
technology reports
How to read a country card
- Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
- Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
- Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
- Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such
| Wave | Countries and unions | State |
|---|---|---|
| W0 | Canada | ISSUED |
| W1 | United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, European Union, Switzerland | PLANNED |
| W2 | Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Türkiye, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, African Union, India, China, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia | PLANNED |
B.6Licences
| Material | Licence |
|---|---|
| Text | CC BY 4.0 |
| Data | on the licence of each source; Nexus tables CC BY 4.0 |
| Figures | Nexus figures CC BY 4.0; third-party as credited |
| Maps | boundary source and licence printed on each plate |
| Metadata | CC0 1.0, as Zenodo publishes it |
| Third-party data, figures and text | The source’s own licence, credited where it is used; never relicensed |
| Nexus-authored text, tables and figures: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0). Map plates print their boundary source and licence. | |
B.7Formats and provenance
| Format | Kind | State | What it is | Identifier |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Web edition | HTML | On this site | Draft in stewardship review; every value resolves to its source. | NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 |
| Print edition | At release | A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF, signed with the web edition at release. | NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0 | |
| Indicator data | CSV · JSON | On this site | 15 indicators with unit, year, status and source; the machine-readable copy ships with the evidence bundle at release. | NR-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE data release v1 |
| Figures | SVG · PNG | On this site | 4 on the web edition: headline figure, figure 1.3, coupling instrument, capability ladder. | FIG-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-* |
| Slides | Not recorded | No slide deck is recorded for this edition. | ||
| Evidence brief | HTML · PDF | Not recorded | No evidence brief is recorded for this edition. | |
| Dataset with DOI | DataCite | At release | Concept and version DOI are minted at deposit; none is recorded yet. |
Provenance
- Edition pack
- The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built
- Evidence cut
- DC-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026
- Reproducibility
- sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters
- Self-check
- 14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release
- Review
- five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)
- Publisher of record
- The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) for the Nexus Consortium
- Corrections
- Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 4Microsoft (ed.), Helping our customers through the CrowdStrike outage (blog post of 20 July 2024; estimate of 8.5 million Windows devices). Microsoft, Redmond. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10UNVERIFIED, not opened: UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays (annual average loss to critical infrastructure above USD 250 billion for floods, tropical cyclones and earthquakes; about USD 2.3 trillion total annual disaster cost), taken from search-result summaries; the report page returned an access error. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 11UNVERIFIED, not opened: Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (disruptions cost at least USD 390 billion a year in low- and middle-income countries; USD 4.2 trillion net benefit; about USD 4 per USD 1), taken from search-result summaries; the repository returned an access error. World Bank and GFDRR, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 12UNVERIFIED, not opened: World Bank, United Nations and European Commission (eds.), Ukraine Fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA5), released 23 February 2026 (needs USD 587.7 billion over ten years; energy about USD 91 billion; direct damage to energy and extractives USD 24.8 billion to end 2025), taken from search-result summaries. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 9IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 14UNVERIFIED, not opened: Uptime Institute (ed.), Annual Outage Analysis 2026 (57% of respondents in the 2025 survey reported a latest major outage above USD 100,000), taken from a press release summary; the report is limited to members. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 5NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, 26 February 2024. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 13UNVERIFIED, not opened: press and think-tank reports on strikes on power and desalination plants in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, March to July 2026 (including The National, Arab News and the Arab Center Washington DC), taken from search-result summaries; no official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back