Methodology
How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Lifelines fail together
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Power loss that overlaps a telecom or cloud failure
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
A.1Methods
The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.
| No. | Derivation | Calculation | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1) | Factors named in the Iberian blackout page summary | count of listed factors | 5, unweighted |
| (2) | ENISA incidents per month in the period | 4,875 ÷ 12 | ≈ 406 |
| (3) | Subsea faults per week at the average | 199 ÷ 52 | ≈ 3.8 |
| (4) | Faults a year from external aggression (about) | 199 × 2 ÷ 3 | ≈ 133 |
| Strength | Definition |
|---|---|
| STRONG | a disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region |
| MODERATE | an effect is documented but buffered or slower |
| WEAK | an effect is plausible but not documented at global scale |
| Label | Rule |
|---|---|
| Reported | value as issued by its source, with year |
| Inferred | reasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement |
| Estimated | Nexus analytical value with stated method |
| Scenario | conditional on stated assumptions |
| Expert input | structured editorial judgement awaiting evidence |
A.2Model card, Lifeline Systems Model v0
- Model ID
- MDL-SR02-LIFELINES · v0.1
- Purpose
- represent lifeline systems as a dependent network and the mechanisms by which failures spread between power, water, communications, transport and health
- Family
- graph-based system of systems
- Inputs
- the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
- Method
- expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
- Validation
- none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
- Uncertainty
- qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
- Domain of validity
- global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
- Reproducibility
- strength table and sources published in this edition
20couplings
typed in v0
5strong
documented within one season
3moderate
documented, buffered
12weak
plausible, undocumented
A.3The baseline evidence cut
Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.
- Cut ID
- DC-STRATEGIC-LIFELINES-GLOBAL-2026-B0
- Type
- baseline documentary cut
- Resolution policy
- pinned · as of 30 September 2026
- Sources pinned
- 40 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
- Model runs
- none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
- Digest
- computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
- Supersedes
- nothing, first cut of the series
- Superseded by
- the 2027 lifeline systems annual cut
Lineage
- 01
source edition
- 02
pinned citation
- 03
finding
- 04
page
- 05
publication record
| Element | Baseline 2026 | 2027 global annual |
|---|---|---|
| Sources | cited global publications, pinned by edition | national, regional and sector cuts through one graph |
| Analysis | stated methods and editorial estimates | typed analysis specifications |
| Models | Lifeline Systems Model v0 specification | model runs with receipts |
| Findings | twelve baseline findings | findings re-bound to federation evidence |
| Review | five passes scheduled | five passes on the exact digest |
A.4Evidence age and coverage
A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.
| Indicator | Observed | Released | Cadence | Next release |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grid failure analysis | 2025 | Mar 2026 | one-off | follow-up reports |
| Cyber advisories | 2024 | Feb 2024 | per event | next joint advisory |
| EU incident counts | Jul 2024 to Jun 2025 | Oct 2025 · v1.3 Sep 2026 | annual | next ENISA report |
| Software outage | 2024 | Jul 2024 | one-off | none scheduled |
| US asset condition | 2025 | Mar 2025 | four-yearly | 2029 |
| Cable fault average | 2010 to 2023 | 2024 | ad hoc | next analysis |
| Hazard losses to infrastructure | 2025 | May 2025 | biennial | 2027 |
| Disruption cost in LMICs | 2019 | 2019 | one-off | no update found |
| Reconstruction needs | to Dec 2025 | Feb 2026 | annual | RDNA6 |
| Gulf strikes | 2026 | Mar to Jul 2026 | per event | not verified |
| System | Coverage | Thinnest dimension |
|---|---|---|
| Power | GOOD | restoration times |
| Communications | PARTIAL | cross-operator dependency |
| Water | THIN | interdependence with power |
| Transport | THIN | cross-modal dependence |
| Health | THIN | facility-level resilience |
| Cyber | PARTIAL | operator-level data |
| Finance of resilience | PARTIAL | recent estimates |
| Conflict damage | THIN | verified 2026 damage |
| Field | Source that would fill it | Blocker |
|---|---|---|
| Cross-sector dependency data at city and national scale | operators, regulators and national statistics offices | security-sensitive and not published on a common basis |
| Restoration times for lifeline services after major outages | operator and regulator reports | not retrieved; no consolidated series |
| Full text of the ENTSO-E final report and its recommendation count | ENTSO-E final report1 | only the publication page was opened; sources disagree on the number of recommendations |
| ENISA sector breakdown and top threats | ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 full report3 | the publication page was read; the PDF was not opened and the page notes corrected figures in version 1.3 |
| Subsea cable repair capacity by region | TeleGeography and ICPC15 | ship counts not retrieved; the 2040 end-of-life figure rests on a search summary |
| Verified damage to Gulf power and desalination plants | national authorities and independent assessments13 | press and think-tank reports only; no official damage assessment found |
| Share of outages caused by power failure at digital facilities | Uptime Institute Annual Outage Analysis14 | report limited to members and subscribers |
| UNDRR GAR 2025 infrastructure loss figures from the report itself | UNDRR GAR 202510 | the report page returned an access error; figures come from search summaries |
| World Bank Lifelines figures from the report itself | World Bank and GFDRR11 | the repository returned an access error; figures come from search summaries |
| Condition of infrastructure outside the United States on one scale | national report cards and statistics | no comparable global series found |
| Status of EU critical entity identification by Member States | European Commission, national authorities16 | not retrieved |
| Capability rungs beyond restoration | operators, regulators, ministries | not reviewed |
A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources
Issued by the association of European transmission system operators. One-off. Role: binds INF-001. Coverage: Continental Europe. The publication page was read; the full report was not opened.
EVD-SR02-001
ENTSO-E publication page on the Iberian blackout1
Issued by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity. Annual. Role: binds CYB-003. Reporting period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; the page notes corrections in version 1.3.
EVD-SR02-002
ENISA Threat Landscape 20253
| Dimension | EVD-SR02-001 | EVD-SR02-002 |
|---|---|---|
| Completeness | event-specific; some generation data missing | incidents analysed; sector split not read |
| Timeliness | about 11 months after the event | about 3 months after the period |
| Revision | final after interim reports | version 1.3 corrected figures |
| Method transparency | expert panel method published | threat-centric method stated |
| External validation | independent expert panel | agency review |
Evidence cards to follow in 2027
A.6Publication acceptance record
Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.
| Group | Area | Items | Pass | N/A | Pending |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | Identity and scope | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| D2 | Source and data | 12 | 9 | 1 | 2 |
| D3 | Analysis and models | 12 | 3 | 8 | 1 |
| D4 | Findings and claims | 9 | 8 | 0 | 1 |
| D5 | Figures, tables, maps | 10 | 6 | 2 | 2 |
| D6 | Editorial and citations | 10 | 8 | 0 | 2 |
| D7 | Review and approval | 13 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| D8 | Artefact and design | 12 | 7 | 0 | 5 |
| D9 | Registry and release | 9 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
Publication gate
- Conditions met
- 14 of 23 at evidence close
- Blocking problems
- none recorded
- Open conditions
- reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer
Not applicable at baseline
- Model runs
- first runs in Q1 2027
- Maps
- plates in Q2 2027
- Waivers
- none
A.7Status words
| Status | What it means |
|---|---|
| Observed | Measured directly and published by the source. |
| Reported | Published statistics of an official or institutional source. |
| Declared | Stated by the body concerned; not independently measured. |
| Estimated | A Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A. |
| Modelled | Produced by a stated model from cited inputs. |
| Inferred | Reasoned from cited evidence; not measured. |
| Forecast | A projection by the cited source. |
| Simulated | A simulation result under stated assumptions. |
| Scenario | A conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction. |
| Expert input | Expert judgement, recorded with its basis. |
| Candidate | Proposed for a later edition; not yet evidence. |
| Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject. | |
A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected
Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.
| Step | What happens | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 01 Evidence arrives from the pillars | Foundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s. | |
| 02 The cut is sealed | On the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on. | |
| 03 The edition is assembled | The edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide. | |
| 04 The keys turn | At the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward. | |
| 05 The gate opens | A named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit. | |
| 06 Signed and deposited | The PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI. | |
| 07 Published on its desk’s site | Only then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part. | |
| 08 Corrections go to Standards | Method and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut. |
A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).
Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.
A.9Glossary and abbreviations
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Baseline Edition | the inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series |
| WEFH+B | water, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core |
| Coupling | a typed dependency through which one system transmits to another |
| Protection gap | the share of losses not covered by insurance |
| Capability ladder | LISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED |
| EQL | evidence-quality level, 1–5 |
| Evidence cut | a frozen resolution of exact sources and versions |
| NNC · NLC · NWG | National Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups |
| Abbreviation | Expansion |
|---|---|
| ASCE | American Society of Civil Engineers |
| CISA | US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency |
| CSF | Cybersecurity Framework |
| ENISA | European Union Agency for Cybersecurity |
| ENTSO-E | European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity |
| GAR | Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction |
| ICPC | International Cable Protection Committee |
| LMIC | low- and middle-income countries |
| NIS2 | second Network and Information Security Directive |
| OT | operational technology |
| RDNA | Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment |
| UNDRR | United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction |
A.10Technical annex
| Item | Annex | Contents | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| A.1 | Indicator definitions | the global indicator set, with units and sources | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.2 | Coupling strengths | the twenty-cell matrix and its rationale | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.3 | Scenario specification | SCN-SR02-PWR-01 assumptions and signposts | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.4 | Capability placements | rung evidence for fifteen functions | IN THIS EDITION |
| A.5 | Model diagnostics | first runs and validation | 2027 |
| A.6 | Sensitivity analyses | influence of coupling strengths | 2027 |
| A.7 | Regional notes | regional lifeline cards | WITH REGIONAL EDITIONS |
| A.8 | Review statements | pass-by-pass review record | AT RELEASE |
A.1 · indicator definition: subsea cable fault
- Construct
- a reported break or damage event on a telecommunications submarine cable
- Unit
- faults per year
- Method
- industry fault databases and operator reports
- Source
- TeleGeography analysis7
- Uncertainty
- counts depend on the database; public and private series differ
- Known limits
- does not record intent or repair time
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1ENTSO-E (ed.), 28 April 2025 Iberian blackout: final report of the expert panel (publication page; report dated 20 March 2026). ENTSO-E, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 3ENISA (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; published 1 October 2025; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15UNVERIFIED, not opened: TeleGeography (ed.), submarine cable maintenance data (June 2025; about two thirds of repair ships reach end of service life by 2040), taken from search-result summaries. TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 13UNVERIFIED, not opened: press and think-tank reports on strikes on power and desalination plants in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, March to July 2026 (including The National, Arab News and the Arab Center Washington DC), taken from search-result summaries; no official damage assessment was found. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 14UNVERIFIED, not opened: Uptime Institute (ed.), Annual Outage Analysis 2026 (57% of respondents in the 2025 survey reported a latest major outage above USD 100,000), taken from a press release summary; the report is limited to members. Uptime Institute, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10UNVERIFIED, not opened: UNDRR (ed.), Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2025: Resilience Pays (annual average loss to critical infrastructure above USD 250 billion for floods, tropical cyclones and earthquakes; about USD 2.3 trillion total annual disaster cost), taken from search-result summaries; the report page returned an access error. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 11UNVERIFIED, not opened: Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity (disruptions cost at least USD 390 billion a year in low- and middle-income countries; USD 4.2 trillion net benefit; about USD 4 per USD 1), taken from search-result summaries; the repository returned an access error. World Bank and GFDRR, Washington, 2019. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 16UNVERIFIED, not opened: Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities, Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2CISA, NSA, FBI and partner agencies (eds.), PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (Volt Typhoon), joint cybersecurity advisory AA24-038A, 7 February 2024. CISA, Arlington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 6ASCE (ed.), 2025 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure (overall grade C; ten-year investment gap USD 3.6 trillion; sector grades). American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 7TeleGeography (ed.), Is it sabotage? Unraveling the mystery of undersea cable breaks (analysis of 199 faults a year, 2010 to 2023). TeleGeography, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back