High-consequence outbreak that overlaps reduced financing and thin surveillance
A conditional statement under stated assumptions, never a prediction.
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Health threats cross every line
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5High-consequence outbreak that overlaps reduced financing and thin surveillance
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
5.1Assumptions
Scenario SCN-SR08-OUT-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.
- Baseline
- the 2026 reference state in this edition
- Drivers
- a filovirus or novel influenza outbreak begins in a region with thin surveillance, while aid for health stays near its 2025 level
- Analogues
- Bundibugyo virus disease, 2026; mpox, 2024 and 2025475
- Interventions
- none modelled: the specification describes the unmitigated case
- Run state
- narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027
5.2The cascade, step by step
- 1
BIO → HLT
a pathogen passes from an animal host to people; early cases go undetected
2026
- 2
HLT → HLT
transmission spreads across health zones and a city
2026
- 3
HLT → TRD
neighbouring states consider border and trade measures
2026
- 4
FIN → HLT
emergency funding is released in small steps against a larger need
2026
- 5
HLT → HLT
routine immunisation and care are displaced by the response
2025 · 2026
- 6
HLT → FIN
costs accumulate and later outbreaks meet a weaker base
2026
5.3The scenario as a table of steps
How the shock in scenario SCN-SR08-OUT-01 would travel through Health Security, One Health and Biosecurity’s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.
| Step | What happens | Source |
|---|---|---|
| 01 Biodiversity to health | A pathogen passes from an animal host to people; early cases go undetected. Analogue or source: 2026. | Edition SR-08, scenario SCN-SR08-OUT-01, step 1 |
| 02 Health to health | Transmission spreads across health zones and a city. Analogue or source: 2026. | Edition SR-08, scenario SCN-SR08-OUT-01, step 2 |
| 03 Health to trade | Neighbouring states consider border and trade measures. Analogue or source: 2026. | Edition SR-08, scenario SCN-SR08-OUT-01, step 3 |
| 04 Finance to health | Emergency funding is released in small steps against a larger need. Analogue or source: 2026. | Edition SR-08, scenario SCN-SR08-OUT-01, step 4 |
| 05 Health to health | Routine immunisation and care are displaced by the response. Analogue or source: 2025 · 2026. | Edition SR-08, scenario SCN-SR08-OUT-01, step 5 |
| 06 Health to finance | Costs accumulate and later outbreaks meet a weaker base. Analogue or source: 2026. | Edition SR-08, scenario SCN-SR08-OUT-01, step 6 |
A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: Health Security, One Health and Biosecurity 2026, scenario SCN-SR08-OUT-01 (2026); Health Security, One Health and Biosecurity 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 47ECDC (ed.), Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, update of 30 September 2026 (cases up to 27 September 2026: 8,116 confirmed and 3,924 deaths; seven provinces; 63 of 167 health zones; Uganda 20 confirmed cases). European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 5WHO (ed.), Fifth meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the upsurge of mpox 2024, statement published 30 October 2025 (Director-General determination of 5 September 2025). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
