Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Readings from the other desks

The global baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.

14 min read0 figures8 tables32 notesNR-STRATEGIC-HEALTHSECURITY-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Health threats cross every line
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5High-consequence outbreak that overlaps reduced financing and thin surveillance
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
    1. 6.1 The other desks’ editions of this subject
    2. 6.2 Three lenses
    3. 6.3 Standards, Academy and steward contributions
    4. 6.4 GCRI reading: the model card
    5. 6.5 Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
    6. 6.6 Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 health security readiness pack
    7. 6.7 Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
    8. 6.8 Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

DeskEditionStateIdentifier
GCRI Systems EvidenceNo edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycleNot in this cycle
GRF Public DeliberationOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
GRA Capital ReadinessNo edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycleNot in this cycle
Standards ProgressOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Academy CapabilityOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit
Index MeasurementOutside this desk’s remitNot in remit

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading health security as one connected system. Common causes recur across diseases, outbreaks spread through shared borders and health services, and response is limited by thresholds such as missing countermeasures, funding and surveillance reach. Evidence is strongest for single events and weakest for cross-border data on a common basis.

HLT-003 · HLT-002 · BIO-006 · SYS-012

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people a health threat arrives as a closed clinic, a missed vaccine or a drug that no longer works. The baseline asks that public debate treat prevention, response and recovery as shared, and keep immunisation and surveillance in view between emergencies.

HLT-003 · HLT-005 · BIO-006

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Aid for health has fallen, large funding needs remain for diseases such as tuberculosis, and emergency funds were small against the Ebola response in May 2026221224. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

FIN-009 · DEV-010

NEXUS

Synthesis

Health-security risk is well described event by event and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind surveillance coverage, test the outbreak and financing compound pathway, and map thresholds before the next large event.

SYS-012 · H-01 · H-02

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for health security. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

Table 6.1The quarterly rhythm every edition follows
QuarterEditionQuestionBoundary
Q1State and AgendaWhat matters this year, and what is the starting position?observed baseline stays distinct from planned work
Q2Evidence and BuildWhat new evidence and capability exist?a configured capability is not a validated result
Q3Stress Test and ReadinessWhat do scenarios and tests show?simulated loss or performance is not observed impact
Q4Annual Synthesis and RenewalWhat changed in the year, and what renews?release follows review, not event publicity deadlines
Table 6.2Who contributes what each quarter
Steward or bodyRoleContribution route
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada)Lead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T)science and practice communities · GCRI gateway
The Global Risks Forum (GRF)leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M)policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway
The Global Risks Alliance (GRA)finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F)finance and insurance · GRA gateway
Nexus Standardspreparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methodsStandards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI
Risk Academylearning pathways tied to the agenda questionsAcademy gateway · learning by review
Reports strategic deskshealth-security chapter inputs: GCRI evidence and GRA readinessstrategic editorial board

Standards drafts used in this edition

  • Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
  • Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
  • Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech

Standards calendar to watch

  • Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
  • Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
  • Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

Animals, people, food and water share pathogens, and borders and health services decide where they stop. Treating each disease alone understates how a gap in one place becomes a gap everywhere. This edition reads the network.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

Health is one network

Emergencies end and new ones begin: the mpox emergency ended in September 2025 and the Bundibugyo emergency was declared in May 2026. Routine immunisation, surveillance and financing decide how large the next one becomes.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Between emergencies is where resilience is built

About one in six infections was resistant in 2023, and rising resistance rarely makes headlines. Missing data for 48% of countries makes the true picture harder to read.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Resistance is a slow emergency

The amended IHR are in force and the Pandemic Agreement is adopted, yet the annex that the agreement needs is not agreed, and some States Parties rejected the amendments. Rules need data, money and trust to work.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Rules are not the same as readiness

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 health security readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.32027 health security readiness pack
ItemRegisterState at baselineFirst 2027 entry
E1Global risk state deltabaseline set by this editionchanges against the baseline
E2WEFH+B state deltafive global system readings setindicator updates and freshness
E3Agenda and Portfolio movementeight agenda items · 6 proposed objectsadmission decisions
E4Federation delivery registernational chapters in preparationnational chapters
E5Consortium capability registernational consortia formingfirst contributions
E6Leadership questions and challengesnone yetfirst challenge log
E7Foundry technical statenational environments preparedfirst federation cut
E8Publication candidatestwelve findings carried forwardPUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9Universe readinessone candidate missionadmission and role spine
E10Correction registernonefirst federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

  • Publish
  • Hold
  • Needs evidence
  • Restricted
  • Superseded

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

  • IN FORCE
  • ADOPTED
  • PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE
  • PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
Table 6.4Standards and regulatory watch
InstrumentBodyScopeStatusRelevance
International Health Regulations (2005), amendments of 20244WHOglobalIN FORCEalert levels
Pandemic Agreement, resolution WHA78.134WHOglobalADOPTED 2025pandemic prevention
Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing annex2WHOglobalUNDER NEGOTIATIONsample and benefit sharing
Biological Weapons Convention35United NationsglobalIN FORCEweapons ban
One Health Joint Plan of Action 2022 to 202615FAO, UNEP, WHO, WOAHglobalPUBLISHED · GUIDANCEOne Health
Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance7WHOglobalPUBLISHED · GUIDANCEresistance
Political declaration on antimicrobial resistance44United NationsglobalADOPTED 2024resistance targets
WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual42WHOglobalPUBLISHED · GUIDANCElaboratory biosafety
ISO 35001 biorisk management43ISOglobalPUBLISHED · VOLUNTARYbiorisk
Terrestrial Animal Health Code45WOAHglobalPUBLISHED · GUIDANCEanimal health
International Health Regulations (2005), original text36WHOglobalIN FORCEbaseline obligations

Changed since 2024

  • The amended International Health Regulations entered into force on 19 September 20254
  • The 2026 World Health Assembly continued the Pandemic Agreement annex negotiations3
  • The mpox emergency of international concern ended on 5 September 20255

To watch in 2027

  • Outcome of the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing annex at the next Assembly or a special session23
  • Report of the Biological Weapons Convention working group to the Tenth Review Conference32
  • Renewal of the One Health joint plan of action after 202615

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers health security assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

Question
What does the published evidence establish about the world’s health security, One Health and biosecurity systems and its couplings?
Sources searched
WHO and agency notices; outbreak updates; peer-reviewed emergence literature; burden and financing statistics
Window
releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
Selection
sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
Next step
systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
Table 6.5Peer-reviewed science and assessments
ReferenceTypeYearRoleUsed for
Jones et al.39journal article2008frameworkemerging disease drivers
Allen et al.40journal article2017supportszoonotic hotspots
Carlson et al.41journal article2022frameworkvirus sharing and climate
Table 6.6Institutional flagships
ReferenceIssuerYearRoleUsed for
GPMB 2026 report16GPMB2026supportssix emergencies in a decade
Global antibiotic resistance surveillance report 20256WHO2025supportsresistance share
Fifth mpox Emergency Committee statement5WHO2025supportsmpox emergency end
Disease Outbreak News2526WHO2026supportsEbola Bundibugyo counts
One Health joint plan of action15FAO, UNEP, WHO, WOAH2022contextOne Health tracks
Table 6.7Statistics, burden and financing
ReferenceIssuerYearRoleUsed for
Financing Global Health 202522IHME2025supportsaid for health
Antimicrobial resistance burden30GRAM and IHME2024contextresistance deaths
Excess mortality estimate20WHO2022supportsCOVID-19 excess deaths
Tuberculosis fact sheet12WHO2025supportstuberculosis burden
Tracking development assistance for health46IHME and Lancet2025contextaid for health series
Pandemic Fund summary31World Bank and WHO2026contextpooled financing
Table 6.8Standards, treaties and instruments
ReferenceIssuerYearRoleUsed for
International Health Regulations (2005), as amended436WHO2025supportsalert levels
Pandemic Agreement, resolution WHA78.134WHO2025supportstreaty text
Biological Weapons Convention35United Nations1972contextweapons ban
Working group papers32BWC States Parties2025contextstrengthening the convention
Laboratory Biosafety Manual42WHO2020contextlaboratory practice
ISO 3500143ISO2019contextbiorisk management
Political declaration on resistance44United Nations2024contextresistance targets
Terrestrial Animal Health Code45WOAH2024contextanimal disease standards

Where the evidence agrees

  • Animals are the origin of most emerging infectious diseases13
  • Immunity gaps and resistance raise the cost of outbreaks68
  • Emergencies end, and new ones begin547

Where it is unsettled

  • How far any given outbreak will spread47
  • How much the loss of aid will change surveillance and response22
  • How many high-containment laboratories operate and under what oversight33

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 22IHME (ed.), Financing Global Health 2025, news release of 15 July 2025 (development assistance for health USD 39 billion in 2025; USD 80 billion peak in 2021; US financing down 67%), read through a syndicated release. Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, Seattle. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 12WHO (ed.), Tuberculosis, fact sheet (10.7 million people fell ill and 1.23 million died in 2024; funding figures). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 24WHO (ed.), WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on Ebola outbreak in DRC and Uganda, 20 May 2026 (Bundibugyo virus; not a pandemic emergency; Contingency Fund for Emergencies). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 4WHO (ed.), Amended International Health Regulations enter into force, news release of 19 September 2025 (11 of 196 States Parties rejected; pandemic emergency level; National IHR Authorities). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 34UNVERIFIED, not opened: WHO Pandemic Agreement, resolution WHA78.1, adopted by the Seventy-eighth World Health Assembly on 20 May 2025, cited from memory and from search summaries; the date was not read on a WHO page. World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 2WHO (ed.), WHO Member States agree to extend negotiations on the Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing annex, news release of 1 May 2026 (resumed sixth meeting 27 April to 1 May 2026; seventh meeting 6 to 17 July 2026). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 1972, cited from memory. United Nations, Geneva. Observation year 1972. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 15WHO, FAO, UNEP and WOAH (eds.), One Health Joint Plan of Action launched to address health threats to humans, animals, plants and environment, news release of 17 October 2022 (plan period 2022 to 2026; six action tracks). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 7WHO (ed.), Antimicrobial resistance, fact sheet (more than 4.7 million deaths associated with bacterial resistance in 2021; 10% reduction target by 2030). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 44UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations General Assembly, Political declaration of the high-level meeting on antimicrobial resistance, 2024, cited from memory. United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: WHO, Laboratory biosafety manual, fourth edition. World Health Organization, Geneva, 2020, cited from memory. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 43UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 35001:2019, Biorisk management for laboratories and other related organisations. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 45UNVERIFIED, not opened: WOAH (ed.), Terrestrial Animal Health Code, cited from memory. World Organisation for Animal Health, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: WHO, International Health Regulations (2005), third edition, cited from memory. World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2005. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 3WHO (ed.), Seventy-ninth World Health Assembly daily update, 19 May 2026 (decision to continue the annex negotiations; outcome to the Eightieth Assembly in May 2027 or a special session in 2026). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 5WHO (ed.), Fifth meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the upsurge of mpox 2024, statement published 30 October 2025 (Director-General determination of 5 September 2025). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 32UNVERIFIED, not opened: Biological Weapons Convention Working Group on the strengthening of the Convention, seventh session, Geneva, 8 to 12 December 2025, and draft final report of 1 October 2025, taken from search-result summaries. Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Jones, K.E. et al., Global trends in emerging infectious diseases, Nature 451, 990 to 993, 2008, cited from memory. Springer Nature. Observation year 2008. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Allen, T. et al., Global hotspots and correlates of emerging zoonotic diseases, Nature Communications 8, 1124, 2017, cited from memory. Springer Nature. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Carlson, C.J. et al., Climate change increases cross-species viral transmission risk, Nature 607, 555 to 562, 2022, cited from memory. Springer Nature. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 16Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (ed.), A World on the Edge: Priorities for a Pandemic-Resilient Future, 2026 report (reports page read; six emergencies of international concern in the past decade). GPMB, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  22. 6WHO (ed.), WHO warns of widespread resistance to common antibiotics worldwide, news release of 13 October 2025 on the Global antibiotic resistance surveillance report 2025 (data year 2023; 104 reporting countries). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  23. 25POST-CLOSE, context only: WHO (ed.), Disease Outbreak News 2026-DON607, 13 June 2026 (695 confirmed cases; risk assessment; continental response plan June to November 2026). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  24. 26WHO (ed.), Disease Outbreak News 2026-DON612, 3 July 2026 (1,481 confirmed cases and 454 deaths; one imported case in France). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  25. 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: GBD 2021 Antimicrobial Resistance Collaborators, Global burden of bacterial antimicrobial resistance 1990 to 2021: a systematic analysis with forecasts to 2050, The Lancet, 2024 (1.14 million attributable and 4.71 million associated deaths in 2021), taken from search-result summaries; the article returned an access error. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  26. 20WHO (ed.), 14.9 million excess deaths were associated with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, news release of 5 May 2022 (range 13.3 to 16.6 million). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  27. 46UNVERIFIED, not opened: IHME and Lancet authors, Tracking development assistance for health, 1990 to 2030, The Lancet, 2025, published with Financing Global Health 2025, taken from search-result summaries. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  28. 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: The Pandemic Fund (ed.), funding rounds and projects (US$499.6 million to 20 projects in the third round, February 2026; US$1.4 billion across three rounds), taken from search-result summaries; the site returned an access error. World Bank and WHO, Washington and Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  29. 13WHO (ed.), One Health, fact sheet (Quadripartite; over 60% of emerging infectious diseases reported globally come from animals). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  30. 8WHO (ed.), Immunisation coverage, fact sheet (WUENIC estimates for 2025, released 15 July 2026). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  31. 47ECDC (ed.), Ebola disease outbreak caused by Bundibugyo virus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, update of 30 September 2026 (cases up to 27 September 2026: 8,116 confirmed and 3,924 deaths; seven provinces; 63 of 167 health zones; Uganda 20 confirmed cases). European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Stockholm. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  32. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: King’s College London and George Mason University, Global BioLabs Report 2023 (51 operating level-4 laboratories in 27 countries and 18 planned or under construction), taken from search-result summaries; the document text was not readable. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 6: Readings from the other desks. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Health Security, One Health and Biosecurity (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-HEALTHSECURITY-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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Sector signature

The sectors behind Health Security, One Health and Biosecurity.

A reading aid: the sectors the findings run through and how strongly they depend on each other.

Select corners · hover lines6 / 15 relations

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Health and its partners

Health gives workforce for operations to infrastructure (0.3), farm labour to food (0.3) and utility workforce to water (0.2).

W · E · I · F · H · B

Sectors
4 of 6
Relations
6 of 15
Coupling
0.42 share of total

Strongest relations in play

  • Water → Food · irrigation0.8
  • Food → Health · nutrition0.7
  • Infrastructure → Water · pipes, dams and treatment works0.6
  • Water → Health · drinking water and sanitation0.7
Teaching values for a typical city-region, not measurements for any place. Coupling is the summed strength of the relations in play, as a share of all fifteen.
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