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Key findings

Twelve findings carry the semiconductor and compute baseline. They are grouped by coupling and never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

6 min read1 figure0 tables15 notesNR-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1AI compute is physical infrastructure built on a few chips and a few places
  4. 2Key findings
    1. 2.1 Headline finding
    2. 2.2 AIC
    3. 2.3 Finance
    4. 2.4 Infrastructure
    5. 2.5 Energy
    6. 2.6 Governance
    7. 2.7 Trade
    8. 2.8 Systemic
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Compute build-out meets local power, water and packaging limits
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-007

United States data centres used 176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4% of national electricity, and a Berkeley Lab report projects 325 to 580 TWh by 2028, or about 6.7% to 12%.

Figure 2.1US data centre electricity use (TWh)
ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
2023176
2028 projection, low325
2028 projection, high580

Source: Berkeley Lab report of December 2024, as described by the US Department of Energy15. The 2028 values are scenario projections.

Implication

The compute build-out is also an electricity build-out. The 2028 range is 1.8 to 3.3 times the 2023 level (method 4), and the spread shows how much depends on chip supply, efficiency and siting. The report covers US data centres, not the world, and not fabrication plants1516.

What would move it

Next national statistics, the IEA global series, published site-level power data and utility interconnection records would each move this finding.

2.2AIC

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-001

    A dataset of 500 AI supercomputers from 2019 to 2025 shows performance doubling about every nine months, with hardware cost and power need each doubling about every year; one system in March 2025 used about 200,000 chips and 300 MW.1

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-002

    Epoch AI estimates that training compute grows about four times a year, that runs of about 2e29 FLOP are likely feasible by 2030, and that power is the constraint most likely to bind first.3

  3. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-003

    The 2025 AI Index reports that hardware costs fell about 30% a year and energy efficiency rose about 40% a year, while training compute doubles about every five months.5

2.3Finance

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-004

    Global semiconductor sales reached USD 791.7 billion in 2025, up 25.6% from USD 630.5 billion; logic sales were USD 301.9 billion and memory sales USD 223.1 billion.8

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-005

    Semiconductor equipment billings reached USD 135.1 billion in 2025, up 15%, according to a trade report of SEMI data; Taiwan rose 90% to USD 31.5 billion and China held near USD 49.3 billion.9

2.4Infrastructure

  1. ReportedEQL 2NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-006

    Press reports put the largest foundry at nearly 70% of the global foundry market in 2025, and about 74% of its wafer revenue came from 7 nanometre and smaller nodes; both are secondary reports.222728

2.5Energy

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-007

    US data centres used 176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4% of national electricity, and a Berkeley Lab report projects 325 to 580 TWh by 2028, or about 6.7% to 12%.1516

  2. ReportedEQL 2NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-008

    The IEA reports global data centre electricity use of about 415 TWh in 2024 and projects about 945 TWh by 2030 in its base case; the figures come from search summaries of the report.24

2.6Governance

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-GOV-009

    The CHIPS and Science Act, enacted on 9 August 2022, provides USD 50 billion, of which USD 39 billion is for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, and award outlays are not bound at the close.44

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-GOV-010

    The EU Chips Act entered into force on 21 September 2023, more than EUR 33 billion was recorded across 19 State aid decisions, and the Commission proposed a second Chips Act in June 2026.12

2.7Trade

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-TRD-011

    US guidance of May 2026 states that a licence is required to export advanced computing items to entities headquartered in Country Group D:5, and the AI diffusion rule was rescinded in May 2025.1331

2.8Systemic

  1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

    The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a build-out of AI compute that meets local limits on power, water and packaging capacity while fabrication stays concentrated. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 16Shehabi, A. and others, 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, December 2024 (publication page abstract only; no figures on the page; the report PDF was not read). Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 5Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2025 AI Index Report, key takeaways page (training compute doubling about every five months; hardware cost down about 30% a year; energy efficiency up about 40% a year; chips detail not given on the page). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 22Focus Taiwan, Central News Agency (ed.), report of 13 March 2026 on the largest foundry reaching almost 70% of the global foundry market in 2025 (headline and lead only; the rest is behind a paywall); press report, weak evidence. Central News Agency, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: TrendForce (ed.), 2025 foundry ranking (largest foundry sales about USD 122.5 billion and a share of about 69.9%), taken from press coverage in search results. TrendForce, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: TSMC (ed.), fourth-quarter 2025 results (about 74% of 2025 wafer revenue from 7 nanometre and smaller nodes against 69% in 2024), taken from press coverage in search results; sources differ on the quarterly share. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Hsinchu. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 24UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Energy and AI, April 2025 (about 415 TWh of global data centre electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the total; about 945 TWh in 2030 in the base case; range of 700 to 1,700 TWh in 2035), taken from search-result summaries; the IEA pages returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: law-firm client alerts on the rescission of the AI diffusion rule and related guidance, 12 and 13 May 2025, taken from search-result summaries; a formal notice date was not confirmed. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 2: Key findings. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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