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Systems and sectors at baseline

7 min read0 figures2 tables14 notesNR-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1AI compute is physical infrastructure built on a few chips and a few places
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
    1. 3.1 Where each system stood at evidence close
    2. 3.2 Domain posture
    3. 3.3 Sector screens
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Compute build-out meets local power, water and packaging limits
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

AIC · Compute

Training compute growth, Epoch AI estimate

≈4times per year

power is the first limit likely to bind.

Reported2024Epoch AI3

FIN · Market

Global semiconductor sales

791.7USD billion

up 25.6% on 2024.

Reported2025SIA8

FIN · Equipment

Semiconductor equipment billings

135.1USD billion

trade report of a SEMI release.

Reported2025trade report9

ENE · Energy

US data centre electricity use

176TWh

about 4.4% of US electricity.

Reported2023Berkeley Lab15

INF · Fabrication

Foundry share of the largest producer

≈70%

press report; a market-research estimate.

Reported2025press22

TRD · Policy

US CHIPS and Science Act programmes

50USD billion

39 for manufacturing, 11 for research.

Reported2022Act44

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through semiconductor and compute, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries semiconductor and compute risk into each domain.

Table 3.1Each domain read in words, not scored
DomainPosture at baselineCouplingStatus
WATCooling and process water use is reported by single companies, not on a common basis; one company reports about 5,300 acre-feet a year for one fab.WAT ↔ INFReported EQL 2
ENEUS data centres used 176 TWh in 2023 and may use 325 to 580 TWh in 2028.AIC → ENEReported EQL 4
FOONo documented coupling at baseline; chips in agricultural equipment are not evidenced here.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
HLTNo documented coupling at baseline; medical device and imaging chips are not evidenced here.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
BIONo documented coupling at baseline.none documentedExpert input EQL 1
CLIElectricity demand of compute and fabrication matters for emissions; the carbon intensity varies by site and region.ENE → CLIReported EQL 3
INFThe core system: fabrication concentrated in a few clusters; equipment billings of USD 135.1 billion in 2025.the core systemReported EQL 3
FINChip sales of USD 791.7 billion in 2025; public programmes of USD 50 billion in the United States.FIN ↔ INFReported EQL 4
DATData centres are the main buyers of AI accelerators; the link is stated, the volumes are not bound.INF → DATInferred EQL 2
AICThe demand driver: AI supercomputer performance doubling about every nine months.AIC → INFReported EQL 3
MINGallium and germanium are used in chips and are concentrated in primary production; figures are not bound from a primary source.MIN → INFInferred EQL 2
TRDUS licences for advanced computing items to D:5 entities; equipment and chip flows follow controls.TRD ↔ INFReported EQL 3

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on semiconductor and compute, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Table 3.2Sectors: baseline evidence and the exposure to watch
CodeSectorBaseline evidenceExposure to watchEvidence coverage
GS-00Cross-systemcompute couples to power, water and trade controlslocal limitsTHIN
GS-01Waterfab water reported by single companies23siting in dry regionsTHIN
GS-02Energydata centre electricity 176 TWh in 202315load growthPARTIAL
GS-03Foodno documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-04Healthno documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-05Financechip sales USD 791.7 billion8capital intensityPARTIAL
GS-06Developmentaccess to chips and skillswidening gapsTHIN
GS-07Climateelectricity demand and emissions1524grid carbon intensityTHIN
GS-08Disasterfabrication clusters in seismic regionssingle-cluster dependenceTHIN
GS-09Infrastructuredata centre and fab power and cooling15grid interconnectionTHIN
GS-10Citiesno documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-11Biodiversityno documented couplingnone documentedTHIN
GS-12Earth observationchips in space sensors not evidenced herenone documentedTHIN
GS-13Cyber and digitalcompute capacity and controls13hardware supply integrityTHIN
GS-14PolicyCHIPS Act and EU Chips Act4412subsidy and control divergenceGOOD
GS-15Sciencepeer-reviewed base on trends and energy1267common benchmarksPARTIAL

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 3Sevilla, J. and others, Can AI scaling continue through 2030?, Epoch AI, 20 August 2024 (first 100,000 characters read: about 4 times a year; 1 to 5 GW campuses; about 2e29 FLOP feasible by 2030; power binds first). Epoch AI, San Francisco. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 8Semiconductor Industry Association (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release; WSTS data; logic USD 301.9 billion; memory USD 223.1 billion; regional growth; about USD 1 trillion projected for 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 9Evertiq (ed.), Semiconductor equipment billings reached $135B in 2025, 9 April 2026, a trade report of a SEMI release (USD 135.06 billion in 2025 against USD 117.14 billion in 2024; regional table); the SEMI page itself returned an access error, so this is a secondary report and weak evidence. Evertiq, Munich. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 15US Department of Energy (ed.), DOE Releases New Report Evaluating Increase in Electricity Demand from Data Centers, 20 December 2024 (176 TWh in 2023, about 4.4%; 325 to 580 TWh, about 6.7% to 12%, in 2028). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 22Focus Taiwan, Central News Agency (ed.), report of 13 March 2026 on the largest foundry reaching almost 70% of the global foundry market in 2025 (headline and lead only; the rest is behind a paywall); press report, weak evidence. Central News Agency, Taipei. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 44United States Congress, CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167, enacted 9 August 2022 (text of section 102 on Congress.gov, first 100,000 characters read: the funding lines for sections 9902 and 9906 of Public Law 116-283 by fiscal year 2022 to 2026 sum to USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research, USD 50 billion in all; the totals are sums of the listed amounts, not stated in the text). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 23AZFamily (ed.), TSMC Arizona expansion could make it Phoenix’s largest water customer, 22 July 2026 (total planned investment USD 265 billion; about 5,300 acre-feet a year for the first fab; 65% reclaimed; goal 90%); local news reporting company figures, weak evidence. Gray Media, Phoenix. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 24UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Energy and AI, April 2025 (about 415 TWh of global data centre electricity in 2024, about 1.5% of the total; about 945 TWh in 2030 in the base case; range of 700 to 1,700 TWh in 2035), taken from search-result summaries; the IEA pages returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 13US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), home page and news items (May 2026 guidance on licences for advanced computing items to Country Group D:5 entities; 7 April 2026 extension of the authorised IC designer timeline to 31 December 2026; Section 232 investigation of semiconductor imports listed). BIS, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 12European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act policy page (entered into force 21 September 2023; three pillars; more than EUR 33 billion across 19 State aid decisions; second Chips Act proposed June 2026). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 1Pilz, K.F., Sanders, J., Rahman, R. and Heim, L., Trends in AI Supercomputers, arXiv:2504.16026, submitted 22 April 2025 (abstract page: 500 systems from 2019 to 2025; performance doubling about every nine months; cost and power doubling about every year; one March 2025 system with about 200,000 chips, USD 7 billion and 300 MW; about 75% of performance in the United States). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 2Sevilla, J., Heim, L., Ho, A., Besiroglu, T., Hobbhahn, M. and Villalobos, P., Compute Trends Across Three Eras of Machine Learning, arXiv:2202.05924, 2022 (abstract page: doubling about every 20 months before 2010 and about every 6 months in the deep learning era). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 6Luccioni, A.S., Jernite, Y. and Strubell, E., Power Hungry Processing: Watts Driving the Cost of AI Deployment?, ACM FAccT 2024, arXiv:2311.16863 (abstract page: multi-purpose generative models orders of magnitude more costly per 1,000 inferences than task-specific models). ACM, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 7Patterson, D. and others, Carbon Emissions and Large Neural Network Training, arXiv:2104.10350, April 2021 (abstract page: sparse models under one tenth of the energy; location effect 5 to 10 times; choice of model, datacentre and processor 100 to 1000 times). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 3: Systems and sectors at baseline. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-SEMICONDUCTORS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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