Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Risks and capability

Four space risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence.

6 min read0 figures1 table22 notesNR-XTECH-SPACE-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Orbit is shared infrastructure under growing load
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
    1. 4.1 Risk objects
    2. 4.2 Capability ladder
  7. 5Severe storm in a crowded low orbit
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

  1. InferredEQL 3RSK-XT18-SPW-001

    Storm exposure in crowded orbits

    Driver
    severe geomagnetic storms and poor forecast skill68
    Exposure
    satellites in low orbit; navigation users
    Vulnerability
    many satellites maneuvering at once; limited recovery time9
    Capacity
    storm scales and watches8
    Cascade
    SPW → INF → DAT, FOO
    Horizon
    1 to 5 years

  2. InferredEQL 3RSK-XT18-DEB-002

    Debris growth and collision cascade

    Driver
    launch growth and fragmentation events12
    Exposure
    low orbits near constellation altitudes1
    Vulnerability
    objects too small to track5
    Capacity
    disposal rules and mitigation guidelines1112
    Cascade
    INF → DAT
    Horizon
    1 to 10 years

  3. InferredEQL 3RSK-XT18-NAV-003

    Navigation and timing outage

    Driver
    storm, interference or ground-segment failure720
    Exposure
    farming, finance, telecommunications, power timing15
    Vulnerability
    single-system dependence
    Capacity
    multiple constellations21; backups not documented here
    Cascade
    DAT → FIN, FOO, ENE
    Horizon
    1 to 5 years

  4. InferredEQL 3RSK-XT18-GOV-004

    Fragmented rules and slow adoption

    Driver
    national rules, a draft EU act and voluntary guidelines111433
    Exposure
    operators in several jurisdictions
    Vulnerability
    scrutiny reservations and slow agreement14
    Capacity
    treaties, ITU recording and guidelines131825
    Cascade
    GOV → INF
    Horizon
    1 to 10 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence for space at the global level.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
FunctionRungLevelStrongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigationEXISTSdisposal rules and mitigation guidelines published111234
Monitoring and observationEXISTSnational catalogues track large objects45
Early warningEXISTSspace weather scales and watches8; forecast skill limited6
Preparedness and planningLISTEDEU Space Act proposal still under review14
Redundancy and reservesLISTEDbackup navigation and timing not documented here
ResponseLISTEDno tested response to a mass loss of satellite control
Continuity of critical servicesLISTEDcontinuity of navigation and timing for critical services not reported
RecoveryLISTEDno consolidated recovery evidence
AdaptationLISTEDdesign for demise and its effects not bound10
Social protectionLISTEDnot applicable at baseline
Finance and insuranceLISTEDloss and insurance data not opened
Institutional coordinationEXISTStreaties and ITU recording of assignments131825
Technical infrastructureEXISTStracking networks and navigation systems421
WorkforceLISTEDno figure bound
Research capacityADEQUATEpeer-reviewed base on debris, storms and atmosphere6102728
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 6Parker, W.E. and Linares, R., Satellite Drag Analysis During the May 2024 Gannon Geomagnetic Storm, arXiv:2406.08617, 2024 (abstract page read; preprint). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 8NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center (ed.), NOAA Space Weather Scales explanation page (G5 extreme geomagnetic storm). National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Boulder. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 9Thiele, S., Heiland, S.R., Boley, A.C. and Lawler, S.M., An Orbital House of Cards: Frequent Satellite Close Conjunctions, arXiv:2512.09643, submitted 10 December 2025, version 3 of 29 June 2026 (abstract page read; preprint, peer review not located; the abstract of this version gives 5.5 days and 164 days). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 1ESA (ed.), ESA Space Environment Report 2025 (summary page dated 1 April 2025; data through the end of 2024). European Space Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 2ESA (ed.), ESA Space Environment Report 2026 (summary page dated 14 September 2026; data through the end of 2025; the full report PDF was not opened). European Space Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 5NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ed.), Orbital debris frequently asked questions (more than 34,000 objects catalogued as of August 2026; about 100 million millimeter-sized pieces; 41 ISS avoidance maneuvers since 1999). National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Houston. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 11FCC (ed.), Second Report and Order, FCC 22-74, Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, IB Docket Nos. 22-271 and 18-313, adopted 29 September 2022, released 30 September 2022. Federal Communications Commission, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 12ESA (ed.), ESA Zero Debris approach (web page, undated; target 2030). European Space Agency, Paris. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 7NASA (ed.), What NASA is learning from the biggest geomagnetic storm in 20 years (article dated 9 May 2025; page updated 25 September 2026). National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 20UK Government (ed.), Russia behind cyber attack with Europe-wide impact an hour before Ukraine invasion (news story of 10 May 2022; company statements are quoted by the government and are weak evidence). Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, London. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 15NIST (ed.), Economic Benefits of the Global Positioning System to the US Private Sector (news page dated 2 October 2019, updated 3 February 2025; study by RTI International sponsored by NIST; about USD 1.4 trillion in 2017 dollars, 1984 to 2017). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 21EUSPA (ed.), Galileo (web page last modified 25 September 2026; no satellite count on the page). European Union Agency for the Space Programme, Prague. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 14General Secretariat of the Council (ed.), Note 15830/25, Regulation on the safety, resilience and sustainability of space activities in the Union (EU Space Act), progress report for the Competitiveness Council of 8 and 9 December 2025, interinstitutional file 2025/0335 (COD), 26 November 2025. Council of the European Union, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (ed.), Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, 2019, cited from memory. United Nations, Vienna. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 13United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (ed.), Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (treaty page; General Assembly resolution 2777 (XXVI) of 29 November 1971; opened for signature 29 March 1972). United Nations, Vienna. Observation year 1972. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 18ITU (ed.), ITU-R Space Services Department (web page; Radio Regulations procedures, Master International Frequency Register, space sustainability support). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 25UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations (ed.), Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967, cited from memory. United Nations, New York. Observation year 1967. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 34UNVERIFIED, not opened: Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (ed.), IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, cited from memory; the page returned an access error. IADC. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 4NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ed.), Orbital Debris Quarterly News, Volume 30, Issue 3, September 2026 (satellite box score as of 4 August 2026; launch table May to July 2026). National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Houston. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 10Ferreira, J.P., Huang, Z., Nomura, K. and Wang, J., Potential Ozone Depletion From Satellite Demise During Atmospheric Reentry in the Era of Mega-Constellations, Geophysical Research Letters 51, 2024, DOI 10.1029/2024GL109280 (full text read; modelling study). American Geophysical Union, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. doi:10.1029/2024GL109280back
  21. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: Kessler, D.J. and Cour-Palais, B.G., Collision frequency of artificial satellites: the creation of a debris belt, Journal of Geophysical Research 83, 2637 to 2646, 1978, cited from memory. Observation year 1978. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  22. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: Boley, A.C. and Byers, M., Satellite mega-constellations create risks in Low Earth Orbit, the atmosphere and on Earth, Scientific Reports 11, 10642, 2021, cited from memory. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 4: Risks and capability. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Space and Orbital Infrastructure (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-SPACE-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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