Risks and capability

Four risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence.

2 min read0 figures1 table4 notesNR-COUNTRY-JPN-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Japan’s risk is seismic, climatic and demographic at once
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
    1. 4.1 Risk objects
    2. 4.2 Capability ladder
  7. 5Great earthquake in an ageing region
  8. 6Lenses and readings
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

  1. ReportedEQL 4RSK-JPN-SEI-001

    Nankai Trough or Tokyo-area great earthquake

    Driver
    subduction-zone or inland megaquake with tsunami
    Exposure
    Pacific coast industry, ports, cities
    Vulnerability
    older buildings; coastal plants; ageing population
    Capacity
    seismic codes; early warning; evacuation
    Cascade
    SEI → INF, ENE, HLT, FIN, TRD
    Horizon
    30 years
  2. ReportedEQL 4RSK-JPN-CLI-002

    Heavy rain, typhoon and river flooding

    Driver
    more intense rainfall and stronger typhoons
    Exposure
    floodplains, steep catchments, cities
    Vulnerability
    older levees; landslide-prone slopes
    Capacity
    basin-wide flood control; warnings
    Cascade
    CLI → WAT → INF, HLT
    Horizon
    annual
  3. ReportedEQL 4RSK-JPN-HLT-003

    Heat and ageing overload of health and care

    Driver
    longer, hotter summers
    Exposure
    older adults living alone; outdoor workers
    Vulnerability
    limited cooling; workforce shortages
    Capacity
    heat alerts; cooling shelters
    Cascade
    CLI → HLT → ENE peak
    Horizon
    seasonal
  4. InferredEQL 3RSK-JPN-ENE-004

    Fuel and LNG supply disruption

    Driver
    shipping disruption or price spike
    Exposure
    power, industry, households
    Vulnerability
    near-total import dependence
    Capacity
    oil stockpiles; nuclear and renewables
    Cascade
    TRD → ENE → FOO, FIN
    Horizon
    1–5 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
FunctionRungLevelStrongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigationDEMONSTRATEDstrict seismic codes credited with limiting building collapse in real events
Monitoring and observationDEMONSTRATEDdense seismic, tsunami and weather networks in continuous use6
Early warningDEMONSTRATEDearthquake early warning and J-Alert in use for real events
Preparedness and planningTESTEDnational drills each year; Nankai Trough advisory issued in August 2024
Redundancy and reservesEXISTSnational oil stockpiles; water and food reserves uneven
ResponseDEMONSTRATEDSelf-Defense Forces and mutual aid in real disasters
Continuity of critical servicesEXISTSNoto showed long water and care outages in remote areas11
RecoveryEXISTSreconstruction frameworks; slow in depopulating areas
AdaptationEXISTSClimate Change Adaptation Act and plans
Social protectionEXISTSuniversal pension and health coverage
Finance and insuranceEXISTSpublic–private earthquake insurance; about a third of homes covered22
Institutional coordinationTESTEDDisaster Management Agency planned for 2026
Technical infrastructureEXISTSageing assets; national resilience plan27
WorkforceLISTEDcare and construction workforce shortages documented
Research capacityADEQUATElong-established seismic and disaster science
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 6Japan Meteorological Agency (ed.), Climate Change Monitoring Report 2024. JMA, Tokyo, 2025.back
  2. 11Cabinet Office (ed.), “Damage situation of the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake.” Cabinet Office, Tokyo, retrieved 2026-09-30.back
  3. 22General Insurance Rating Organization of Japan (ed.), Earthquake insurance statistics, 2023. GIROJ, Tokyo, 2024.back
  4. 27Cabinet Secretariat (ed.), Basic Plan for National Resilience, 2023 revision. Government of Japan, Tokyo, 2023.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 4: Risks and capability. In Japan Systems Risk and Resilience Report 2026: The State of Japan’s Interdependent Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-COUNTRY-JPN-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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