GCRI · 空间与地球观测
通信与导航
Satellite communications connect remote areas, ships, aircraft and disaster zones, and navigation satellites provide the position and timing that transport, telecom, finance and power grids depend on. Large new constellations are changing both. This page sets out how satellite communication and navigation services work, how society’s dependence on them can be mapped, and what evidence serves the regulators and operators who plan for their loss.
Communications and navigation: how the risk develops.
GNSS, satcom and dependency. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Constellations change connectivity
Large low Earth orbit constellations offer lower latency broadband, extending coverage but concentrating it with a few operators.
Timing is a hidden dependency
Telecom networks, power grid measurement and financial 系统 use satellite time signals. Many users do not know they depend on them.
Navigation underpins transport
Aviation, shipping, road logistics and agriculture rely on satellite positioning, with augmentation systems for higher accuracy and integrity.
Backups are often missing
Alternative positioning and timing, such as terrestrial systems or holdover clocks, are unevenly deployed, so outages can cascade.
How communications and navigation is modelled, measured and tested.
模型、其假设、数据和不确定性，以科学家或工程师会核查的形式呈现。结构遵循已发表的方法。所取数值仅为示意，不是研究发现。
地球观测链
How a satellite or sensor record becomes evidence on communications and navigation, and where each step adds uncertainty.
- 01 · 获取轨道、传感器和重访周期不确定性：云层和轨道造成的缺口
- 02 · 校准辐射和几何不确定性：传感器漂移
- 03 · 更正大气与地形不确定性：气溶胶和坡度假设
- 04 · 检索或分类变量或类别不确定性：模型和训练误差
- 05 · 验证对照地面实况不确定性：样本设计与规模
- 06 · 发布附误差线和沿袭信息不确定性：明确说明，从不隐藏
Satellite communication and navigation reach every domain.
Findings are designed for the 战略系统系列. Spectrum is governed by the ITU Radio Regulations; the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) recommends no provider.
- Interference and outage records.
- Connectivity studies in remote areas.
衡量什么，以及衡量得如何。
每个指标都注明其单位、频率、背后的来源类型以及数值将附带的证据标签。此处不显示数值：数值由计划依据其自身权限提供。
| 指标 | 单位 | 节奏 | 来源类型 | 标签 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Population covered by satellite broadband | percent of population | 年度 | Regulator and operator data | 估算 |
| Critical sectors using GNSS timing | count of sectors | 每次评估 | Dependency studies | 估算 |
| Timing holdover capability | hours | per system | Operator documentation | 已声明 |
| Satellite broadband subscribers | 计数 | 年度 | Regulator statistics | 已发布统计 |
| Satellite-based augmentation coverage | status by region | 每次评估 | Augmentation system documentation | 已发布统计 |
| Navigation outages and degradations | count and duration | 年度 | Service notices | 已发布统计 |
证据来自何处。
具名公共数据集与机构记录，各自注明许可类别。依协议获得的来源仅按其条款使用，绝不再次发布。
| 来源 | 它提供什么 | 许可类别 |
|---|---|---|
| ITU satellite network filings and Radio Regulations | Spectrum and orbit filings | Public, ITU terms |
| GNSS service performance reports (GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, BeiDou) | Service performance and notices | Public, terms per provider |
| Government studies of GNSS dependence, such as the UK and US economic impact studies | Sectors depending on positioning and timing | Public records, licence per government |
| National telecom regulator statistics | Satellite broadband adoption | Public records, licence per regulator |
| ICAO and IMO documentation on navigation | Navigation requirements in aviation and shipping | Public, terms per organisation |
由谁决定，以及证据服务于什么。
Space and Earth Observation prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| 谁来决定 | 问题 | 本页面服务的证据 |
|---|---|---|
| Telecom and transport regulators | What backup timing and navigation to require | Dependency maps; backup reviews |
| 关键基础设施 operators | How long they can operate without satellite timing | Holdover evidence |
| Governments planning connectivity | Where satellite broadband fills gaps | Connectivity gap analyses |
该主题产生的产出
- Dependency maps of positioning and timing
- Backup capability reviews
- Connectivity gap analyses including satellite options
- Evidence notes for resilience planning
专家提出的问题。
Specialists in navigation and satellite communications ask how dependent 系统 are and how they fail.
- Which sectors rely on satellite timing and positioning, and do they know it?
- How vulnerable are receivers to jamming, spoofing and interference?
- What alternative time and position sources exist, and are they in use?
- How do satellite communications support emergency response and remote areas, and how resilient are they?
- How does the growth of large communications constellations change dependency and risk?
Weak signals, wide dependence.
Navigation satellites broadcast signals that receivers use to calculate position and time. The signals are very weak by the time they reach the ground, which makes them easy to drown out with jamming or imitate with spoofing. Beyond navigation for transport and agriculture, the timing function is embedded in telecommunications networks, electricity grid synchronisation and the time-stamping of financial transactions, often without operators being aware of it.
Satellite communications carry data, voice and broadband to ships, aircraft, remote communities and disaster zones where terrestrial networks are absent or damaged. They are themselves exposed to interference, ground-segment faults and space weather. Resilience comes from diversity: multiple constellations, terrestrial backups, holdover clocks that maintain time during outages, and receivers that detect anomalies.
证据如何构建，以及止于何处。
- 01
Dependency surveys
Identifying where timing and positioning are used in critical services. Embedded dependencies are often undocumented.
- 02
Interference monitoring
Detecting jamming and spoofing through receiver networks and communications and network technology. Coverage of monitoring is limited.
- 03
韧性测试
Testing how 系统 behave when signals are lost or falsified. Live testing is constrained by regulation and safety.
- 04
Signal and orbit physics
Modelling signal propagation and errors, grounded in 物理学. Atmospheric effects vary in ways that are hard to predict locally.
Where this page’s references lead.
阅读本页时所对照的机构和文件。状态和版本会变化；每个链接都指向发布机构。
问题与解答。
What is GNSS?
Why do power grids and banks depend on satellites?
What is a low Earth orbit constellation?
Why does finance depend on satellite navigation?
What is spoofing?
Are there alternatives to satellite timing?
从本页贡献证据。
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