Cybersecurity and cryptography is the technology this platform stewards for the network. It protects the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and systems through architecture, controls, monitoring, cryptography and response, measured against recognised frameworks.
Cybersecurity and cryptography protect information systems and data from unauthorised access, disruption and manipulation. They address threats that can spread rapidly across interconnected digital and physical systems. In cyber and digital resilience and critical infrastructure, cybersecurity analysis identifies how a single compromise can propagate across sectors that share software, vendors or networks. It informs resilience requirements and cyber insurance. The canonical description is on the STEM Commons.
Control baselines and gap analysis
An organisation's controls are mapped against framework outcomes, such as NIST CSF functions, to find gaps that matter for its critical services and set priorities.
Exploited vulnerability prioritisation
Vulnerabilities are ranked by evidence of exploitation and exploit likelihood, not severity scores alone, so remediation goes first to what attackers use.
Detection coverage mapping
Logging and detection rules are mapped against attacker techniques in MITRE ATT&CK to show which behaviours would be seen and which would not.
03Simulator
A cascade through interdependent networks.
A hazard footprint takes out co-located assets in every layer; fragmentation, dependency between layers and overload of the survivors then spread the failure. The 3D view separates the layers by depth. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction.
Controls
Assets per layer
18
Hazard footprint
8% of area
Assets that depend on another layer
60%
Spare capacity (tolerance)
30%
Readouts
Assets hit by the hazard
7%
Assets still working
50%
Amplification of the initial damage
6.8 times
Steps to settle
4
Numbers, methods and sources
Step
Data centres working (%)
Networks working (%)
Power working (%)
0
83
100
94
1
72
94
89
2
72
67
83
3
72
39
67
4
56
39
56
Methods
Interdependent networks Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464
Overload cascades Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66
Betweenness load Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25
Multilayer networks Kivela and others (2014), Journal of Complex Networks 2
Infrastructure interdependencies Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001), IEEE Control Systems 21(6)
Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Data
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page's map can draw:
Natural events (NASA EONET) NASA EONET · register nasa.eonet.events
A cascade through interdependent networks. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: Interdependent networks (Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464); Overload cascades (Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66); Betweenness load (Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25).
Datasets and records used by cybersecurity and cryptography on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in the source register.
Data
Role
Label
CISA KEV catalogue
Exploited vulnerabilities
Published statistics
FIRST EPSS
Exploit likelihood
ESTIMATED
MITRE ATT&CK
Technique catalogue
REPORTED
Organisational telemetry
Detection coverage
OBSERVED
05Methods and evidence
How cybersecurity practice is modelled, measured and tested.
The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.
System model
The couplings between the systems in cybersecurity practice: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
Causal loop diagram from the page's systems; signs show the direction of influence. Illustrative structure for a system dynamics or network model, not estimated couplings.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
06Validation
How results are checked.
Controls are tested through red-team exercises, audits and formal analysis of cryptographic schemes. Incident data are used to check whether defences performed as intended.
Check
How it is done
Control testing
Controls are tested, not only documented
Detection validation
Detection rules are tested with simulated techniques
Framework mapping review
Mappings to frameworks are reviewed by a second analyst
Adversaries adapt, so historical data may not reflect future attacks. Software supply chains and legacy systems introduce weaknesses that are hard to inventory.
What are the limits of cybersecurity and cryptography in this field?
Adversaries adapt, so historical data may not reflect future attacks. Software supply chains and legacy systems introduce weaknesses that are hard to inventory.
How are results checked?
Controls are tested through red-team exercises, audits and formal analysis of cryptographic schemes. Incident data are used to check whether defences performed as intended.
Are the values on this page real?
The data names, roles and checks are real descriptions of practice. The canvas shows a design of the method's use, not a run; no result is reported here.
Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
GCRICybersecurity and Digital ResilienceStrategic SystemsScenario and Stress-Test
Never send personal data, sensitive infrastructure detail or anything you have no right to share. A contribution is reviewed before use; sending it confers no authorship or editorial rights, and sponsorship never buys a finding.
Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
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Maps, data and figures on this site are shown for context and general information. They are not advice, forecasts or warnings; the limits of the information are set out in the Disclaimers and Data Notices.
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