GCRI · Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
Post quantum migration
A sufficiently powerful quantum computer would break the public-key cryptography that protects most internet traffic, digital signatures and identities today. Data captured now could be decrypted later. Standard post-quantum algorithms now exist, and migration will take many years across software, hardware, protocols and certificates. This page sets out why migration matters now, how it is planned and measured, and what evidence serves the organisations and agencies that must carry it out.
Post quantum migration on the record.
Post quantum migration: how the risk develops.
Cryptographic transition requirements. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Quantum algorithms break public-key schemes
Shor's algorithm, run on a large fault-tolerant quantum computer, would break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. Symmetric encryption is less affected and can be strengthened with longer keys.
Harvest now, decrypt later
Adversaries can store encrypted data today and decrypt it once quantum capability exists. Data that must stay secret for many years is already at risk.
Cryptography is everywhere
Public-key cryptography is embedded in protocols, devices, smart cards, firmware and certificates. Organisations rarely have an inventory of where it is used.
Migration takes years
Replacing algorithms requires standards, product updates, testing, interoperability and replacing long-lived hardware. Agencies plan migration over a decade or more.
Connected activity in Europe.
Night lights, population density, land cover and true-colour imagery over Europe, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.
The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.
Layers 4
Connected activity, for this page
Keyboard, with the map focused
Hold Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll to zoom
Latest available
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth
Loading the latest NASA imagery.
Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.
Connected activity, framed on Europe.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.
Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · NASA HLS S30Sources and licences
- We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
- MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). Cite as: NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA open data
- Made with Natural Earth. Free vector and raster map data @ naturalearthdata.com. Public domain
- © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). ODbL
- Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- Context on the globe and flat map: coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names from NASA GIBS reference layers (OpenStreetMap data, ODbL, © OpenStreetMap contributors); Blue Marble imagery as an optional base; 3D terrain and the elevation read-out from the ASTER GDEM elevation colour index (5 m to 200 m classes, exaggerated for legibility). Boundaries are drawn as published and imply no position on any territory.
- Live events: NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker (EONET); events are indicative and keep their original source links.
- Observed (EO): NASA HLS S30 (contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
- NASA GIBS: We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA's Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA's Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
- Optional layers (5 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.
Layers and dates
- Night-time lights, daily: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Oct 2026
- Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
- Vegetation greenness (NDVI), rolling 8 days: MODIS Terra NDVI, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
- True colour: VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
- Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024
- Enhanced vegetation index, rolling 8 days: MODIS Terra EVI, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
Post-quantum migration is due in every domain that keeps long-lived secrets.
- HealthCouplingHealth records must stay confidential for decades.What to watchData lifetime against migration date
- EnergyCouplingGrid devices last decades and need crypto-agility.What to watchDevice upgrade paths
- WaterCouplingControl system protocols need inventory before migration.What to watchCryptographic inventory
Migration planning is designed for the Foresight Outlook series. NIST published FIPS 203, 204 and 205 in 2024; national agencies have set transition timelines, which organisations should check at source.
- Cryptographic inventory lessons.
- Migration project records.
Security posture and third parties.
The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Security posture and third parties
Post quantum migration · Enterprise network · Quarter 1
CSF profile, current vs target
tier 1 to 4
Critical suppliers
| Supplier A | Cloud hosting | Yes | Medium |
| Supplier B | Payroll SaaS | No | Unknown |
| Supplier C | Managed SOC | Yes | Low |
| Supplier D | Identity provider | No | Unknown |
Critical vulnerabilities open
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Systems with cryptographic inventory | percent of critical systems | per assessment | Cryptographic discovery and inventory | DECLARED |
| Connections using post-quantum or hybrid key exchange | percent of connections | monthly | Network measurements | OBSERVED |
| Products supporting standard post-quantum algorithms | count | per assessment | Vendor disclosures | DECLARED |
| Data with long confidentiality requirements | count of data classes | per assessment | Data classification | DECLARED |
| Migration milestones met | percent of planned milestones | annual | Migration programme records | REPORTED |
| Expert estimates of cryptographically relevant quantum computer timing | probability by period | annual | Expert surveys | ESTIMATED |
Model post quantum migration as a system. Run the cascade.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Cyber and digital resilience law alignment: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
Hazards
- Dam failure
- Sea-ice loss
- Coastal erosion (set off downstream)
- River flood (set off downstream)
- Flash flood (set off downstream)
- Mass displacement (set off downstream)
- Biodiversity loss (set off downstream)
- Widespread power outage (set off downstream)
- Water supply shortfall (set off downstream)
- Arctic winter sea-ice collapse (set off downstream)
- Polar vortex disruption (set off downstream)
Systems and couplings
Controls
NS-10Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations: definition, binding, evaluation and enforcement)NS-11Verification and monitoring (evidence, attestations, zero-trust conformance observation)NS-9Contextual UNIs (deployments, instances, programme instances)NRS-X6Cyber and digital security riskNRS-H93Hazard family: Identity, trust and cryptographic failure (NHS-1 cyber.identity)NRS-K31Domain pack profile: Cyber national resilience (DOMAIN-031)NRS-H54Hazard family: Signal and platform disruption (NHS-1 cyber.platform)NRS-H86Hazard family: Telecom and data-centre failure (NHS-1 infra.digital)NRS-H94Hazard family: Systemic cyber events (NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber)
Observation
- NIST National Vulnerability Database APIs (listed for reference)
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue (listed for reference)
- EUR-Lex Cellar (EU legal acts and delegated acts) (listed for reference)
- Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
- Legal measures pillar of the Global Cybersecurity Index
Example geography
- North America: 243 hexagonal cells
- Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
- Surface water through cloud, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 radar), NASA GIBS
- Rain rate, last half hour (IMERG), NASA GIBS
- Vegetation disturbance alerts, 30 m (OPERA DIST-ALERT), NASA GIBS
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Source | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205 and the NIST post-quantum project | Standard post-quantum algorithms and transition guidance | Public domain, US government |
| National cyber agency migration guidance, such as UK NCSC and German BSI | Timelines and practices for migration | Public, terms per agency |
| IETF drafts and standards for post-quantum and hybrid protocols | Protocol integration of new algorithms | Open, IETF Trust terms |
| Cloudflare Radar post-quantum adoption data | Share of web traffic using post-quantum key agreement | Public, terms per provider (to check) |
| Expert surveys on quantum threat timelines | Distribution of expert expectations | Public reports, licence to check |
How post quantum migration is modelled, measured and tested.
The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.
System model
The couplings between the systems in post quantum migration: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Who decides | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Organisations and their security teams | Which systems to migrate first and when | Inventories; prioritisation by data lifetime |
| National cyber agencies | What timelines and requirements to set | Readiness reviews; adoption data |
| Vendors and standards bodies | How to implement and test new algorithms | Protocol and product readiness |
Outputs this topic produces
- Cryptographic inventory methods
- Migration prioritisation by data lifetime and system exposure
- Readiness reviews for products and protocols
- Evidence notes on migration timelines
What experts ask.
The timing of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer is uncertain, but the migration cannot wait for certainty. Data encrypted today could be recorded and decrypted later, a risk often called harvest now, decrypt later. Systems with long lifetimes, such as infrastructure controls, vehicles and identity documents, may still be in service when the threat arrives. Past cryptographic transitions have taken many years, which is why experts recommend starting now.
- Where does an organisation use public-key cryptography, in which protocols, products and devices?
- Which data must remain confidential long enough to be at risk from future decryption?
- Which systems can be updated easily, and which will need replacement or special measures?
- How can systems be designed for cryptographic agility, so that algorithms can be changed again in future?
Drivers and processes.
The transition is driven by a future threat, current standards and long system lifetimes.
Quantum attack
A large fault-tolerant quantum computer could break widely used public-key schemes. Symmetric encryption is less affected and can be strengthened with longer keys. See Quantum Technologies.
New algorithms
Post-quantum algorithms for key establishment and digital signatures have been standardised and are being built into protocols and products.
Inventory and agility
Organisations often do not know where cryptography is used. Hard-coded algorithms in devices and software make change slow.
The hardest part of the migration is usually not the mathematics but the inventory. Cryptography is embedded in protocols, libraries, hardware security modules, smart cards and devices, often without documentation. Organisations that treat the transition as an opportunity to build cryptographic agility, the ability to change algorithms without redesigning systems, will be better placed for future changes as well.
How the evidence is built, and its limits.
- 01
Cryptographic inventory
Discovery of algorithms, keys and certificates in use. Automated tools help but miss embedded and legacy systems.
- 02
Risk prioritisation
Ranking systems by data sensitivity, lifetime and exposure. It depends on assumptions about when the threat arrives.
- 03
Hybrid deployment
Combining classical and post-quantum algorithms during transition, applying cybersecurity and cryptography. It adds overhead but guards against flaws in new schemes.
- 04
Testing
Performance and interoperability testing of new algorithms, which have larger keys or signatures and can affect constrained devices.
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Quantum computing, sensing and communicationQuantum threat timeline assessment · Comparing PQC and QKD · Data lifetime analysisApplied here
- 02Cybersecurity and cryptographyControl baselines and gap analysis · Exploited vulnerability prioritisationApplied here
- 03Software and safety-critical systems engineeringSecure development life cycle · Safety and security co-assuranceApplied here
- 04Communications and network technologyNetwork segmentation design · Protocol security review · Post-quantum protocol readinessApplied here
Where this page's references lead.
The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.
Questions and answers.
What is post-quantum cryptography?
When will quantum computers break encryption?
What is hybrid key exchange?
When will quantum computers break current encryption?
Is quantum key distribution the answer?
Does symmetric encryption need to change?
What should an organisation do first?
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