GCRI · Health Nexus

Healthcare infrastructure

Hospitals and clinics must stay safe, standing and functioning when they are needed most: in earthquakes, floods, storms, heat, fires and conflict. Their resilience depends on location, on the structure, on non-structural elements such as equipment and utilities, and on how quickly they recover after damage. This page sets out how facilities fail and recover, how their safety is assessed, and what the evidence serves for the institutions that build and operate them.

02The question

Healthcare infrastructure: how the risk develops.

Facility resilience and recovery. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

Location sets the exposure

Facilities built on flood plains, low coasts, unstable slopes or near active faults carry that hazard for their whole working life. Siting decisions made decades earlier constrain what retrofitting can achieve.

Mechanism

Non-structural failure stops care

A building can stand while care stops: generators flood in basements, ceilings and medical gas lines fall, equipment topples and water tanks rupture. Non-structural elements fail at lower hazard intensities than structures and are cheaper to protect.

Mechanism

Functional dependencies lie outside

A hospital depends on roads for staff and patients, and on grid power, water mains, telecommunications and supply deliveries. A facility undamaged by a flood can still be unreachable or without water.

Mechanism

Recovery is its own process

After damage, recovery depends on assessment, repair finance, procurement and staff returning. Temporary facilities and referral to other sites bridge the gap, and recovery time differs by facility and by service line.

03Geography

Environmental exposure in Africa.

Population density, daytime surface heat and haze over Africa, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.

The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.

Layers 3

Environmental exposure, for this page

About this layer
Evidence
Estimated
Source
Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Columbia University))
Provider
NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Columbia University)
Licence
CC BY 4.0
Vintage
null; Census-based estimate, static (2020)
Resolution
about 1 km grid
Uncertainty
Census-based estimate of people per square kilometre in 2020, shown as exposure context; not a count of people affected by any hazard.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed (persistent cloud still leaves gaps)
Source
VIIRS NOAA-20 Level 3, 8-day (NASA LANCE)
Provider
NASA LANCE
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
8-day; Satellite 8-day composite; persistent cloud still leaves gaps
Newest at build
2026-09-14
Resolution
about 1 km grid
Uncertainty
Satellite skin temperature of the ground over the 8 days ending on the date shown, a heat exposure indicator; not air temperature, heat index or a heat warning.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed (clouds leave gaps)
Source
VIIRS NOAA-20 Deep Blue AOD (NASA LANCE)
Provider
NASA LANCE
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite retrieval; clouds leave gaps
Newest at build
2026-10-14
Resolution
about 2 km grid
Uncertainty
Satellite measure of haze, smoke and dust through the whole air column on the day shown; an exposure indicator, not ground-level PM2.5, an air quality index or a health warning.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed
Source
VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance (NASA LANCE)
Provider
NASA LANCE
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite image
Newest at build
2026-10-14
Resolution
about 250 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite image. Satellite or model raster as the provider publishes it. Clouds, swath gaps and retrieval error leave gaps and noise; values are indicators, not measurements at a place.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed (clouds leave gaps)
Source
VIIRS Global Flood Product (NASA LANCE)
Provider
NASA LANCE
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite detection; clouds leave gaps
Newest at build
2026-10-14
Resolution
about 250 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite detection; clouds leave gaps. Satellite or model raster as the provider publishes it. Clouds, swath gaps and retrieval error leave gaps and noise; values are indicators, not measurements at a place.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Modelled (latest year GIBS publishes)
Source
MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1) (NASA LP DAAC)
Provider
NASA LP DAAC
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
yearly; Satellite classification; latest year GIBS publishes
Newest at build
2024-01-01
Resolution
about 500 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite land cover classes for the year shown, including croplands; a classification with known errors, not a farm register.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map

Latest available

NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth

Loading the latest NASA imagery.

Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.

Environmental exposure, framed on Africa.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.

Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · ESA Copernicus Sentinel-5P TROPOMI · NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERTSources and licences

  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
  • VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS and VIIRS atmosphere products, NASA LANCE and LAADS DAAC; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). Cite as: NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA open data
  • Made with Natural Earth. Free vector and raster map data @ naturalearthdata.com. Public domain
  • © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). ODbL
  • Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Context on the globe and flat map: coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names from NASA GIBS reference layers (OpenStreetMap data, ODbL, © OpenStreetMap contributors); Blue Marble imagery as an optional base; 3D terrain and the elevation read-out from the ASTER GDEM elevation colour index (5 m to 200 m classes, exaggerated for legibility). Boundaries are drawn as published and imply no position on any territory.
  • Live events: NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker (EONET); events are indicative and keep their original source links.
  • Live: NASA EONET Events are indicative, not authority warnings.
  • Observed (EO): ESA Copernicus Sentinel-5P TROPOMI (contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • Observed (EO): NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERT (contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • NASA GIBS: We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • Air quality forecast, 5 days, PM2.5 (CAMS via Open-Meteo): Contains modified Copernicus Atmosphere Monitoring Service information 2026.
  • Past year, daily temperature (ERA5 via Open-Meteo): Contains modified Copernicus Climate Change Service information 2026.
  • Weather data by Open-Meteo.com (https://open-meteo.com/), licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
  • Optional layers (14 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.

Layers and dates

  • Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
  • Land surface temperature, day, 8-day composite: VIIRS NOAA-20 Level 3, 8-day, NASA LANCE · 14 Sep 2026
  • Aerosol optical depth, daily: VIIRS NOAA-20 Deep Blue AOD, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
  • True colour: VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
  • Flood water, 3-day composite: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Oct 2026
  • Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024

04Couplings

A hospital is a small city that depends on every lifeline.

DomainHow it couples hereWhat to watch
EnergyReliable electricity is a precondition of most care; many facilities in low-income settings lack it, as documented in the 2023 joint report of WHO, the World Bank, SEforALL and IRENA on electricity access in health-care facilities.Facilities with reliable electricity
WaterOn-site storage bridges supply interruptions. See water utilities.Days of water storage
FoodKitchens and supply stores need cold storage.Food storage continuity
BiodiversitySite selection and green design reduce flood and heat exposure.Facilities in flood zones

Facility safety is assessed with the WHO and PAHO Hospital Safety Index (second edition, 2015), which scores structural, non-structural and functional safety. WHO guidance on climate resilient and environmentally sustainable health care facilities (2020) adds climate hazards and environmental performance.

05Monitor

Health supply continuity.

The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.

Health supply continuity

Healthcare infrastructure · Province B · Month 10

Stock-out risk in 3 districtsGCRI · Health Nexus

Tracer commodities

Oral rehydration salts1.056Low
First-line antibiotic0.71412Low
Insulin4410Adequate
Rapid diagnostic tests0.367Critical

Order in transit

Order
PO-77959
Route
Port of entry to central store
ETA
16 days
Cold chain
Monitored

Facilities stocked out by district

Health supply continuity: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Healthcare infrastructure.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
06Reports, standards and contributions

Infrastructure evidence and contributions.

Facility resilience studies are designed for the Country Systems Risk and Resilience series. Safety assessments are done by national teams trained in the index; the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) conducts none as an authority. Useful contributions: assessment results that a ministry chooses to publish, and facility performance in past events.

07Simulator

A cascade through interdependent networks.

A hazard footprint takes out co-located assets in every layer; fragmentation, dependency between layers and overload of the survivors then spread the failure. The 3D view separates the layers by depth. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows Africa; the model itself is not tied to a place.

Controls

Assets per layer
18
Hazard footprint
8% of area
Assets that depend on another layer
60%
Spare capacity (tolerance)
30%

Readouts

Assets hit by the hazard
17%
Assets still working
17%
Amplification of the initial damage
5.0 times
Steps to settle
3
Numbers, methods and sources
StepHospitals working (%)Power working (%)Water working (%)
0788389
1392856
2171128
3171122

Methods

  1. Interdependent networks Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464
  2. Overload cascades Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66
  3. Betweenness load Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25
  4. Multilayer networks Kivela and others (2014), Journal of Complex Networks 2
  5. Infrastructure interdependencies Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001), IEEE Control Systems 21(6)
  6. Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
  7. One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley

Data

The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page’s map can draw:

  • Major roads Natural Earth
  • Railways Natural Earth
  • Seaports Natural Earth
  • Airports Natural Earth
  • Urban extents Natural Earth
  • Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band) NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP) · register nasa.gibs.context-live-layers
  • Natural events (NASA EONET) NASA EONET · register nasa.eonet.events
A cascade through interdependent networks. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: Interdependent networks (Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464); Overload cascades (Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66); Betweenness load (Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25).

Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium

08Indicators

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Hospital Safety Index categorysafety category from the indexper assessmentHospital Safety Index assessmentsPublished statistics
Facilities in hazard zonescount of facilities by hazard classper updateFacility locations on hazard mapsESTIMATED
Facility functionality after an eventpercent of facilities fully, partially or not functioningper eventHeRAMS and rapid assessmentsREPORTED
Population losing access after an eventpersons beyond a travel-time thresholdper eventAccess models with damaged roads and facilitiesMODELLED
Time to restore servicesdays by service lineper eventFacility recovery recordsREPORTED
Attacks on health careincidents; facilities affectedcontinuousWHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health CareREPORTED
Deferred maintenance and retrofit backlogcost of deferred works, local currencyannualCapital asset registersPublished statistics
09Twin and cascade simulator

Model healthcare infrastructure as a system. Run the cascade.

Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Health security and One Health: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.

Hazards

Controls

  • NS-0 Constitution and principles
  • NS-3 Risk record UNIs (grammar, legacy crosswalk, allocation authority)
  • NS-9 Contextual UNIs (deployments, instances, programme instances)
  • NS-10 Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations: definition, binding, evaluation and enforcement)
  • NS-11 Verification and monitoring (evidence, attestations, zero-trust conformance observation)
  • NRS-H83 Hazard family: Health system capacity failure (NHS-1 health.system)
  • NRS-H42 Hazard family: Rare and persistent human infections (NHS-1 health.other-human)
  • NRS-H41 Hazard family: Animal-to-human spillover (NHS-1 health.zoonotic)
  • NRS-H43 Hazard family: Livestock and aquaculture epizootics (NHS-1 health.animal-health)
  • NRS-D3 Humanitarian response and resilient recovery
  • NRS-H46 Hazard family: Environmental and product harm to people (NHS-1 health.harm)

Observation

  • WHO Disease Outbreak News (listed for reference)
  • WAHIS animal health events (listed for reference)
  • WorldPop gridded population (listed for reference)
  • International Health Regulations capacity and health emergency preparedness
  • Percentage of bloodstream infections due to selected antimicrobial-resistant organisms

Example geography

  • West Africa: 59 hexagonal cells
  • Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
  • Surface water through cloud, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 radar), NASA GIBS
  • Rain rate, last half hour (IMERG), NASA GIBS
10Sources

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

SourceWhat it givesLicence class
National master facility listsAuthoritative facility identifiers, locations and service typesBy agreement; some published as open data
Healthsites.ioOpen map of health facilities built on OpenStreetMapOpen Database Licence (ODbL)
WHO HeRAMSFacility status, damage and service availability in emergenciesBy agreement; public summaries
WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health CareAttacks on facilities, transport, personnel and patients in emergenciesPublic dashboard, WHO terms of use
Copernicus Emergency Management ServiceRapid damage and flood mapping after disastersFree and open, attribution
GEM global seismic hazard mapSeismic hazard for assessing facility exposureAttribution, non-commercial, share-alike (CC BY-NC-SA)
JRC global river flood hazard mapsRiver flood extent and depth by return periodFree and open, attribution
11Methods and evidence

How healthcare infrastructure is modelled, measured and tested.

The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.

System model

The couplings between the systems in healthcare infrastructure: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.

++−HealthCommunitiesEconomyR reinforcingB balancing
Causal loop diagram from the page’s systems; signs show the direction of influence. Illustrative structure for a system dynamics or network model, not estimated couplings.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
12Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Health Nexus prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Ministries of health and capital planning unitsWhere to build, relocate or retrofit facilities, and in what orderExposure profiles; Hospital Safety Index results; access loss scenarios
Hospital boards and facility managersWhich non-structural and utility protections to fund firstDependency maps; failure modes by hazard; recovery times by service line
Disaster management agenciesWhich facilities will remain reachable and functioning in an event, and where to send patientsAccess loss scenarios; facility functionality reports
Humanitarian health clusters and WHO country officesWhere temporary facilities and mobile services are needed after damage or attackHeRAMS functionality; attacks on health care; population without access

Outputs this topic produces

  • Facility exposure profiles by hazard with location uncertainty stated
  • Functional dependency maps for power, water, access and supplies
  • Access loss scenarios after facility or road failure
  • Recovery and retrofit evidence for capital planning
13Core questions

What experts ask.

Infrastructure questions follow a hazard through a building to a service.

  • Where are health facilities located relative to flood plains, fault lines, coasts and wildfire zones?
  • How do structural and non-structural elements, such as ceilings, equipment and pipes, perform in a hazard?
  • Which building systems, such as ventilation, cooling and medical gases, are most critical to keep running?
  • How quickly can a damaged facility restore services, and where do patients go meanwhile?
  • How should new and refurbished facilities be designed and sited for future hazards?
14Mechanisms

Mechanisms and drivers.

Hospitals can lose function without structural collapse. Non-structural damage, such as fallen equipment, broken pipes or failed lifts, and the loss of utilities are common causes of evacuation. Overheating can make wards and operating theatres unusable and damage medicines and equipment.

Recovery depends on the availability of engineers, parts and temporary facilities, and on the condition of the surrounding area. Facilities built decades ago may not reflect current hazard knowledge, and hazard patterns are changing with the climate, so siting and design decisions made now will be tested by conditions different from the past.

15Methods and data

How it is studied, and where the methods stop.

Method or dataWhat it showsLimits
Hazard exposure mapping of facilitiesWhich facilities sit in hazard zonesFacility location and attribute data can be incomplete
Structural and non-structural assessmentHow buildings and systems would performRequires on-site inspection and engineering expertise
Fragility and functionality modelsLikely loss of function at given hazard intensitiesModels generalise from limited observed damage
Post-event damage and recovery studiesWhat actually failed and how long recovery tookEach event is different; lessons need careful transfer
16Methods

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

  1. Complex systems and agent-based modellingContact and mobility networks · Cascades across health and infrastructureApplied here
  2. Data engineering, interoperability and stewardshipLinking health information systems · Privacy-preserving publicationApplied here
  3. Probability and statisticsSurvey-weighted and small-area estimation · Expected baselines for excess mortalityApplied here
  4. Epidemiology and public health scienceSurveillance design and evaluation · Nowcasting under reporting delayApplied here
18Questions

Questions and answers.

What is a safe hospital?
In the framing of the Safe Hospitals initiative, a health facility whose services remain accessible and functioning at maximum capacity, and in the same infrastructure, during and immediately after an emergency or disaster.
Why focus on non-structural elements?
Because equipment, utilities and fittings fail at lower hazard intensities than the structure, and they are often what stops care. They are also usually cheaper to protect than the structure itself.
Can open maps replace a master facility list?
No. Open maps fill gaps and help check locations, but a government master facility list with stable identifiers is needed to link facilities across health information systems.
What does safe hospital mean in this context?
A facility that remains accessible and functioning at maximum capacity, in its own structure, during and after a hazard. Achieving it requires attention to structure, non-structural elements, utilities and emergency management together.
Is retrofitting existing facilities worthwhile?
Often, particularly for non-structural elements and utilities, which can be improved without rebuilding. Priorities depend on hazard, condition and the services each facility provides.
Does Health Nexus inspect buildings?
No. Inspections are carried out by qualified engineers under the authority of owners and regulators. Health Nexus publishes research and methods.
ReportsContribute

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Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

GCRIHealth NexusGlobal Sector Risk and ResilienceCountry Systems Risk and ResilienceEvidence Brief
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