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Key findings

Twelve findings carry the supply chains and chokepoints baseline. They are grouped by coupling and never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

6 min read1 figure0 tables14 notesNR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Trade moves through a few narrow places
  4. 2Key findings
    1. 2.1 Headline finding
    2. 2.2 Trade
    3. 2.3 Infrastructure
    4. 2.4 Energy
    5. 2.5 CON
    6. 2.6 Finance
    7. 2.7 Food
    8. 2.8 Minerals
    9. 2.9 Systemic
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-007

Daily transits through the Strait of Hormuz fell from about 130 in February 2026 to 6 in March, a drop of about 95 percent, and sources differ on the February base.

Figure 2.1Strait of Hormuz daily transits, 2026
ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
February (about)≈130
March6

Source: UNCTAD rapid assessment5. The WTO cites 138 vessels a day before the closure13; the drop is a Nexus derivation, method (3).

Implication

A closure of one strait removes a large share of oil, LNG and fertiliser flows at once, so buffers, bypass routes and the speed of reopening matter more than the cause. Daily counts differ by source and by what is counted51320.

What would move it

Verified transit counts, the duration of the closure and the pace of any return of traffic would each move this finding.

2.2Trade

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-TRD-001

    Seaborne trade reached 12,720 million tons in 2024, up 2.2 percent, and 66,781 billion ton-miles, up 5.9 percent, the fastest rise since 2011, mainly because of Red Sea rerouting.1

2.3Infrastructure

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-002

    The detour around the Cape of Good Hope added about 30 percent to voyage lengths and an estimated 11 percent to container TEU-mile demand.1

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-003

    The Suez Canal handles about 10 percent of world maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade, and the Panama Canal about 3 percent; by June 2024 transits through both were down by over half from their peaks.4

  3. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-004

    Suez Canal tonnage was still 70 percent below 2023 levels in May 2025, while the Panama Canal recorded 13,404 transits and 489.1 million tons in fiscal year 2025, up 19.3 and 15.6 percent.310

2.4Energy

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-005

    The Strait of Hormuz carried 20.7 million barrels of oil a day in 2024 in the EIA table, about one fifth of global liquids consumption, and about one fifth of global LNG trade.78

2.5CON

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-006

    Estimated Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026, against 25.2 million barrels a day of production in February, and were 6.7 in August. NOT BOUND at the close: Hormuz oil and LNG flow series after the second quarter of 2026.46

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-CON-007

    Daily transits through the Strait of Hormuz fell from about 130 in February 2026 to 6 in March, a drop of about 95 percent, and sources differ on the February base.513

2.6Finance

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-008

    The WTO March 2026 baseline put 2026 merchandise volume growth at 1.9 percent after 4.6 percent in 2025, and at 1.4 percent if high energy prices persist, while UNCTAD projected 1.5 to 2.5 percent. NOT BOUND at the close: any later revision of the 2026 forecast.135

  2. ReportedEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-011

    The IMF projected Suez Canal revenue at USD 3.6 billion in fiscal year 2024/25 against USD 6.6 billion a year earlier, with transit trade at about a third of pre-conflict levels.18

2.7Food

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FOO-009

    About one third of seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes, normally passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and urea prices rose 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April 2026.617

2.8Minerals

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-MIN-010

    China’s April 2025 export controls on seven rare earth elements remain in force, and the October 2025 expansion to five more elements is suspended only until 10 November 2026.22

2.9Systemic

  1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

    The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 20News report, Facts about the Strait of Hormuz since its negotiated reopening (last updated 8 April 2026; Kpler: average of eight commodity carriers a day from 1 March to 7 April; Lloyd’s List estimate of about 800 ships stuck in the Gulf; two-week ceasefire). Arab News Pakistan, Islamabad. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 3UNCTAD (ed.), Maritime trade under pressure, growth set to stall in 2025 (news item; Suez Canal tonnage 70 percent below 2023 in May 2025; Shanghai Containerized Freight Index averaged 2,496 in 2024). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 2: Key findings. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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