Readings from the other desks
The global baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Trade moves through a few narrow places
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 6.1 The other desks’ editions of this subject
- 6.2 Three lenses
- 6.3 Standards, Academy and steward contributions
- 6.4 GCRI reading: the model card
- 6.5 Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
- 6.6 Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 supply chains and chokepoints readiness pack
- 6.7 Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
- 6.8 Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject
Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.
| Desk | Edition | State | Identifier |
|---|---|---|---|
| GCRI Systems Evidence | No edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycle | Not in this cycle | |
| GRF Public Deliberation | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| GRA Capital Readiness | No edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycle | Not in this cycle | |
| Standards Progress | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| Academy Capability | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit | |
| Index Measurement | Outside this desk’s remit | Not in remit |
6.2Three lenses
One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.
GCRI · KEY T
Technical Truth
The evidence supports reading trade as a network with narrow places. Common causes recur across routes, disruptions spread through shared straits, canals and processors, and recovery is limited by thresholds such as transit capacity and stocks. Evidence is strongest for single routes and weakest for exposure that crosses several.
INF-003 · CON-007 · MIN-010 · SYS-012
GRF · KEY M
Public Meaning
For most people supply chain failure arrives as a higher price at the pump, on a food label or on a device. The baseline asks that public debate treat trade routes as shared and keep recovery, not only prevention, in view.
CON-006 · FOO-009 · FIN-008
GRA · KEY F
Capital Meaning
Readiness implications only. Freight, insurance and fuel costs moved sharply, and projected canal revenue halved in one year1618. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.
FIN-008 · FIN-011
NEXUS
Synthesis
Trade risk is well described route by route and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind exposure data, test the compound chokepoint loss, and map recovery thresholds before the next closure.
SYS-012 · C-01 · C-03
6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions
How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for supply chains and chokepoints. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.
| Quarter | Edition | Question | Boundary |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | State and Agenda | What matters this year, and what is the starting position? | observed baseline stays distinct from planned work |
| Q2 | Evidence and Build | What new evidence and capability exist? | a configured capability is not a validated result |
| Q3 | Stress Test and Readiness | What do scenarios and tests show? | simulated loss or performance is not observed impact |
| Q4 | Annual Synthesis and Renewal | What changed in the year, and what renews? | release follows review, not event publicity deadlines |
| Steward or body | Role | Contribution route |
|---|---|---|
| The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada) | Lead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T) | science and practice communities · GCRI gateway |
| The Global Risks Forum (GRF) | leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M) | policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway |
| The Global Risks Alliance (GRA) | finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F) | finance and insurance · GRA gateway |
| Nexus Standards | preparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methods | Standards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI |
| Risk Academy | learning pathways tied to the agenda questions | Academy gateway · learning by review |
| Reports strategic desks | supply chain chapter inputs: GCRI evidence and GRA readiness | strategic editorial board |
Standards drafts used in this edition
- Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
- Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
- Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech
Standards calendar to watch
- Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
- Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
- Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition
6.4GCRI reading: the model card
GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology
6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays
Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.
Ships carry most of the world’s goods, and a few straits, canals and processing hubs decide cost and time. Reading each route alone understates how a fault in one becomes a fault in many. This edition reads the network.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01
Trade is a network with narrow places
Distance-adjusted trade grew 5.9 percent in 2024 against 2.2 percent for volume. UNCTAD reads the gap as fragility and inefficiency, not as strength. A route that works only by taking a longer way is a cost, not a buffer.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02
Rerouting is not resilience
A closure at Hormuz shut in oil production and cut fertiliser flows together. The fertiliser effect arrives later, at planting, and cannot be rescheduled without yield loss. This is why the baseline treats trade and food as one system.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03
Energy and food share a strait
WTO data show world merchandise volume up 4.6 percent in 2025, while Middle East export volumes fell 9.7 percent year on year in the first quarter of 2026. A healthy total can hide a severe regional loss.
EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04
Aggregate trade can hold while parts fail
6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 supply chains and chokepoints readiness pack
The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.
| Item | Register | State at baseline | First 2027 entry |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | Global risk state delta | baseline set by this edition | changes against the baseline |
| E2 | WEFH+B state delta | five global system readings set | indicator updates and freshness |
| E3 | Agenda and Portfolio movement | eight agenda items · 6 proposed objects | admission decisions |
| E4 | Federation delivery register | national chapters in preparation | national chapters |
| E5 | Consortium capability register | national consortia forming | first contributions |
| E6 | Leadership questions and challenges | none yet | first challenge log |
| E7 | Foundry technical state | national environments prepared | first federation cut |
| E8 | Publication candidates | twelve findings carried forward | PUBLISH · HOLD dispositions |
| E9 | Universe readiness | one candidate mission | admission and role spine |
| E10 | Correction register | none | first federation-wide cycle |
Publication dispositions
- Publish
- Hold
- Needs evidence
- Restricted
- Superseded
6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch
Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.
- IN FORCE
- ADOPTED
- PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE
- PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY
| Instrument | Body | Scope | Status | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, straits regime29 | United Nations | global | IN FORCE | transit passage |
| Montreux Convention30 | signatory states | Turkish Straits | IN FORCE | straits passage |
| Constantinople Convention31 | signatory states | Suez Canal | IN FORCE | canal passage |
| Panama Canal treaties32 | Panama and the United States | Panama | IN FORCE | canal neutrality |
| ISPS Code, SOLAS chapter XI-224 | IMO | global | IN FORCE | ship and port security |
| Trade Facilitation Agreement25 | WTO | global | IN FORCE | customs and transit |
| ISO 28000:2022 supply chain security33 | ISO | global | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | security management |
| ISO 31000:2018 risk management34 | ISO | global | PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY | risk process |
| Critical Raw Materials Act35 | European Union | EU | IN FORCE | strategic raw materials |
| Chips Act36 | European Union | EU | IN FORCE | chip supply |
| SAFE Framework of Standards37 | World Customs Organization | global | PUBLISHED · GUIDANCE | secure and facilitated trade |
Changed since 2024
6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments
The review behind this edition covers supply chains and chokepoints assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.
Review protocol
- Question
- What does the published evidence establish about the world’s supply chains, trade routes and chokepoints and its couplings?
- Sources searched
- agency and organisation reports; chokepoint flow statistics; freight indices; peer-reviewed supply network literature
- Window
- releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
- Selection
- sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
- Next step
- systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027
| Reference | Type | Year | Role | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Acemoglu et al.38 | journal article | 2012 | framework | network origins of fluctuations |
| Carvalho et al.39 | journal article | 2021 | supports | supply chain disruption after an earthquake |
| Barrot and Sauvagnat40 | journal article | 2016 | supports | input specificity and shock propagation |
| Baldwin and Freeman41 | journal article | 2022 | framework | risks and global supply chains |
| Benigno et al.42 | working paper | 2022 | framework | supply chain pressure measurement |
| Rodrigue43 | book | 2020 | framework | transport geography |
| Reference | Issuer | Year | Role | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Review of Maritime Transport 20251 | UNCTAD | 2025 | supports | volume and ton-miles |
| Review of Maritime Transport 20244 | UNCTAD | 2024 | supports | canal shares |
| Hormuz rapid assessment5 | UNCTAD | 2026 | supports | transit drop |
| World Trade Report 202615 | WTO | 2026 | supports | MFN share |
| Global Trade Outlook and Statistics13 | WTO | 2026 | supports | trade forecast |
| Director-General remarks17 | FAO | 2026 | supports | fertiliser and food |
| Reference | Issuer | Year | Role | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| World Oil Transit Chokepoints7 | EIA | 2026 | supports | chokepoint oil flows |
| Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 202646 | EIA | 2026 | supports | Hormuz-related oil shut-ins |
| Panama Canal fiscal year 202510 | Panama Canal Authority | 2025 | supports | canal transits |
| World Container Index16 | Drewry | 2026 | supports | container freight |
| IMF fourth review as reported18 | IMF | 2025 | context | Suez revenue |
| Global Critical Minerals Outlook 202626 | IEA | 2026 | context | mineral concentration |
| Mineral Commodity Summaries 202627 | USGS | 2026 | context | rare earth production |
| Semiconductor supply chain study28 | SIA and BCG | 2021 | context | chip manufacturing location |
| Reference | Issuer | Year | Role | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, straits29 | United Nations | 1982 | context | transit passage |
| Montreux Convention30 | signatory states | 1936 | context | Turkish Straits |
| Constantinople Convention31 | signatory states | 1888 | context | Suez Canal |
| Panama Canal treaties32 | Panama and the United States | 1977 | context | canal neutrality |
| ISPS Code24 | IMO | 2004 | supports | ship and port security |
| Trade Facilitation Agreement25 | WTO | 2017 | supports | customs and transit |
| ISO 2800033 | ISO | 2022 | context | supply chain security management |
Where the evidence agrees
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, cited from memory. United Nations, New York. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits (Montreux Convention), 1936, cited from memory. Observation year 1936. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal (Constantinople Convention), 1888, cited from memory. Observation year 1888. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 32UNVERIFIED, not opened: Treaty concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, 1977, cited from memory. Observation year 1977. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 24IMO (ed.), SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (web page; mandatory Part A and guidance Part B; in force 1 July 2004). International Maritime Organization, London. Observation year 2004. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 25WTO (ed.), Trade Facilitation Agreement (web page; Bali Ministerial Conference 2013; in force 22 February 2017). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 28000:2022, Security and resilience: security management systems for the supply chain. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 34UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 31000:2018, Risk management: guidelines. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2024, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2023, cited from memory. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 37UNVERIFIED, not opened: World Customs Organization (ed.), SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, cited from memory. World Customs Organization, Brussels. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2UNCTAD (ed.), Stormy seas for global shipping: UNCTAD warns of uncertainty, volatility and rising costs (press release of 24 September 2025; 2025 volume growth 0.5 percent; port fees on certain vessels; alternative-fuel share 8 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 45UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Trade Representative, Section 301 action on China’s targeted maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors, 2025 (port fees on certain vessels); the page returned an error and the measure is known here only from the UNCTAD press release cited as reference 2. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V.M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., The network origins of aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 80(5), 1977 to 2016, 2012, cited from memory. Observation year 2012. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Carvalho, V.M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y.U. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1255 to 1321, 2021, cited from memory. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Barrot, J.-N. and Sauvagnat, J., Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(3), 1543 to 1592, 2016, cited from memory. Observation year 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Baldwin, R. and Freeman, R., Risks and global supply chains: what we know and what we need to know, Annual Review of Economics 14, 153 to 180, 2022, cited from memory. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Benigno, G., di Giovanni, J., Groen, J.J.J. and Noble, A.I., The Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: a new tool to measure supply chain disruptions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2022, cited from memory; the index page returned no definition. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 43UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rodrigue, J.-P., The Geography of Transport Systems, 5th edition. Routledge, New York, 2020, cited from memory. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 26UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (July 2026), taken only from the press article cited as reference 23; the IEA page returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, rare earths chapter; the publication returned an access error and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era, 2021, taken from search-result summaries that disagree on the Taiwan share; no figure is used in findings. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 23Investment Monitor (ed.), China rare earth curbs put USD 6.5 trillion of output at risk, article of 16 July 2026 reporting the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (about 85 percent top-country rare earth refining share in 2025; investment down 9 percent in 2025); the IEA report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back