Systems and sectors at baseline
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Trade moves through a few narrow places
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
3.1Where each system stood at evidence close
TRD · Volume
Seaborne trade volume, 2024
12,720million tonsup 2.2%.
Reported2024UNCTAD1
INF · Distance
Seaborne trade in ton-miles, 2024
66,781billion ton-milesup 5.9%, fastest since 2011.
Reported2024UNCTAD1
ENE · Hormuz, 2024
Total oil flow through the strait
20.7million b/dEIA table; LNG about one fifth of trade.
CON · Hormuz, 2026
Crude oil shut-ins, March to June average
9.4million b/dagainst 25.2 produced in February.
Reported2026EIA46
FIN · Trade outlook
WTO 2026 merchandise volume growth, March baseline
1.9%1.4% in the high-energy-price case.
Reported2026WTO13
FOO · Fertiliser
Share of seaborne fertiliser trade through Hormuz
≈1/3about 16 million tonnesUNCTAD estimate, March 2026.
Reported2026UNCTAD6
3.2Domain posture
Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through supply chains and chokepoints, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries supply chains and chokepoints risk into each domain.
| Domain | Posture at baseline | Coupling | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| WAT | Desalination and pumping depend on energy; Gulf water systems not consolidated here. | ENE → WAT | Inferred EQL 2 |
| ENE | About one fifth of oil and LNG passes through Hormuz; oil production was shut in at scale in 2026. | ENE → all | Reported EQL 4 |
| FOO | About one third of seaborne fertiliser passes through Hormuz; urea prices rose sharply. | ENE → FOO | Reported EQL 3 |
| HLT | Medical supply chains depend on freight and energy; not consolidated here. | ENE → HLT | Inferred EQL 2 |
| BIO | Bulk trade routes and ports affect species movement; evidence not consolidated here. | TRD → BIO | Expert input EQL 2 |
| CLI | Low water levels cut Panama Canal transits until mid-2024. | CLI → INF | Reported EQL 3 |
| INF | Canals, straits and ports: Suez about 10 percent of maritime trade volume. | the core system | Reported EQL 4 |
| FIN | WTO March baseline of 1.9 percent volume growth in 2026; Suez revenue projected to halve. | TRD → FIN | Reported EQL 4 |
| DAT | Vessel-tracking data are the main evidence and were unreliable for Hormuz in 2026. | DAT ↔ TRD | Reported EQL 3 |
| AIC | The share of trade growth from AI-enabling goods is not bound at the close. | AIC → TRD | Inferred EQL 2 |
| MIN | Rare earth controls and concentrated refining: about 85 percent top-country refining share in 2025. | MIN → TRD | Reported EQL 3 |
| TRD | The core system: 12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024. | the core system | Reported EQL 4 |
3.3Sector screens
All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on supply chains and chokepoints, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.
| Code | Sector | Baseline evidence | Exposure to watch | Evidence coverage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GS-00 | Cross-system | trade routes couple every sector14 | chokepoint closure with freight spike | PARTIAL |
| GS-01 | Water | desalination depends on energy and fuel flows | fuel loss at coastal plants | THIN |
| GS-02 | Energy | Hormuz-related oil shut-ins in 202646 | strait closure | GOOD |
| GS-03 | Food and agrifood | about one third of seaborne fertiliser via Hormuz617 | fertiliser and freight shocks | PARTIAL |
| GS-04 | Health | medical supply depends on freight and energy | port closure | THIN |
| GS-05 | Finance and economy | WTO March baseline 1.9 percent13 | trade shock and price spike | PARTIAL |
| GS-06 | Development | high transport costs hit small island and least developed states hardest2 | rerouting costs | PARTIAL |
| GS-07 | Climate | low water levels cut Panama transits4 | water-level limits on canals | PARTIAL |
| GS-08 | Disaster | port and route closures after hazards | concurrent closures | THIN |
| GS-09 | Infrastructure | canal and strait transits410 | canal capacity limits | GOOD |
| GS-10 | Cities | port cities depend on a few routes | port disruption | THIN |
| GS-11 | Biodiversity | shipping routes shape pressure on ecosystems | route shifts | THIN |
| GS-12 | Earth observation | vessel tracking underpins chokepoint evidence546 | tracking data gaps | PARTIAL |
| GS-13 | Cyber and digital | port and vessel systems carry digital risk | systems disruption | THIN |
| GS-14 | Policy | MFN terms cover 72 percent of trade15; export controls22 | policy shocks | GOOD |
| GS-15 | Science | supply network science is mature383940 | data at operating scale | PARTIAL |
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 2UNCTAD (ed.), Stormy seas for global shipping: UNCTAD warns of uncertainty, volatility and rising costs (press release of 24 September 2025; 2025 volume growth 0.5 percent; port fees on certain vessels; alternative-fuel share 8 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V.M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., The network origins of aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 80(5), 1977 to 2016, 2012, cited from memory. Observation year 2012. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Carvalho, V.M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y.U. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1255 to 1321, 2021, cited from memory. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Barrot, J.-N. and Sauvagnat, J., Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(3), 1543 to 1592, 2016, cited from memory. Observation year 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.back