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Risks and capability

Four global risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence; loss metrics are added only where they can be modelled.

6 min read0 figures1 table22 notesNR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Trade moves through a few narrow places
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
    1. 4.1 Risk objects
    2. 4.2 Capability ladder
  7. 5A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

  1. ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR03-CON-001

    Strait closure with energy and fertiliser knock-on

    Driver
    war closing a strait to most traffic546
    Exposure
    oil, LNG and fertiliser importers in South Asia and Europe
    Vulnerability
    few bypass routes; thin stocks of fertiliser inputs
    Capacity
    strategic stocks; bypass pipelines; alternative suppliers
    Cascade
    ENE → FOO → HLT
    Horizon
    1 to 3 years

  2. ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR03-INF-002

    Red Sea diversion and loss of Suez capacity

    Driver
    attacks on vessels leading lines to route around Africa1
    Exposure
    East Asia to Europe container trade, Egypt’s canal revenue
    Vulnerability
    longer voyages absorb ship capacity
    Capacity
    route diversity; return of transits1916
    Cascade
    TRD → FIN → DEV
    Horizon
    1 to 3 years

  3. InferredEQL 3RSK-SR03-MIN-003

    Export licensing of processed minerals

    Driver
    licence requirements on rare earth elements22
    Exposure
    magnet, electronics and vehicle makers
    Vulnerability
    concentrated refining; no short-run substitute
    Capacity
    stocks; recycling; processing capacity outside the top refiner23
    Cascade
    MIN → TRD → AIC
    Horizon
    1 to 5 years

  4. ReportedEQL 3RSK-SR03-INF-004

    Canal capacity limits from water levels

    Driver
    low water levels limiting transits14
    Exposure
    US East Coast and Asia container, LPG and bulk trade
    Vulnerability
    single water source for a major canal
    Capacity
    draft and slot management; recovery to 13,404 transits in FY202510
    Cascade
    CLI → INF → TRD
    Horizon
    annual

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence at the global level, from a policy listing to performance in real events.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
FunctionRungLevelStrongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigationEXISTSmaritime security regime and trade facilitation rules widespread; implementation uneven242533
Monitoring and observationADEQUATEvessel tracking and statistics; Hormuz series unreliable in 20264644
Early warningLISTEDno common cross-chokepoint warning; shipping advisories are issued per event
Preparedness and planningEXISTScritical raw materials and chips frameworks in force in the EU3536
Redundancy and reservesLISTEDstrategic stock and spare ship capacity not consolidated
ResponseDEMONSTRATEDrerouting around the Cape within weeks of the 2023 to 2024 attacks1
Continuity of critical servicesEXISTScanal operators recovered transits after the drought year10
RecoveryLISTEDrecovery of Hormuz flows after 2026 not verified at close
AdaptationEXISTSdiversification of origins and destinations reported1
Social protectionLISTEDsupport for importers of food and fuel not consolidated
Finance and insuranceLISTEDwar-risk insurance cost reported to rise; premiums not bound5
Institutional coordinationEXISTSWTO trade facilitation and straits law252930
Technical infrastructureEXISTScanal expansions and port systems; fleet partly ageing4
WorkforceLISTEDseafarer and port workforce not consolidated
Research capacityADEQUATEsupply network science mature3839404142
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 19FreightWaves (ed.), Suez container ships near low for all of 2025 (2 December 2025; container transits about 4.7 to 5.0 a day in July to November 2025; sources include Xeneta and a shipping agency). FreightWaves, Chattanooga. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 23Investment Monitor (ed.), China rare earth curbs put USD 6.5 trillion of output at risk, article of 16 July 2026 reporting the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (about 85 percent top-country rare earth refining share in 2025; investment down 9 percent in 2025); the IEA report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 24IMO (ed.), SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (web page; mandatory Part A and guidance Part B; in force 1 July 2004). International Maritime Organization, London. Observation year 2004. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 25WTO (ed.), Trade Facilitation Agreement (web page; Bali Ministerial Conference 2013; in force 22 February 2017). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 28000:2022, Security and resilience: security management systems for the supply chain. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 44UNVERIFIED, not opened: IMF (ed.), PortWatch, chokepoint transit and trade monitoring platform; the dashboard page returned no readable content and no figure is used. International Monetary Fund, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2024, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2023, cited from memory. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, cited from memory. United Nations, New York. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits (Montreux Convention), 1936, cited from memory. Observation year 1936. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V.M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., The network origins of aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 80(5), 1977 to 2016, 2012, cited from memory. Observation year 2012. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Carvalho, V.M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y.U. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1255 to 1321, 2021, cited from memory. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Barrot, J.-N. and Sauvagnat, J., Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(3), 1543 to 1592, 2016, cited from memory. Observation year 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Baldwin, R. and Freeman, R., Risks and global supply chains: what we know and what we need to know, Annual Review of Economics 14, 153 to 180, 2022, cited from memory. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  22. 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Benigno, G., di Giovanni, J., Groen, J.J.J. and Noble, A.I., The Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: a new tool to measure supply chain disruptions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2022, cited from memory; the index page returned no definition. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 4: Risks and capability. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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