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A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates

A conditional statement under stated assumptions, never a prediction.

2 min read0 figures0 tables3 notesNR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Trade moves through a few narrow places
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates
    1. 5.1 Assumptions
    2. 5.2 The cascade, step by step
    3. 5.3 The scenario as a table of steps
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

5.1Assumptions

Scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.

Baseline
the 2026 reference state in this edition
Drivers
a strait closure that removes energy and fertiliser flows while container ships still route around Africa
Analogues
Hormuz, March 2026; Red Sea rerouting, 20245461
Interventions
none modelled: the specification describes the unmitigated case
Run state
narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027

5.2The cascade, step by step

  1. 1

    CON → ENE

    transits through the strait fall by about 95 percent

    2026

  2. 2

    ENE → TRD

    tanker rates, war-risk cover and bunker costs rise

    2026

  3. 3

    ENE → FOO

    fertiliser deliveries are delayed and prices rise

    2026

  4. 4

    TRD → INF

    ships stay on long routes, so capacity stays tight

    2024

  5. 5

    TRD → FIN

    importers face higher bills; canal revenue stays low

    2025

  6. 6

    FIN → DEV

    import-dependent economies cut spending

    2026

5.3The scenario as a table of steps

How the shock in scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01 would travel through Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints’s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.

StepWhat happensSource
01 CON to energyTransits through the strait fall by about 95 percent. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition SR-03, scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01, step 1
02 Energy to tradeTanker rates, war-risk cover and bunker costs rise. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition SR-03, scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01, step 2
03 Energy to foodFertiliser deliveries are delayed and prices rise. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition SR-03, scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01, step 3
04 Trade to infrastructureShips stay on long routes, so capacity stays tight. Analogue or source: 2024.Edition SR-03, scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01, step 4
05 Trade to financeImporters face higher bills; canal revenue stays low. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition SR-03, scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01, step 5
06 Finance to developmentImport-dependent economies cut spending. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition SR-03, scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01, step 6

A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints 2026, scenario SCN-SR03-CHK-01 (2026); Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 5: A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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