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Signature lag while key agreement migrates

A conditional statement under stated assumptions, never a prediction.

2 min read0 figures0 tables2 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Cryptography is infrastructure under change
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Signature lag while key agreement migrates
    1. 5.1 Assumptions
    2. 5.2 The cascade, step by step
    3. 5.3 The scenario as a table of steps
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

5.1Assumptions

Scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.

Baseline
the 2026 reference state in this edition
Drivers
key agreement is widely hybrid while signatures, certificates and long-life devices stay on current methods, and a hardware milestone arrives sooner than planned
Analogues
the fall in resource estimates from 2019 to 2025; the 2024 standards221
Interventions
none modelled: the specification describes the unmitigated case
Run state
narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027

5.2The cascade, step by step

  1. 1

    INF → DAT

    a hardware milestone lowers confidence in public-key signatures

    2025

  2. 2

    DAT → INF

    long-life devices and certificates cannot be updated quickly

    2025

  3. 3

    INF → FIN

    operators re-prioritise migration spending

    2026

  4. 4

    GOV → INF

    national timelines and reporting duties diverge

    2026

  5. 5

    INF → HLT

    archived records and device identities become the first exposure

    2026

  6. 6

    FIN → INF

    spending shifts to inventory and agility

    2026

5.3The scenario as a table of steps

How the shock in scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01 would travel through Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography’s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.

StepWhat happensSource
01 Infrastructure to datA hardware milestone lowers confidence in public-key signatures. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 1
02 DAT to infrastructureLong-life devices and certificates cannot be updated quickly. Analogue or source: 2025.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 2
03 Infrastructure to financeOperators re-prioritise migration spending. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 3
04 Governance to infrastructureNational timelines and reporting duties diverge. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 4
05 Infrastructure to healthArchived records and device identities become the first exposure. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 5
06 Finance to infrastructureSpending shifts to inventory and agility. Analogue or source: 2026.Edition XT-10, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01, step 6

A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026, scenario SCN-XT10-SIG-01 (2026); Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 5: Signature lag while key agreement migrates. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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