Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Data appendix

The indicator set with its sources, the source registers, the licences of every kind of material and the formats of the edition.

10 min read0 figures8 tables21 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Cryptography is infrastructure under change
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Signature lag while key agreement migrates
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
    1. B.1 The indicator set
    2. B.2 Global source register
    3. B.3 Regional reading, cybersecurity and cryptography across ten clusters
    4. B.4 Cluster card: hybrid key-agreement deployment
    5. B.5 How countries appear in the cybersecurity and cryptography edition
    6. B.6 Licences
    7. B.7 Formats and provenance
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

B.1The indicator set

Table B.1Global baseline indicator set
IndicatorValueUnitYearStateSource
NIST post-quantum standards finalised3standards2024Reported123
ML-KEM parameter sets3sets2024Reported1
NIST IR 8547 initial draft published12 Novdate2024Reported44
NIST IR 8547 draft: algorithms disallowed after2035year2024Reported44
Post-close, context only: NIST IR 8547 final published27 Octdate2026Reported5
HQC selection announced11 Mardate2025Reported6
NCSC first milestone2028year2025Reported10
NCSC last milestone2035year2025Reported10
RSA-2048 noisy-qubit estimate<1million2025Reported22
Assumed gate error in estimate0.1%2025Reported22
Origin servers supporting post-quantum key agreement3.7%2025Reported23
ML-DSA-44 signature added to a TLS handshake≈15kB2025Reported23
CISA KEV entriesNOT BOUNDentries2026NOT BOUND
Agencies co-sealing the 2025 advisory23agencies2025Reported14
FBI complaints859,532complaints2024Reported15
FBI reported losses16.6USD billion2024Reported15
Incidents analysed in the ENISA period4,875incidents2025Reported16
Indicators, CSVIndicators, JSON

B.2Global source register

The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.

Domains bound by the register

  • INF
  • DAT
  • FIN
  • TRD
  • HLT
  • ENE
  • WAT
  • MIN
  • CLI
  • FOO
Table B.3Global source register
SourceCategoryCoveragePeriodCadenceRole
NIST FIPS pages123national standards bodyUS and global2024one-offstandards
NIST IR 8547 draft44national standards bodyUS2024periodictransition
NCSC timelines10national agencyUK2025periodictimeline
European Commission page11EU institutionEU2025continuousroadmap
CISA KEV catalogue13national agencyglobal entries2026continuousexploitation
FBI IC3 report15national agencyUS complaints2024annuallosses
ENISA threat landscape16EU agencyEU2025annualincidents
Cloudflare analysis23vendorone network2025continuousdeployment
IBM Cost of a Data Breach18vendorglobal sample2026annualcost
ISC2 workforce study20professional bodyglobal survey2025annualskills

B.3Regional reading, cybersecurity and cryptography across ten clusters

Regional plates follow with the regional editions. This page gives the regional reading of cybersecurity and cryptographic readiness in table form and ranks no region.

Table B.4Regional reading, cybersecurity and cryptography across ten clusters
RegionPrincipal hazardsSystems most exposedBaseline evidence
North Americafederal migration directives; standards authorship; incident reportingcryptography, threatNIST44; FBI15; CISA12
South Americamigration planningcryptographyregional evidence (not bound)
EuropeEU roadmap, Cyber Resilience Act and national timelinescryptography, regulationEuropean Commission11; NCSC10; ENISA16
Eurasianational standards programmescryptographyregional evidence (not bound)
Middle East and North Africanational programmesthreatregional evidence (not bound)
Africaskills and accessworkforceregional evidence (not bound)
South Asianational programmescryptography, skillsregional evidence (not bound)
East Asianational standards programmescryptographyregional evidence (not bound)
ASEANregional cooperation; the UN convention was opened for signature in Hanoi in 2025governanceUN convention29
Oceania-Pacificco-sealed the 2025 advisory with partnersthreatCISA14

B.4Cluster card: hybrid key-agreement deployment

  • deployment
  • key agreement
  • protocols
  • signatures
Systems in view
web protocol, secure shell, messaging protocols, content networks
Defining events
OpenSSH 10.0 default and the 2025 network measurement2324
Couplings
GOV → INF timelines; INF → DAT exposure
Capability evidence
open-source defaults and protocol designs reported242526
Gaps
signature deployment; embedded devices; sector totals
Agenda items
C-02 · C-03

Hybrid key agreement is on by default in major open-source and network deployments, and most human traffic to one large network used it in late 2025 [23] [24].

KEY AGREEMENT

Wide hybrid deployment

Apple and Signal describe ongoing post-quantum rekeying in their messaging protocols [25] [26].

MESSAGING

Post-quantum protocol steps

Signatures add size to every handshake, and trust in new certificates is not expected to be broad before 2027 [23].

SIGNATURES

The harder step

B.5How countries appear in the cybersecurity and cryptography edition

Countries enter the cybersecurity and cryptography edition through the readiness chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never ranked.

Table B.5How countries appear in the cybersecurity and cryptography edition
Card fieldWhat it showsSource
WEFH+B stateeach core system against peer distribution bandsnational edition
Couplingsthe national dependency matrixnational edition
Risk objectsthe national risk portfolionational edition
Capability rungsthe national capability laddernational edition
Evidence ageoldest and newest source datesnational source register

Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme

26national

countries and unions

10regional

clusters

16global

flagship and sector

14strategic

systems reports

20frontier

technology reports

How to read a country card

  • Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
  • Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
  • Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
  • Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such
Table B.6National Baseline Editions in the 2026 programme
WaveCountries and unionsState
W0CanadaISSUED
W1United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, European Union, SwitzerlandPLANNED
W2Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Türkiye, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, African Union, India, China, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, AustraliaPLANNED

B.6Licences

Table B.7Licences of each kind of material
MaterialLicence
TextCC BY 4.0
Dataon the licence of each source; Nexus tables CC BY 4.0
FiguresNexus figures CC BY 4.0; third-party as credited
Mapsboundary source and licence printed on each plate
MetadataCC0 1.0, as Zenodo publishes it
Third-party data, figures and textThe source’s own licence, credited where it is used; never relicensed
Nexus-authored text, tables and figures: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0). Map plates print their boundary source and licence.

B.7Formats and provenance

Table B.8This edition in every format
FormatKindStateWhat it isIdentifier
Web editionHTMLOn this siteDraft in stewardship review; every value resolves to its source.NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Print editionPDFAt releaseA4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF, signed with the web edition at release.NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Indicator dataCSV · JSONOn this site17 indicators with unit, year, status and source; the machine-readable copy ships with the evidence bundle at release.NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE data release v1
FiguresSVG · PNGOn this site4 on the web edition: headline figure, figure 1.3, coupling instrument, capability ladder.FIG-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-*
SlidesPDFNot recordedNo slide deck is recorded for this edition.
Evidence briefHTML · PDFNot recordedNo evidence brief is recorded for this edition.
Dataset with DOIDataCiteAt releaseConcept and version DOI are minted at deposit; none is recorded yet.

Provenance

Edition pack
The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built
Evidence cut
DC-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026
Reproducibility
sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters
Self-check
14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release
Review
five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)
Publisher of record
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) for the Nexus Consortium
Corrections
Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 5POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, final (publication page; document history 27 October 2026, after the 30 September evidence close; abstract refers to Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15; no dates on the page; PDF not opened). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 16European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; 4,875 incidents analysed; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026 corrected figures; PDF not opened). ENISA, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 13POST-CLOSE, context only: CISA (ed.), Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (catalogue page; 1,767 results at the read; newest entry added 2026-11-03). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations, Convention against Cybercrime (opened for signature in Hanoi on 25 October 2025; signatory counts of 65, 72, 74 and 75 appear in news and press summaries; entry into force on the ninetieth day after the fortieth ratification), taken from search summaries; the UNODC page returned an error. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 25Signal (ed.), Signal Protocol and Post-Quantum Ratchets, SPQR triple ratchet (blog post, 2 October 2025; ML-KEM 768; gradual rollout; formal verification). Signal Messenger, Mountain View. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 26Apple (ed.), iMessage with PQ3: The new state of the art in quantum-secure messaging at scale (security blog post, 21 February 2024; Kyber-1024 and Kyber-768 hybrid with P-256; level 3 on its own scale). Apple, Cupertino. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this annex

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Annex B: Data appendix. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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