Readings from the other desks

The cybersecurity and cryptography baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.

15 min read0 figures8 tables35 notesNR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

Desk	Edition	State
GCRI Systems Evidence	No edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycle	Not in this cycle
GRF Public Deliberation	Outside this desk’s remit	Not in remit
GRA Capital Readiness	Outside this desk’s remit	Not in remit
Standards Progress	No edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycle	Not in this cycle
Academy Capability	No edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycle	Not in this cycle
Index Measurement	Outside this desk’s remit	Not in remit

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading cybersecurity and cryptography as protective infrastructure under change. Standards are finalised, key agreement has moved, and signatures and long-life devices have not. Evidence is strongest for standards and official threat records, and weakest for migration progress, cost and workforce.

CRY-001 · GOV-004 · INF-005 · SYS-012

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people the story arrives as a message about encryption, a breach notice or a ransomware headline. The baseline asks that public debate separate standards from deployment, and ordinary vulnerabilities from distant machines.

CRY-001 · THR-009 · INF-006

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Breach and ransomware costs come from vendors and are weak evidence¹⁸¹⁹. Migration has costs that fall on operators. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

FIN-010 · CRY-001

NEXUS

Synthesis

Cryptography is well described by standards and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind migration progress, publish a comparable deployment table and test the signature pathway before the next hardware milestone.

SYS-012 · C-01 · C-02

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for cybersecurity and cryptography. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

Table 6.1The quarterly rhythm every edition follows
Quarter	Edition	Question	Boundary
Q1	State and Agenda	What matters this year, and what is the starting position?	observed baseline stays distinct from planned work
Q2	Evidence and Build	What new evidence and capability exist?	a configured capability is not a validated result
Q3	Stress Test and Readiness	What do scenarios and tests show?	simulated loss or performance is not observed impact
Q4	Annual Synthesis and Renewal	What changed in the year, and what renews?	release follows review, not event publicity deadlines

Table 6.2Who contributes what each quarter
Steward or body	Role	Contribution route
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI Canada)	Lead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T)	science and practice communities · GCRI gateway
The Global Risks Forum (GRF)	leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M)	policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway
The Global Risks Alliance (GRA)	finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F)	finance and insurance · GRA gateway
Nexus Standards	preparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methods	Standards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI
Risk Academy	learning pathways tied to the agenda questions	Academy gateway · learning by review
Nexus Standards and Academy	technology chapter inputs: GCRI evidence, NXS standards, RA capability	technology editorial board

Standards drafts used in this edition

Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech

Standards calendar to watch

Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

NIST finished three standards in 2024. Deployment is a different record, and it is moving at different speeds for key agreement and signatures. Keeping them apart avoids both alarm and complacency.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

Standards are not deployment

Exploited known vulnerabilities, ransomware and fraud account for the reported harm. A distant machine is a planning question; an unpatched router is an incident now.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Ordinary causes dominate

Telemetry from vendors is useful and unaudited. This edition labels each vendor figure and asks for primary data before costs and payments are compared.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Vendor evidence needs a label

No consolidated series of migration progress was found. A shared indicator table would show where inventory, signatures and devices are stuck.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Measurement is the missing layer

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 cybersecurity and cryptography readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.32027 cybersecurity and cryptography readiness pack
Item	Register	State at baseline	First 2027 entry
E1	Cybersecurity and Cryptography risk state delta	baseline set by this edition	changes against the baseline
E2	WEFH+B state delta	five global system readings set	indicator updates and freshness
E3	Agenda and Portfolio movement	eight agenda items · 6 proposed objects	admission decisions
E4	Federation delivery register	national chapters in preparation	national chapters
E5	Consortium capability register	national consortia forming	first contributions
E6	Leadership questions and challenges	none yet	first challenge log
E7	Foundry technical state	national environments prepared	first federation cut
E8	Publication candidates	twelve findings carried forward	PUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9	Universe readiness	one candidate mission	admission and role spine
E10	Correction register	none	first federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

Publish
Hold
Needs evidence
Restricted
Superseded

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

IN FORCE
PUBLISHED
DRAFT
PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY

Table 6.4Standards and regulatory watch
Instrument	Body	Scope	Status	Relevance
FIPS 203, 204 and 205¹²³	NIST	US, used globally	PUBLISHED 2024	post-quantum algorithms
NIST IR 8547 initial public draft⁴⁴	NIST	US	DRAFT 2024	migration
NIST SP 800-227⁷	NIST	US	PUBLISHED 2025	key-encapsulation guidance
NIST SP 800-232⁸	NIST	US	PUBLISHED 2025	lightweight cryptography
NIST CSF 2.0⁹	NIST	global, voluntary	PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY	risk outcomes
NCSC migration timelines¹⁰	UK NCSC	UK	PUBLISHED 2025	timeline
EU coordinated roadmap¹¹³¹	European Commission and Member States	EU	PUBLISHED 2025	migration milestones
CNSA 2.0³⁰	NSA	US national security systems	PUBLISHED	migration timetable
Cyber Resilience Act²⁷	European Union	EU	IN FORCE · STAGED	product duties
SEC cybersecurity disclosure rules²¹	US SEC	US listed companies	IN FORCE	incident disclosure

Changed since 2024

Post-close, context only: NIST published the final IR 8547 transition report on 27 October 2026⁵
NIST published SP 800-227 on key encapsulation in September 2025 and SP 800-232 on lightweight cryptography in August 2025⁷⁸
The UK NCSC published its migration timelines in March 2025¹⁰

To watch in 2027

The HQC draft standard expected about a year after March 2025⁶
National roadmaps due under the EU coordinated roadmap¹¹³¹
Staged application dates of the EU Cyber Resilience Act²⁷

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers cybersecurity and cryptography assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

Question: What does the published evidence establish about cybersecurity and advanced cryptography as infrastructure and its couplings?
Sources searched: preprints and journals; standards bodies and agencies; roadmaps and regulation; threat and cost reports
Window: releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
Selection: sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
Next step: systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027

Table 6.5Peer-reviewed science and preprints
Reference	Type	Year	Role	Used for
Gidney²²	preprint	2025	supports	resource estimate
Shor³⁷	journal article	1997	framework	factoring algorithm
Mosca³⁸	journal article	2018	framework	migration timing

Table 6.6Institutional flagships
Reference	Issuer	Year	Role	Used for
Signal triple ratchet post²⁵	protocol post	2025	context	messaging design
Apple PQ3 post²⁶	protocol post	2024	context	messaging design
OpenSSH page²⁴	project documentation	2025	supports	protocol default
RFC 8446⁴³	IETF standard	2018	framework	TLS 1.3

Table 6.7Standards, policy and strategies
Reference	Issuer	Year	Role	Used for
NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205¹²³	NIST	2024	supports	standards
NIST IR 8547 initial draft⁴⁴	NIST	2024	supports	transition plan
NCSC timelines¹⁰	UK NCSC	2025	supports	timeline
EU roadmap page¹¹	European Commission	2025	supports	roadmap date
CSF 2.0⁹	NIST	2024	context	risk framework
NIST IR 8545³²	NIST	2025	context	fourth-round status
NIST SP 1800-38³⁹	NIST NCCoE	2023	context	migration practice guide
OMB M-23-02⁴¹	US OMB	2022	context	federal inventory memorandum

Table 6.8Threat, cost and field overviews
Reference	Issuer	Year	Role	Used for
FBI IC3 report¹⁵	FBI	2025	supports	complaints and losses
ENISA Threat Landscape 2025¹⁶	ENISA	2025	supports	incident count
Cost of a Data Breach 2026¹⁸	IBM	2026	context	vendor cost
Crypto crime ransomware analysis¹⁹	Chainalysis	2026	context	vendor payments
Workforce study²⁰	ISC2	2025	supports	skills needs
Data Breach Investigations page¹⁷	Verizon	2026	context	vendor sample
Digital Defense Report³⁶	Microsoft	2025	context	vendor report

Where the evidence agrees

Post-quantum standards are finalised and migration should begin¹¹⁰
Exploited known vulnerabilities recur across sources¹⁴¹⁷
Signatures are harder to migrate than key agreement²³

Where it is unsettled

When a cryptographically relevant machine could exist²²³⁸
How fast sectors are migrating, since no common series exists¹²
How vendor cost and payment estimates compare with primary data¹⁸¹⁹

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

18IBM and Ponemon Institute (eds.), Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 (landing page; global average USD 4.99 million, up 12%; AI-driven attacks up 56%). IBM, Armonk. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
19Chainalysis (ed.), ransomware analysis (blog page; more than USD 820 million on-chain in 2025, down 8% from an updated USD 892 million for 2024; original 2024 estimate USD 813 million). Chainalysis, New York. Vendor estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
1NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, FIPS 203 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024; initial draft 24 August 2023). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2NIST (ed.), Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 204 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; ML-DSA). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3NIST (ed.), Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 205 (publication page; final 13 August 2024; SLH-DSA, based on SPHINCS+). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
44NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (draft PDF, November 2024; Tables 2 and 4: for quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment schemes at 112 bits of security strength, deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035, and at 128 bits or more, disallowed after 2035; the cover sheet added on withdrawal on 27 October 2026 is not used). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7NIST (ed.), Recommendations for Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms, SP 800-227 (publication page; final 18 September 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8NIST (ed.), Ascon-Based Lightweight Cryptography Standards for Constrained Devices, SP 800-232 (publication page; final 13 August 2025; Ascon-AEAD128, Ascon-Hash256, Ascon-XOF128, Ascon-CXOF128). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9NIST (ed.), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29 (publication page; 26 February 2024). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10UK National Cyber Security Centre (ed.), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (guidance page; version 1.0, 20 March 2025; milestones 2028, 2031 and 2035). NCSC, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; published 23 June 2025; the milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
31UNVERIFIED, not opened: NIS Cooperation Group (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (national roadmaps by the end of 2026, high-risk use cases by 2030, as many systems as feasible by 2035), taken from secondary summaries in an earlier edition of this series; the milestones were not on the page read. European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
30UNVERIFIED, not opened: NSA (ed.), Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 advisory and FAQ, cited from memory; the NSA pages returned an access error and no date is used. National Security Agency, Fort Meade. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
27UNVERIFIED, not opened: European Union, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act; in force 10 December 2024; reporting duties from 11 September 2026; main obligations from 11 December 2027), dates taken from law-firm search summaries; the Official Journal page returned no text. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
21US Securities and Exchange Commission (ed.), SEC adopts rules on cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance and incident disclosure by public companies (press release 2023-139; adopted 26 July 2023; Form 8-K Item 1.05 within four business days of a materiality determination). SEC, Washington. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, final (publication page; document history 27 October 2026, after the 30 September evidence close; abstract refers to Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15; no dates on the page; PDF not opened). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6NIST (ed.), NIST selects HQC as fifth algorithm for post-quantum encryption (news item, 11 March 2025; backup to ML-KEM; draft standard expected in about a year; final standard expected in 2027). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
22Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025 (abstract page; under one million noisy qubits; under a week; 0.1% gate error; 1 microsecond cycle; 10 microsecond reaction time; the author’s 2019 estimate was about 20 million qubits in 8 hours). arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
37UNVERIFIED, not opened: Shor, P.W., Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer, SIAM Journal on Computing 26(5), 1484 to 1509, 1997, cited from memory. Observation year 1997. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Mosca, M., Cybersecurity in an era with quantum computers: will we be ready?, IEEE Security and Privacy 16(5), 38 to 41, 2018, cited from memory. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
25Signal (ed.), Signal Protocol and Post-Quantum Ratchets, SPQR triple ratchet (blog post, 2 October 2025; ML-KEM 768; gradual rollout; formal verification). Signal Messenger, Mountain View. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
26Apple (ed.), iMessage with PQ3: The new state of the art in quantum-secure messaging at scale (security blog post, 21 February 2024; Kyber-1024 and Kyber-768 hybrid with P-256; level 3 on its own scale). Apple, Cupertino. Vendor announcement, weak evidence. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
24OpenSSH project (ed.), Post-quantum cryptography in OpenSSH (documentation page; sntrup761x25519-sha512 from 9.0; mlkem768x25519-sha256 added in 9.9 and default in 10.0; warning from 10.1). OpenBSD Project. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
43UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rescorla, E., The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3, RFC 8446, Internet Engineering Task Force, August 2018, cited from memory. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
32UNVERIFIED, not opened: NIST (ed.), Status Report on the Fourth Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process, NIST IR 8545, March 2025, cited from memory. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
39UNVERIFIED, not opened: NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (ed.), Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography, NIST SP 1800-38, cited from memory. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
41UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Office of Management and Budget (ed.), Memorandum M-23-02, Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography, November 2022, cited from memory. OMB, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internet Crime Complaint Center (ed.), 2024 Internet Crime Report (859,532 complaints; USD 16.6 billion losses, up 33%; 256,256 complaints with a loss; 3,156 ransomware complaints; 263,455 cyber-threat complaints and USD 1.571 billion; 4,878 critical-infrastructure complaints). FBI, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ed.), ENISA Threat Landscape 2025 (publication page; period 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025; 4,875 incidents analysed; version 1.3 of 22 September 2026 corrected figures; PDF not opened). ENISA, Athens. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
20ISC2 (ed.), 2025 Cybersecurity Workforce Study (page; published 4 December 2025; 16,029 respondents; 59% critical or significant skills needs, up from 44%; no workforce gap estimate). ISC2, Alexandria. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
17Verizon (ed.), 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report (landing page; period 1 November 2024 to 31 October 2025; 48% of breaches involve ransomware; 31% begin with exploited vulnerabilities). Verizon Business, New York. Vendor report, weak evidence; the full report was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Microsoft (ed.), Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2025, cited from memory; the page returned an error. Microsoft, Redmond. Vendor report, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14CISA and 22 partner agencies (eds.), Countering Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Compromise of Networks Worldwide to Feed Global Espionage System, advisory AA25-239A (published 27 August 2025; revised 3 September 2025; 23 agencies from 13 countries; known vulnerabilities; no zero-day exploitation observed). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
23Cloudflare (ed.), The state of the post-quantum Internet in 2025 (blog analysis; late October 2025 majority of human traffic with post-quantum key agreement; 3.7% of origins; 39% of top 100,000 domains in September 2025; ML-DSA-44 about 15 kB; first post-quantum certificates expected in 2026). Cloudflare, San Francisco. Vendor analysis of its own network, weak evidence. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12CISA (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative (page; key dates, federal inventory duty under 6 U.S.C. 1526, product categories list, references to Executive Orders 14306, 14412 and 14413 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Arlington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 6: Readings from the other desks. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-CRYPTO-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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