Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

References and record

Every source the edition rests on, the publication record, the corrections log and the open record.

15 min read0 figures1 table0 notesNR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Trade moves through a few narrow places
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5A chokepoint closure that overlaps a Red Sea diversion and high freight rates
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
    1. C.1 46 sources
    2. C.2 Publication record
    3. C.3 Corrections log
    4. C.4 Open record
    5. C.5 Where this edition sits among the six pillars
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

C.146 sources

NR-CIT-1, editor first. A DOI is linked where the source has one; Nexus records carry a UNI once the catalogue allocates it (NS-1).

  1. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025, chapter I: International maritime trade (12,720 million tons and 66,781 billion ton-miles in 2024; Cape detour about 30 percent; cobalt and copper concentration). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  2. 2UNCTAD (ed.), Stormy seas for global shipping: UNCTAD warns of uncertainty, volatility and rising costs (press release of 24 September 2025; 2025 volume growth 0.5 percent; port fees on certain vessels; alternative-fuel share 8 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 6
  3. 3UNCTAD (ed.), Maritime trade under pressure, growth set to stall in 2025 (news item; Suez Canal tonnage 70 percent below 2023 in May 2025; Shanghai Containerized Freight Index averaged 2,496 in 2024). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2
  4. 4UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2024, chapter II: World shipping fleet and services (Suez Canal about 10 percent of maritime trade volume and 22 percent of container trade; Panama Canal about 3 percent). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  5. 5UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz disruption deepens global economic strain across trade, prices and finance (second rapid assessment; transits about 130 a day in February and 6 in March 2026; merchandise trade growth 1.5 to 2.5 percent projected for 2026). United Nations Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  6. 6UNCTAD (ed.), initial assessment of the Strait of Hormuz disruption of 10 March 2026 (about one third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, about 16 million tonnes), as reported by a Pakistani daily newspaper; the UNCTAD text itself was not opened. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  7. 7EIA (ed.), World Oil Transit Chokepoints (last updated 3 March 2026; 2024 total oil flows: Hormuz 20.7, Malacca 22.5, Suez and SUMED 4.8, Bab el-Mandeb 4.1, Cape of Good Hope 9.3 million barrels a day). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  8. 8EIA (ed.), Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy, 16 June 2025; about 20 million barrels a day, about one fifth of global LNG trade in 2024). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3
  9. 9POST-CLOSE, context only: EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026, global energy security data (Hormuz oil flow 21.6, 14.9 and 4.9 million barrels a day; LNG 10.5, 7.4 and 0.8 billion cubic feet a day; released 6 October 2026). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  10. 10Panama Canal Authority (ed.), Panama Canal maintains operational and financial strength (press release of 8 October 2025; fiscal year 2025: 13,404 transits and 489.1 million CP/SUAB tons; preliminary and unaudited). Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Panama City. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  11. 11POST-CLOSE, context only: WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, update of October 2026 (news release of 8 October 2026; 2026 merchandise volume growth 3.9 percent, 2027 4.1 percent; Middle East merchandise exports minus 17.2 percent in 2026). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  12. 12POST-CLOSE, context only: WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, executive summary of the October 2026 update (AI-enabling goods 47 percent of merchandise trade growth and 14.8 percent of trade in the first half of 2026). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  13. 13WTO (ed.), Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, news release of 19 March 2026 (2025 merchandise volume growth 4.6 percent; 2026 baseline 1.9 percent; high-energy-price case 1.4 percent; Hormuz traffic from 138 vessels a day to almost zero). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  14. 14WTO and UNCTAD (eds.), Global goods trade resilient in Q1 2026 despite Middle East war (WTO news item of 31 July 2026; Middle East export volumes down 9.7 percent and import volumes down 11.9 percent year on year in the first quarter). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1
  15. 15WTO (ed.), World Trade Report 2026: A critical juncture for the world trading system (about 72 percent of merchandise trade on MFN terms). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  16. 16POST-CLOSE, context only: Drewry (ed.), World Container Index (assessment of 29 October 2026; composite USD 4,429 per 40ft; Shanghai to Los Angeles USD 7,514; Shanghai to Rotterdam USD 3,686; two vessels transiting Hormuz and 62 vessels through Suez in the previous week). Drewry Shipping Consultants, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 4, chapter 6
  17. 17FAO (ed.), Strait of Hormuz crisis: FAO Director-General outlines risks, actions and policy responses (remarks to the 180th Council session, 28 April 2026; urea up 52 percent in the United States and 60 percent in Brazil by mid-April). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
  18. 18IMF (ed.), fourth review of Egypt’s arrangement (Suez Canal revenue USD 6.6 billion in FY2023/24 and projected USD 3.6 billion in FY2024/25), as reported by Hellenic Shipping News from Arab Finance; the IMF report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 6, chapter 8
  19. 19FreightWaves (ed.), Suez container ships near low for all of 2025 (2 December 2025; container transits about 4.7 to 5.0 a day in July to November 2025; sources include Xeneta and a shipping agency). FreightWaves, Chattanooga. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4
  20. 20News report, Facts about the Strait of Hormuz since its negotiated reopening (last updated 8 April 2026; Kpler: average of eight commodity carriers a day from 1 March to 7 April; Lloyd’s List estimate of about 800 ships stuck in the Gulf; two-week ceasefire). Arab News Pakistan, Islamabad. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2, chapter 8
  21. 21Lloyd’s List Intelligence (ed.), Bab el-Mandeb transits continue to decline but slight uptick for Suez Canal (blog; data for the week ending 10 March 2024: Bab el-Mandeb 218 passings, 60 percent below normal; the page carries a 2026 date, which is not reconciled). Lloyd’s List Intelligence, London. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.
  22. 22China Briefing (ed.), How will China’s rare earth export controls impact industries and businesses? (April 2025 controls on seven elements; 9 October 2025 expansion to five more; suspended until 10 November 2026). Dezan Shira and Associates, Hong Kong. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
  23. 23Investment Monitor (ed.), China rare earth curbs put USD 6.5 trillion of output at risk, article of 16 July 2026 reporting the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (about 85 percent top-country rare earth refining share in 2025; investment down 9 percent in 2025); the IEA report itself was not opened. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
  24. 24IMO (ed.), SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (web page; mandatory Part A and guidance Part B; in force 1 July 2004). International Maritime Organization, London. Observation year 2004. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  25. 25WTO (ed.), Trade Facilitation Agreement (web page; Bali Ministerial Conference 2013; in force 22 February 2017). World Trade Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  26. 26UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (July 2026), taken only from the press article cited as reference 23; the IEA page returned an access error. International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  27. 27UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, rare earths chapter; the publication returned an access error and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  28. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: Semiconductor Industry Association and Boston Consulting Group, Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era, 2021, taken from search-result summaries that disagree on the Taiwan share; no figure is used in findings. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
  29. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation, cited from memory. United Nations, New York. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  30. 30UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits (Montreux Convention), 1936, cited from memory. Observation year 1936. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  31. 31UNVERIFIED, not opened: Convention respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal (Constantinople Convention), 1888, cited from memory. Observation year 1888. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  32. 32UNVERIFIED, not opened: Treaty concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, 1977, cited from memory. Observation year 1977. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  33. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 28000:2022, Security and resilience: security management systems for the supply chain. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  34. 34UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 31000:2018, Risk management: guidelines. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  35. 35UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials (Critical Raw Materials Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2024, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  36. 36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act), Official Journal of the European Union, 2023, cited from memory. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  37. 37UNVERIFIED, not opened: World Customs Organization (ed.), SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, cited from memory. World Customs Organization, Brussels. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  38. 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Acemoglu, D., Carvalho, V.M., Ozdaglar, A. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., The network origins of aggregate fluctuations, Econometrica 80(5), 1977 to 2016, 2012, cited from memory. Observation year 2012. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  39. 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Carvalho, V.M., Nirei, M., Saito, Y.U. and Tahbaz-Salehi, A., Supply chain disruptions: evidence from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Quarterly Journal of Economics 136(2), 1255 to 1321, 2021, cited from memory. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  40. 40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Barrot, J.-N. and Sauvagnat, J., Input specificity and the propagation of idiosyncratic shocks in production networks, Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(3), 1543 to 1592, 2016, cited from memory. Observation year 2016. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
  41. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Baldwin, R. and Freeman, R., Risks and global supply chains: what we know and what we need to know, Annual Review of Economics 14, 153 to 180, 2022, cited from memory. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  42. 42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Benigno, G., di Giovanni, J., Groen, J.J.J. and Noble, A.I., The Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: a new tool to measure supply chain disruptions, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2022, cited from memory; the index page returned no definition. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
  43. 43UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rodrigue, J.-P., The Geography of Transport Systems, 5th edition. Routledge, New York, 2020, cited from memory. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  44. 44UNVERIFIED, not opened: IMF (ed.), PortWatch, chokepoint transit and trade monitoring platform; the dashboard page returned no readable content and no figure is used. International Monetary Fund, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4
  45. 45UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Trade Representative, Section 301 action on China’s targeted maritime, logistics and shipbuilding sectors, 2025 (port fees on certain vessels); the page returned an error and the measure is known here only from the UNCTAD press release cited as reference 2. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
  46. 46EIA (ed.), Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026, global oil markets (Brent averaged USD 91 a barrel in August 2026; Middle East crude oil production shut-ins from the Hormuz closure averaged 9.4 million barrels a day from March to June 2026 against February production of 25.2, and were 5.0 in July and 6.7 in August). US Energy Information Administration, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 8

C.2Publication record

Publication

Title
Strategic Systems Report 2026: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints, Baseline Edition
Series
Reports · Strategic Systems Series SR-03
Edition
Baseline Edition 2026 · inaugural annual
Version
v1.0.0 · draft for stewardship review
Publication ID
NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Evidence close
30 September 2026
Publication date
October 2026
DOI
concept and version DOI at deposit

Publisher

Publisher of record
The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for the Nexus Consortium
Place
Toronto
Editor
Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor
Stewards
GCRI · technical truth · the Global Risks Forum (GRF) · public meaning · the Global Risks Alliance (GRA) · capital meaning
Licence
text CC BY 4.0; data on the terms of each source
Copyright
© 2026 GCRI · Nexus Consortium
Language
English (en-GB) source edition
Correspondence
Registry correction pathway · editorial office

Colophon

Format
A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF
Typefaces
Space Grotesk (display) · Geist (text) · IBM Plex Sans Italic (standfirsts) · IBM Plex Mono (data)
Design standard
Reports Foundational Edition, Volume I, Part VII
Accessibility
tagged PDF and HTML targets; text alternatives for every figure
Production
Reports editorial team, GCRI

Release path for this version

Table C.1Release path for this version
StepWhat happensWhen
Drafteditorial self-check complete at evidence closeOctober 2026
Steward reviewfive passes on the exact draft (keys T · M · F · N)Q4 2026
Approvalpublication authority approves the exact digestbefore release
Depositconcept and version DOI minted; registry pointer setat release
Successionthe 2027 supply chains and chokepoints edition reports changes against this baseline2027
Current version
v1.0.0 draft, stewardship review
Previous edition
none, first edition of the series
Next edition
NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2027-v1.0.0
Latest version
resolve the concept DOI or the registry record
Correction route
Registry correction pathway
Notice types
erratum · addendum · supersession · withdrawal

C.3Corrections log

0correction notices. No edition has been released yet, so none can be corrected; the log below lists each edition’s current version.

EditionVersionDateStateChangeNotice
SR-03NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0October 2026DraftBaseline Edition 2026, inaugural annual edition,None

Notice types: erratum, addendum, supersession, withdrawal. A correction is a new version with a published notice; the earlier version stays resolvable, and no edition is ever edited in silence.

C.4Open record

This edition’s open record

Publication ID
NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Desk identifier and series alias
NR-STR-SR-03-2026-BL
Collection
None
DOI
Concept and version DOI at deposit, on Zenodo with DataCite metadata
Versions
Each correction is a new version (isNewVersionOf); the concept DOI resolves to the latest
Bundle
RO-Crate 1.2 with CITATION.cff, CodeMeta and PROV-O provenance; a signed manifest
Licence
CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0) for original material; metadata CC0 1.0

Credit and identity

ORCID
Your iD in the deposit and the contribution record; DataCite can then add the work to your ORCID record
ROR
Your organisation by its ROR identifier, never by a typed name alone
CRediT
Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Validation, Visualisation, Writing, review and editing
Account
None needed to contribute; never a password

Find and follow

Search the open indexes for Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints; software is cited by its SWHID from Software Heritage, and a quantified scenario run is preregistered on OSF before it is run. Annotation is your choice: Hypothesis opens this page in its own viewer.

Mirrors and harvest

The DOI is canonical. At release each signed bundle is also given an IPFS content identifier and a bloxberg anchor as mirrors; both are listed in the record once they exist. Zenodo exposes every record over OAI-PMH, and reviews and endorsements can arrive through COAR Notify where the repository supports it.

InvenioRDM metadata for a contribution on Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints, prefilled from this page
{
  "metadata": {
    "resource_type": {
      "id": "dataset"
    },
    "title": "Evidence on Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints for Nexus Reports",
    "publication_date": "YYYY-MM-DD",
    "creators": [
      {
        "person_or_org": {
          "type": "personal",
          "family_name": "Your family name",
          "given_name": "Your given name",
          "identifiers": [
            {
              "scheme": "orcid",
              "identifier": "0000-0000-0000-0000"
            }
          ]
        },
        "affiliations": [
          {
            "id": "ROR identifier of your organisation"
          }
        ]
      }
    ],
    "description": "What it is, where its record is kept and how it bears on Strategic Systems Report 2026: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints.",
    "rights": [
      {
        "id": "cc-by-4.0"
      }
    ],
    "subjects": [
      {
        "subject": "Nexus Reports"
      },
      {
        "subject": "Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints"
      },
      {
        "subject": "Strategic Systems Report · SR-03"
      }
    ],
    "related_identifiers": [
      {
        "identifier": "https://therisk.global/nexus-reports/editions/sr-03/",
        "scheme": "url",
        "relation_type": {
          "id": "issupplementto"
        },
        "resource_type": {
          "id": "publication-report"
        }
      }
    ],
    "version": "1.0.0"
  },
  "custom_fields": {},
  "access": {
    "record": "public",
    "files": "public"
  },
  "files": {
    "enabled": true
  },
  "parent": {
    "communities": {
      "default": "nexusreports"
    }
  }
}

C.5Where this edition sits among the six pillars

Foundry seals the evidence and Universe tests it; Reports publishes it; Standards takes its corrections and Academy teaches from it.

  1. F03 Sealed observations and indicator series Foundry Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
  2. F04 After-action and scenario findings for Universe After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
  3. F05 National Portfolio movement for chapter Foundry National Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
  4. Applied in editions Standards Nexus Standards: applied in editions.
  5. SR-03 edition Reports Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints 2026, published in every format with its sources, citation and corrections.
  6. F06 Method and correction findings as change Standards Method and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
  7. F12 Q4 synthesis informs the next-year Universe Q4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
  8. Taught in the open Academy Risk Academy: taught in the open.

What Foundry and Universe hand to this edition, and what it hands to Standards, Universe and Academy. From the programme spine; SR-03 is a drafted Baseline Edition, so these handoffs run from its first operational quarter.

HandoffBetweenWhat crosses, and when
F03Foundry to ReportsSealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
F04Universe to ReportsAfter-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
F05Foundry to ReportsNational Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
RingNexus Standards to ReportsNexus Standards: applied in editions.
F06Reports to Nexus StandardsMethod and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
F12Reports to UniverseQ4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
RingReports to Risk AcademyRisk Academy: taught in the open.

Cite this annex

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Annex C: References and record. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-SUPPLYCHAINS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

ReportsContribute

Send evidence or a correction on Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the GCRI Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

GCRI Systems Evidence deskStrategic Systems

CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.

The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation

Science · evidence · measurement

Not for profit

Our articles, maps and twins are free to read and free to republish. Readers and partners keep it that way.

Partner with us

Who funds us

GCRI is a not-for-profit institution. To ask who funds a piece of work, use the funding questions form.

Independence

Editors and the expert reviewers named on each article decide what we publish. Funders and partners do not review or approve articles before publication.

Licence

Articles: CC BY 4.0. Figures, maps, twins and data: CC BY 4.0. Other uses: ask through the permissions form.