Small volumes, large dependence
Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.
Contents
- ·Edition home
- ·Executive summary
- 1Small volumes, large dependence
- 2Key findings
- 3Systems and sectors at baseline
- 4Risks and capability
- 5Export-control expansion that overlaps a cobalt quota squeeze
- 6Readings from the other desks
- 7The 2027 agenda
- 8Systems in depth
- AMethodology
- BData appendix
- CReferences and record
- ·Complete edition, for print
1.1The questions this part answers
Key questions
- Where is critical minerals risk concentrated?
- Which couplings carry critical minerals shocks into other systems?
- Which critical minerals capabilities hold under compound stress?
- What must 2027 evidence measure first?
In this part
- Narrative
- Headline finding
- Lead figure
- Five mechanism chapters
- Twelve-domain reading
- Sector screens
- Dependency matrix
- Risk objects
- Capability ladder
- Scenario
- Three lenses
- Portfolio
1.2The argument
Critical minerals are usually reported by commodity: lithium, cobalt, graphite, rare earths. The 2025 and 2026 evidence reads them as one dependent network. A few countries refine most of the supply, trade controls and quotas can move prices within months, and small volumes underpin very large downstream output21.
The causes repeat. China placed licence controls on seven heavy rare earths in April 20255. The DRC capped cobalt exports from October 20259. Zimbabwe and Mozambique limited raw exports of lithium and graphite2. Prices followed: cobalt rose by around 130% and strategic minor minerals more than doubled2.
Diversification is slow. Refining and magnet capacity lag mining outside the dominant supplier, and refining projects there face capital costs 20% to over 150% higher2. In rare earths, diversified refining capacity equals about two thirds of expected mined supply by 2035, but planned magnet capacity only one third2.
The edition therefore asks the same four questions of every event: what was the common cause, how did it spread, what was shared, and what threshold was crossed. It attributes no motive and places no producer in a league table.
For each mineral one country holds most of the output. The shares come from different measures, so the bars compare reach, not risk, and refining shares are higher still for several minerals12.
| Item | Bar, scaled to the largest value | Value |
|---|---|---|
| China, primary low-purity gallium | 99 | |
| China, natural graphite | 82 | |
| DRC, mined cobalt | 73 | |
| China, rare earth mine output | 69 |
Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.
Figure ID FIG-STRATEGIC-MINERALS-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003
1.3Twenty couplings between five systems
The critical minerals-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their critical minerals content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.
Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.
- Strong
- Moderate
- Weak
Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.
| From, to | WAT | ENE | FOO | HLT | BIO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WAT Water | · | WEAK hydro · cooling | WEAK irrigation | WEAK safe supply | MODERATE mine water · tailings |
| ENE Energy | MODERATE pumping · treatment · acid | · | MODERATE sulphur · acid · fertiliser | WEAK power | MODERATE mining footprint |
| FOO Food | WEAK withdrawals | WEAK bioenergy | · | WEAK nutrition | WEAK land conversion |
| HLT Health | WEAK workforce | WEAK workforce | WEAK labour | · | WEAK residues |
| BIO Biodiversity | WEAK catchments | WEAK hydrology | WEAK pollination | WEAK zoonoses | · |
| Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A. | |||||
Transmission paths
- 01
TRD → MIN → FIN
A licence on heavy rare earths halts magnet supply and cuts vehicle output.
- 02
MIN → FIN
A producer quota lifts cobalt prices by around 130%.
- 03
INF → MIN → DAT
Weak smelter fees threaten by-product recovery of gallium and germanium.
Reported 2026 fees2
- 04
ENE → MIN → FOO
A Gulf shutdown curbs sulphur and acid used in processing and fertiliser.
Reported 20262
- 05
MIN → BIO
Mine expansion triggers offsite deforestation.
Reported Africa 2001 to 202027
Notes
Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references
- 2IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 1U.S. Geological Survey (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (version 1.3, May 2026; manuscript dated 6 February 2026). U.S. Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 5Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman (eds.), China Suspends Export Controls on Certain Critical Minerals and Related Items (client alert; announcements 55 to 58, 61 and 62 suspended from 7 November 2025 to 10 November 2026; Article 2 of Announcement 46 suspended to 27 November 2026; Announcement 18 of 4 April 2025 remains in force). Pillsbury, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 9Fastmarkets (ed.), Cobalt export quotas: DRC sets limits to rebalance global supply (ARECOMS announcement of 21 September 2025; 18,125 tonnes to the end of 2025; 87,000 tonnes base plus a 9,600 tonne strategic quota for 2026; effective 16 October 2025). Fastmarkets, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
- 27Morton, O., Bousfield, C.G., Dégny Valé, P. et al., Mining triggers extensive additional deforestation in sub-Saharan Africa, Nature, 2026 (16,627 mines, 2001 to 2020). Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03.back