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Key findings

Twelve findings carry the strategic technology infrastructure baseline. They are grouped by coupling and never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

5 min read1 figure0 tables13 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Technology rests on a few physical inputs
  4. 2Key findings
    1. 2.1 Headline finding
    2. 2.2 AIC
    3. 2.3 Energy
    4. 2.4 Infrastructure
    5. 2.5 Minerals
    6. 2.6 Trade
    7. 2.7 Finance
    8. 2.8 Data and digital
    9. 2.9 Development
    10. 2.10 Systemic
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-001

Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024, or about 1.5% of global electricity, and grew about 12% a year over five years; the IEA Base Case reaches about 945 TWh by 2030.

Figure 2.1Data centre electricity use (TWh)
ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
2024 estimate415
2030 Base Case (about)945

Source: IEA Energy and AI1. The 2030 value is a Base Case projection.

Implication

The global share stays small, at just under 3% in 2030 in the Base Case. The pressure is local, because use clusters in a few regions and the IEA reports that nearly half of US data-centre capacity sits in five clusters1.

What would move it

Grid connection times, efficiency gains in chips and software, and the pace of AI uptake would each move this finding.

2.2AIC

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-001

    Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024, or about 1.5% of global electricity, and grew about 12% a year over five years; the IEA Base Case reaches about 945 TWh by 2030.1

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-002

    The United States accounted for about 45% of data centre electricity use in 2024, China about 25% and Europe about 15%, and nearly half of US data-centre capacity sits in five regional clusters.1

2.3Energy

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-003

    In the United States, data centres made up half of all growth in electricity use in 2025.2

2.4Infrastructure

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-004

    Data centres took 22% of Ireland’s metered electricity in 2024, up from 21% in 2023 and 5% in 2015.12

2.5Minerals

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-MIN-005

    Excluding rare earths, the average share of the top refining country across the minerals the IEA tracks rose to 72% in 2025.3

2.6Trade

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-TRD-006

    Global semiconductor sales reached USD 795.6 billion in 2025, up 26.2% on 2024, with Americas and Asia Pacific growing fastest.45

  2. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-TRD-007

    The EU target is a 20% share of global chip production by 2030, and the Commission’s own forecast reaches 11.7% by 2030 from 9.8% in 2022.78

2.7Finance

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-008

    The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 appropriated USD 50 billion to the CHIPS for America Fund for fiscal years 2022 to 2026: USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research.43

  2. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-010

    Private artificial intelligence investment in 2025 was USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China, and the private figure likely understates Chinese spending.11

2.8Data and digital

  1. ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DAT-009

    In 2025, 52.74% of EU enterprises bought cloud services and 19.95% used artificial intelligence; use rises sharply with firm size.910

2.9Development

  1. ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DEV-011

    An estimated 6.3 billion people (76%) use the internet and 2 billion do not; use is 93% in high-income countries and 32% in low-income countries.13

2.10Systemic

  1. Expert inputEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012

    The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 5SIA (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release of 6 February 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 11Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2026 AI Index Report (report page; private AI investment in 2025 of USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 10Eurostat (ed.), Use of artificial intelligence in enterprises (Statistics Explained; 19.95% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons in 2025; large enterprises 55.03%). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 13ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures (page titled 2025 whose text describes the 2026 edition; 6.3 billion people online, 76%; 2 billion offline; 93% in high-income and 32% in low-income countries). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 2: Key findings. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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