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Baseline Edition 2026
Complete edition

Strategic Systems Report 2026: Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness

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ReportsSR-13

Strategic Systems

Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness 2026

Baseline Edition 2026NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINEGCRI for the Nexus Consortium

Imprint

Editor: Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor, the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI)
Publisher of record: The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) for the Nexus Consortium, Toronto
Report number: NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE
Evidence close: 30 September 2026, cut DC-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-B0
Status: Draft under stewardship review; not yet released
DOI and UNI: Issued at deposit
Licence: CC BY 4.0 for Nexus-authored text, tables and figures; third-party material keeps its own licence
Cite as: Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Strategic Systems Report 2026: Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI). https://therisk.global/nexus-reports/editions/sr-13/

Contents

·
Executive summary
1
Chapter 1. Technology rests on a few physical inputs
2
Chapter 2. Key findings
3
Chapter 3. Systems and sectors at baseline
4
Chapter 4. Risks and capability
5
Chapter 5. Local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint
6
Chapter 6. Readings from the other desks
7
Chapter 7. The 2027 agenda
8
Chapter 8. Systems in depth
A
Annex A. Methodology
B
Annex B. Data appendix
C
Annex C. References and record

Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness 2026
Executive summary

Executive summary

The edition on a few pages: the abstract, the key messages, the headline finding and what each steward reads in it.

5 min read1 figure0 tables10 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

S.1Abstract

Strategic technology infrastructure is the physical base of the digital economy: data centres, chips, the power they draw, the minerals behind them and the networks that link them. The 2024 to 2026 evidence shows one pattern. Demand grows fast and the supply chain beneath it is concentrated. Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024, or 1.5% of global electricity, and the IEA Base Case reaches about 945 TWh by 2030¹. In the United States data centres made up half of electricity demand growth in 2025². In Ireland they took 22% of metered electricity in 2024, up from 5% in 2015¹². Global semiconductor sales reached USD 795.6 billion in 2025, up 26.2%⁴. The average share of the top refining country across the energy minerals the IEA tracks, excluding rare earths, rose to 72% in 2025³. Governments have answered with policy. The United States set aside USD 50 billion for chips⁴³. The EU set a 20% target for its share of chip production by 2030, and its own forecast reaches 11.7%⁷⁸. Sovereign readiness here means the capacity to keep critical technology running and to recover it when supply or power is short. This baseline reads these facts as mechanisms. It ranks no country or company, attributes no intent and recommends no policy.

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the strategic technology infrastructure baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

Yes: about 12% a year to 2024, and the Base Case more than doubles use by 2030.¹
Is demand for compute growing fast?Reported
In some places it already does: half of US demand growth in 2025 and 22% of Irish metered use in 2024.²¹²
Does it reach the grid?Reported
The average top-refiner share is 72% in 2025 for the minerals tracked, excluding rare earths.³
Is the mineral base concentrated?Reported
USD 795.6 billion in 2025, up 26.2%.⁴
How big is the chip market?Reported
The Commission’s own forecast falls short of the EU 2030 chip target.⁷⁸
Are policy targets on track?Reported
The US set aside USD 50 billion for chips in 2022.⁴³
How much public money is in play?Reported
About half of EU enterprises buy cloud; one in five uses artificial intelligence.⁹¹⁰
Who uses the services?Reported
A local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint. SCN-SR13-GRID-01
What will 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-001

Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024, or about 1.5% of global electricity, and grew about 12% a year over five years; the IEA Base Case reaches about 945 TWh by 2030.

Figure S.1Data centre electricity use (TWh)

Item	Bar, scaled to the largest value	Value
2024 estimate		415
2030 Base Case (about)		945

Source: IEA Energy and AI¹. The 2030 value is a Base Case projection.

The global share stays small, at just under 3% in 2030 in the Base Case. The pressure is local, because use clusters in a few regions and the IEA reports that nearly half of US data-centre capacity sits in five clusters¹.

S.4At a glance

415TWh

data centres, 2024¹

945TWh

Base Case, 2030¹

72%

top-refiner average share³

795.6USD billion

chip sales, 2025⁴

50USD billion

US CHIPS funding⁴³

11.7%

EU forecast chip share, 2030⁷

S.5What each steward reads in it

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading technology infrastructure as one dependent stack.

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people the stack appears as a service that works or does not.

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Public funding is large in places and private investment is concentrated.

NEXUS

Synthesis

Technology infrastructure risk is well described by layer and thinly measured as a system.

S.6What this edition is, and is not

What this edition is

A baseline: the 2026 state of the world’s strategic technology infrastructure and sovereign readiness and the couplings through which it carries risk into other systems. It synthesises published evidence and ranks no country, company or asset.

What it is not

Not a sovereignty ranking, a market assessment, an export-control position or an assessment of any company, regulator or government. Operation, protection and policy for technology infrastructure rest with owners, operators and competent authorities.

What comes next

National, regional and sector evidence feeds the 2027 strategic technology infrastructure edition through the federation. Each edition reports what changed against this baseline: observations, source revisions, method changes, scenario updates and corrections.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10Eurostat (ed.), Use of artificial intelligence in enterprises (Statistics Explained; 19.95% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons in 2025; large enterprises 55.03%). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Technology rests on a few physical inputs

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.

6 min read2 figures2 tables10 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

Where is strategic technology infrastructure risk concentrated?
Which couplings carry strategic technology infrastructure shocks into other systems?
Which strategic technology infrastructure capabilities hold under compound stress?
What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

Narrative
Headline finding
Lead figure
Five mechanism chapters
Twelve-domain reading
Sector screens
Dependency matrix
Risk objects
Capability ladder
Scenario
Three lenses
Portfolio

1.2The argument

Technology infrastructure is usually discussed one layer at a time: chips, cloud, networks, power. The 2024 to 2026 evidence reads them as one dependent stack. Chips need minerals, data centres need power, and services need both¹³⁴.

The load is growing. Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024 and the IEA Base Case reaches about 945 TWh by 2030¹. In the United States they made up half of electricity demand growth in 2025². In Ireland they took 22% of metered electricity in 2024¹².

Supply is concentrated. The average share of the top refining country was 72% in 2025 for the minerals the IEA tracks, excluding rare earths³. The chip market reached USD 795.6 billion in 2025⁴. Governments are acting: the US set aside USD 50 billion⁴³ and the EU set a 20% chip target that its own forecast does not reach⁷⁸.

The edition therefore asks the same four questions of every event: what was the common cause, how did it spread, what was shared, and what threshold was crossed. It makes no attribution and ranks no country or company.

Figure 1.1How fast did chip sales grow? Global semiconductor sales, USD billion

Annual sales rose 25.6% in this series, from USD 630.5 billion to USD 791.7 billion. A second source puts 2025 at USD 795.6 billion, so the two bars use one source and the difference is noted⁴⁵.

Item	Bar, scaled to the largest value	Value
2025		791.7
2024		630.5

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.

Figure ID FIG-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003

791.7USD billion

chip sales, 2025 (SIA)⁵

795.6USD billion

chip sales, 2025 (WSTS)⁴

25.6%

growth in the SIA series⁵

26.2%

growth in the WSTS series⁴

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The strategic technology infrastructure-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their strategic technology infrastructure content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings between the five systems

Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.

Strong
Moderate
Weak

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, to	WAT	ENE	FOO	HLT	BIO
WAT Water	·	STRONG cooling · hydro	MODERATE irrigation · processing	STRONG safe supply · hospitals	WEAK flows
ENE Energy	STRONG pumping · treatment	·	STRONG cold chain · processing	STRONG hospitals · cooling · telecoms	WEAK land use
FOO Food	WEAK withdrawals	WEAK bioenergy	·	MODERATE nutrition · food safety	WEAK land conversion
HLT Health	WEAK workforce	WEAK workforce	WEAK labour	·	WEAK residues
BIO Biodiversity	MODERATE natural infrastructure	WEAK hydrology	WEAK pollination	WEAK zoonoses	·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

01
AIC → ENE → INF
Clustered data-centre load tightens a local grid.
Reported Ireland and US 2024 to 2025¹²²¹
02
MIN → TRD → AIC
Concentrated refining limits the chips that compute needs.
Reported IEA 2026 and WSTS 2025³⁴
03
FIN → TRD
Public funding aims to move chip capacity.
Reported US and EU 2022 to 2026⁴³⁸
04
DAT → INF
Wide cloud use makes shared services a shared dependency.
Inferred Eurostat 2025⁹
05
ENE → AIC → INF
Power shortfalls limit new compute and local services.
Inferred IEA 2025¹

1.4Reinforcing loops

A shock entering either system of a loop can return amplified through the other.

Table 1.2Pairs of systems where both directions are rated strong
Loop	First direction	Second direction
WAT and ENE	Water to energy: cooling · hydro	Energy to water: pumping · treatment
A causal-loop reading of the matrix (Sterman, Business Dynamics, 2000): structural, from estimated strengths, not a measured feedback.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5SIA (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release of 6 February 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Key findings

Twelve findings carry the strategic technology infrastructure baseline. They are grouped by coupling and never ranked. Each resolves to its source or, where Nexus analysis is involved, to its stated method.

5 min read1 figure0 tables13 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

2.1Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-001

Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024, or about 1.5% of global electricity, and grew about 12% a year over five years; the IEA Base Case reaches about 945 TWh by 2030.

Figure 2.1Data centre electricity use (TWh)

Item	Bar, scaled to the largest value	Value
2024 estimate		415
2030 Base Case (about)		945

Source: IEA Energy and AI¹. The 2030 value is a Base Case projection.

Implication

What would move it

Grid connection times, efficiency gains in chips and software, and the pace of AI uptake would each move this finding.

2.2AIC

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-001
Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024, or about 1.5% of global electricity, and grew about 12% a year over five years; the IEA Base Case reaches about 945 TWh by 2030.¹
ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-002
The United States accounted for about 45% of data centre electricity use in 2024, China about 25% and Europe about 15%, and nearly half of US data-centre capacity sits in five regional clusters.¹

2.3Energy

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-ENE-003
In the United States, data centres made up half of all growth in electricity use in 2025.²

2.4Infrastructure

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-INF-004
Data centres took 22% of Ireland’s metered electricity in 2024, up from 21% in 2023 and 5% in 2015.¹²

2.5Minerals

ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-MIN-005
Excluding rare earths, the average share of the top refining country across the minerals the IEA tracks rose to 72% in 2025.³

2.6Trade

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-TRD-006
Global semiconductor sales reached USD 795.6 billion in 2025, up 26.2% on 2024, with Americas and Asia Pacific growing fastest.⁴⁵
ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-TRD-007
The EU target is a 20% share of global chip production by 2030, and the Commission’s own forecast reaches 11.7% by 2030 from 9.8% in 2022.⁷⁸

2.7Finance

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-008
The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 appropriated USD 50 billion to the CHIPS for America Fund for fiscal years 2022 to 2026: USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives and USD 11 billion for research.⁴³
ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-FIN-010
Private artificial intelligence investment in 2025 was USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China, and the private figure likely understates Chinese spending.¹¹

2.8Data and digital

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DAT-009
In 2025, 52.74% of EU enterprises bought cloud services and 19.95% used artificial intelligence; use rises sharply with firm size.⁹¹⁰

2.9Development

ReportedEQL 3NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-DEV-011
An estimated 6.3 billion people (76%) use the internet and 2 billion do not; use is 93% in high-income countries and 32% in low-income countries.¹³

2.10Systemic

Expert inputEQL 2NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-SYS-012
The leading compound pathway for 2027 testing is a local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint. § scenario

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5SIA (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release of 6 February 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2026 AI Index Report (report page; private AI investment in 2025 of USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10Eurostat (ed.), Use of artificial intelligence in enterprises (Statistics Explained; 19.95% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons in 2025; large enterprises 55.03%). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures (page titled 2025 whose text describes the 2026 edition; 6.3 billion people online, 76%; 2 billion offline; 93% in high-income and 32% in low-income countries). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Systems and sectors at baseline

6 min read0 figures2 tables16 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

AIC · Compute load

Data centre electricity use

415TWh

1.5% of global electricity, 2024.

Reported2024IEA¹

ENE · Power

Share of US electricity growth from data centres

50%

about half of growth in 2025.

Reported2025IEA²

MIN · Minerals

Average top-refiner share, excluding rare earths

72%

up from 70% in an earlier year; the report gives two base years.

Reported2025IEA³

TRD · Chips

Global semiconductor sales

795.6USD billion

up 26.2% on 2024.

Reported2025WSTS⁴

INF · Local grid

Data centre share of Irish metered electricity

22%

up from 5% in 2015.

Reported2024CSO¹²

DAT · Cloud use

EU enterprises buying cloud services

52.74%

enterprises with 10 or more staff.

Reported2025Eurostat⁹

3.2Domain posture

Each of the twelve coupled domains is read through strategic technology infrastructure, in words, not scored. The coupling column names the dependency that carries strategic technology infrastructure risk into each domain.

Table 3.1Each domain read in words, not scored
Domain	Posture at baseline	Coupling	Status
WAT	Cooling and fabrication use water; no consolidated series opened here.	WAT → AIC	Expert input EQL 2
ENE	Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024 and made up half of US electricity growth in 2025.	AIC → ENE	Reported EQL 4
FOO	Cold chains and logistics run on networks and power; no series here.	INF → FOO	Expert input EQL 2
HLT	Hospitals depend on power and connectivity; not consolidated here.	ENE → HLT	Inferred EQL 2
BIO	Siting and land-use pressure from large sites; not consolidated here.	AIC → BIO	Expert input EQL 2
CLI	Heat and floods stress grids and facilities; hazard series sit in sibling editions.	CLI → INF	Inferred EQL 2
INF	The core system: data centres took 22% of Ireland’s metered electricity in 2024.	the core system	Reported EQL 4
FIN	USD 50 billion of US chip funding; USD 285.88 billion of US private AI investment in 2025.	FIN → INF	Reported EQL 3
DAT	52.74% of EU enterprises bought cloud services in 2025; provider concentration not bound.	DAT ↔ INF	Reported EQL 4
AIC	Data-centre use reaches about 945 TWh by 2030 in the IEA Base Case.	AIC → ENE	Reported EQL 4
MIN	The average top-refiner share was 72% in 2025, excluding rare earths.	MIN → TRD	Reported EQL 3
TRD	Chip sales were USD 795.6 billion in 2025, up 26.2%.	TRD → AIC	Reported EQL 4

3.3Sector screens

All sixteen sectors are screened for their dependence on strategic technology infrastructure, on the same grammar as every national edition. The evidence column describes coverage of the baseline evidence, not the performance of the sector.

Table 3.2Sectors: baseline evidence and the exposure to watch
Code	Sector	Baseline evidence	Exposure to watch	Evidence coverage
GS-00	Cross-system	technology rests on power, chips and minerals¹³⁴	local grid and supply overlap	PARTIAL
GS-01	Water	cooling and fabrication demand	drought at a large site	THIN
GS-02	Energy	half of US electricity growth in 2025²	connection delays	GOOD
GS-03	Food and agrifood	cold chains depend on networks	outage during heat	THIN
GS-04	Health	hospitals depend on connectivity	loss of power and links	THIN
GS-05	Finance and economy	USD 285.88 billion of US private AI investment¹¹	capital concentration	PARTIAL
GS-06	Development	2 billion people offline¹³	access gap	PARTIAL
GS-07	Climate	heat and floods stress facilities	concurrent hazards	THIN
GS-08	Disaster	recovery of data and networks after hazards	multi-site loss	THIN
GS-09	Infrastructure	22% of Irish metered electricity¹²	grid saturation	GOOD
GS-10	Cities	clustered load near metropolitan grids¹	local constraint	PARTIAL
GS-11	Biodiversity	land and water pressure at sites	site conflicts	THIN
GS-12	Earth observation	satellite links and timing signals underpin networks	signal interference	THIN
GS-13	Cyber and digital	reporting and security rules in force¹⁸¹⁹	implementation gaps	GOOD
GS-14	Policy	chip and AI rules and funding⁴³⁸¹⁶	delivery against targets	GOOD
GS-15	Science	interdependency and weaponised-interdependence research³⁷³⁹⁴⁰	data at operating scale	PARTIAL

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2026 AI Index Report (report page; private AI investment in 2025 of USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures (page titled 2025 whose text describes the 2026 edition; 6.3 billion people online, 76%; 2 billion offline; 93% in high-income and 32% in low-income countries). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
18European Commission (ed.), Cyber Resilience Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/2847; in force 10 December 2024; reporting from 11 September 2026; main obligations from 11 December 2027). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
19European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive (policy page; Directive (EU) 2022/2555; transposition deadline 17 October 2024). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16European Commission (ed.), AI Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; in force 1 August 2024; general application 2 August 2026; omnibus in force 27 July 2026). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
37UNVERIFIED, not opened: Farrell, H. and Newman, A.L., Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, International Security 44(1), 42 to 79, 2019, cited from memory. MIT Press. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, 2001, cited from memory. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Buldyrev, S.V. et al., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, 2010, cited from memory. Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Risks and capability

Four global risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence; loss metrics are added only where they can be modelled.

5 min read0 figures1 table22 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

ReportedEQL 4RSK-SR13-ENE-001
Local grid constraint on large new loads
Driver
clustered data-centre load and fast growth¹²
Exposure
regions where data centres hold a large share of electricity¹²
Vulnerability
connection waits and local clustering; waiting times not bound
Capacity
grid reinforcement; flexible or interruptible connections; siting rules
Cascade
AIC → ENE → INF
Horizon
1 to 5 years
ReportedEQL 3RSK-SR13-MIN-002
Concentrated refining of energy and technology minerals
Driver
top-refiner average share of 72% in 2025³
Exposure
chips, cables, batteries and power equipment
Vulnerability
one country holds most refining for most minerals tracked
Capacity
new refining projects; recycling; stockpiles; trade partners³
Cascade
MIN → TRD → AIC
Horizon
1 to 5 years
ReportedEQL 3RSK-SR13-TRD-003
Chip supply short of policy targets
Driver
fast demand growth with concentrated production⁴⁷
Exposure
cloud, communications, vehicles, defence, health devices
Vulnerability
EU forecast of 11.7% against a 20% target⁷
Capacity
public funding and state aid decisions⁴³⁸
Cascade
TRD → AIC → DAT
Horizon
5 to 10 years
InferredEQL 3RSK-SR13-DAT-004
Dependence on shared cloud services
Driver
wide cloud use by enterprises⁹
Exposure
enterprises, public services, payments
Vulnerability
provider concentration; not bound in this edition
Capacity
data portability and switching rules¹⁷
Cascade
DAT → INF → FIN
Horizon
1 to 5 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence at the global level, from a policy listing to performance in real events.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
Function	Level	Strongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigation	EXISTS	security, continuity and risk standards widespread; implementation uneven³¹³²³³³⁴
Monitoring and observation	ADEQUATE	load and sales series published; supply-chain visibility uneven¹⁴
Early warning	LISTED	no common early warning for chip or mineral shortages
Preparedness and planning	EXISTS	chips, AI, data and cyber rules in force or applying⁸¹⁶¹⁷¹⁸¹⁹
Redundancy and reserves	LISTED	stockpiles and spare capacity not consolidated
Response	LISTED	crisis coordination set up under the EU Chips Act, not tested here⁸
Continuity of critical services	EXISTS	continuity standards and critical-entity rules²⁹³²
Recovery	LISTED	recovery of data services after multi-site loss not consolidated
Adaptation	EXISTS	new refining projects reported³
Social protection	LISTED	support for exposed workers and regions not consolidated
Finance and insurance	EXISTS	USD 50 billion US chip programme; EU state aid decisions⁴³⁸
Institutional coordination	EXISTS	European Semiconductor Board and AI Office; cross-border practice uneven⁸¹⁶
Technical infrastructure	EXISTS	AI Factories established across Member States¹⁵
Workforce	LISTED	skills shortages noted by auditors⁷
Research capacity	ADEQUATE	interdependency science mature³⁷³⁹⁴⁰
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
17European Commission (ed.), Data Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/2854; in force 11 January 2024; applies from 12 September 2025). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
31UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security management systems. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
32UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: business continuity management systems. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
33UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
34UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 31000:2018, Risk management: guidelines. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16European Commission (ed.), AI Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; in force 1 August 2024; general application 2 August 2026; omnibus in force 27 July 2026). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
18European Commission (ed.), Cyber Resilience Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/2847; in force 10 December 2024; reporting from 11 September 2026; main obligations from 11 December 2027). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
19European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive (policy page; Directive (EU) 2022/2555; transposition deadline 17 October 2024). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
29UNVERIFIED, not opened: Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities, Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15EuroHPC Joint Undertaking (ed.), AI Factories (programme page; states 19 AI Factories and 13 antennas while the listing shows 18 entries; no amounts). EuroHPC Joint Undertaking, Luxembourg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
37UNVERIFIED, not opened: Farrell, H. and Newman, A.L., Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, International Security 44(1), 42 to 79, 2019, cited from memory. MIT Press. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, 2001, cited from memory. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Buldyrev, S.V. et al., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, 2010, cited from memory. Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint

A conditional statement under stated assumptions, never a prediction.

2 min read0 figures0 tables3 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

5.1Assumptions

Scenario SCN-SR13-GRID-01: what is assumed, and what is held constant.

Baseline: the 2026 reference state in this edition
Drivers: a regional grid constraint during peak demand, coinciding with a shortage of a refined mineral or a chip class
Analogues: clustered load in Ireland and the United States, 2024 to 2025; refining concentration, 2025¹²²³
Interventions: none modelled: the specification describes the unmitigated case
Run state: narrative specification; quantified run scheduled for 2027

5.2The cascade, step by step

1
AIC → ENE
large new loads queue for connection and tighten the local grid
2025
2
MIN → TRD
a refined input is short and chip lead times lengthen
2025
3
TRD → AIC
new server and grid equipment is delayed
2025
4
AIC → DAT
capacity for cloud and AI services grows slower than demand
2025
5
DAT → INF
services that share a provider are exposed together
2025
6
INF → FIN
investment is re-timed and costs reach budgets
2025

5.3The scenario as a table of steps

How the shock in scenario SCN-SR13-GRID-01 would travel through Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness’s coupled systems, step by step, under the assumptions the edition states.

Step	What happens	Source
01 AI compute to energy	Large new loads queue for connection and tighten the local grid. Analogue or source: 2025.	Edition SR-13, scenario SCN-SR13-GRID-01, step 1
02 Minerals to trade	A refined input is short and chip lead times lengthen. Analogue or source: 2025.	Edition SR-13, scenario SCN-SR13-GRID-01, step 2
03 Trade to ai compute	New server and grid equipment is delayed. Analogue or source: 2025.	Edition SR-13, scenario SCN-SR13-GRID-01, step 3
04 AI compute to dat	Capacity for cloud and AI services grows slower than demand. Analogue or source: 2025.	Edition SR-13, scenario SCN-SR13-GRID-01, step 4
05 DAT to infrastructure	Services that share a provider are exposed together. Analogue or source: 2025.	Edition SR-13, scenario SCN-SR13-GRID-01, step 5
06 Infrastructure to finance	Investment is re-timed and costs reach budgets. Analogue or source: 2025.	Edition SR-13, scenario SCN-SR13-GRID-01, step 6

A teaching model of a conditional scenario under the edition’s stated assumptions: not a forecast, not a prediction and not a warning. Sources: Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness 2026, scenario SCN-SR13-GRID-01 (2026); Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness 2026, references (NR-CIT-1) (2026).

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Readings from the other desks

The global baseline is read through each steward’s lens, then once as a whole. Each lens is a projection of reviewed findings, not a separate argument. The other desks’ own editions of this subject are listed first, as cross-references, not copies.

15 min read0 figures8 tables40 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

Federation: each desk writes its own edition for the subjects in its remit. Until a desk releases, its edition shows its frame and the reading this edition printed for it.

Desk	Edition	State
GCRI Systems Evidence	No edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycle	Not in this cycle
GRF Public Deliberation	Outside this desk’s remit	Not in remit
GRA Capital Readiness	No edition of this subject at this desk in the 2026 Baseline cycle	Not in this cycle
Standards Progress	Outside this desk’s remit	Not in remit
Academy Capability	Outside this desk’s remit	Not in remit
Index Measurement	Outside this desk’s remit	Not in remit

6.2Three lenses

One edition, read by each steward. The lens of this site comes first.

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading technology infrastructure as one dependent stack. Load growth, concentrated refining and concentrated chip production recur across regions, and policy targets and delivery are still apart. Evidence is strongest for load and sales and weakest for capacity by region and provider concentration.

AIC-001 · ENE-003 · MIN-005 · SYS-012

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people the stack appears as a service that works or does not. The baseline asks that public debate treat power, chips and minerals as shared inputs, and keep recovery as well as growth in view.

INF-004 · DAT-009 · DEV-011

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Public funding is large in places and private investment is concentrated⁴³¹¹. These show where finance-readiness evidence will matter. Nothing here is advice, a rating or an approval.

FIN-008 · FIN-010

NEXUS

Synthesis

Technology infrastructure risk is well described by layer and thinly measured as a system. The 2027 programme should bind connection times, chip capacity and provider concentration, and test the grid and supply overlap before the next shortage.

SYS-012 · R-01 · R-03

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

How the Nexus Standards drafts, the Risk Academy and the three stewards feed each quarterly edition for strategic technology infrastructure. The standards are a preparatory working draft (2026) and are cited as drafts, never as adopted standards.

Table 6.1The quarterly rhythm every edition follows
Quarter	Edition	Question	Boundary
Q1	State and Agenda	What matters this year, and what is the starting position?	observed baseline stays distinct from planned work
Q2	Evidence and Build	What new evidence and capability exist?	a configured capability is not a validated result
Q3	Stress Test and Readiness	What do scenarios and tests show?	simulated loss or performance is not observed impact
Q4	Annual Synthesis and Renewal	What changed in the year, and what renews?	release follows review, not event publicity deadlines

Table 6.2Who contributes what each quarter
Steward or body	Role	Contribution route
GCRI Canada	Lead Institution and Consortium Secretariat; publisher of record; technical truth (key T)	science and practice communities · GCRI gateway
The Global Risks Forum (GRF)	leadership, dialogue and the Universe programme; public meaning (key M)	policy, Universe and national adoption · GRF gateway
The Global Risks Alliance (GRA)	finance, insurance and development readiness; capital meaning (key F)	finance and insurance · GRA gateway
Nexus Standards	preparatory drafts on vocabulary, hazards, indicators and methods	Standards site · working groups HAZ, IND, MTH, FIN, AI
Risk Academy	learning pathways tied to the agenda questions	Academy gateway · learning by review
Reports strategic desks	technology infrastructure chapter inputs: GCRI evidence and GRA readiness	strategic editorial board

Standards drafts used in this edition

Risk vocabulary NRS-C1 (424 terms) for terms in the glossary
Hazard atlas NHS-1 1.1.0 (905 hazards in 120 families) for risk objects
Seven risk classes: global, catastrophic, existential, emerging, planetary, exponential, frontier-tech

Standards calendar to watch

Founding calls from 20 October 2026; working groups meet from 5 November 2026
Inaugural Global Standards Council session, 12 January 2027
Quarterly reviews in March, June, September and December, aligned with each edition

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

GCRI’s reading of this edition is its model card: what the national model is, what it computes and where it stops. It is printed in full in Annex A, with the methods it belongs to. Annex A, methodology

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

Four signed essays by the Reports editorial team set out the positions this edition takes. They are interpretation, labelled as such; the evidence they draw on is in the findings register.

Chips need minerals, data centres need power and services need both. Treating each layer alone understates how a limit in one becomes a limit in all. This edition reads the stack.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

Technology is a stack of physical inputs

The global share of electricity used by data centres is small. The effect is local, in clusters such as those in the United States and in Ireland, where grid limits arrive first.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

Load is local

Public targets and funding set direction. The Commission’s forecast and the Court of Auditors show that a target and delivered capacity can be far apart, and the same test applies to every programme.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

Targets are not capacity

Readiness is not self-sufficiency. It is the ability to keep critical services running and to recover them when an input is short. The literature on weaponised interdependence explains why shared inputs matter.

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

Sovereignty is a matter of degree

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 strategic technology infrastructure readiness pack

The registers that open the 2027 global cycle. At baseline each is initialised from this edition.

Table 6.32027 strategic technology infrastructure readiness pack
Item	Register	State at baseline	First 2027 entry
E1	Global risk state delta	baseline set by this edition	changes against the baseline
E2	WEFH+B state delta	five global system readings set	indicator updates and freshness
E3	Agenda and Portfolio movement	eight agenda items · 6 proposed objects	admission decisions
E4	Federation delivery register	national chapters in preparation	national chapters
E5	Consortium capability register	national consortia forming	first contributions
E6	Leadership questions and challenges	none yet	first challenge log
E7	Foundry technical state	national environments prepared	first federation cut
E8	Publication candidates	twelve findings carried forward	PUBLISH · HOLD dispositions
E9	Universe readiness	one candidate mission	admission and role spine
E10	Correction register	none	first federation-wide cycle

Publication dispositions

Publish
Hold
Needs evidence
Restricted
Superseded

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Instruments and published guidance that shape the systems in this edition, by status on the retrieval date. The edition assesses no one’s compliance.

IN FORCE
ADOPTED
PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY

Table 6.4Standards and regulatory watch
Instrument	Body	Scope	Status	Relevance
EU Chips Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/1781⁸	European Union	EU	IN FORCE	chip supply and resilience
EU Artificial Intelligence Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689¹⁶	European Union	EU	IN FORCE	artificial intelligence
EU Data Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/2854¹⁷	European Union	EU	IN FORCE	data access and cloud switching
EU Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847¹⁸	European Union	EU	IN FORCE	product security
NIS2 Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/2555¹⁹	European Union	EU	IN FORCE	network security
Critical Entities Resilience Directive, Directive (EU) 2022/2557²⁹	European Union	EU	IN FORCE	critical entities
CHIPS and Science Act, Public Law 117-167²⁷	United States	US	ADOPTED	chip funding
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0³⁵	NIST	global use	PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY	cyber risk
ISO/IEC 27001 information security³¹	ISO	global	PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY	security management
ISO 22301 business continuity³²	ISO	global	PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY	continuity
IEC 62443 control-system security³³	IEC	global	PUBLISHED · VOLUNTARY	operational technology

Changed since 2024

The EU AI Act applies generally from 2 August 2026, with some high-risk dates extended by an omnibus act that entered into force on 27 July 2026¹⁶
Reporting obligations under the Cyber Resilience Act apply from 11 September 2026¹⁸
The Data Act has applied since 12 September 2025¹⁷
The EU published an action plan on cable security in February 2025³⁰
The 20% chip target comes from the Digital Decade programme³⁶

To watch in 2027

Full application of the Cyber Resilience Act on 11 December 2027¹⁸
Mid-term review of the EU Chips Act and any successor⁷⁸
Member State transposition of the NIS2 Directive, due 17 October 2024¹⁹

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

The review behind this edition covers strategic technology infrastructure assessments, peer-reviewed science and the institutional reports that bind its findings. Systematic reviews for each agenda item begin in 2027.

Review protocol

Question: What does the published evidence establish about the world’s strategic technology infrastructure and sovereign readiness and its couplings?
Sources searched: agency and statistical releases; policy pages; peer-reviewed interdependency literature; market statistics
Window: releases available at evidence close, 30 September 2026
Selection: sources that bind or contextualise a finding in this edition
Next step: systematic reviews for agenda items 01 to 05 in 2027

Table 6.5Peer-reviewed science and assessments
Reference	Type	Year	Role	Used for
Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly³⁹	journal article	2001	framework	interdependencies
Buldyrev et al.⁴⁰	journal article	2010	supports	cascading failure
Farrell and Newman³⁷	journal article	2019	framework	weaponised interdependence
Miller, Chip War³⁸	book	2022	context	chip supply history
Bradford, Digital Empires⁴²	book	2023	context	regulatory models
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory report²³	national laboratory report	2024	context	US data-centre energy

Table 6.6Institutional flagships
Reference	Issuer	Year	Role	Used for
Energy and AI¹	IEA	2025	supports	data centre load
Global Energy Review 2026²	IEA	2026	supports	electricity growth
Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026³	IEA	2026	supports	refining concentration
Technology and Innovation Report 2025²²	UNCTAD	2025	context	frontier technology
Draghi report²⁰	European Commission	2024	context	competitiveness
Space Environment Report²⁵	ESA	2025	context	orbital infrastructure

Table 6.7Statistics, markets and indices
Reference	Issuer	Year	Role	Used for
Semiconductor sales release⁴	WSTS	2026	supports	chip market
Annual sales release⁵	SIA	2026	supports	chip market
AI Index 2026¹¹	Stanford HAI	2026	supports	private investment
Data centre tracker¹⁴	Epoch AI	2026	supports	large sites
Cloud use by enterprises⁹	Eurostat	2025	supports	cloud use
AI use by enterprises¹⁰	Eurostat	2025	supports	AI use
Data centre electricity release¹²	CSO Ireland	2025	supports	local load
Facts and Figures¹³	ITU	2026	supports	connectivity
Cloud market share series²⁶	Synergy Research	2026	context	provider concentration

Table 6.8Standards, directives and policy
Reference	Issuer	Year	Role	Used for
Chips Act page⁸	European Commission	2026	supports	EU chip policy
Special report on the EU chip strategy⁷	European Court of Auditors	2025	supports	target and forecast
CHIPS and Science Act text⁴³	US Congress	2022	supports	US funding
CHIPS for America page⁶	NIST	2026	post-close, context only	award notices
National Semiconductor Strategy²¹	UK government	2023	context	UK policy
AI Factories¹⁵	EuroHPC Joint Undertaking	2026	context	compute capacity
AI Act page¹⁶	European Commission	2026	context	dates of application
AI export measure of 2025²⁸	US Department of Commerce	2025	context	export controls

Where the evidence agrees

Data-centre load is growing fast and is concentrated in a few regions¹²
Refining of energy minerals is concentrated³
The chip market is large and growing⁴⁵

Where it is unsettled

How fast efficiency gains will slow data-centre load growth¹
Whether public targets for chip capacity will be met⁷⁸
How large cross-system cascades are at operating scale³⁹⁴⁰

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2026 AI Index Report (report page; private AI investment in 2025 of USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16European Commission (ed.), AI Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; in force 1 August 2024; general application 2 August 2026; omnibus in force 27 July 2026). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
17European Commission (ed.), Data Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/2854; in force 11 January 2024; applies from 12 September 2025). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
18European Commission (ed.), Cyber Resilience Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/2847; in force 10 December 2024; reporting from 11 September 2026; main obligations from 11 December 2027). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
19European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive (policy page; Directive (EU) 2022/2555; transposition deadline 17 October 2024). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
29UNVERIFIED, not opened: Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities, Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
27CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, United States (statute text opened; see reference [43]). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
35UNVERIFIED, not opened: NIST, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, February 2024, cited from memory; the programme page read gave no figures. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
31UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security management systems. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
32UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: business continuity management systems. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
33UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
30UNVERIFIED, not opened: European Commission and High Representative, Joint Communication on an EU Action Plan on Cable Security, February 2025, cited from memory; the policy page returned not found. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030, Decision (EU) 2022/2481, Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, cited from memory as the origin of the 20% chip target. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, 2001, cited from memory. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Buldyrev, S.V. et al., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, 2010, cited from memory. Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
37UNVERIFIED, not opened: Farrell, H. and Newman, A.L., Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, International Security 44(1), 42 to 79, 2019, cited from memory. MIT Press. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Miller, C., Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology. Scribner, New York, 2022, cited from memory; no figure used. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Bradford, A., Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology. Oxford University Press, New York, 2023, cited from memory; no figure used. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
23UNVERIFIED, not opened: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (ed.), 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, December 2024, cited from memory; no figure used; the page returned an access error. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
22UNCTAD (ed.), Technology and Innovation Report 2025 (publication page read for date, 7 April 2025; no figures used). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
20European Commission (ed.), The Draghi report: A competitiveness strategy for Europe (page read for title and date, 9 September 2024; no figures used). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
25UNVERIFIED, not opened: ESA (ed.), ESA Space Environment Report 2025, cited for orbital infrastructure context; the page returned an access error and no figure is used. European Space Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5SIA (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release of 6 February 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14POST-CLOSE, context only: Epoch AI (ed.), Frontier data centres (tracker page updated 1 November 2026; 96 sites, 15.1 GW of IT power; estimated coverage of about 45% of deployed AI compute). Epoch AI. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10Eurostat (ed.), Use of artificial intelligence in enterprises (Statistics Explained; 19.95% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons in 2025; large enterprises 55.03%). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures (page titled 2025 whose text describes the 2026 edition; 6.3 billion people online, 76%; 2 billion offline; 93% in high-income and 32% in low-income countries). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
26UNVERIFIED, not opened: Synergy Research Group (ed.), cloud infrastructure market share series, cited as the intended source of provider shares; the article address returned not found and no figure is used. Synergy Research Group, Reno. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
6POST-CLOSE, context only: Post-close, context only: NIST (ed.), CHIPS for America (programme page; award notices to October 2026; supports no baseline claim). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
21UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (ed.), National Semiconductor Strategy (page read for date, 19 May 2023, and three objectives; no figures used). UK Government, London. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15EuroHPC Joint Undertaking (ed.), AI Factories (programme page; states 19 AI Factories and 13 antennas while the listing shows 18 entries; no amounts). EuroHPC Joint Undertaking, Luxembourg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
28UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, rescission of the 2025 AI diffusion export measure, May 2025, cited from memory; the Federal Register page redirected to an access gate. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

The 2027 agenda

Eight bounded questions open the 2027 strategic technology infrastructure agenda. Each comes from a baseline finding, names the initiative that will carry it and the first output due in the 2027 strategic technology infrastructure edition.

5 min read0 figures6 tables3 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

7.1Questions for the operational series

R-01
How would a local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint spread through cloud services, health and payments?
INI-SR13-GRD-01 · grid and supply compound test; first output: dependency analysis for six regions.
R-02
Which shared dependencies (power, chips, minerals, cloud, connectivity) sit behind the most services?
INI-SR13-DEP-02 · shared dependencies; first output: dependency register.
R-03
How long do grid connections for large loads take, and what limits them?
INI-SR13-CON-03 · connection times; first output: connection table.
R-04
Where is chip and mineral supply most concentrated, and how fast is it changing?
INI-SR13-SUP-04 · supply concentration; first output: concentration map.
R-05
How do policy targets compare with delivered capacity?
INI-SR13-TGT-05 · targets and delivery; first output: target tracker.
R-06
Which countries publish data-centre load on a comparable basis?
To be admitted in 2027; first output: coverage note.
R-07
How do export and import controls change supply for chips and minerals?
To be admitted in 2027; first output: scoping note.
R-08
Which readiness capabilities have been tested under real shortages, and which are only planned?
Readiness capability register; first output: rung evidence for 15 functions.

7.2Portfolio proposed for the Q1 2027 alignment

Five initiatives and one Universe mission candidate are proposed for the 2027 technology infrastructure portfolio. They are programme objects: no partner, funder or member is attached to them in this edition.

Table 7.1Objects proposed for the first operational quarter
ID	Object	Kind	Question	State
INI-SR13-GRD-01	Grid and supply compound test	Initiative	R-01	PROPOSED
INI-SR13-DEP-02	Shared dependencies	Initiative	R-02	PROPOSED
INI-SR13-CON-03	Connection times for large loads	Initiative	R-03	PROPOSED
INI-SR13-SUP-04	Supply concentration	Initiative	R-04	PROPOSED
INI-SR13-TGT-05	Targets and delivery	Initiative	R-05	PROPOSED
MSN-SR13-2027-01	Grid and supply overlap Universe mission	Mission	R-01	Candidate

7.3The pathway

The technology infrastructure edition reads national technology chapters, sector editions, exponential technology editions and the global edition through one governed evidence graph. At baseline the federation is designed and its first editions are drafted. This page states what exists today and what comes next.

01
National technology chapters
technology infrastructure reading in each national edition
IN PREPARATION · national baselines
02
Sector and technology editions
energy, cyber, chips, cloud, minerals
PLANNED · sector and technology Baseline Editions
03
Technology infrastructure model
the global system of systems
v0 SPECIFIED · v1 with federation evidence
04
Strategic links
SR-02 · SR-03 supply chains · SR-04 minerals
PLANNED · strategic baselines
05
Universe
annual proving environment
CANDIDATE MISSION · mandate in 2027
06
Technology Infrastructure Report
this series
BASELINE DRAFT · 2027 annual edition
07
Evidence and correction
one graph, many projections
OPEN · first correction cycle in 2027

7.4Universe 2027: evidence pack for the strategic technology infrastructure candidate mission

01
Mandate
02
Core Build · 1 month
03
Action · 1 week
04
Evidence seal
05
Portfolio correction
06
Next mandate

Table 7.2Universe 2027: evidence pack for the strategic technology infrastructure candidate mission
Item	Record	State	Timing
F1	Annual mandate record	PLANNED	after the Q2 2027 alignment
F2	Core Build record	PLANNED	one month before the exercise
F3	Exercise evidence	PLANNED	during the Action week
F4	Decision packets	PLANNED	exercise state only
F5	Proof receipts	PLANNED	scoped to each recorded check
F6	After-action report	PLANNED	within one quarter
F7	Upgrade docket	PLANNED	routed to the Portfolio
F8	Portfolio renewal	PLANNED	2027 strategic technology infrastructure annual edition
F9	Public synthesis	PLANNED	public-safe extracts only

Mission

ID: MSN-SR13-2027-01 · Grid and supply overlap Universe mission
Role spine: Leadership sponsor · Institutional anchor · Mission lead: drawn from national pathways
Receiving actors: to be identified with the mandate

7.5Handoffs and routing

Where the baseline’s findings go next. A handoff routes a finding for awareness, review or work; it transfers no authority.

Table 7.3Handoffs and routing
Finding	Routed to	Purpose	Class
AIC-001 · data centre load	regional consortia	grid constraint overlay	PUBLIC
ENE-003 · US electricity growth	INI-SR13-CON-03	connection times	PUBLIC
MIN-005 · refining concentration	INI-SR13-SUP-04	supply concentration	PUBLIC
TRD-006 · chip sales	INI-SR13-SUP-04	supply concentration	PUBLIC
TRD-007 · EU chip target	INI-SR13-TGT-05	targets and delivery	PUBLIC
FIN-008 · US chip funding	INI-SR13-TGT-05	targets and delivery	PUBLIC
DAT-009 · cloud and AI use	INI-SR13-DEP-02 · key F review	shared dependencies	PUBLIC
SYS-012 · compound pathway	MSN-SR13-2027-01	Universe candidate	CONSORTIUM

Table 7.4Routing rules by publication class
Class	Where it goes	Who can see it
PUBLIC	the published edition and its evidence bundle	anyone
CONSORTIUM	governed rooms of the federation	consortium members under agreement
CONTROLLED	need-to-know channels	named competent actors only

7.6Feeds and signal register

Table 7.5Feeds watched from 2027
Feed	Producer	Latency	Feeds into
Semiconductor sales	WSTS and SIA	monthly and annual	TRD-006
Energy and AI outlook	IEA	annual	AIC-001
Critical minerals outlook	IEA	annual	MIN-005
Enterprise digital use	Eurostat	annual	DAT-009
Metered data centre electricity	CSO Ireland	annual	INF-004
Large AI site tracker	Epoch AI	continuous	AIC-002
Connectivity statistics	ITU	annual	DEV-011

Escalation routes

none · keep monitoring
research question
project
risk object
annual publication
signal report

Table 7.6Signals at baseline
ID	Signal	Corroboration	Systems	Route
SIG-SR13-001	Data centres took half of US electricity growth in 2025²	CORROBORATED	AIC · ENE	risk object RSK-SR13-ENE-001
SIG-SR13-002	Average top-refiner share of 72% in 2025³	CORROBORATED	MIN · TRD	research question R-04
SIG-SR13-003	EU forecast chip share below its target⁷	CORROBORATED	TRD · FIN	research question R-05

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Systems in depth

One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.

7 min read0 figures5 tables14 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

8.1Common causes

One cause can strain many layers at once: fast demand growth, a concentrated supply chain, a policy change or a hazard. The shared cause matters more than the layer.

415TWh

data centre electricity use, 2024¹

72%

average top-refiner share, 2025³

26.2%

growth in chip sales, 2025⁴

Table 8.1Evidence at baseline
Instance	Mechanism in action	Evidence	Status
Demand growth	data-centre use grew about 12% a year to 2024	¹	Reported
Concentrated supply	one country holds the top refining share for most minerals tracked	³	Reported
Policy change	new chip, AI, data and cyber rules and funding	⁴³⁸¹⁶	Reported
Export measures	a 2025 US measure on AI chips and its rescission were reported; effect not bound	²⁸	Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

AIC → ENE load growth
MIN → TRD concentrated supply
FIN → TRD policy funding

Evidence to bind in 2027

common cause tagging of shortages
frequency of concurrent causes

Related editions

GLB Global Systems
SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
XT-06 Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute
XT-08 Cloud, Edge and Distributed Computing

8.2Domino effects

A limit in one layer removes an input from the next. A grid limit slows new compute, and a refining limit slows chips.

50%

of US electricity growth from data centres, 2025²

22%

of Irish metered electricity, 2024¹²

945TWh

IEA Base Case, 2030¹

Table 8.2Evidence at baseline
Instance	Mechanism in action	Evidence	Status
Power to compute	clustered load tightens local grids	¹¹²	Reported
Minerals to chips	refining concentration limits inputs to chips and equipment	³	Inferred
Chips to services	chip supply limits server and network capacity	⁴	Inferred
Cloud to users	shared cloud services pass a fault to many users	⁹	Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

AIC → ENE → INF
MIN → TRD → AIC
DAT → INF

Evidence to bind in 2027

sequence timing of capacity limits
service-level dependence data

Related editions

GLB Global Systems
SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
XT-06 Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute
XT-08 Cloud, Edge and Distributed Computing

8.3Inter-systemic feedbacks

Technology infrastructure depends on what it powers and also presses back on it. Compute raises power demand, and power limits compute.

≈85%

of data-centre use in the US, China and Europe, 2024¹

285.88USD billion

US private AI investment, 2025¹¹

<10%

of global electricity growth to 2030 from data centres, Base Case¹

Table 8.3Evidence at baseline
Instance	Mechanism in action	Evidence	Status
Compute to grid	clustered demand tightens local grids	¹²	Reported
Grid to compute	connection limits slow new capacity	¹	Inferred
Capital to capacity	private investment funds new sites and chips	¹¹	Inferred
Efficiency to load	hardware and software efficiency changes the load path	¹	Reported

Pathways in this mechanism

AIC → ENE
ENE → AIC → INF
FIN → AIC

Evidence to bind in 2027

connection-time data
cluster-level reliability

Related editions

GLB Global Systems
SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
XT-06 Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute
XT-08 Cloud, Edge and Distributed Computing

8.4Shared vulnerabilities

Different layers share the same weak points: concentrated refining, concentrated chip supply, shared cloud services and clustered sites.

72%

average top-refiner share, 2025³

52.74%

of EU enterprises buy cloud services, 2025⁹

5clusters

hold nearly half of US data-centre capacity¹

Table 8.4Evidence at baseline
Instance	Mechanism in action	Evidence	Status
Refining	a single country leads refining for most minerals tracked	³	Reported
Cloud services	wide use makes shared providers a shared dependency; shares not bound	⁹	Inferred
Clustered sites	nearly half of US capacity sits in five regional clusters	¹	Reported
Orbital links	satellite and timing signals underpin networks; no series opened	²⁵	Expert input

Pathways in this mechanism

MIN → TRD concentrated refining
DAT → INF shared cloud
AIC → ENE clustered load

Evidence to bind in 2027

provider concentration by region
dependence on timing and positioning signals

Related editions

GLB Global Systems
SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
XT-06 Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute
XT-08 Cloud, Edge and Distributed Computing

8.5Thresholds and tipping

A system can absorb stress until a threshold is crossed. Grid headroom, refining diversity and delivered chip capacity are such thresholds for technology infrastructure.

11.7%

EU forecast chip share, 2030⁷

50USD billion

US CHIPS funding⁴³

2.3times

IEA Base Case 2030 against 2024 use, derived¹

Table 8.5Evidence at baseline
Instance	Mechanism in action	Evidence	Status
Grid headroom	load that doubles by 2030 meets local limits first	¹¹²	Inferred
Chip capacity	a 20% target against an 11.7% forecast	⁷	Reported
Refining diversity	rare earth refining concentration fell modestly while other minerals rose	³	Reported
Tipping in networks	cascades can become abrupt in interdependent networks	⁴⁰	Inferred

Pathways in this mechanism

AIC → ENE threshold
FIN → TRD capacity threshold
MIN → TRD diversity threshold

Evidence to bind in 2027

grid headroom by region
cascade thresholds at operating scale

Related editions

GLB Global Systems
SR-02 Critical Infrastructure and Lifeline Systems
SR-03 Global Supply Chains, Trade and Chokepoints
SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
XT-06 Advanced Semiconductors and AI Compute
XT-08 Cloud, Edge and Distributed Computing

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
16European Commission (ed.), AI Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; in force 1 August 2024; general application 2 August 2026; omnibus in force 27 July 2026). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
28UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, rescission of the 2025 AI diffusion export measure, May 2025, cited from memory; the Federal Register page redirected to an access gate. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2026 AI Index Report (report page; private AI investment in 2025 of USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
25UNVERIFIED, not opened: ESA (ed.), ESA Space Environment Report 2025, cited for orbital infrastructure context; the page returned an access error and no figure is used. European Space Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Buldyrev, S.V. et al., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, 2010, cited from memory. Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Methodology

How the edition was made: methods, the model card, the evidence cut and its age, the acceptance record and the glossary.

12 min read0 figures13 tables14 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

A.1Methods

The global baseline uses published values and four simple derivations. Each is shown in full so that any reader can reproduce it.

Table A.1Methods
No.	Derivation	Calculation	Result
(1)	IEA Base Case 2030 against 2024 use	945 ÷ 415	≈ 2.3 times
(2)	Rise in global chip sales, 2024 to 2025 (SIA series)	791.7 − 630.5	= USD 161.2 billion
(3)	EU chip share gap to target in 2030	20 − 11.7	= 8.3 percentage points
(4)	Combined share of data-centre use, US, China, Europe	45 + 25 + 15	≈ 85%

Table A.2Coupling strength scale (matrix and model card)
Strength	Definition
STRONG	a disruption in the source system has historically changed the target system’s service or output within one season, in more than one region
MODERATE	an effect is documented but buffered or slower
WEAK	an effect is plausible but not documented at global scale

Table A.3Status grammar
Label	Rule
Reported	value as issued by its source, with year
Inferred	reasoned from cited evidence; never a measurement
Estimated	Nexus analytical value with stated method
Scenario	conditional on stated assumptions
Expert input	structured editorial judgement awaiting evidence

A.2Model card, Technology Infrastructure Model v0

Model ID: MDL-SR13-STRATTECH · v0.1
Purpose: represent strategic technology infrastructure as a dependent stack and the mechanisms by which strain spreads between compute, chips, power, minerals and connectivity
Family: graph-based system of systems
Inputs: the cited sources of this edition; no proprietary data
Method: expert-specified coupling strengths (STRONG · MODERATE · WEAK) from assessments and analogue events
Validation: none yet, first validation against federation evidence in 2027
Uncertainty: qualitative; strengths are hypotheses, not measurements
Domain of validity: global scale; not for asset-, site- or country-level use
Reproducibility: strength table and sources published in this edition

20couplings

typed in v0

5strong

documented within one season

3moderate

documented, buffered

12weak

plausible, undocumented

A.3The baseline evidence cut

Every Nexus edition is published from a frozen evidence cut. The global baseline cut is documentary: it pins the exact edition of every source cited. Federation cuts begin with the first national Foundry cuts in 2027.

Cut ID: DC-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-B0
Type: baseline documentary cut
Resolution policy: pinned · as of 30 September 2026
Sources pinned: 43 cited sources, each at the edition and access date in the references
Model runs: none at baseline, analytical values are stated with their method
Digest: computed at freeze and recorded in the publication record
Supersedes: nothing, first cut of the series
Superseded by: the 2027 strategic technology infrastructure annual cut

Lineage

01
source edition
02
pinned citation
03
finding
04
page
05
publication record

Table A.4From the baseline cut to the federation cut
Element	Baseline 2026	2027 global annual
Sources	cited global publications, pinned by edition	national, regional and sector cuts through one graph
Analysis	stated methods and editorial estimates	typed analysis specifications
Models	Technology Infrastructure Model v0 specification	model runs with receipts
Findings	twelve baseline findings	findings re-bound to federation evidence
Review	five passes scheduled	five passes on the exact digest

A.4Evidence age and coverage

A 2026 global edition rests on evidence observed in many different years. This page shows each time base, so that no single year label hides older evidence.

Table A.5Evidence age and coverage
Indicator	Observed	Released	Cadence	Next release
Data centre load	2024	Apr 2025	one-off	next IEA update
US electricity growth	2025	May 2026	annual	next review
Refining concentration	2025	Jul 2026	annual	next outlook
Chip sales	2025	Feb to Mar 2026	quarterly	next forecast
EU chip target	2022 to 2030	Apr 2025	one-off	mid-term review
US chip funding	2022	2026	rolling	next award notice
Enterprise cloud and AI use	2025	2025	annual	2026 survey
Irish data centre load	2024	Jun 2025	annual	next CSO release
Private AI investment	2025	2026	annual	next AI Index
Connectivity	2026	Nov 2026	annual	next ITU release

Table A.6Coverage by system at baseline
System	Coverage	Thinnest dimension
Compute load	GOOD	load by site and region
Power	PARTIAL	connection waiting times
Chips	PARTIAL	capacity by region
Minerals	PARTIAL	rare earth and heavy-mineral shares
Cloud	THIN	provider concentration
Connectivity	PARTIAL	quality and resilience of links
Policy and finance	PARTIAL	delivery against targets
Orbital infrastructure	THIN	satellite and timing dependence

Table A.7Designed empty states: what is not bound, what would fill it and why
Field	Source that would fill it	Blocker
Chip manufacturing capacity by region on a common basis	industry associations and national statistics	no consolidated series opened; sales are bound, capacity is not
Cloud market concentration by region	market analysts²⁶	the analyst page returned not found; no provider shares are used
Grid connection waiting times for large loads	system operators and regulators	not retrieved; no comparable series
AI compute by country beyond tracked sites	Epoch AI data centre tracker¹⁴	the tracker estimates it covers about 45% of deployed AI compute, with a wide interval
Sovereign cloud and local hosting adoption	national statistics and market analysts	no common definition found
Rare earth mine and refining shares from the primary tables	USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026²⁴	the report returned an access error; the IEA outlook excludes rare earths from its 72% average
US data-centre electricity use in the national laboratory report	Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory²³	the report page returned an access error
Orbital infrastructure counts and debris	ESA Space Environment Report²⁵	the report page returned an access error
EU investment amounts for AI Factories and gigafactories	EuroHPC Joint Undertaking¹⁵	the page read gives no amounts and lists 18 or 19 AI Factories
Data centre definition used by national statistics	national statistics offices¹²	the release page read gives no definition
Effect of export measures on chip and mineral supply	agencies and independent studies²⁸	the rule page was not opened; no outcome data found
Status of national NIS2 transposition	European Commission, Member States¹⁹	the status page was not opened

A.5Evidence cards, two anchor sources

Issued by the International Energy Agency. One-off special report. Role: binds AIC-001 and AIC-002. Coverage: global with US, China and Europe splits. The full report was read.

EVD-SR13-001

IEA Energy and AI¹

Issued by the International Energy Agency. Annual. Role: binds MIN-005. Coverage: energy and strategic minerals. The full report was read; it gives 2020 and 2023 as the earlier base for the same 72% figure.

EVD-SR13-002

IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026³

Table A.8Quality dimensions at baseline
Dimension	EVD-SR13-001	EVD-SR13-002
Completeness	projection cases published; site-level data limited	refining shares for many minerals; rare earths excluded from the average
Timeliness	about 12 months before evidence close	about 3 months before evidence close
Revision	special report; later outlooks update it	revised version of July 2026
Method transparency	cases and assumptions stated	country shares by mineral shown
External validation	industry expectations for server shipments	IEA data and expert review

Evidence cards to follow in 2027

IEA¹: regional tables for load by country
IEA³: shares for each mineral and the base-year note
WSTS⁴: regional sales totals
Eurostat⁹¹⁰: country detail and size classes

A.6Publication acceptance record

Editorial self-check at evidence close. Every applicable item carries a disposition; the remaining items are review, approval and deposit.

Table A.9Publication acceptance record
Group	Area	Items	Pass	N/A	Pending
D1	Identity and scope	8	8	0	0
D2	Source and data	12	9	1	2
D3	Analysis and models	12	3	8	1
D4	Findings and claims	9	8	0	1
D5	Figures, tables, maps	10	6	2	2
D6	Editorial and citations	10	8	0	2
D7	Review and approval	13	0	0	13
D8	Artefact and design	12	7	0	5
D9	Registry and release	9	0	0	9

Publication gate

Conditions met: 14 of 23 at evidence close
Blocking problems: none recorded
Open conditions: reviews, approval of the exact digest, deposit, registry pointer

Not applicable at baseline

Model runs: first runs in Q1 2027
Maps: plates in Q2 2027
Waivers: none

A.7Status words

Table A.10The status every value carries
Status	What it means
Observed	Measured directly and published by the source.
Reported	Published statistics of an official or institutional source.
Declared	Stated by the body concerned; not independently measured.
Estimated	A Nexus estimate from cited evidence, with its method in Annex A.
Modelled	Produced by a stated model from cited inputs.
Inferred	Reasoned from cited evidence; not measured.
Forecast	A projection by the cited source.
Simulated	A simulation result under stated assumptions.
Scenario	A conditional statement under stated assumptions; never a prediction.
Expert input	Expert judgement, recorded with its basis.
Candidate	Proposed for a later edition; not yet evidence.
Evidence-quality levels (EQL 1 to 5) grade the source behind a value; they are not a score of the subject.

A.8How the edition is made, released and corrected

Every edition is built from a sealed evidence cut, reviewed under three keys, signed and deposited before any site shows it as published; corrections go to Nexus Standards as change proposals and feed the next cut.

Step	What happens	Source
01 Evidence arrives from the pillars	Foundry seals observations and indicator series, Universe hands over after-action and scenario findings, and contributions are screened at every gateway, including this site’s.
02 The cut is sealed	On the cut date the evidence is pinned under one identifier, so anyone can rebuild the edition from exactly what it was built on.
03 The edition is assembled	The edition is drafted from its template and content pack. Agents may draft; they never publish and never decide.
04 The keys turn	At the publisher of record the truth key comes first: every value is checked against its source or stated method before the meaning and capital keys turn. No edition moves on until every key has been turned by a named steward.
05 The gate opens	A named approver releases one exact digest of the edition; any change after this point is a new version, never a silent edit.
06 Signed and deposited	The PDF, the web edition and the data bundle are signed together with a manifest and an RO-Crate description, and deposited on Zenodo with a concept and a version DOI.
07 Published on its desk’s site	Only then does the edition show as published on its desk’s Reports site, and the Collection lists it as a part.
08 Corrections go to Standards	Method and correction findings go to Nexus Standards as change proposals; citations, corrections and new contributions feed the next evidence cut.

A teaching model of the process, not a forecast and not a record of any run; dates and counts on this page come from the programme record. Sources: Reports governance at GCRI Canada (2026); Zenodo, repository of record for Reports deposits (2026).

Lifecycle, one state at a time: Draft, Computed, Evidence bound, Reviewed, Approved for release, Published, Corrected, Superseded. This edition is a draft.

A.9Glossary and abbreviations

Table A.11Series terms
Term	Meaning
Baseline Edition	the inaugural annual edition that fixes the reference state for the series
WEFH+B	water, energy, food, health and biodiversity, the national nexus core
Coupling	a typed dependency through which one system transmits to another
Protection gap	the share of losses not covered by insurance
Capability ladder	LISTED → EXISTS → ADEQUATE → TESTED → DEMONSTRATED
EQL	evidence-quality level, 1–5
Evidence cut	a frozen resolution of exact sources and versions
NNC · NLC · NWG	National Nexus Consortium · National Leadership Council · National Working Groups

Table A.12Abbreviations used in this edition
Abbreviation	Expansion
AI	artificial intelligence
CER	Critical Entities Resilience
CRA	Cyber Resilience Act
CSF	Cybersecurity Framework
ECA	European Court of Auditors
GW	gigawatt
IEA	International Energy Agency
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
NIS2	second Network and Information Security Directive
SIA	Semiconductor Industry Association
TWh	terawatt hour
WSTS	World Semiconductor Trade Statistics

A.10Technical annex

Table A.13Technical annex
Item	Annex	Contents	Status
A.1	Indicator definitions	the global indicator set, with units and sources	IN THIS EDITION
A.2	Coupling strengths	the twenty-cell matrix and its rationale	IN THIS EDITION
A.3	Scenario specification	SCN-SR13-GRID-01 assumptions and signposts	IN THIS EDITION
A.4	Capability placements	rung evidence for fifteen functions	IN THIS EDITION
A.5	Model diagnostics	first runs and validation	2027
A.6	Sensitivity analyses	influence of coupling strengths	2027
A.7	Regional notes	regional technology infrastructure cards	WITH REGIONAL EDITIONS
A.8	Review statements	pass-by-pass review record	AT RELEASE

A.1 · indicator definition: data centre electricity use

Construct: electricity consumed by facilities that house servers, storage and network equipment
Unit: terawatt hours per year
Method: IEA estimate built on server shipments and efficiency assumptions; national statistics use meter data
Source: IEA Energy and AI¹; CSO Ireland¹²
Uncertainty: definitions of a data centre differ between sources
Known limits: does not record the service delivered or the site’s grid constraint

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

26UNVERIFIED, not opened: Synergy Research Group (ed.), cloud infrastructure market share series, cited as the intended source of provider shares; the article address returned not found and no figure is used. Synergy Research Group, Reno. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14POST-CLOSE, context only: Epoch AI (ed.), Frontier data centres (tracker page updated 1 November 2026; 96 sites, 15.1 GW of IT power; estimated coverage of about 45% of deployed AI compute). Epoch AI. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
24UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, rare earths chapter, cited as the primary table for mine and refining shares; the file returned an access error and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
23UNVERIFIED, not opened: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (ed.), 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, December 2024, cited from memory; no figure used; the page returned an access error. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
25UNVERIFIED, not opened: ESA (ed.), ESA Space Environment Report 2025, cited for orbital infrastructure context; the page returned an access error and no figure is used. European Space Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15EuroHPC Joint Undertaking (ed.), AI Factories (programme page; states 19 AI Factories and 13 antennas while the listing shows 18 entries; no amounts). EuroHPC Joint Undertaking, Luxembourg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
28UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, rescission of the 2025 AI diffusion export measure, May 2025, cited from memory; the Federal Register page redirected to an access gate. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
19European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive (policy page; Directive (EU) 2022/2555; transposition deadline 17 October 2024). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10Eurostat (ed.), Use of artificial intelligence in enterprises (Statistics Explained; 19.95% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons in 2025; large enterprises 55.03%). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Data appendix

The indicator set with its sources, the source registers, the licences of every kind of material and the formats of the edition.

8 min read0 figures8 tables14 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

B.1The indicator set

Table B.1Global baseline indicator set
Indicator	Value	Unit	Year	State	Source
Data centre electricity use	415	TWh	2024	Reported	¹
Share of global electricity	≈ 1.5	%	2024	Reported	¹
Data centre use, 2030 Base Case	≈ 945	TWh	2030	Estimated	¹
US share of data centre use	≈ 45	%	2024	Reported	¹
US electricity growth from data centres	≈ 50	%	2025	Reported	²
Irish data centre share of metered electricity	22	%	2024	Reported	¹²
Average top-refiner share, excluding rare earths	72	%	2025	Reported	³
Global semiconductor sales (WSTS)	795.6	USD billion	2025	Reported	⁴
Global semiconductor sales (SIA)	791.7	USD billion	2025	Reported	⁵
EU forecast chip share	11.7	%	2030	Estimated	⁷
US CHIPS manufacturing incentives	39	USD billion	2022	Reported	⁴³
EU enterprises buying cloud services	52.74	%	2025	Reported	⁹
EU enterprises using artificial intelligence	19.95	%	2025	Reported	¹⁰
Private AI investment, United States	285.88	USD billion	2025	Reported	¹¹
People using the internet	6.3	billion	2026	Reported	¹³

Indicators, CSV Indicators, JSON

B.2Global source register

The governed source set behind this edition. Each source keeps its authority, coverage, cadence and role; categories describe origin, not truth.

Domains bound by the register

Table B.3Global source register
Source	Category	Coverage	Period	Cadence	Role
IEA Energy and AI¹	intergovernmental agency	global	2024	one-off	data centre load
IEA Global Energy Review 2026²	intergovernmental agency	global	2025	annual	electricity growth
IEA Critical Minerals Outlook 2026³	intergovernmental agency	global	2025	annual	refining concentration
WSTS release⁴	industry statistics body	global	2025	quarterly	chip sales
SIA release⁵	industry association	global	2025	annual	chip sales
CHIPS and Science Act text⁴³	legislature	US	2022	one-off	funding totals
NIST CHIPS page⁴³	national standards body	US	2026	rolling	post-close, context only
ECA special report⁷	audit institution	EU	2025	one-off	chip target
Eurostat cloud and AI use⁹¹⁰	statistical office	EU	2025	annual	enterprise use
CSO data centre release¹²	statistical office	Ireland	2024	annual	local load
Stanford AI Index¹¹	university institute	global	2025	annual	private investment

B.3Regional reading, ten regional clusters

Map plates follow with the regional Baseline Editions, when boundary sources and public-safe resolutions are bound. This page gives the regional reading in table form and ranks no region.

Table B.4Regional reading, ten regional clusters
Region	Principal hazards	Systems most exposed	Baseline evidence
North America	data-centre load; chip funding	power, chips	IEA¹²; CHIPS and Science Act⁴³
South America	connectivity and power for new sites	power, networks	regional statistics (not bound)
Europe	chip target gap; cloud and AI use; AI Factories	chips, cloud, power	ECA⁷; Eurostat⁹¹⁰; EuroHPC¹⁵
Eurasia	not bound in this edition	not bound	regional statistics (not bound)
Middle East and North Africa	not bound in this edition	not bound	regional statistics (not bound)
Africa	access gap in connectivity	networks	ITU¹³
South Asia	access gap in connectivity	networks	ITU¹³
East Asia	chip sales growth; refining concentration	chips, minerals	WSTS⁴; IEA³
ASEAN	new large AI sites	power, compute	Epoch AI¹⁴
Oceania-Pacific	not bound in this edition	not bound	regional statistics (not bound)

B.4Regional card: Ireland data centres and the grid

country
grid
data centres
metered electricity

Systems in view: power, data centres, cloud services
Defining facts: data centres took 22% of metered electricity in 2024, up from 5% in 2015¹²
Couplings: AIC → ENE → INF
Capability evidence: a public annual statistical release¹²
Gaps: GWh values and the definition of a data centre were not on the page read
Agenda items: R-03 · R-01

Data centres took 22% of metered electricity in 2024 and 21% in 2023 [12].

POWER

Share of metered electricity

The share was 5% in 2015, so it rose by 17 percentage points over nine years [12].

GROWTH

From 5% to 22%

The release covers metered electricity and gives no definition of a data centre on the page read [12].

LIMITS

Metered electricity only

B.5How countries appear in the global edition

Countries enter the technology infrastructure edition through the technology chapters of their own national editions, on one card grammar. They are read against peer distributions and thresholds, never placed in a league table.

Table B.5How countries appear in the global edition
Card field	What it shows	Source
WEFH+B state	each core system against peer distribution bands	national edition
Couplings	the national dependency matrix	national edition
Risk objects	the national risk portfolio	national edition
Capability rungs	the national capability ladder	national edition
Evidence age	oldest and newest source dates	national source register

Editions in the 2026 Baseline programme

26national

countries and unions

10regional

clusters

16global

flagship and sector

14strategic

systems reports

20frontier

technology reports

How to read a country card

Each system is shown against the distribution of its peers, with thresholds where they exist
Couplings and risk objects come from the country’s own national edition
Capability rungs record evidence, not a judgement of institutions
Evidence age is printed, so older national data are visible as such

Table B.6National Baseline Editions in the 2026 programme
Wave	Countries and unions	State
W0	Canada	ISSUED
W1	United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, European Union, Switzerland	PLANNED
W2	Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Türkiye, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, African Union, India, China, Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, Australia	PLANNED

B.6Licences

Table B.7Licences of each kind of material
Material	Licence
Text	CC BY 4.0
Data	on the licence of each source; Nexus tables CC BY 4.0
Figures	Nexus figures CC BY 4.0; third-party as credited
Maps	boundary source and licence printed on each plate
Metadata	CC0 1.0, as Zenodo publishes it
Third-party data, figures and text	The source’s own licence, credited where it is used; never relicensed
Nexus-authored text, tables and figures: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0). Map plates print their boundary source and licence.

B.7Formats and provenance

Table B.8This edition in every format
Format	Kind	State	What it is	Identifier
Web edition	HTML	On this site	Draft in stewardship review; every value resolves to its source.	NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Print edition	PDF	At release	A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF, signed with the web edition at release.	NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Indicator data	CSV · JSON	On this site	15 indicators with unit, year, status and source; the machine-readable copy ships with the evidence bundle at release.	NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE data release v1
Figures	SVG · PNG	On this site	4 on the web edition: headline figure, figure 1.3, coupling instrument, capability ladder.	FIG-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-*
Slides	PDF	Not recorded	No slide deck is recorded for this edition.
Evidence brief	HTML · PDF	Not recorded	No evidence brief is recorded for this edition.
Dataset with DOI	DataCite	At release	Concept and version DOI are minted at deposit; none is recorded yet.

Provenance

Edition pack: The edition’s content pack (JSON), from which the print and web editions are built
Evidence cut: DC-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-B0, closed 30 September 2026
Reproducibility: sourced values cited; analytical values reproducible from stated parameters
Self-check: 14 of 23 at evidence close; a fail on any item blocks release
Review: five passes scheduled before release (in Annex C)
Publisher of record: GCRI for the Nexus Consortium
Corrections: Registry correction pathway; upheld corrections are published as notices with a new version

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
5SIA (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release of 6 February 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
10Eurostat (ed.), Use of artificial intelligence in enterprises (Statistics Explained; 19.95% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons in 2025; large enterprises 55.03%). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
11Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2026 AI Index Report (report page; private AI investment in 2025 of USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
13ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures (page titled 2025 whose text describes the 2026 edition; 6.3 billion people online, 76%; 2 billion offline; 93% in high-income and 32% in low-income countries). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
15EuroHPC Joint Undertaking (ed.), AI Factories (programme page; states 19 AI Factories and 13 antennas while the listing shows 18 entries; no amounts). EuroHPC Joint Undertaking, Luxembourg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
14POST-CLOSE, context only: Epoch AI (ed.), Frontier data centres (tracker page updated 1 November 2026; 96 sites, 15.1 GW of IT power; estimated coverage of about 45% of deployed AI compute). Epoch AI. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

References and record

Every source the edition rests on, the publication record, the corrections log and the open record.

13 min read0 figures1 table0 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

C.143 sources

NR-CIT-1, editor first. A DOI is linked where the source has one; Nexus records carry a UNI once the catalogue allocates it (NS-1).

1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
5SIA (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release of 6 February 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 6
6POST-CLOSE, context only: Post-close, context only: NIST (ed.), CHIPS for America (programme page; award notices to October 2026; supports no baseline claim). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8
8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
10Eurostat (ed.), Use of artificial intelligence in enterprises (Statistics Explained; 19.95% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons in 2025; large enterprises 55.03%). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 2, chapter 6
11Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (ed.), The 2026 AI Index Report (report page; private AI investment in 2025 of USD 285.88 billion in the United States, USD 20.92 billion in Europe and USD 12.41 billion in China). Stanford University, Stanford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6, chapter 8
12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 8
13ITU (ed.), Facts and Figures (page titled 2025 whose text describes the 2026 edition; 6.3 billion people online, 76%; 2 billion offline; 93% in high-income and 32% in low-income countries). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 6
14POST-CLOSE, context only: Epoch AI (ed.), Frontier data centres (tracker page updated 1 November 2026; 96 sites, 15.1 GW of IT power; estimated coverage of about 45% of deployed AI compute). Epoch AI. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
15EuroHPC Joint Undertaking (ed.), AI Factories (programme page; states 19 AI Factories and 13 antennas while the listing shows 18 entries; no amounts). EuroHPC Joint Undertaking, Luxembourg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
16European Commission (ed.), AI Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; in force 1 August 2024; general application 2 August 2026; omnibus in force 27 July 2026). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
17European Commission (ed.), Data Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/2854; in force 11 January 2024; applies from 12 September 2025). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
18European Commission (ed.), Cyber Resilience Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2024/2847; in force 10 December 2024; reporting from 11 September 2026; main obligations from 11 December 2027). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
19European Commission (ed.), NIS2 Directive (policy page; Directive (EU) 2022/2555; transposition deadline 17 October 2024). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
20European Commission (ed.), The Draghi report: A competitiveness strategy for Europe (page read for title and date, 9 September 2024; no figures used). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
21UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (ed.), National Semiconductor Strategy (page read for date, 19 May 2023, and three objectives; no figures used). UK Government, London. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
22UNCTAD (ed.), Technology and Innovation Report 2025 (publication page read for date, 7 April 2025; no figures used). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
23UNVERIFIED, not opened: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (ed.), 2024 United States Data Center Energy Usage Report, December 2024, cited from memory; no figure used; the page returned an access error. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
24UNVERIFIED, not opened: USGS (ed.), Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, rare earths chapter, cited as the primary table for mine and refining shares; the file returned an access error and no figure is used. US Geological Survey, Reston. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.
25UNVERIFIED, not opened: ESA (ed.), ESA Space Environment Report 2025, cited for orbital infrastructure context; the page returned an access error and no figure is used. European Space Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
26UNVERIFIED, not opened: Synergy Research Group (ed.), cloud infrastructure market share series, cited as the intended source of provider shares; the article address returned not found and no figure is used. Synergy Research Group, Reno. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
27CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, United States (statute text opened; see reference [43]). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
28UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, rescission of the 2025 AI diffusion export measure, May 2025, cited from memory; the Federal Register page redirected to an access gate. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6, chapter 8
29UNVERIFIED, not opened: Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities, Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, cited from memory; the EUR-Lex request returned no text. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
30UNVERIFIED, not opened: European Commission and High Representative, Joint Communication on an EU Action Plan on Cable Security, February 2025, cited from memory; the policy page returned not found. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
31UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Information security management systems. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
32UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 22301:2019, Security and resilience: business continuity management systems. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
33UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEC 62443 series, Security for industrial automation and control systems. International Electrotechnical Commission, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4, chapter 6
34UNVERIFIED, not opened: ISO 31000:2018, Risk management: guidelines. International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 4
35UNVERIFIED, not opened: NIST, The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29, February 2024, cited from memory; the programme page read gave no figures. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
36UNVERIFIED, not opened: Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030, Decision (EU) 2022/2481, Official Journal of the European Union, 2022, cited from memory as the origin of the 20% chip target. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
37UNVERIFIED, not opened: Farrell, H. and Newman, A.L., Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion, International Security 44(1), 42 to 79, 2019, cited from memory. MIT Press. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Miller, C., Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology. Scribner, New York, 2022, cited from memory; no figure used. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P. and Kelly, T.K., Identifying, understanding, and analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies, IEEE Control Systems Magazine 21(6), 11 to 25, 2001, cited from memory. Observation year 2001. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6
40UNVERIFIED, not opened: Buldyrev, S.V. et al., Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464, 1025 to 1028, 2010, cited from memory. Springer Nature. Observation year 2010. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8
41UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations General Assembly, Global Digital Compact (annex to the Pact for the Future), September 2024, cited from memory; no figure used. United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.
42UNVERIFIED, not opened: Bradford, A., Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology. Oxford University Press, New York, 2023, cited from memory; no figure used. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in chapter 6
43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03. Cited in the summary, chapter 1, chapter 2, chapter 3, chapter 4, chapter 6, chapter 8

C.2Publication record

Publication

Title: Strategic Systems Report 2026: Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness, Baseline Edition
Series: Reports · Strategic Systems Series SR-13
Edition: Baseline Edition 2026 · inaugural annual
Version: v1.0.0 · draft for stewardship review
Publication ID: NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Evidence close: 30 September 2026
Publication date: October 2026
DOI: concept and version DOI at deposit

Publisher

Publisher of record: The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), for the Nexus Consortium
Place: Toronto
Editor: Saeed Valadbaygi, Chief Steward and Managing Editor
Stewards: GCRI · technical truth · GRF · public meaning · GRA · capital meaning
Licence: text CC BY 4.0; data on the terms of each source
Language: English (en-GB) source edition
Correspondence: Registry correction pathway · editorial office

Colophon

Format: A4 portrait · screen, print and archival PDF
Typefaces: Space Grotesk (display) · Geist (text) · IBM Plex Sans Italic (standfirsts) · IBM Plex Mono (data)
Design standard: Reports Foundational Edition, Volume I, Part VII
Accessibility: tagged PDF and HTML targets; text alternatives for every figure
Production: Reports editorial team, GCRI

Release path for this version

Table C.1Release path for this version
Step	What happens	When
Draft	editorial self-check complete at evidence close	October 2026
Steward review	five passes on the exact draft (keys T · M · F · N)	Q4 2026
Approval	publication authority approves the exact digest	before release
Deposit	concept and version DOI minted; registry pointer set	at release
Succession	the 2027 strategic technology infrastructure edition reports changes against this baseline	2027

Current version: v1.0.0 draft, stewardship review
Previous edition: none, first edition of the series
Next edition: NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2027-v1.0.0

Latest version: resolve the concept DOI or the registry record
Correction route: Registry correction pathway
Notice types: erratum · addendum · supersession · withdrawal

C.3Corrections log

0correction notices. No edition has been released yet, so none can be corrected; the log below lists each edition’s current version.

Edition	Version	Date	State	Change	Notice
SR-13	NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0	October 2026	Draft	Baseline Edition 2026, inaugural annual edition,	None

Notice types: erratum, addendum, supersession, withdrawal. A correction is a new version with a published notice; the earlier version stays resolvable, and no edition is ever edited in silence.

C.4Open record

This edition’s open record

Publication ID: NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-v1.0.0
Desk identifier and series alias: NR-STR-SR-13-2026-BL
Collection: None
DOI: Concept and version DOI at deposit, on Zenodo with DataCite metadata
Versions: Each correction is a new version (isNewVersionOf); the concept DOI resolves to the latest
Bundle: RO-Crate 1.2 with CITATION.cff, CodeMeta and PROV-O provenance; a signed manifest
Licence: CC BY 4.0 (SPDX CC-BY-4.0) for original material; metadata CC0 1.0

Credit and identity

ORCID: Your iD in the deposit and the contribution record; DataCite can then add the work to your ORCID record
ROR: Your organisation by its ROR identifier, never by a typed name alone
CRediT: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Software, Validation, Visualisation, Writing, review and editing
Account: None needed to contribute; never a password

Find and follow

Search the open indexes for Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness; software is cited by its SWHID from Software Heritage, and a quantified scenario run is preregistered on OSF before it is run. Annotation is your choice: Hypothesis opens this page in its own viewer.

Mirrors and harvest

The DOI is canonical. At release each signed bundle is also given an IPFS content identifier and a bloxberg anchor as mirrors; both are listed in the record once they exist. Zenodo exposes every record over OAI-PMH, and reviews and endorsements can arrive through COAR Notify where the repository supports it.

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C.5Where this edition sits among the six pillars

Foundry seals the evidence and Universe tests it; Reports publishes it; Standards takes its corrections and Academy teaches from it.

F03 Sealed observations and indicator series Foundry Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
F04 After-action and scenario findings for Universe After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
F05 National Portfolio movement for chapter Foundry National Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
Applied in editions Standards Nexus Standards: applied in editions.
SR-13 edition Reports Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness 2026, published in every format with its sources, citation and corrections.
F06 Method and correction findings as change Standards Method and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
F12 Q4 synthesis informs the next-year Universe Q4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
Taught in the open Academy Risk Academy: taught in the open.

What Foundry and Universe hand to this edition, and what it hands to Standards, Universe and Academy. From the programme spine; SR-13 is a drafted Baseline Edition, so these handoffs run from its first operational quarter.

Handoff	Between	What crosses, and when
F03	Foundry to Reports	Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profile (closeout).
F04	Universe to Reports	After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13 (after action review).
F05	Foundry to Reports	National Portfolio movement for chapter 11 (after action review).
Ring	Nexus Standards to Reports	Nexus Standards: applied in editions.
F06	Reports to Nexus Standards	Method and correction findings as change proposals (correction).
F12	Reports to Universe	Q4 synthesis informs the next-year mandate (renewal).
Ring	Reports to Risk Academy	Risk Academy: taught in the open.

S.1Abstract

S.2Key messages

S.3Headline finding

S.4At a glance

S.5What each steward reads in it

Technical Truth

Public Meaning

Capital Meaning

Synthesis

S.6What this edition is, and is not

What this edition is

What it is not

What comes next

Notes

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

In this part

1.2The argument

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

Transmission paths

1.4Reinforcing loops

Notes

2.1Headline finding

Implication

What would move it

2.2AIC

2.3Energy

2.4Infrastructure

2.5Minerals

2.6Trade

2.7Finance

2.8Data and digital

2.9Development

2.10Systemic

Notes

3.1Where each system stood at evidence close

Data centre electricity use

Share of US electricity growth from data centres

Average top-refiner share, excluding rare earths

Global semiconductor sales

Data centre share of Irish metered electricity

EU enterprises buying cloud services

3.2Domain posture

3.3Sector screens

Notes

4.1Risk objects

Local grid constraint on large new loads

Concentrated refining of energy and technology minerals

Chip supply short of policy targets

Dependence on shared cloud services

4.2Capability ladder

Notes

5.1Assumptions

5.2The cascade, step by step

5.3The scenario as a table of steps

Notes

6.1The other desks’ editions of this subject

6.2Three lenses

Technical Truth

Public Meaning

Capital Meaning

Synthesis

6.3Standards, Academy and steward contributions

Standards drafts used in this edition

Standards calendar to watch

6.4GCRI reading: the model card

6.5Global Risks Forum reading: editorial essays

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 01

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 02

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 03

EDITORIAL ESSAY · 04

6.6Global Risks Alliance reading: 2027 strategic technology infrastructure readiness pack

Publication dispositions

6.7Nexus Standards reading: standards and regulatory watch

Changed since 2024

To watch in 2027

6.8Risk Academy reading: literature and evidence review, science and assessments

Review protocol

Where the evidence agrees

Where it is unsettled