Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Executive summary

The edition on a few pages: the abstract, the key messages, the headline finding and what each steward reads in it.

5 min read1 figure0 tables10 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
    1. S.1 Abstract
    2. S.2 Key messages
    3. S.3 Headline finding
    4. S.4 At a glance
    5. S.5 What each steward reads in it
    6. S.6 What this edition is, and is not
  3. 1Technology rests on a few physical inputs
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

S.1Abstract

Strategic technology infrastructure is the physical base of the digital economy: data centres, chips, the power they draw, the minerals behind them and the networks that link them. The 2024 to 2026 evidence shows one pattern. Demand grows fast and the supply chain beneath it is concentrated. Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024, or 1.5% of global electricity, and the IEA Base Case reaches about 945 TWh by 20301. In the United States data centres made up half of electricity demand growth in 20252. In Ireland they took 22% of metered electricity in 2024, up from 5% in 201512. Global semiconductor sales reached USD 795.6 billion in 2025, up 26.2%4. The average share of the top refining country across the energy minerals the IEA tracks, excluding rare earths, rose to 72% in 20253. Governments have answered with policy. The United States set aside USD 50 billion for chips43. The EU set a 20% target for its share of chip production by 2030, and its own forecast reaches 11.7%78. Sovereign readiness here means the capacity to keep critical technology running and to recover it when supply or power is short. This baseline reads these facts as mechanisms. It ranks no country or company, attributes no intent and recommends no policy.

S.2Key messages

Six readings that frame the strategic technology infrastructure baseline, and the eight questions this edition answers, each with its status and source.

  1. Yes: about 12% a year to 2024, and the Base Case more than doubles use by 2030.1

    Is demand for compute growing fast?Reported

  2. In some places it already does: half of US demand growth in 2025 and 22% of Irish metered use in 2024.212

    Does it reach the grid?Reported

  3. The average top-refiner share is 72% in 2025 for the minerals tracked, excluding rare earths.3

    Is the mineral base concentrated?Reported

  4. USD 795.6 billion in 2025, up 26.2%.4

    How big is the chip market?Reported

  5. The Commission’s own forecast falls short of the EU 2030 chip target.78

    Are policy targets on track?Reported

  6. The US set aside USD 50 billion for chips in 2022.43

    How much public money is in play?Reported

  7. About half of EU enterprises buy cloud; one in five uses artificial intelligence.910

    Who uses the services?Reported

  8. A local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint. SCN-SR13-GRID-01

    What will 2027 test first?Expert input

S.3Headline finding

ReportedEQL 4NRF-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-AIC-001

Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024, or about 1.5% of global electricity, and grew about 12% a year over five years; the IEA Base Case reaches about 945 TWh by 2030.

Figure S.1Data centre electricity use (TWh)
ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
2024 estimate415
2030 Base Case (about)945

Source: IEA Energy and AI1. The 2030 value is a Base Case projection.

The global share stays small, at just under 3% in 2030 in the Base Case. The pressure is local, because use clusters in a few regions and the IEA reports that nearly half of US data-centre capacity sits in five clusters1.

S.4At a glance

415TWh

data centres, 20241

945TWh

Base Case, 20301

72%

top-refiner average share3

795.6USD billion

chip sales, 20254

50USD billion

US CHIPS funding43

11.7%

EU forecast chip share, 20307

S.5What each steward reads in it

GCRI · KEY T

Technical Truth

The evidence supports reading technology infrastructure as one dependent stack.

GRF · KEY M

Public Meaning

For most people the stack appears as a service that works or does not.

GRA · KEY F

Capital Meaning

Readiness implications only. Public funding is large in places and private investment is concentrated.

NEXUS

Synthesis

Technology infrastructure risk is well described by layer and thinly measured as a system.

S.6What this edition is, and is not

What this edition is

A baseline: the 2026 state of the world’s strategic technology infrastructure and sovereign readiness and the couplings through which it carries risk into other systems. It synthesises published evidence and ranks no country, company or asset.

What it is not

Not a sovereignty ranking, a market assessment, an export-control position or an assessment of any company, regulator or government. Operation, protection and policy for technology infrastructure rest with owners, operators and competent authorities.

What comes next

National, regional and sector evidence feeds the 2027 strategic technology infrastructure edition through the federation. Each edition reports what changed against this baseline: observations, source revisions, method changes, scenario updates and corrections.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 10Eurostat (ed.), Use of artificial intelligence in enterprises (Statistics Explained; 19.95% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons in 2025; large enterprises 55.03%). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this summary

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Executive summary: Executive summary. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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