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Technology rests on a few physical inputs

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.

6 min read2 figures2 tables10 notesNR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Technology rests on a few physical inputs
    1. 1.1 The questions this part answers
    2. 1.2 The argument
    3. 1.3 Twenty couplings between five systems
    4. 1.4 Reinforcing loops
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Local grid constraint that overlaps a chip or mineral supply constraint
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is strategic technology infrastructure risk concentrated?
  • Which couplings carry strategic technology infrastructure shocks into other systems?
  • Which strategic technology infrastructure capabilities hold under compound stress?
  • What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Five mechanism chapters
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • Scenario
  • Three lenses
  • Portfolio

1.2The argument

Technology infrastructure is usually discussed one layer at a time: chips, cloud, networks, power. The 2024 to 2026 evidence reads them as one dependent stack. Chips need minerals, data centres need power, and services need both134.

The load is growing. Data centres used about 415 TWh in 2024 and the IEA Base Case reaches about 945 TWh by 20301. In the United States they made up half of electricity demand growth in 20252. In Ireland they took 22% of metered electricity in 202412.

Supply is concentrated. The average share of the top refining country was 72% in 2025 for the minerals the IEA tracks, excluding rare earths3. The chip market reached USD 795.6 billion in 20254. Governments are acting: the US set aside USD 50 billion43 and the EU set a 20% chip target that its own forecast does not reach78.

The edition therefore asks the same four questions of every event: what was the common cause, how did it spread, what was shared, and what threshold was crossed. It makes no attribution and ranks no country or company.

Figure 1.1How fast did chip sales grow? Global semiconductor sales, USD billion

Annual sales rose 25.6% in this series, from USD 630.5 billion to USD 791.7 billion. A second source puts 2025 at USD 795.6 billion, so the two bars use one source and the difference is noted45.

ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
2025791.7
2024630.5

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.

Figure ID FIG-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003

791.7USD billion

chip sales, 2025 (SIA)5

795.6USD billion

chip sales, 2025 (WSTS)4

25.6%

growth in the SIA series5

26.2%

growth in the WSTS series4

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The strategic technology infrastructure-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their strategic technology infrastructure content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings between the five systems

Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.

  • Strong
  • Moderate
  • Weak

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT Water·STRONG
cooling · hydro		MODERATE
irrigation · processing		STRONG
safe supply · hospitals		WEAK
flows
ENE EnergySTRONG
pumping · treatment		·STRONG
cold chain · processing		STRONG
hospitals · cooling · telecoms		WEAK
land use
FOO FoodWEAK
withdrawals		WEAK
bioenergy		·MODERATE
nutrition · food safety		WEAK
land conversion
HLT HealthWEAK
workforce		WEAK
workforce		WEAK
labour		·WEAK
residues
BIO BiodiversityMODERATE
natural infrastructure		WEAK
hydrology		WEAK
pollination		WEAK
zoonoses		·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    AIC → ENE → INF

    Clustered data-centre load tightens a local grid.

    Reported Ireland and US 2024 to 20251221

  2. 02

    MIN → TRD → AIC

    Concentrated refining limits the chips that compute needs.

    Reported IEA 2026 and WSTS 202534

  3. 03

    FIN → TRD

    Public funding aims to move chip capacity.

    Reported US and EU 2022 to 2026438

  4. 04

    DAT → INF

    Wide cloud use makes shared services a shared dependency.

    Inferred Eurostat 20259

  5. 05

    ENE → AIC → INF

    Power shortfalls limit new compute and local services.

    Inferred IEA 20251

1.4Reinforcing loops

A shock entering either system of a loop can return amplified through the other.

Table 1.2Pairs of systems where both directions are rated strong
LoopFirst directionSecond direction
WAT and ENEWater to energy: cooling · hydroEnergy to water: pumping · treatment
A causal-loop reading of the matrix (Sterman, Business Dynamics, 2000): structural, from estimated strengths, not a measured feedback.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1IEA (ed.), Energy and AI (World Energy Outlook Special Report). International Energy Agency, Paris, April 2025. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 3IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 4WSTS (ed.), Global Semiconductor Market grows 26% in 2025 to USD 796 billion (release page; sales of USD 795.6 billion, up 26.2%). World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, Dec 2025 data, release dated March 2026 by file name. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 2IEA (ed.), Global Energy Review 2026 (revised version, May 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 12Central Statistics Office (ed.), Data Centres Metered Electricity Consumption 2024 (release of 10 June 2025; 22% of metered electricity in 2024, 21% in 2023, 5% in 2015). CSO, Cork. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 43US Congress (ed.), CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, Public Law 117-167, Division A, Title I, section 102 (statute text, US Government Publishing Office; CHIPS for America Fund appropriations for fiscal years 2022 to 2026 of USD 39 billion for manufacturing incentives under section 9902 and USD 11 billion for research; totals are sums of the annual amounts). Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 7European Court of Auditors (ed.), The EU’s strategy for microchips, special report 12/2025 (news item read; the 20% target and the Commission forecast of 9.8% in 2022 and 11.7% in 2030; the full report was not opened). European Court of Auditors, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 8European Commission (ed.), European Chips Act (policy page; Regulation (EU) 2023/1781; three pillars; 19 State aid decisions with over EUR 33 billion of public and private investment). European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 5SIA (ed.), Global Annual Semiconductor Sales Increase 25.6% to $791.7 Billion in 2025 (release of 6 February 2026). Semiconductor Industry Association, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 9Eurostat (ed.), Cloud computing: statistics on the use by enterprises (Statistics Explained; 52.74% of EU enterprises with 10 or more persons used paid cloud services in 2025). Eurostat, Luxembourg. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 1: Technology rests on a few physical inputs. In Strategic Systems Report 2026: Strategic Technology Infrastructure and Sovereign Readiness (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-STRATEGIC-STRATTECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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