Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Systems in depth

One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.

8 min read0 figures5 tables23 notesNR-XTECH-QUANTUM-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Quantum is infrastructure and a cryptographic deadline
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Long-lived data exposure while migration is slow
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
    1. 8.1 Hardware and compute platforms
    2. 8.2 Cryogenics, energy and helium
    3. 8.3 Materials, fabrication and supply chain
    4. 8.4 Economy, investment and workforce
    5. 8.5 Security, cryptography and governance watch
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

8.1Hardware and compute platforms

Quantum machines are built on several platforms. Evidence is strongest where peer review exists, and weakest where claims rest on vendor announcements.

101qubits

distance-7 surface code experiment2

0.143%

logical error per cycle, distance 72

200logical qubits

IBM target for 2029, a plan8

Table 8.1State at baseline
ComponentStateEvidenceStatus
Superconducting circuitserror correction below threshold at small distances; a 120-qubit processor listed28Reported
Trapped ionsa company reported 99.921% two-qubit gate fidelity on 98 qubits in November 202542Reported
Neutral atomslogical-processor results published in 202438Reported
Error-correction codessurface and qLDPC codes studied2939Inferred

Couplings

  • INF ↔ FIN hardware and funding
  • INF → DAT capability and cryptography
  • MIN → INF materials

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • logical-qubit claims on a common basis
  • delivered milestones against plans

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-02 Energy
  • XT-10 Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography
  • XT-12 Advanced Materials and Nanotechnology
  • SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems

8.2Cryogenics, energy and helium

Many machines run below 10 millikelvin on dilution refrigerators that use helium-3 and helium-4. The energy and cooling footprint of useful machines is not yet published.

<10mK

operating regime of many superconducting machines13

2023estimate

energy-efficiency threshold for quantum advantage estimated9

2026disruption

helium markets disrupted by the Hormuz closure10

Table 8.2State at baseline
ComponentStateEvidenceStatus
Dilution refrigeratorsneed helium-3 and helium-4; cryogenic setups scale to about 100 qubits in reported designs1333Reported
Energy useclassical methods can be more energy-efficient for some problems on noisy hardware9Reported
Helium supplymarket disruption in 2026; helium-3 scarce1013Reported
Cooling waternot published for useful-scale machines9Expert input

Couplings

  • MIN → INF helium supply
  • ENE ↔ INF facility power
  • WAT → INF cooling water

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • machine-level energy and water use
  • helium-3 volumes and reserves

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-02 Energy
  • XT-10 Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography
  • XT-12 Advanced Materials and Nanotechnology
  • SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems

8.3Materials, fabrication and supply chain

Hardware depends on specialised materials and fabrication steps, and on strategic minor minerals whose prices rose sharply in 2025 and 2026.

≈5times

European gallium price against Chinese domestic10

≈3times

European germanium price against Chinese domestic10

≈6times

tungsten price rise, strategic minor minerals10

Table 8.3State at baseline
ComponentStateEvidenceStatus
Strategic minor mineralsprices more than doubled; export controls tripled in scope10Reported
Fabricationcapacity by country not consolidated here34Expert input
Cryogenic componentsfew suppliers; helium-3 scarce13Inferred
Research accessdepends on shared facilities7Inferred

Couplings

  • MIN → INF materials
  • TRD → INF export controls
  • FIN → INF fabrication

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • fabrication capacity by country
  • materials dependence by platform

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-02 Energy
  • XT-10 Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography
  • XT-12 Advanced Materials and Nanotechnology
  • SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems

8.4Economy, investment and workforce

Investment surged in 2025, and almost all of it was private. Public finance and workforce numbers are the thin parts of the evidence.

12.6USD billion

startup investment, 202511

6.3times

growth over 202411

>1USD billion

company revenues, 202511

Table 8.4State at baseline
ComponentStateEvidenceStatus
Startup investmentUSD 12.6 billion in 2025; about 97% private11Reported
Revenuepassed USD 1 billion for the first time11Reported
Public programmesEU flagship EUR 1 billion from 2018; national strategies set funding72223Reported
Workforceskills gaps reported; no figure bound34Expert input

Couplings

  • FIN → INF scale-up
  • FIN → DAT migration costs
  • HLT → INF workforce

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • public funding totals
  • workforce size and skills gaps

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-02 Energy
  • XT-10 Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography
  • XT-12 Advanced Materials and Nanotechnology
  • SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems

8.5Security, cryptography and governance watch

The nearest effect of quantum technology on other infrastructure is the move to new cryptography. Standards exist, and national roadmaps are starting to set dates.

3standards

finalised by NIST on 13 August 20243

<1million qubits

RSA-2048 estimate under stated assumptions1

2030milestone

EU roadmap date for high-risk use cases, as reported15

Table 8.5State at baseline
ComponentStateEvidenceStatus
StandardsFIPS 203, 204 and 205 finalised; FIPS 206 planned3Reported
Migration plansNIST transition report; EU roadmap; US federal directives456Reported
Export controlsUS controls on quantum items from 202421Reported
GovernanceEU strategy; Canadian and UK strategies; UN year of quantum science7222324Reported

Couplings

  • INF → DAT cryptographic exposure
  • GOV → DAT migration timing
  • GOV → TRD export controls

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • migration progress by sector
  • text of national roadmaps

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-02 Energy
  • XT-10 Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography
  • XT-12 Advanced Materials and Nanotechnology
  • SR-04 Critical Minerals and Strategic Materials
  • XT-01 Artificial Intelligence and Agentic Systems

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 2Google Quantum AI and collaborators, Quantum error correction below the surface code threshold, Nature 638, 920 to 926, 2025 (preprint arXiv:2408.13687, August 2024). Springer Nature, London. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 8IBM (ed.), IBM Quantum technology and roadmap page (Nighthawk 120 qubits; Starling planned for 2029 with 200 logical qubits and 100 million gates; statement on advantage in 2026). IBM, Armonk. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 42Quantinuum (ed.), Quantinuum announces commercial launch of Helios (press release, 5 November 2025; 98 qubits, 99.921% two-qubit and 99.9975% single-qubit gate fidelity; 94 error-detected and 48 error-corrected logical qubits; no logical gate fidelity stated). Quantinuum, Broomfield. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Bluvstein, D. et al., Logical quantum processor based on reconfigurable atom arrays, Nature 626, 58 to 65, 2024, cited from memory. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: Fowler, A.G. et al., Surface codes: towards practical large-scale quantum computation, Physical Review A 86, 032324, 2012, cited from memory. Observation year 2012. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 39UNVERIFIED, not opened: Bravyi, S. et al., High-threshold and low-overhead fault-tolerant quantum memory, Nature 627, 778 to 782, 2024, cited from memory. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 13UNVERIFIED, not opened: War on the Rocks (ed.), The supply chain chokepoints in quantum (October 2025), and CNAS (ed.), report on helium-3 recovery and reserves (March 2026), taken from search-result summaries. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 9Jaschke, D. and Montangero, S., Is quantum computing green? An estimate for an energy-efficiency quantum advantage, Quantum Science and Technology 8, 025001, 2023 (preprint arXiv:2205.12092). IOP Publishing, Bristol. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 10IEA (ed.), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 (revised version, July 2026). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 33UNVERIFIED, not opened: Krinner, S. et al., Engineering cryogenic setups for 100-qubit scale superconducting circuit systems, EPJ Quantum Technology 6, 2, 2019, cited from memory. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 34UNVERIFIED, not opened: World Economic Forum (ed.), Quantum Economy Blueprint, January 2024, cited from memory. WEF, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 7European Commission (ed.), Quantum policy page (Quantum Europe Strategy adopted July 2025; Quantum Act planned for 2026; Quantum Technologies Flagship EUR 1 billion from 2018; EuroHPC quantum computers EUR 100 million, October 2022). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 11UNVERIFIED, not opened: McKinsey and Company (ed.), Quantum Technology Monitor 2026 (startup investment USD 12.6 billion in 2025, 6.3 times 2024; company revenues above USD 1 billion; about 97% private funding), taken from search-result summaries; the chart page returned a service error. McKinsey and Company, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 22UNVERIFIED, not opened: Government of Canada (ed.), National Quantum Strategy, January 2023, cited from memory. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Ottawa. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 23UNVERIFIED, not opened: UK Government (ed.), National Quantum Strategy, March 2023, cited from memory. Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, London. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 3NIST (ed.), NIST releases first 3 finalised post-quantum encryption standards (news release, 13 August 2024; FIPS 203, 204, 205). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 1Gidney, C., How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits, arXiv:2505.15917, submitted 21 May 2025. arXiv, Ithaca. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 15UNVERIFIED, not opened: NIS Cooperation Group PQC workstream (eds.), A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (milestones: roadmaps by the end of 2026, high-risk use cases by 2030, as many systems as feasible by 2035), taken from secondary summaries. European Commission, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 4NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, initial public draft (publication page; published 12 November 2024; comment period closed 10 January 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 5POST-CLOSE, context only: NIST (ed.), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, NIST IR 8547, final (publication page; document history 27 October 2026, after the 30 September evidence close; abstract refers to Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 6European Commission (ed.), Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography (library page; roadmap published 23 June 2025; page updated 3 September 2026; the roadmap milestones were not on the page). Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Brussels. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  22. 21UNVERIFIED, not opened: US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (ed.), interim final rule on export controls for quantum computing items, September 2024, cited from memory. BIS, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  23. 24UNVERIFIED, not opened: United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/78/287 proclaiming 2025 the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology, 2024, cited from memory. United Nations, New York. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 8: Systems in depth. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Quantum Technologies (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-QUANTUM-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

ReportsContribute

Send evidence or a correction on Quantum Technologies.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

GCRI Systems Evidence deskExponential Technology

CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.

The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation

Science · evidence · measurement

Not for profit

Our articles, maps and twins are free to read and free to republish. Readers and partners keep it that way.

Partner with us

Who funds us

GCRI is a not-for-profit institution. To ask who funds a piece of work, use the funding questions form.

Independence

Editors and the expert reviewers named on each article decide what we publish. Funders and partners do not review or approve articles before publication.

Licence

Articles: CC BY 4.0. Figures, maps, twins and data: CC BY 4.0. Other uses: ask through the permissions form.