GCRI · Energy Nexus

Grid disruption and recovery

Large outages come from storms, wildfires, heat, ice, floods, earthquakes, geomagnetic storms, equipment failure, operator error and cyberattack. How long they last depends less on the cause than on how quickly the grid can be restarted and repaired. This page sets out how outages unfold, how black start and restoration work, how critical services are prioritised, and what evidence operators, regulators and civil protection authorities use.

02The question

Grid disruption and recovery: how the risk develops.

Outages, black-start and critical service restoration. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.

Mechanism

From damage to outage

Wind, ice and falling trees bring down distribution lines; floods inundate substations; wildfire risk forces preventive de-energisation. Distribution damage usually causes most customer outage minutes, while transmission failures cause the widest outages.

Mechanism

Black start

After a system-wide collapse, operators restart from units that can start without external power, such as hydropower, some gas turbines or batteries, then energise transmission paths and pick up load in steps while holding frequency stable.

Mechanism

Critical services fall back

Hospitals, water works, telecommunications and fuel stations depend on backup generators with limited fuel. Mobile networks fail as site batteries run down, which slows the very restoration that depends on communications.

Mechanism

Recovery bottlenecks

Restoration is limited by crews, spare transformers, road access, fuel logistics and communications. Large power transformers take a long time to manufacture and move, so spares and mutual-aid agreements largely decide recovery time.

03Geography

Energy now in Europe.

Night lights, population density and flood water over Europe, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.

The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.

Layers 3

Energy now, for this page

About this layer
Evidence
Observed
Source
VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2) (NASA LAADS DAAC)
Provider
NASA LAADS DAAC
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite radiance, corrected for moonlight and atmosphere
Newest at build
2026-10-12
Resolution
about 500 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite night-time radiance for the date shown; lights are a proxy for electricity use and outages, not a measurement of supply or access.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Estimated
Source
Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Columbia University))
Provider
NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Columbia University)
Licence
CC BY 4.0
Vintage
null; Census-based estimate, static (2020)
Resolution
about 1 km grid
Uncertainty
Census-based estimate of people per square kilometre in 2020, shown as exposure context; not a count of people affected by any hazard.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed (clouds leave gaps)
Source
VIIRS Global Flood Product (NASA LANCE)
Provider
NASA LANCE
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite detection; clouds leave gaps
Newest at build
2026-10-14
Resolution
about 250 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite detection; clouds leave gaps. Satellite or model raster as the provider publishes it. Clouds, swath gaps and retrieval error leave gaps and noise; values are indicators, not measurements at a place.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed
Source
VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance (NASA LANCE)
Provider
NASA LANCE
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite image
Newest at build
2026-10-14
Resolution
about 250 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite image. Satellite or model raster as the provider publishes it. Clouds, swath gaps and retrieval error leave gaps and noise; values are indicators, not measurements at a place.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Modelled (latest year GIBS publishes)
Source
MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1) (NASA LP DAAC)
Provider
NASA LP DAAC
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
yearly; Satellite classification; latest year GIBS publishes
Newest at build
2024-01-01
Resolution
about 500 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite land cover classes for the year shown, including croplands; a classification with known errors, not a farm register.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
Evidence
Observed (clouds and overpass timing leave gaps)
Source
VIIRS NOAA-20 375 m (FIRMS) (NASA LANCE FIRMS)
Provider
NASA LANCE FIRMS
Licence
NASA open data
Vintage
daily; Satellite detection; clouds and overpass timing leave gaps
Newest at build
2026-10-13
Resolution
about 500 m grid
Uncertainty
Satellite hot-spot detections for the day shown, including gas flares and industrial heat; not a confirmed fire, an incident report or a warning.
Reached through
gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map

Latest available

NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth

Loading the latest NASA imagery.

Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.

Energy now, framed on Europe.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.

Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · NASA/NOAA VIIRS · NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERTSources and licences

  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
  • VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), VIIRS 375 m active fire product, NASA LANCE; vector tiles via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). Cite as: NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA open data
  • Made with Natural Earth. Free vector and raster map data @ naturalearthdata.com. Public domain
  • © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). ODbL
  • Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
  • Context on the globe and flat map: coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names from NASA GIBS reference layers (OpenStreetMap data, ODbL, © OpenStreetMap contributors); Blue Marble imagery as an optional base; 3D terrain and the elevation read-out from the ASTER GDEM elevation colour index (5 m to 200 m classes, exaggerated for legibility). Boundaries are drawn as published and imply no position on any territory.
  • Live events: NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker (EONET); events are indicative and keep their original source links.
  • Observed (EO): NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • Observed (EO): NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERT (contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • NASA GIBS: We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
  • Past year, daily temperature (ERA5 via Open-Meteo): Contains modified Copernicus Climate Change Service information 2026.
  • Past year, daily temperature and sunshine (NASA POWER): These data were obtained from the NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) POWER Project funded through the NASA Earth Science/Applied Science Program..
  • Weather data by Open-Meteo.com (https://open-meteo.com/), licensed under CC BY 4.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
  • Optional layers (10 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.

Layers and dates

  • Night-time lights, daily: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Oct 2026
  • Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
  • Flood water, 3-day composite: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Oct 2026
  • True colour: VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
  • Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024
  • Active fires and thermal anomalies: VIIRS NOAA-20 375 m (FIRMS), NASA LANCE FIRMS · 13 Oct 2026

04Couplings

What stops when the lights go out, in order.

DomainHow it couples hereWhat to watch
WaterPumping and treatment stop within hours unless backup holds; pressure loss raises contamination risk. See drinking water and sanitation.Hours of backup at critical water sites
HealthHospitals switch to generators; dialysis, oxygen and cold chains are at risk. See health system continuity.Generator fuel autonomy at hospitals
FoodCold chains, retail and payment systems fail together.Food retail continuity during outages
BiodiversityWildfire-related shutoffs and storm damage link outages to landscape conditions.Vegetation-related outage causes

Outage impact is reported as SAIDI and SAIFI (IEEE 1366) and as energy not supplied in megawatt-hours. The joint FERC and NERC staff report on the February 2021 cold-weather outages in Texas and the south-central United States documented how gas supply, generation and demand failed together under cold, a pattern now studied for heat and drought.

05Monitor

Grid contingency board.

The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.

Grid contingency board: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Grid disruption and recovery.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
06Reports, standards and contributions

Restoration evidence and how it is shared.

Restoration and cascade studies are designed for the Scenario and Stress-Test series and exercises for the Universe Annual Synthesis. Exercise records would carry NS-11 verification evidence under the proposed Nexus Standards.

  • Restoration timelines for power and dependent services after real events.
  • After-action reviews from operators and civil protection.
  • Records of which critical customers had backup and how long it lasted.
07Simulator

A cascade through interdependent networks.

A hazard footprint takes out co-located assets in every layer; fragmentation, dependency between layers and overload of the survivors then spread the failure. The 3D view separates the layers by depth. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows Europe; the model itself is not tied to a place.

Controls

Assets per layer
18
Hazard footprint
8% of area
Assets that depend on another layer
60%
Spare capacity (tolerance)
30%

Readouts

Assets hit by the hazard
9%
Assets still working
33%
Amplification of the initial damage
7.2 times
Steps to settle
4
Numbers, methods and sources
StepPower working (%)Gas working (%)Telecoms working (%)
0899489
1617856
2443944
3332844
4332839

Methods

  1. Interdependent networks Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464
  2. Overload cascades Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66
  3. Betweenness load Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25
  4. Multilayer networks Kivela and others (2014), Journal of Complex Networks 2
  5. Infrastructure interdependencies Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001), IEEE Control Systems 21(6)
  6. Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
  7. One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley

Data

The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page’s map can draw:

  • Major roads Natural Earth
  • Railways Natural Earth
  • Seaports Natural Earth
  • Airports Natural Earth
  • Urban extents Natural Earth
  • Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band) NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP) · register nasa.gibs.context-live-layers
  • Natural events (NASA EONET) NASA EONET · register nasa.eonet.events
A cascade through interdependent networks. Illustrative teaching model: it runs on the values set by the controls, not on measured data. Methods: Interdependent networks (Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464); Overload cascades (Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66); Betweenness load (Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25).
08Indicators

What is measured, and how well.

Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.

IndicatorUnitCadenceSource typeLabel
Customer minutes lostcustomer minutesper eventUtility outage management systemsPublished statistics
Customers without power over timecustomershourly during eventsUtility outage reportingREPORTED
Restoration curvepercent of customers restored against elapsed hoursper eventUtility and regulator event reportsREPORTED
Loss of night-time lights in the affected areachange in radiancedailySatellite night-time lightsOBSERVED
Backup power endurance at critical siteshoursper assetFacility and asset registersPublished statistics
Contracted black start capabilitymegawattsannualOperator restoration plansDECLARED
Mobile network site availabilitypercent of sites operatinghourly during eventsTelecommunications regulator status reportsREPORTED
09Twin and cascade simulator

Model grid disruption and recovery as a system. Run the cascade.

Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Energy utilities and grids: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.

Hazards

  • Windstorm
  • Geomagnetic storm
  • Widespread power outage (set off downstream)
  • Large forest disturbance (set off downstream)
  • Wildfire (set off downstream)
  • Geomagnetically induced current (set off downstream)
  • Ionospheric disturbance (set off downstream)
  • Satellite space-environment anomaly (set off downstream)
  • Shoreline ice shove (set off downstream)
  • Thermospheric drag surge (set off downstream)
  • Radiation-belt electron enhancement (set off downstream)
  • Seiche (set off downstream)
  • Satellite-navigation disruption (set off downstream)
  • Uncontrolled re-entry (set off downstream)
  • Satellite communications outage (set off downstream)

Controls

  • NS-0 Constitution and principles
  • NS-3 Risk record UNIs (grammar, legacy crosswalk, allocation authority)
  • NS-9 Contextual UNIs (deployments, instances, programme instances)
  • NS-10 Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations: definition, binding, evaluation and enforcement)
  • NS-11 Verification and monitoring (evidence, attestations, zero-trust conformance observation)
  • NRS-H84 Hazard family: Energy system instability and shortfall (NHS-1 infra.energy)
  • NRS-N2 Energy risk and resilience
  • NRS-H109 Hazard family: Energy-transition technology failures (NHS-1 tech.energy-transition)
  • NRS-U8 Universe platform profile: Energy Nexus
  • NRS-T12 Energy transition technology risk
  • NRS-H53 Hazard family: Cyber-physical disruption (NHS-1 cyber.cyber-physical)

Observation

  • Global Power Plant Database v1.3.0 (listed for reference)
  • ENTSO-E Transparency Platform (listed for reference)
  • World Development Indicators (listed for reference)
  • OECD Data Explorer (incl. Creditor Reporting System, insurance and pension statistics) (listed for reference)
  • Proportion of population with access to electricity
  • Renewable energy share in the total final energy consumption
  • Number of other destroyed or damaged critical infrastructure units and facilities, attributed to disasters
  • Access to electricity (% of population)
  • Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output)

Example geography

  • Europe: 113 hexagonal cells
  • Rain rate, last half hour (IMERG), NASA GIBS
  • Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
  • Vegetation disturbance alerts, 30 m (OPERA DIST-ALERT), NASA GIBS
  • Carbon monoxide, smoke transport (AIRS), NASA GIBS
10Sources

Where the evidence comes from.

Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.

SourceWhat it givesLicence class
DOE Form OE-417 electric emergency incident and disturbance reportsMajor outages and disturbances in the United StatesPublic domain
NASA Black Marble night-time lights (VIIRS)Daily night-time radiance for mapping outage and recoveryPublic domain
NERC event analyses and FERC inquiry reportsReconstructions of major disturbances and recommendationsPublic reports
ENTSO-E incident classification scale reports and expert panel reportsClassification and investigation of European grid incidentsPublic reports, ENTSO-E terms
EM-DAT international disaster database (CRED)Disaster events with their reported infrastructure impactsFree for non-commercial use, registration
FCC Disaster Information Reporting System status reportsCommunications outages during activated disasters in the United StatesPublic domain
Utility and regulator outage recordsEvent timelines, customers affected and restoration progressPublic records or by agreement
11Methods and evidence

How grid disruption and recovery is modelled, measured and tested.

The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.

System model

The couplings between the systems in grid disruption and recovery: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.

++−++EnergyCritical infrastructureClimateCommunitiesEconomyR reinforcingB balancing
Causal loop diagram from the page’s systems; signs show the direction of influence. Illustrative structure for a system dynamics or network model, not estimated couplings.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
12Decisions

Who decides, and what the evidence serves.

Energy Nexus prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.

Who decidesThe questionEvidence this page serves
Transmission and distribution operatorsHow to sequence restoration and which loads to restore firstRestoration plans, dependency maps, backup endurance at critical sites
Energy regulatorsWhether resilience investment such as undergrounding, hardening or spares is justifiedCustomer minutes lost by cause, restoration curves, cost and benefit evidence
Civil protection and emergency management agenciesWhere to send generators, fuel and shelter capacity during a long outageOutage extent from night-time lights and utility data; critical service maps
Hospital, water and telecommunications operatorsHow much backup power and fuel to hold and how to secure resupplyEndurance records, past outage durations, fuel logistics evidence

Outputs this topic produces

  • Restoration curves reconstructed from public records of past events
  • Critical service dependency maps with backup endurance
  • Disruption scenarios for storms, heat, wildfire and geomagnetic events
  • Briefs on spare equipment, mutual aid and black start arrangements
13Core questions

What restoration experts ask.

  • Which plants can start without external power, and are there enough of them, in the right places?
  • How long can telecommunications, water and hospitals keep running on backup power and fuel?
  • In what order should load be restored to keep the system stable and protect people at greatest risk?
  • How do distributed resources such as rooftop solar complicate or help restoration?
14Mechanisms

Why recovery is harder than it looks.

Restoration typically builds islands of supply around black-start plants, then synchronises them with each other and with neighbouring systems. Each step must keep frequency and voltage within limits while operators work with partial information.

Black start

Starting from nothing

Only some plants can start without grid power. Others need power to run pumps and controls before they can generate.

Interdependence

Restoration needs other services

Crews need telecommunications and fuel, which themselves need power. Backup batteries and generators run down.

Stability

Careful rebuilding

Reconnecting load too fast can collapse the partially rebuilt system and restart the process.

15Methods and limits

How recovery is studied and prepared.

  1. 01

    Restoration planning

    Operators maintain restoration plans and test parts of them. Full-system tests are rarely possible.

  2. 02

    Dependency mapping

    Network science and resilience engineering map which services need which supply and how long backup lasts. Backup data is often incomplete.

  3. 03

    Exercises

    Cross-sector exercises test assumptions between energy, water, telecommunications and emergency services.

  4. 04

    Event reviews

    Post-event reports remain the main evidence. Their findings are not always comparable across countries.

16Methods

How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.

19Questions

Questions and answers.

What is black start?
The process of restarting a power system after a total or partial collapse, using units that can start without external power and energising the network step by step.
Why do some outages last much longer than others?
Recovery depends on the damage to equipment, road access, crews, spares and communications, not only on the cause. Damaged transmission equipment and large transformers take longest to replace.
Can satellites see outages?
Night-time light imagery shows loss and return of lighting at neighbourhood scale, which helps where utility data are missing. It is a proxy with stated limits from cloud, moonlight and season.
Why can’t the grid simply be switched back on?
Because most plants need power to start, and the network must be rebuilt in stable steps, matching generation and reconnected load as it grows.
Who gets power back first?
That is decided by operators and emergency authorities under their plans. Critical services are usually prioritised, but arrangements differ by jurisdiction.
Does Energy Nexus run outage exercises?
Exercises are designed and run with the responsible authorities. Energy Nexus contributes evidence and scenario design when asked.
ReportsContribute

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Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

GCRIEnergy NexusGlobal Sector Risk and ResilienceStrategic SystemsScenario and Stress-Test
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