Draft, not yet released. In stewardship review. Not indexed until the first approved release.

Systems in depth

One section per system: its state at evidence close, its exposures and what the operational series will watch.

10 min read0 figures5 tables31 notesNR-XTECH-DLT-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Ledgers are settlement infrastructure and a regulatory subject
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Large stablecoin base against uneven rules and theft controls
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
    1. 8.1 Protocols and ledger platforms
    2. 8.2 Energy, mining and hardware
    3. 8.3 Custody, security and sanctions
    4. 8.4 Economy, payments and workforce
    5. 8.5 Security, cryptography and governance watch
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

8.1Protocols and ledger platforms

Distributed ledgers run on a small set of mature protocols. Evidence is strongest for documented specifications and upgrade dates, and weakest where it rests on project statements.

2008year

white paper that specified the first network1

2022year

move of the largest smart-contract network to proof of stake4

3upgrades

Dencun, Pectra and Fusaka, 2024 to 20254

Table 8.1State at baseline
ComponentStateEvidenceStatus
Proof-of-work networksspecified in a 2008 paper; chained hash-based proof of work1Reported
Proof-of-stake networksEthereum moved on 15 September 2022; Dencun 13 March 2024, Pectra 7 May 2025, Fusaka 3 December 20254Reported
Consensus theoryByzantine agreement and fault-tolerance papers underlie permissioned designs3738Inferred
Technology overviewNIST describes tamper-resistant distributed ledgers2Reported

Couplings

  • INF ↔ FIN settlement and funding
  • INF → DAT key and signature exposure
  • ENE ↔ INF electricity

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • activity and usage on a common basis
  • delivered upgrades against plans

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-10 Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography
  • SR-05 Sovereign, Fiscal and Financial Resilience

8.2Energy, mining and hardware

Electricity use depends on the consensus design. A project estimate exists for one proof-of-stake network. The current value for proof-of-work networks is not bound here.

2,601MWh per year

Ethereum electricity use, project estimate3

>99.988%

cut cited by the project after proof of stake3

99.95%

cut cited on the project roadmap page4

Table 8.2State at baseline
ComponentStateEvidenceStatus
Proof of stakethe project cites 2,601 MWh a year; two pages give two cut percentages34Reported
Proof of workthe Cambridge index method is a hybrid top-down model; the live value was not read5Expert input
Mining water useestimated in a study known from press coverage only29Expert input
Mining hardwarespecialised chips; supply not read28Expert input

Couplings

  • ENE ↔ INF electricity demand
  • WAT → INF cooling water
  • MIN → INF hardware

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • proof-of-work electricity use from the primary index
  • mining water and hardware footprint

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-10 Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography
  • SR-05 Sovereign, Fiscal and Financial Resilience

8.3Custody, security and sanctions

Security depends on how keys are held and on the services that hold them. Large thefts show the exposure of custodians and exchanges.

1.5USD billion

Bybit theft, February 202519

2USD billion

North Korea-linked thefts in 2025, vendor20

21March 2025

US Treasury delisting of Tornado Cash21

Table 8.3State at baseline
ComponentStateEvidenceStatus
Exchange custodya theft of about USD 1.5 billion attributed to North Korea19Reported
Vendor totalsat least USD 154 billion received by illicit addresses in 2025; a lower bound; other vendor and monitoring-team reports were not opened204546Reported
Sanctions policythe US removed sanctions against Tornado Cash on 21 March 202521Reported
Transaction orderingextraction of value from ordering is documented in research41Inferred

Couplings

  • DAT → FIN confidence
  • TRD → DAT sanctions
  • INF → DAT key compromise

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • loss totals on a common basis
  • custody concentration

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-10 Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography
  • SR-05 Sovereign, Fiscal and Financial Resilience

8.4Economy, payments and workforce

Stablecoins and central bank projects bring ledgers into payments. Reserve composition, remittance cost and workforce numbers are the thin parts of the evidence.

317USD billion

stablecoin market capitalisation, April 202617

>99%

of stablecoins denominated in US dollars6

85central banks

exploring a digital currency, 20247

Table 8.4State at baseline
ComponentStateEvidenceStatus
StablecoinsUSD 317 billion; more than 50% above early 202517Reported
BIS assessmentstablecoins fall short on the tests of singleness, elasticity and integrity6Reported
Central bank projects146 jurisdictions exploring; 3 launched; 41 pilot projects8Reported
Workforcedeveloper activity is tracked by an industry report; no figure bound25Expert input

Couplings

  • FIN → INF scale-up
  • FIN → DAT theft exposure
  • INF ↔ TRD payments

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • reserve composition
  • remittance cost on ledger channels
  • workforce size

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-10 Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography
  • SR-05 Sovereign, Fiscal and Financial Resilience

8.5Security, cryptography and governance watch

Statutes, supervisory pages and standard setters now frame the sector. The nearest cryptographic question is the exposure of ledger signatures to a future quantum machine.

18months

GENIUS Act default effective date after enactment13

30 Dec 2024date

MiCA applies in full14

8recommendations

in the FSB review of October 202512

Table 8.5State at baseline
ComponentStateEvidenceStatus
US statuteGENIUS Act: reserves at least 1 to 1; no issuer interest or yield13Reported
EU regimeMiCA applies in full; ART and EMT rules from 30 June 2024; grandfathering to 1 July 2026 at the latest1415Reported
Global standardsFSB framework of 2023; review of 2025 found significant gaps; Basel standard of 2022; earlier FSB risk assessment and IOSCO review not opened1112164344Reported
Quantum exposureproposals 360 and 361 are drafts; NIST finalised signature standards in 2024222324Reported

Couplings

  • INF → DAT cryptographic exposure
  • GOV → FIN issuer rules
  • GOV → TRD cross-border rules

Evidence to bind in 2027

  • text of national rules
  • migration progress of signatures

Related editions

  • GLB Global Systems
  • GS-05 Finance and Economy
  • GS-13 Cyber and Digital Systems
  • XT-02 Quantum Technologies
  • XT-10 Cybersecurity and Advanced Cryptography
  • SR-05 Sovereign, Fiscal and Financial Resilience

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1Nakamoto, S., Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, white paper, 2008 (PDF read in full for the abstract). Observation year 2008. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 4Ethereum Foundation (ed.), Ethereum roadmap (project page: Merge 15 September 2022 with a cut in energy use of about 99.95%; Dencun 13 March 2024; Pectra 7 May 2025; Fusaka 3 December 2025). A project-published page, weak evidence for the energy figure. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 37UNVERIFIED, not opened: Castro, M. and Liskov, B., Practical Byzantine fault tolerance, Proceedings of OSDI, 1999, cited from memory. Observation year 1999. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 38UNVERIFIED, not opened: Lamport, L., Shostak, R. and Pease, M., The Byzantine generals problem, ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 4(3), 382 to 401, 1982, cited from memory. Observation year 1982. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 2Yaga, D., Mell, P., Roby, N. and Scarfone, K., Blockchain Technology Overview, NIST IR 8202 (publication page; published 3 October 2018, page updated 7 May 2026). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2018. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 3Ethereum Foundation (ed.), Ethereum energy consumption (project page citing Crypto Carbon Ratings Institute estimates: annual electricity use of 2,601 MWh; cut of more than 99.988% after the Merge). A project-published estimate, weak evidence. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 5Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (ed.), Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index, landing and methodology pages (hybrid top-down method; landing page values load by script and none was read). University of Cambridge, Cambridge. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 29UNVERIFIED, not opened: de Vries, A., Bitcoin’s growing water footprint, Cell Reports Sustainability, 2023, known from press coverage only; no figure used. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 28UNVERIFIED, not opened: IEA (ed.), Electricity 2024 (page blocked automated access; cited from memory without figures). International Energy Agency, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 19Federal Bureau of Investigation (ed.), Public service announcement on the Bybit theft (about USD 1.5 billion in virtual assets stolen on or about 21 February 2025; attributed to North Korea). FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 20Chainalysis (ed.), 2026 Crypto Crime Report introduction (illicit addresses received at least USD 154 billion in 2025, up 162%; sanctioned-entity value up 694%; North Korea-linked thefts USD 2 billion; Bybit nearly USD 1.5 billion; illicit share below 1%; stablecoins 84% of illicit volume). A security-vendor report and a lower-bound estimate, weak evidence. Chainalysis, New York. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 21US Department of the Treasury (ed.), Tornado Cash Delisting (press release of 21 March 2025). Treasury, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 45UNVERIFIED, not opened: TRM Labs (ed.), 2026 Crypto Crime Report, cited from memory without figures. TRM Labs, San Francisco. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 46UNVERIFIED, not opened: Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (ed.), report on North Korea cyber activity, 2025, cited from memory without figures. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 41UNVERIFIED, not opened: Daian, P. et al., Flash Boys 2.0: frontrunning in decentralised exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2020, cited from memory. Observation year 2020. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  16. 17Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (ed.), Stablecoins in 2025: Developments and Financial Stability Implications, FEDS Notes, 8 April 2026 (market capitalisation USD 317 billion on 6 April 2026; more than 50% above early 2025). Federal Reserve Board, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  17. 6BIS (ed.), Annual Economic Report 2025, chapter III, The next-generation monetary and financial system (stablecoins fall short on the tests of singleness, elasticity and integrity; over 99% of stablecoins are US dollar-denominated; first 100,000 characters of the page read). Bank for International Settlements, Basel. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  18. 7Illes, A., Kosse, A. and Wierts, P., Embracing diversity, advancing together: results of the 2024 BIS survey on central bank digital currencies and crypto, BIS Papers 159 (published 22 August 2025; 93 central banks surveyed; 91% exploring). Bank for International Settlements, Basel. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  19. 8Atlantic Council (ed.), Central Bank Digital Currency Tracker (page last updated May 2026: 146 countries and currency unions exploring; 3 launched; 41 pilot projects). Atlantic Council, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  20. 25Electric Capital (ed.), Crypto developer report and dashboard (page read; figures load by script and none was read). Electric Capital, San Francisco. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  21. 13United States Congress, Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act), Public Law 119-27, enacted 18 July 2025 (full text read from the Government Publishing Office version). Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  22. 14ESMA (ed.), Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA) page (timeline: entered into force June 2023; full application 30 December 2024; grandfathering under Article 143(3) ends 1 July 2026 at the latest; no count of authorised providers). European Securities and Markets Authority, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  23. 12FSB (ed.), Thematic review on the FSB Global Regulatory Framework for Crypto-asset Activities (publication page; October 2025; information as of August 2025; significant gaps and inconsistencies; eight recommendations). Financial Stability Board, Basel. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  24. 15EBA (ed.), Asset-referenced and e-money tokens (MiCA) page (requirements for issuers of ARTs and EMTs apply from 30 June 2024; EBA statement; joint reports). European Banking Authority, Paris. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  25. 11FSB (ed.), FSB Global Regulatory Framework for Crypto-asset Activities (publication page; final report of 17 July 2023). Financial Stability Board, Basel. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  26. 16Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (ed.), Prudential treatment of cryptoasset exposures, standard SCO60 (publication page; published 16 December 2022; the page states implementation by 1 January 2025; later date and review known only from search summaries). Bank for International Settlements, Basel. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  27. 43UNVERIFIED, not opened: FSB (ed.), Assessment of Risks to Financial Stability from Crypto-assets, February 2022, cited from memory. Financial Stability Board, Basel. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  28. 44UNVERIFIED, not opened: IOSCO (ed.), thematic review on the implementation of IOSCO crypto-asset recommendations, October 2025, known from the FSB page only. International Organization of Securities Commissions, Madrid. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  29. 22NIST (ed.), Post-Quantum Cryptography project page (three finalised standards; announcement of 13 August 2024; HQC selected as a backup on 11 March 2025). National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  30. 23Beast, H., Heilman, E. and Duke, I.F., BIP 360: Pay-to-Merkle-Root (P2MR), Bitcoin improvement proposal, status Draft, version 0.12.1 (resists long exposure attacks only). Bitcoin improvement proposals repository. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  31. 24Lopp, J. et al., BIP 361: Post Quantum Migration and Legacy Signature Sunset, Bitcoin improvement proposal, status Draft, assigned 11 February 2026 (states that over 34% of all bitcoin had revealed a public key on-chain on 1 March 2026). Bitcoin improvement proposals repository. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 8: Systems in depth. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-DLT-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

ReportsContribute

Send evidence or a correction on Blockchain and Distributed Ledgers.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication, written by six desks. This page sits with the Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) Systems Evidence desk. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work. Sent to the wrong desk, it is forwarded, not refused.

GCRI Systems Evidence deskExponential Technology

Never send personal data, sensitive infrastructure detail or anything you have no right to share. A contribution is reviewed before use; sending it confers no authorship or editorial rights, and sponsorship never buys a finding.

CC BY 4.0 Free to read. Text and figures: CC BY 4.0. Data: CC0 1.0. Authors keep copyright. Published by GCRI Canada.

The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation

Science · evidence · measurement

Not for profit

Our articles, maps and twins are free to read and free to republish. Readers and partners keep it that way.

Partner with us

Who funds us

GCRI is a not-for-profit institution. To ask who funds a piece of work, use the funding questions form.

Independence

Editors and the expert reviewers named on each article decide what we publish. Funders and partners do not review or approve articles before publication.

Corrections policy

Licence

Articles: CC BY 4.0. Figures, maps, twins and data: CC BY 4.0. Other uses: ask through the permissions form.

Privacy choices