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East Asia’s risk is shared through weather, fuel and demography

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It assesses no authority and ranks no member country.

8 min read2 figures2 tables15 notesNR-REGIONAL-EAS-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1East Asia’s risk is shared through weather, fuel and demography
    1. 1.1 The questions this part answers
    2. 1.2 The argument
    3. 1.3 Twenty couplings between five systems
    4. 1.4 Reinforcing loops
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Hot summer with a typhoon landfall across the Yellow Sea and East China Sea corridor
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is East Asia’s risk concentrated, and in which systems?
  • Which couplings carry shocks across member borders?
  • Which capabilities hold under compound stress, and which are only documented?
  • What must the 2027 programme measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Member system cards
  • Shared basins and grids
  • Hub list
  • Regional pathway
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • Scenario
  • Three lenses
  • Portfolio

1.2The argument

The three members held about 1,581.6 million people in 2025: China 1,406.6 million, Japan 123.4 million and the Republic of Korea 51.7 million on the World Bank series1. China’s own year-end count was 1,404.89 million, a fall of 3.39 million; the difference from the World Bank value is about 1.7 million and the bases differ5. This baseline reads East Asia as a region whose members share weather systems, seas and fuel markets, so that a shock in one reaches the others.

The forcing layer is visible in the records of 2025. Japan, China and the Republic of Korea each recorded their hottest summer8. China’s annual mean temperature of 10.9 °C tied 2024 as the warmest year since 19519. The Republic of Korea’s annual mean of 13.7 °C was its second highest since 197310. Marine heatwaves covered almost the whole ocean area of Asia in July to September, and sea level in the Kuroshio region rose by more than 6 mm a year from 1999 to 2025 against about 3.6 mm globally8.

Wildfire and storm add acute events. The Republic of Korea’s March 2025 wildfires burned about 48,238 hectares and killed at least 30 people12. In China, natural disasters affected 67.03 million people and left 763 dead or missing, with 241.6 billion yuan of direct losses11. The western North Pacific season had 27 named cyclones, and ten typhoons made landfall in China13.

The energy layer combines a rapid build-out with import exposure. China’s wind and solar capacity reached 1,842 GW in total at the end of 2025 and clean energy supplied 30.4% of its energy consumption, while coal still supplied 51.4%5. Japan and the Republic of Korea net-import 87.3% and 83.2% of their energy24. Japan’s emissions fell below one billion tonnes net in FY20246.

The demographic layer sets the vulnerability. Japan has 30.0% of its people aged 65 or over, the Republic of Korea 20.3% and China 14.9%3. The Republic of Korea’s total fertility rate rose to 0.8 in 2025 from 0.717. Heat, storm and supply interruption fall hardest on older people and on those who depend on powered care.

This edition therefore reads East Asia’s risk as a property of the couplings between these forces. The matrix, risk objects, capability ladder and scenario that follow ask two questions: where does a shock travel next across a border, and who holds the capability to stop it?

Figure 1.1How import-dependent are the members? Net energy imports as a share of energy use, 2024 (%)

Net energy imports were 87.3% of energy use in Japan, 83.2% in the Republic of Korea and 24.0% in China in 202424. China’s coal supply is mostly domestic and the series does not show the mix of fuels5. LNG import volumes of China and Japan are not bound32.

ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
China24
Japan87.3
Republic of Korea83.2

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2024.

Figure ID FIG-REGIONAL-EAS-2026-BASELINE-01-003

87.3%

Japan net energy imports, 202424

83.2%

Republic of Korea net energy imports, 202424

24.0%

China net energy imports, 202424

46.33million t

Republic of Korea LNG imports, 202414

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The East Asia matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the starting graph that the Q1 2027 Foundry cut will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings between the five systems

Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.

  • Strong
  • Moderate
  • Weak

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT Water·STRONG
hydro · thermal cooling		STRONG
irrigation · rain-fed yield		STRONG
safe water · sanitation		STRONG
flows · wetlands
ENE EnergyMODERATE
pumping · desalination		·STRONG
fuel · fertiliser · cold chain		STRONG
air pollution · cooling		MODERATE
land use · mining
FOO FoodSTRONG
≈70% of withdrawals		WEAK
bioenergy feedstock		·STRONG
nutrition · food safety		STRONG
land conversion
HLT HealthWEAK
workforce		WEAK
workforce		MODERATE
labour · disease		·WEAK
residues
BIO BiodiversitySTRONG
regulation · filtration		MODERATE
biomass · hydrology		STRONG
pollination · soils		MODERATE
zoonoses · medicines		·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    CLI → ENE → HLT

    Heat raises power demand and loads health services for an ageing population.

    Inferred hottest summer 20258; no event bound

  2. 02

    CLI → INF → FIN

    Typhoon landfall damages ports and lifelines and the loss falls on insurers and budgets.

    Inferred China disasters 202511; loss series not bound

  3. 03

    TRD → ENE → FOO

    A fuel supply change reaches power prices and food costs.

    Inferred import dependence24; no event bound

  4. 04

    CLI → WAT → FOO

    Heat and low rainfall raise withdrawals and crop stress.

    Inferred withdrawals20; no event bound

  5. 05

    CLI → HLT

    Wildfire deaths and displacement load emergency services.

    Reported Korean wildfires 202512

1.4Reinforcing loops

A shock entering either system of a loop can return amplified through the other.

Table 1.2Pairs of systems where both directions are rated strong
LoopFirst directionSecond direction
WAT and FOOWater to food: irrigation · rain-fed yieldFood to water: ≈70% of withdrawals
WAT and BIOWater to biodiversity: flows · wetlandsBiodiversity to water: regulation · filtration
FOO and BIOFood to biodiversity: land conversionBiodiversity to food: pollination · soils
A causal-loop reading of the matrix (Sterman, Business Dynamics, 2000): structural, from estimated strengths, not a measured feedback.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), World Development Indicators: Population, total (SP.POP.TOTL), China, Japan and Republic of Korea. World Bank, Washington, DC, data updated 2026-10-08. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 5National Bureau of Statistics of China (ed.), Statistical Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China on the 2025 National Economic and Social Development (preliminary figures, mainland China, 28 February 2026). NBS, Beijing. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 8World Meteorological Organization (ed.), State of the Climate in Asia 2025 (media release, 17 June 2026; report WMO-No. 1397). WMO, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 9China Daily (ed.), China reports warmest year on record tied with 2024 (report on the China Climate Bulletin 2025 of the China Meteorological Administration and the National Climate Center, 29 January 2026). China Daily, Beijing. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 10The Korea Times (ed.), 2025 was nation’s second hottest year on record (report on the Korea Meteorological Administration announcement, 6 January 2026). The Korea Times, Seoul. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 12The Korea Times (ed.), Man investigated for causing South Korea’s worst-ever wildfire (about 48,238 hectares, at least 30 deaths, 30 March 2025). The Korea Times, Seoul. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 11China Daily (ed.), Natural disasters in China in 2025: 67.03 million people affected, 763 dead or missing, 241.6 billion yuan direct losses (report on a Ministry of Emergency Management briefing, 16 January 2026). China Daily, Beijing. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 13World Meteorological Organization (ed.), Typhoon Committee: cooperation and innovation save lives (news release, 13 March 2026; 27 named cyclones, ten landfalls in China). WMO, Geneva. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 24DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), World Development Indicators: Energy imports, net, % of energy use (EG.IMP.CONS.ZS), China, Japan and Republic of Korea. World Bank, Washington, DC, data updated 2026-10-08. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 6Ministry of the Environment of Japan (ed.), Japan’s National Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Removals, FY2024 (press release, 14 April 2026). Ministry of the Environment, Tokyo. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 3DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), World Development Indicators: Population ages 65 and above, % of total population (SP.POP.65UP.TO.ZS), China, Japan and Republic of Korea. World Bank, Washington, DC, data updated 2026-10-08. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 17The Korea Times (ed.), Number of newborns hits 4-year high in 2025 (report on the Ministry of Data and Statistics release, 25 February 2026; 254,457 births, total fertility rate 0.8). The Korea Times, Seoul. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 32UNVERIFIED, not opened: GIIGNL (ed.), Annual Report on the LNG industry (latest edition at evidence close; import volumes by member not read). GIIGNL, Paris. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 14United States International Trade Administration (ed.), South Korea Country Commercial Guide: Energy (page updated 2026-06-26; generation mix 2024, provisional 2025, 11th Basic Plan, LNG imports). International Trade Administration, Washington, DC. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 20DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), World Development Indicators: Annual freshwater withdrawals, total, % of internal resources (ER.H2O.FWTL.ZS), China, Japan and Republic of Korea. World Bank, Washington, DC, data updated 2026-10-08. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 1: East Asia’s risk is shared through weather, fuel and demography. In East Asia Regional Systems Risk and Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition, The State of East Asia’s Interdependent Systems. (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-REGIONAL-EAS-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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