GCRI · فناوری‌های کوانتومی
ارتباطات کوانتومی
Quantum communications use quantum states of light to distribute encryption keys with security rooted in physics, and in future to link quantum computers and sensors in networks. Quantum key distribution works over limited distances and needs dedicated hardware and trusted nodes today. This page sets out how quantum communications work, what they can and cannot secure, and what evidence serves the network operators and security agencies weighing them.
Quantum communications in seven parts.
- 01The questionQuantum communications: how the risk develops
- 02در سراسر حوزه‌هاQuantum communication touches the networks domains depend on
- 03نشانگرهاWhat is measured, and how well
- 04منابعWhere the evidence comes from
- 05تصمیم‌هاWho decides, and what the evidence serves
- 06Core questionsWhat experts ask
- 07MechanismsMechanisms and drivers
Quantum communications: how the risk develops.
Communications research and deployment limits. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
Measurement reveals eavesdropping
In quantum key distribution, measuring a quantum state disturbs it, so an eavesdropper introduces detectable errors. Keys are kept only when error rates are low.
Distance is limited by loss
Photons are lost in fibre, limiting direct links. Longer networks use trusted relay nodes or satellites, each with security implications.
Implementations can be attacked
Real devices deviate from ideal theory. Side-channel attacks on detectors and sources have been demonstrated, so security depends on implementation and certification.
Quantum networks are early
Distributing entanglement between distant nodes needs quantum repeaters and memories, which are still in research.
ردیاب مهاجرت پساکوانتومی.
The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
ردیاب مهاجرت پساکوانتومی
Quantum communications · Crypto inventory · Wave 2
مهاجرت
- سیاهههمهٔ رمزنگاری
- اولویت‌بندیعمر داده
- انتخابالگوریتم‌های استاندارد
- استقرار ترکیبیکلاسیک و PQC
- آزمونهم‌کنشی
- گذار نهاییبازنشسته‌سازی
سامانه‌ها بر پایهٔ اولویت
| امضای بایگانی | RSA-2048 | 28 | ML-DSA ترکیبی | آزمایشی |
| دروازهٔ VPN | ECDH | 9 | ML-KEM ترکیبی | برنامه‌ریزی‌شده |
| HSM پرداخت‌ها | RSA-3072 | 11 | نقشهٔ راه فروشنده | مسدود |
| TLS وب | ECDHE | 2 | مبادلهٔ کلید ترکیبی | انجام‌شده |
پیشرفت
Quantum communication touches the networks domains depend on.
- انرژیپیوستگیGrid control networks are candidate users of quantum key distribution.What to watchCost and range limits
- سلامتپیوستگیHealth networks weigh QKD against post-quantum cryptography.What to watchAgency guidance on QKD use
- آبپیوستگیUtilities are more likely to migrate to post-quantum algorithms.What to watchAlgorithm migration plans
Communication studies are designed for the مجموعهٔ Exponential Technology. Standards work sits in ETSI’s QKD group and the ITU-T Y.3800 series; several national security agencies prefer post-quantum cryptography to QKD for most uses.
- Network trial reports.
- Security analyses of QKD implementations.
How quantum communications is modelled, measured and tested.
مدل، مفروضات، داده‌ها و عدم قطعیت آن، به شکلی که دانشمند یا مهندس بررسی می‌کند. ساختارها از روش‌های منتشرشده پیروی می‌کنند. مقادیر ترسیم‌شده تبیینی‌اند، نه یافته.
مدل سامانه
The couplings between the systems in quantum communications: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | دورهٔ تکرار | Source type | برچسب |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| QKD link distance | kilometres | per demonstration | Published experiments | گزارش‌شده |
| Secret key rate | bits per second at a stated distance | per demonstration | Published experiments | گزارش‌شده |
| Deployed QKD network nodes | count | annual | Operator and government reports | گزارش‌شده |
| Security evaluations completed for QKD products | count | annual | Evaluation scheme records | آمارهای منتشرشده |
| Quantum memory storage time | milliseconds | per experiment | Peer-reviewed results | مشاهده‌شده |
| Satellite QKD demonstrations | count | annual | Agency reports | گزارش‌شده |
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| منبع | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| ETSI ISG QKD specifications | Component, interface and security specifications | Public, ETSI terms |
| مجموعهٔ ITU-T Y.3800 | Network recommendations for QKD | Public, ITU terms |
| National cyber agency positions on QKD | Agency views on QKD versus post-quantum cryptography | Public, terms per agency |
| EuroQCI programme documentation | European quantum communication infrastructure plans | Public, EU terms |
| Peer-reviewed quantum communication literature | Experimental results | Licence per article |
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Quantum Technologies prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| چه کسی تصمیم می‌گیرد | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Network operators | Whether QKD fits any of their links and threat models | Use comparisons; architecture reviews |
| National cyber agencies | What position to take on QKD for government use | Implementation security evidence |
| Research funders | How to fund quantum network research | Progress on memories and repeaters |
Outputs this topic produces
- Comparisons of QKD and post-quantum cryptography for specific uses
- Network architecture reviews including trusted nodes
- Summaries of implementation security evidence
- Evidence notes for operators
What experts ask.
Communications questions weigh physical security against practical limits.
- What security does quantum key distribution actually provide, and under what assumptions?
- How far can quantum signals travel through fibre or free space before they are lost?
- Do trusted relay nodes undermine end-to-end security?
- How do implementation flaws in real devices open side channels?
- How does quantum key distribution compare with post-quantum cryptography for a given use?
Mechanisms and drivers.
Quantum key distribution relies on the principle that measuring a quantum state disturbs it, so two parties can detect an eavesdropper and agree a secret key. The security of the ideal protocol rests on physics rather than on assumptions about computational difficulty. Real سامانه‌ها, however, use imperfect sources and detectors, and several attacks have exploited those imperfections.
Photons are absorbed and scattered in fibre, which limits direct links to relatively short distances. Longer networks currently rely on trusted nodes, where the key is held in classical form and must be protected conventionally. Quantum repeaters, which would extend range without trusted nodes, remain a research goal. Satellites have been used to demonstrate links over long distances.
How it is studied, and where the methods stop.
| Method or data | What it shows | محدودیت‌ها |
|---|---|---|
| Security proofs | Theoretical security of protocols | Proofs assume idealised devices |
| Implementation testing and quantum hacking research | Vulnerabilities in real equipment | Testing cannot prove the absence of flaws |
| Network trials | Performance, key rates and operations | Trials are limited in scale and duration |
| Comparative security assessment | When quantum or post-quantum approaches fit | Depends on threat model and system constraints |
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01محاسبات، سنجش و ارتباطات کوانتومیComparable benchmarking · Technology readiness assessment · Security implications trackingApplied here
- 02فیزیک و علم کوانتومCharacterising qubit noise · Metrology of quantum clocks · Verifying quantum effectsApplied here
- 03امنیت سایبری و رمزنگاریCryptographic inventory · Migration prioritisation · QKD implementation reviewApplied here
Where this page’s references lead.
نهادها و اسنادی که این صفحه بر پایهٔ آن‌ها خوانده می‌شود. وضعیت و ویراست‌ها تغییر می‌کنند؛ هر پیوند به نهاد صادرکننده می‌رود.
پرسش و پاسخ.
What is quantum key distribution?
Is QKD unbreakable?
Should organisations use QKD or post-quantum cryptography?
Is quantum key distribution unbreakable?
Does quantum communication replace post-quantum cryptography?
What is a quantum internet?
شواهد را از همین صفحه ارسال کنید.
گزارش‌ها is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
- ایمیلدرگاه GW-GCRIاز همین صفحه ارسال کنیدشواهد، یک اصلاحیه، یک مورد، یک روش، یک داوری، یک ترجمه یا ورودی نمایه. با برچسب این صفحه میرسد تا ویراستار مسئول آن را دریافت کند.
- Zenodoسپردهٔ بازآن را واگذار کنید و به جامعه ارائه دهیدسابقهٔ خود را با شناسهٔ ORCID خود در Zenodo منتشر کنید و سپس آن را در همانجا به جامعهٔ Reports ارسال کنید. گزینشگران آن را داوری می‌کنند؛ DOI از آنِ شما میماند.
- گزارش‌هاGCRIهمهٔ راههای مشارکت را ببینیدانواع مشارکت، نحوهٔ بررسی هر یک، اعتباری که دریافت میکنید، مجوز و آنچه هرگز پذیرفته نمیشود.
هرگز داده شخصی، جزئیات حساس زیرساخت یا چیزی را که حق اشتراکش را ندارید نفرستید. هر مشارکت پیش از استفاده داوری می‌شود؛ ارسال آن حق مؤلفی یا ویرایشی نمی‌دهد و حمایت مالی هرگز یافته‌ای را نمی‌خرد.
یک روش، یک مجموعه‌داده یا یک پرسش بیاورید.
اطلاعات و درخواست‌ها امروز باز است. هر درخواست یک شمارهٔ پیگیری می‌گیرد و گام بعدی را مشخص می‌کند؛ درخواست‌های عضویت، پرداخت‌ها، تخصیص رایانش و ثبت‌نام‌ها تنها زمانی باز می‌شوند که تیم، شرایط و ظرفیت داوری آن‌ها فراهم باشد.
اسناد حقوقی.
نقشه‌ها، داده‌ها و ارقام این سایت برای زمینه و اطلاعات عمومی نشان داده می‌شوند. توصیه، پیش‌بینی یا هشدار نیستند؛ حدود این اطلاعات در سلب مسئولیت‌ها و اعلامیه‌های داده بیان شده است.