Redundancy and diversity design
Critical functions are given independent backup paths, with diversity in supplier, technology and location so that one common cause cannot disable both.
GCRI · 系统性风险管理
Reliability and resilience engineering supply the design methods that keep 系统 working through failure: redundancy, diversity, graceful degradation and recovery planning. In 系统性风险 management they connect the analysis of risk to the engineering and organisational choices that reduce it.
Reliability and resilience engineering studies how 系统 fail, how failures can be prevented and how systems absorb, adapt and recover from disruption. It addresses both technical components and the organisations that operate them. In risk management and 系统性风险 and methods and modelling, resilience engineering identifies critical components and recovery bottlenecks across connected systems. It informs redundancy, spares and restoration priorities. The canonical description is on STEM Commons.
Critical functions are given independent backup paths, with diversity in supplier, technology and location so that one common cause cannot disable both.
Services are designed to shed lower-priority functions under stress and keep essential ones, with the order of shedding agreed before an event.
Recovery objectives are set for each service and tested in exercises, and the dependencies that lengthen recovery are identified and addressed.
来自 NASA GIBS 的亚洲洪水、人口密度和活跃火点数据。每个图层都标注各自的日期。
交互式地图需要JavaScript;图层列表和来源见下文。
图层 3
本页面的危害与暴露
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最新可用
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap贡献者 (ODbL) · Natural Earth
正在加载最新的NASA影像。
拖动以移动。按住 Ctrl 或 ⌘ 并滚动、双指缩放或使用按钮缩放;悬停可查看指针下的数值;重置可返回该区域。
危害与风险暴露,以亚洲为取景。NASA 发布的卫星和模型产品,各带自己的日期。它们是指标,而非对任何地点的评估。
图层与日期
Datasets and records used by reliability and resilience engineering on this platform, with the role each plays and the label its values carry. Sources are listed in 来源登记册.
| 数据 | 角色 | 标签 |
|---|---|---|
| Asset and component failure records | Reliability inputs | 观测 |
| Continuity test results | Recovery performance | 观测 |
| Design documentation | Redundancy and diversity structure | 已声明 |
| Incident and near-miss reports | Failure modes in practice | 已报告 |
团队遵循该方法时会使用的界面:其指标、状态与决策。名称为示例,数值仅作示意。
Systemic risk · Reliability and resilience · Run R-9568
nodes: assets · edges: dependencies
| N3 | 1470 | 35 | Critical |
| N4 | 6600 | 5 | 正常 |
| N5 | 2499 | 15 | 正常 |
| N6 | 6395 | 2 | 正常 |
Reliability predictions are compared with field failure data. Exercises and post-event reviews check whether recovery performed as planned.
| 核查 | 如何开展 |
|---|---|
| Common-cause analysis | Redundant paths are checked for shared dependencies that could fail together |
| Exercise verification | Recovery objectives are verified in tests, not assumed from design |
| Failure mode review | Failure modes and effects are reviewed with operators who know the system |
Common-cause failures and rare events are hard to estimate from limited data. Human and organisational factors resist quantification.
两个存量,即压力和 适应能力,由一个增强型增长回路、一个延迟的平衡响应以及压力超过能力时的损害连接在一起;越过阈值后,系统可能发生突变。这是带有说明性取值的教学模型,不是预测。本页地图显示亚洲;模型本身并不绑定某个地点。
控制措施
读数
| 年份 | 压力 | 能力 | 感知 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 20.0 | 50.0 | 20.0 |
| 4 | 23.3 | 44.9 | 21.2 |
| 8 | 27.2 | 42.2 | 24.0 |
| 12 | 31.7 | 42.3 | 27.7 |
| 16 | 36.8 | 45.5 | 32.2 |
| 20 | 42.3 | 51.5 | 37.2 |
| 24 | 47.9 | 60.3 | 42.6 |
| 28 | 53.2 | 71.3 | 48.0 |
| 32 | 57.8 | 84.3 | 53.1 |
| 36 | 66.4 | 98.4 | 58.4 |
| 40 | 82.7 | 115.9 | 69.7 |
| 44 | 97.8 | 139.7 | 83.8 |
| 48 | 109.1 | 169.4 | 97.3 |
No observed data enters this model: it runs on the teaching values set by the controls, to be replaced with a programme’s own evidence.
贯穿六大支柱,由 Nexus Consortium 牵头
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile 全球与系统性风险: the hazards it names, the 系统 and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
灾害
控制措施
NS-0 章程与原则NS-3 风险记录 UNI(语法、旧编码对照、分配机构)NS-9 情境 UNI(部署、实例、计划实例)NS-10 政策和条款(机器可读的义务:定义、约束、评估和执行)NS-11 验证与监测(证据、证明、零信任符合性观测)NS-14 符合性及与外部标准的对照NRS-H120 危害族:互联系统的结构性脆弱(NHS-1 sys.fragility)NRS-C6 系统性风险与级联风险NRS-H61 危害族:级联失效(NHS-1 sys.cascade)NRS-H62 危害类别:复合与多危害事件(NHS-1 sys.compound)NRS-H94 危害族:系统性网络事件(NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber)NRS-H60 危害类别:供应链与流动中断(NHS-1 sys.supply-chain)观测
示例地理范围
关键基础设施 stewards reliability and resilience engineering for the Consortium and reviews how it is applied across platforms.
模型、其假设、数据和不确定性,以科学家或工程师会核查的形式呈现。结构遵循已发表的方法。所取数值仅为示意,不是研究发现。
The model structure used for reliability and resilience engineering, the assumptions it makes and how each is tested.
Ri = f(Hi, Ei, Vi, Ci)危害、风险暴露、脆弱性和应对能力EAL = ∑k pk · Lk对年概率为 pkxt+1 = A xt + B ut + εtA carries the couplings, u the shock, ε the error| 假设 | 为何制作 | 如何检验 |
|---|---|---|
| 在一次事件中,危害与暴露相互独立 | 使损失积分保持可计算 | 与基于联合记录拟合的 copula 进行比较 |
| 耦合在工作点附近是线性的 | 让冲击通过 A 传播 | 在线性范围之外施加扰动并比较 |
| 脆弱性曲线可以在不同地点之间迁移使用 | 很少有本地曲线可用 | 在有观测损失的地方据此进行验证 |
报告 is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
切勿发送个人数据、敏感基础设施细节或您无权分享的任何内容。贡献在使用前会经过审查;发送贡献不赋予署名权或编辑权,赞助也绝不能换取研究结论。
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