GCRI · Global challenges
Spatial intelligenceObservations, models and their uncertainty in one view
Power, water, transport, ports, telecommunications, data centres and payments are lifelines. When one fails, the others feel it within hours. Most run on electricity and digital control, and many share corridors, suppliers and operators. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI) maps these dependencies, the single points of failure and the bottlenecks that slow recovery. Part of global challenges.
Water treatment, hospitals, cold chains, communications and payments all stop when the grid fails, and the grid needs communications and water to restart.
A shared substation, cable landing, fuel terminal or cloud region can sit beneath services that appear independent.
Spare transformers, specialist crews, fuel logistics and access routes often decide how long an outage lasts.
Night lights, population density, flood water and true-colour imagery across the world, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.
The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.
Layers 4
Infrastructure exposure, for this page
Keyboard, with the map focused
Hold Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll to zoom
Latest available
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth
Loading the latest NASA imagery.
Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.
Infrastructure exposure, framed on World. Layers as NASA publishes them, each with its own date.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date; indicators, not assessments of any place; claim ceiling INTEGRATED.
Layers and dates
Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly set out in 2001 the classification still used in infrastructure studies. A dependency runs one way; an interdependency runs both ways, which is why restarting a grid can need working telecommunications that themselves need power.
| Type | Example | Measure |
|---|---|---|
| Physical | A water treatment works needs electricity; a power station needs cooling water | Input dependency share; backup duration in hours of on-site fuel or storage |
| Cyber | Grid control, payment clearing and port logistics rely on shared networks and software | Count of services relying on one platform, region or provider class |
| Geographic | Cables, pipelines and roads share a corridor, bridge or landing site | Co-located assets within a hazard footprint |
| Logical | Markets, regulation or staff shared across systems | Shared crews or spares per region; restoration priority rules |
Service performance is expressed in standard reliability terms. Availability is the share of time a service is up. Mean time to repair is in hours. For power systems, SAIDI and SAIFI measure customer-minutes, as defined in IEEE Standard 1366.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Critical infrastructure and critical entities: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification.
Hazards
Systems and couplings
Controls
NS-0 Constitution and principlesNS-3 Risk record UNIs (grammar, legacy crosswalk, allocation authority)NS-9 Contextual UNIs (deployments, instances, programme instances)NS-10 Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations: definition, binding, evaluation and enforcement)NS-11 Verification and monitoring (evidence, attestations, zero-trust conformance observation)NRS-H61 Hazard family: Cascading failure (NHS-1 sys.cascade)NRS-H94 Hazard family: Systemic cyber events (NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber)NRS-H107 Hazard family: Digital infrastructure concentration and monoculture (NHS-1 tech.digital-concentration)NRS-K31 Domain pack profile: Cyber national resilience (DOMAIN-031)NRS-K36 Domain pack profile: Critical infrastructure (DOMAIN-036)NRS-K48 Domain pack profile: Financial system resilience (DOMAIN-048)Observation
Example geography
| Method | What it answers | Limit |
|---|---|---|
| Network criticality analysis | Which nodes or links, if lost, disconnect the most users | Topology alone ignores capacity, operator response and repair priorities |
| Interdependent network simulation | How a failure crosses from power to water, telecoms and transport | Coupling data are usually restricted; public studies use permitted or synthetic networks |
| Fragility curves and restoration functions | Probability of damage at a hazard intensity, and how fast service returns | Curves often borrowed from other countries' asset stock; restoration depends on crews and spares |
| Economic impact of outages (input-output, surveys of firms) | Value of lost production and household welfare | Customer damage functions vary by country and season; estimates carry wide ranges |
The World Bank's Lifelines study of 2019 and the UNDRR Principles for Resilient Infrastructure of 2022 both make the same point. The cost of disruption to users, not damage to assets, drives the case for resilience. That cost is the part least often measured.
The sectors urban flood touches and how strongly they depend on each other: what a study has to observe and model together.
Sectors · Urban floodStress
Pillars · Urban floodKPI
WhenAll phases
Context
Urban flood
Flooded streets take out substations, pumping stations and clinic access together; drinking water fails when power does.
W · E · I · F · H · B
Risk
Hover a corner, a line or a row to trace it across both sides.
Route
Applied to urban flood
L · F · U · S · R · A
Response
Expected value
Hover a pillar, a line or a row to read how it is applied.
Left: a teaching cascade (shock 0.6, gain 0.35, four rounds) over teaching values for a typical city-region, not measurements. Right: illustrative applications and the KPI each pillar answers for; values are published benchmarks, cited, not forecasts. Open events: NASA EONET, live.
GCRI develops dependency and restoration methods, runs studies with operators under agreed terms and publishes what review and security allow. It does not inspect, regulate or operate infrastructure, and it holds no role in national designation of critical entities, which in the European Union follows Directive 2022/2557. Field work sits with the Critical Infrastructure platform, in development.
Public findings are designed for the Strategic Systems series and the Scenario and Stress-Test series; dependency records would carry identifiers under the proposed Nexus Standards. Contributions that help: restoration timelines from past outages, fragility data for local asset types, and cases where a hidden shared dependency surfaced.
Which services depend on which assets, suppliers and operators, using network science and systems engineering.
Where one hazard, failure or attack can disable several systems at once.
Controlled scenarios using reliability and resilience engineering, with results labelled as modelled.
Options and their limits go to the operator or authority that decides. GCRI never operates infrastructure.
Infrastructure studies often involve sensitive topology. Public pages describe mechanisms and published findings only; operator data is used under agreed terms and never appears in public examples. Membership of a programme never grants access to production systems.
GCRI does not regulate, inspect or certify infrastructure.
Field work is organized through the Critical Infrastructure platform, in development, and the critical infrastructure field gateway. Operators can start at infrastructure and industry. The Global Risk Alliance (GRA) examines the finance questions under infrastructure preparedness. See also digital and cyber dependencies.
The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.
Nexus Reports is the Consortium's quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
Never send personal data, sensitive infrastructure detail or anything you have no right to share. A contribution is reviewed before use; sending it confers no authorship or editorial rights, and sponsorship never buys a finding.
The current service level is R0: information and enquiries. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.
Maps, data and figures on this site are shown for context and general information. They are not advice, forecasts or warnings; the limits of the information are set out in the Disclaimers and Data Notices.