GCRI · Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
Security, reliability and continuity of cyber-dependent services, devices and institutions. Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience is an established platform of The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation.
- STEM methods
- 6
- Canonical methods this field applies
- Topics
- 8
- Subject pages in the field
- Counterparts
- 7
- Platforms in shared fields across the network
- Report series
- 2
- Reports series it contributes to
The workspace for Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience.
Incident response timeline
Critical service A · Incident IR-3954 · Severity 2 · Example interface, not a record
CSF 2.0 functions
- GovernGV
- IdentifyID
- ProtectPR
- DetectDE
- RespondRS
- RecoverRC
Timeline
- T+00:00DE.AEAnomalous logins flagged on identity platform
- T+00:32RS.MAIncident declared, commander assigned
- T+01:35RS.ANScope: 7 hosts, one service account
- T+02:37RS.MIAccount disabled, hosts isolated
- T+04:00RS.CORegulator notification window opens
Affected assets
| IDP-01 | Identity | Compromised | Identity platform |
| APP-07 | Payments API | Isolated | Service owner |
| DB-02 | Customer data | Forensics | Data owner |
| BK-01 | Backups | Clean | Operations |
Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience · Incident response timeline. Incident response timeline: example names and illustrative values, not a record.
How work moves in this field.
A question becomes evidence, a governed build, an organised community, a controlled test, a reviewed publication and, finally, a decision taken by the competent authority under its own rules.
- Question Universe National, regional or institutional priority. Question in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
- Evidence Foundry STEM foundation of the platform. Evidence in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
- Build Foundry Foundry. Build in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
- Organise Universe Nexus ecosystem. Organise in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
- Test Universe Universe (independent site). Test in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
- Publish Reports Reports. Publish in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
- Decide Competent authority Competent authorities and institutions, through NXS-RLS (participants, agreements and handoffs). Decide in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
- Renew Universe Corrections and the next annual agenda. Renew in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
Each step of the cycle in the pillar it runs in; the decision stays with the competent authority, outside the programme.
- Labs
- Foundry
- Universe
- Nexus Standards
- Reports
- Risk Academy
- Competent authority (outside the programme)
A cascade through interdependent networks.
A hazard footprint takes out co-located assets in every layer; fragmentation, dependency between layers and overload of the survivors then spread the failure. The 3D view separates the layers by depth. Teaching model with stated illustrative values, not a prediction. The map on this page shows Europe; the model itself is not tied to a place.
Controls
- Assets per layer
- 18
- Hazard footprint
- 8% of area
- Assets that depend on another layer
- 60%
- Spare capacity (tolerance)
- 30%
Readouts
- Assets hit by the hazard
- 13%
- Assets still working
- 41%
- Amplification of the initial damage
- 4.6 times
- Steps to settle
- 2
Numbers, methods and sources
| Step | Data centres working (%) | Networks working (%) | Power working (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 89 | 89 | 83 |
| 1 | 61 | 67 | 39 |
| 2 | 61 | 22 | 39 |
Methods
- Interdependent networks Buldyrev and others (2010), Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks, Nature 464
- Overload cascades Motter and Lai (2002), Physical Review E 66
- Betweenness load Brandes (2001), Journal of Mathematical Sociology 25
- Multilayer networks Kivela and others (2014), Journal of Complex Networks 2
- Infrastructure interdependencies Rinaldi, Peerenboom and Kelly (2001), IEEE Control Systems 21(6)
- Uncertainty fan (parameter Monte Carlo) Spiegelhalter, Pearson and Short (2011), Visualising uncertainty about the future, Science 333
- One-at-a-time sensitivity (tornado) Saltelli and others (2008), Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley
Data
The model runs on the teaching values set by the controls. To calibrate it for a place, read it against these admitted layers and series, which this page’s map can draw:
- Major roads Natural Earth
- Railways Natural Earth
- Seaports Natural Earth
- Airports Natural Earth
- Urban extents Natural Earth
- Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band) NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP) · register nasa.gibs.context-live-layers
- Natural events (NASA EONET) NASA EONET · register nasa.eonet.events
Across the six pillars, led by Nexus Consortium
- Experiments Labs
- Built in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience in Foundry
- Tested at Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience in Universe
- Codified in Digital, Cyber and AI in Standards
- Published in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience in Reports
- Taught in Faculty of Technology and Digital Systems in Academy
The questions this field works on.
Cyber risk management
Threat exposure, vulnerabilities and controls.
TopicCritical service cyber
Cyber-physical lifelines and safety.
TopicCloud and third parties
Concentration and vendor dependency.
TopicIdentity and data security
Authentication, authorisation and privacy.
TopicInformation operations
Information integrity and digital disruption.
TopicIncident response recovery
Detection, containment, restoration and evidence.
TopicSupply chain security
Software and hardware dependency risk.
TopicPost quantum migration
Cryptographic transition requirements.
Model Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience as a system. Run the cascade.
Assembled from the Nexus Standards area profile Cyber and digital resilience law alignment: the hazards it names, the systems and sectors that carry the loss, the controls that dampen it and the data that observe it. Choose the components, pick an initiating hazard and step through the cascade. The Map view places the run on an example geography with open data. Every coupling weight is a stated assumption you can change. A teaching model, not a forecast, an assessment or a certification. To model a place of your own choosing, open the full System Builder.
Hazards
- Dam failure
- Sea-ice loss
- Coastal erosion (set off downstream)
- River flood (set off downstream)
- Flash flood (set off downstream)
- Mass displacement (set off downstream)
- Biodiversity loss (set off downstream)
- Widespread power outage (set off downstream)
- Water supply shortfall (set off downstream)
- Arctic winter sea-ice collapse (set off downstream)
- Polar vortex disruption (set off downstream)
Systems and couplings
Controls
NS-10Policies and clauses (machine-readable obligations: definition, binding, evaluation and enforcement)NS-11Verification and monitoring (evidence, attestations, zero-trust conformance observation)NS-9Contextual UNIs (deployments, instances, programme instances)NRS-X6Cyber and digital security riskNRS-H93Hazard family: Identity, trust and cryptographic failure (NHS-1 cyber.identity)NRS-K31Domain pack profile: Cyber national resilience (DOMAIN-031)NRS-H54Hazard family: Signal and platform disruption (NHS-1 cyber.platform)NRS-H86Hazard family: Telecom and data-centre failure (NHS-1 infra.digital)NRS-H94Hazard family: Systemic cyber events (NHS-1 cyber.systemic-cyber)
Observation
- NIST National Vulnerability Database APIs (listed for reference)
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue (listed for reference)
- EUR-Lex Cellar (EU legal acts and delegated acts) (listed for reference)
- Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
- Legal measures pillar of the Global Cybersecurity Index
Example geography
- North America: 243 hexagonal cells
- Night lights tonight, outages (VIIRS Day/Night Band), NASA GIBS
- Surface water through cloud, 30 m (OPERA DSWx-S1 radar), NASA GIBS
- Rain rate, last half hour (IMERG), NASA GIBS
- Vegetation disturbance alerts, 30 m (OPERA DIST-ALERT), NASA GIBS
What Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience does.
Cyber resilience is the ability of organisations and societies to anticipate, withstand, recover from and adapt to cyber attacks and failures of digital systems. Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience covers risk management, critical services, cloud and third parties, identity and data, information operations, incident recovery, supply chains and post-quantum migration. Operators, regulators and cyber agencies decide.
Its community
Security researchers; SOC practitioners; infrastructure defenders; digital-risk analysts.
Its methods
Threat modelling; incident methods; dependency and recovery analysis.
Its outputs
Digital resilience research notes; critical service scenarios; security literacy.
Coupled risk, applied response.
The sectors urban flood touches and how strongly they depend on each other: what a study has to observe and model together.
Choose a context
Sectors · Urban floodStress
Pillars · Urban floodKPI
In this contextDependence or handoff, heavier is strongerOutside this context
Programme yearAll phases
Context
Urban flood
Flooded streets take out substations, pumping stations and clinic access together; drinking water fails when power does.
W · E · I · F · H · B
Risk
- Sectors
- 4 of 6
- Relations
- 6 of 15
- Coupling
- 0.46 share of total
Hover a corner, a line or a row to trace it across both sides.
Route
Applied to urban flood
L · F · U · S · R · A
Response
- Pillars
- 5 of 6
- Handoffs
- 11 of 18
- Loops
- 8 closed
Expected value
- What is at stake
- $390Ba year at least, in infrastructure disruption costs to households and firms in low- and middle-income countriesWorld Bank, Lifelines, 2019
- Return on resilience
- 4 : 1benefit to costWorld Bank, Lifelines, 2019
- Avoided loss
- 30%less damage with 24 hours’ warning of a storm or heatwaveGlobal Commission on Adaptation, Adapt Now, 2019
Hover a pillar, a line or a row to read how it is applied.
A: a teaching cascade (shock 0.6, gain 0.35, four rounds) over teaching values for a typical city-region, not measurements. B: illustrative applications and the KPI each pillar answers for; values are published benchmarks, cited, not forecasts. Open events: NASA EONET, live.
What Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience studies, and the services it does not provide.
Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience, studies how organisations and societies keep digital services secure and running, and helps public institutions plan resilience and migrations. It provides no incident response, monitors no network, publishes no exploit detail and gives no assurance about any product; national cyber agencies and operators hold those roles.
Threat and dependency diagrams shown here are illustrative. Vulnerabilities in GCRI’s own services are reported to the security address.
How Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience is modelled, measured and tested.
The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.
System model
The couplings between the systems in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
Model, equations and assumptions
The model structure used for Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience, the assumptions it makes and how each is tested.
Ri = f(Hi, Ei, Vi, Ci)hazard, exposure, vulnerability and coping capacityEAL = ∑k pk · Lkover events k with annual probability pkxt+1 = A xt + B ut + εtA carries the couplings, u the shock, ε the error| Assumption | Why it is made | How it is tested |
|---|---|---|
| Hazard and exposure are independent within an event | Keeps the loss integral tractable | Compare with a copula fit on joint records |
| Couplings are linear near the operating point | Lets shocks propagate through A | Perturb beyond the linear range and compare |
| Vulnerability curves transfer between places | Local curves are rarely available | Validate against observed losses where they exist |
- Inputs
- versioned datasets with provenance
- Outputs
- distributions, never single numbers
- Code
- released with the model card and tests
- Reproduction
- same data, code, environment and seed
Every domain now runs on digital control.
- WaterHow this field couples to itWater treatment and distribution rely on industrial control systems exposed to network attack.
- EnergyHow this field couples to itGrid control, markets and metering are digital and interconnected.
- FoodHow this field couples to itFood logistics, payments and cold chain monitoring depend on shared platforms.
- HealthHow this field couples to itHospitals have been disrupted by ransomware; patient safety depends on downtime procedures.
- BiodiversityHow this field couples to itEnvironmental monitoring networks and data repositories need integrity protection.
Connected activity in Europe.
Night lights, population density and land cover over Europe, from NASA GIBS. Each layer carries its own date.
The interactive map needs JavaScript; the layer list and sources are below.
Layers 3
Connected activity, for this page
About this layer
- Evidence
- Observed
- Source
- VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2) (NASA LAADS DAAC)
- Provider
- NASA LAADS DAAC
- Licence
- NASA open data
- Vintage
- daily; Satellite radiance, corrected for moonlight and atmosphere
- Newest at build
- 2026-10-12
- Resolution
- about 500 m grid
- Uncertainty
- Satellite night-time radiance for the date shown; lights are a proxy for electricity use and outages, not a measurement of supply or access.
- Reached through
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
- Evidence
- Estimated
- Source
- Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Columbia University))
- Provider
- NASA SEDAC (CIESIN, Columbia University)
- Licence
- CC BY 4.0
- Vintage
- null; Census-based estimate, static (2020)
- Resolution
- about 1 km grid
- Uncertainty
- Census-based estimate of people per square kilometre in 2020, shown as exposure context; not a count of people affected by any hazard.
- Reached through
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
- Evidence
- Observed (clouds leave gaps)
- Source
- VIIRS Global Flood Product (NASA LANCE)
- Provider
- NASA LANCE
- Licence
- NASA open data
- Vintage
- daily; Satellite detection; clouds leave gaps
- Newest at build
- 2026-10-14
- Resolution
- about 250 m grid
- Uncertainty
- Satellite detection; clouds leave gaps. Satellite or model raster as the provider publishes it. Clouds, swath gaps and retrieval error leave gaps and noise; values are indicators, not measurements at a place.
- Reached through
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
- Evidence
- Observed
- Source
- VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance (NASA LANCE)
- Provider
- NASA LANCE
- Licence
- NASA open data
- Vintage
- daily; Satellite image
- Newest at build
- 2026-10-14
- Resolution
- about 250 m grid
- Uncertainty
- Satellite image. Satellite or model raster as the provider publishes it. Clouds, swath gaps and retrieval error leave gaps and noise; values are indicators, not measurements at a place.
- Reached through
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
- Evidence
- Modelled (latest year GIBS publishes)
- Source
- MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1) (NASA LP DAAC)
- Provider
- NASA LP DAAC
- Licence
- NASA open data
- Vintage
- yearly; Satellite classification; latest year GIBS publishes
- Newest at build
- 2024-01-01
- Resolution
- about 500 m grid
- Uncertainty
- Satellite land cover classes for the year shown, including croplands; a classification with known errors, not a farm register.
- Reached through
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
About this layer
- Evidence
- Observed (clouds leave gaps)
- Source
- MODIS Terra EVI (NASA LANCE)
- Provider
- NASA LANCE
- Licence
- NASA open data
- Vintage
- daily; Satellite index; clouds leave gaps
- Newest at build
- 2026-10-13
- Resolution
- about 250 m grid
- Uncertainty
- Satellite vegetation index for the 8 days to the date shown, a habitat condition indicator; not a measure of species or biodiversity.
- Reached through
- gibs.earthdata.nasa.gov, only after you allow the live map
Keyboard, with the map focused
Hold Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll to zoom
Latest available
NASA GIBS / EOSDIS · ASTER GDEM (METI, NASA) · Blue Marble (NASA) · © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL) · Natural Earth
Loading the latest NASA imagery.
Drag to move. Ctrl or ⌘ and scroll, pinch or the buttons to zoom; hover for the values under the pointer; reset returns to the region.
Connected activity, framed on Europe.Satellite and model products as NASA publishes them, each with its own date. They are indicators, not assessments of any place.
Data: NASA GIBS · ASTER GDEM · Blue Marble · © OpenStreetMap contributors · Natural Earth · NASA EONET · NASA/NOAA VIIRS · NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERTSources and licences
- We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- VIIRS Black Marble night-time lights, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; distributed by the NASA Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive and Distribution System (LAADS DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Columbia University. 2018. Gridded Population of the World, Version 4 (GPWv4): Population Density, Revision 11. NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC). Licensed under CC BY 4.0. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). doi:10.7927/H49C6VHW. CC BY 4.0
- VIIRS near-real-time products (flood, land surface temperature, snow cover, corrected reflectance), NASA LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- MODIS land products (vegetation indices, gross primary production, land cover), NASA LP DAAC and LANCE; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- ASTER GDEM is a product of METI and NASA (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003, NASA LP DAAC); imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). Cite as: NASA/METI/AIST/Japan Spacesystems and U.S./Japan ASTER Science Team (2019). ASTER Global Digital Elevation Model V003. doi:10.5067/ASTER/ASTGTM.003. NASA open data
- Made with Natural Earth. Free vector and raster map data @ naturalearthdata.com. Public domain
- © OpenStreetMap contributors (ODbL), via NASA GIBS (coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names). Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). ODbL
- Blue Marble, NASA Earth Observatory; imagery via NASA GIBS. Colours redrawn from the published colour map; values averaged into hexagonal cells where shown (modified). NASA open data
- Context on the globe and flat map: coastlines, boundaries, roads and place names from NASA GIBS reference layers (OpenStreetMap data, ODbL, © OpenStreetMap contributors); Blue Marble imagery as an optional base; 3D terrain and the elevation read-out from the ASTER GDEM elevation colour index (5 m to 200 m classes, exaggerated for legibility). Boundaries are drawn as published and imply no position on any territory.
- Live events: NASA Earth Observatory Natural Event Tracker (EONET); events are indicative and keep their original source links.
- Observed (EO): NASA/NOAA VIIRS (Suomi NPP). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
- Observed (EO): NASA JPL OPERA DIST-ALERT (contains modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2026). We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
- NASA GIBS: We acknowledge the use of imagery provided by services from NASA’s Global Imagery Browse Services (GIBS), part of NASA’s Earth Science Data and Information System (ESDIS).
- Optional layers (5 sources in the layer list: live, forecast, observed and context) print their provider credit on the map and here when switched on; forecasts are model output and derived indices are estimates.
Layers and dates
- Night-time lights, daily: VIIRS Black Marble (VNP46A2), NASA LAADS DAAC · 12 Oct 2026
- Population density, 2020: Population: CIESIN, Columbia University, Gridded Population of the World v4.11 (2018), NASA SEDAC, CC BY 4.0 · static
- Flood water, 3-day composite: VIIRS Global Flood Product, NASA LANCE · 14 Oct 2026
- True colour: VIIRS NOAA-20 corrected reflectance, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
- Land cover type (IGBP), yearly: MODIS Terra and Aqua land cover (MCD12Q1), NASA LP DAAC · 2024
- Enhanced vegetation index, rolling 8 days: MODIS Terra EVI, NASA LANCE · 13 Oct 2026
Where cyber resilience evidence goes.
Dependency and migration studies are designed for the Exponential Technology series; sector studies for the Global Sector Risk and Resilience series. Software studied would carry bills of materials under NS-12 of the proposed Nexus Standards.
- Operators can share anonymised post-incident reviews.
- Researchers can contribute dependency mapping methods.
- Public bodies can share cryptographic inventory lessons.
Digital failures now travel into the physical world.
Almost every essential service depends on software, networks and data, often through suppliers that the service operator does not control. That makes cyber risk a question of public safety and continuity, not only of information security.
Modern infrastructure runs on layered digital systems. Industrial control systems open valves and switch breakers; clinical systems hold patient records and drive medical devices; payment systems move wages and benefits. These systems connect through shared cloud platforms, identity providers, software libraries and telecommunications networks. A weakness in one widely used component can expose thousands of organisations at once, and a failure at one provider can stop services that appear unrelated.
Threats are varied. Criminal groups use ransomware to halt operations and extort payment; state-linked actors pursue espionage and pre-position for disruption; insiders and errors cause outages without any attacker. Accidental failures, such as a faulty software update or a misconfiguration, can cause as much disruption as attacks. The common pattern is concentration and coupling: many services depend on few components, and those components are tightly linked.
Failures cascade because organisations plan for their own systems but not for their dependencies. When a regional hospital loses its electronic records, ambulances divert, laboratories slow and neighbouring hospitals absorb the load. When a payment processor fails, retail, transport and benefits are affected together. Recovery is slowed by unclear responsibilities, missing backups and the difficulty of rebuilding trust in systems that may still be compromised.
Research for those who keep services running.
The platform turns security engineering, incident evidence and dependency analysis into research that defenders and institutions can use.
How systems can fail
Structured analysis of attackers, failure modes and weak points in critical services, published at a level that informs defenders without enabling harm.
Learning from events
Methods for detection, containment, recovery and evidence handling, and for drawing lessons from public incident reports.
What depends on what
Maps of shared providers, software and networks behind essential services, and the recovery paths when they fail.
Planned outputs are digital resilience research notes, critical service scenarios and security literacy material. GCRI does not regulate, certify or approve. The Consortium is not an emergency or incident response service. If you are dealing with an active incident, contact your national computer emergency response team or your own security provider.
Shared methods and counterparts at the other institutions.
The platform stewards the method pages for cybersecurity and cryptography and software and safety-critical systems engineering, and applies communications and network technology, network science and contagion, reliability and resilience engineering and quantum computing, sensing and communication. All six are listed on the platform STEM foundation.
Its work connects to the Foundry systems NXS-NSF (trust, authorisation and assurance), NXS-NET (network topology and continuity), NXS-SIG (signal, spectrum, timing and PNT) and NXS-NST (civilian common operating picture), and to the report series Strategic Systems and Scenario and Stress-Test. A cyber-physical outage exercise is one of its themes in the Universe programme. At GCRI it works closely with Critical Infrastructure, Digital Public Infrastructure, Quantum Technologies and Data and Compute.
At The Global Risks Forum (GRF), AI and Digital Governance and Disaster and Crisis Governance convene the institutions that govern digital technology and crisis response. At The Global Risks Alliance (GRA), Financial Cyber and Operational Resilience, Payments and Market Infrastructure and Financial Crime and Fraud Risk build shared financial-sector understanding of cyber and operational risk, without advising on or arranging transactions. See counterparts across the Consortium.
The areas of cyber and digital resilience this platform takes on.
Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience studies how organisations and societies keep digital services secure and running: managing cyber risk, protecting critical services, depending on cloud and third parties, securing identity and data, resisting information operations, responding to and recovering from incidents, securing software supply chains and migrating to post-quantum cryptography. Its pages set out methods, standards and evidence for each, with every value labelled and every limit stated. It prepares evidence; operators, regulators and national cyber agencies decide.
Cyber risk management
Identifying, assessing and treating cyber risk as part of how an organisation governs its risks.
Critical service cyber
Security of the systems that run power, water, health, finance and transport, including operational technology.
Cloud and third parties
Dependence on cloud providers, managed services and software vendors, and the concentration it creates.
Identity and data security
Authentication, access control, encryption and protection of personal and sensitive data.
Information operations
Coordinated manipulation of information, including foreign interference, and how it is detected and countered.
Incident response and recovery
Detecting, containing and recovering from incidents such as ransomware, and restoring trusted operation.
Supply chain security
Risks introduced through software components, updates, vendors and hardware.
Post-quantum migration
Replacing public-key cryptography vulnerable to future quantum computers with new standard algorithms.
Built on named science, technology, engineering and mathematics.
Every claim on Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience rests on methods with a canonical page in the STEM Commons, so readers can see what a finding depends on and where its limits lie.
See the STEM foundation of Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
How this works across the six pillars.
Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience works through six pillars of one annual programme, led by the Nexus Consortium, with GCRI, GRF and GRA each contributing in its role: explore, experiment and prototype in Labs, build, simulate and prepare in Foundry, convene and test in Universe, codify, correct and apply in Nexus Standards, publish in every format in Reports, teach in the open in Risk Academy.
handoff in playrecorded handoffno direct handoff
Programme yearAll phases
Route
The whole programme
Every pillar hands its work to another; together they close the year’s feedback loops.
L · F · U · S · R · A
- Pillars
- 6 of 6
- Handoffs
- 18 of 18
- Loops
- 17 closed
Handoffs in play
- F01Universe → Foundry · Admitted mission becomes a cycle project with a decision caseReadiness preparation
- F02Foundry → Universe · Core Build Report and go or no-go evidenceControlled build
- F03Foundry → Reports · Sealed observations and indicator series behind a profileCloseout
- F04Universe → Reports · After-action and scenario findings for chapters 10 and 13After-action review
and 14 more
- LabsWhere questions become experiments and prototypes: new methods, data and tools are tried in the open, with their limits on record, before the Foundry builds them, under the Nexus Consortium.Labs
- FoundryWhere methods, data and models become reproducible builds, each run with its inputs, version and limits on record.Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience in FoundryFoundry
- UniverseWhere a build is tested under controlled conditions with independent evaluators, so a method’s skill is measured, not assumed.Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience in Universeuniverse.nexus
- Nexus StandardsWhere methods, identifiers and data schemas are codified in the open and corrected when a test finds a fault.Digital, Cyber and AI in Standardsnexustandards.com
- ReportsWhere findings are published with their method, uncertainty and evidence class, and corrected as new versions.Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience in ReportsReports
- Risk AcademyWhere methods and systems are taught on real data and real places, by working the case, on Risk Academy.Faculty of Technology and Digital Systems in Academyrisksacademy.com
What the work is read against.
The platform does not set standards. It reads its evidence against the frameworks that competent bodies have adopted, so a finding can be placed where a decision-maker already works.
| Framework or standard | Body | What it sets |
|---|---|---|
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 | US National Institute of Standards and Technology | Functions to govern, identify, protect, detect, respond to and recover from cyber risk |
| ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 | ISO and IEC (JTC 1/SC 27) | Requirements for an information security management system and a catalogue of controls |
| NIS2 Directive | European Union | Cybersecurity risk management and incident reporting duties for essential and important entities |
| Digital Operational Resilience Act | European Union | ICT risk management, incident reporting, testing and third-party oversight in finance |
| Cyber Resilience Act | European Union | Security requirements for products with digital elements across their life cycle |
| IEC 62443 series | International Electrotechnical Commission | Security for industrial automation and control systems |
| Post-quantum cryptography standards FIPS 203, 204 and 205 | US National Institute of Standards and Technology | Standard algorithms for key establishment and digital signatures resistant to quantum attack |
| Framework of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace | United Nations General Assembly (GGE and OEWG reports) | Voluntary norms, international law, confidence-building and capacity-building for states |
| Convention on Cybercrime | Council of Europe | Criminal law and cooperation on offences against and by means of computer systems |
The same field, seen three ways.
GCRI studies a field as science, GRF governs it and GRA builds shared financial understanding of it. Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience links to its counterparts so that work on one side is visible on the others.
- Disaster and Crisis GovernanceInstitutionGRFShared fieldCritical infrastructure
- AI and Digital GovernanceInstitutionGRFShared fieldCyber and digital resilience
- Fintech NexusInstitutionGRAShared fieldCyber and digital resilience
- Development Finance NexusInstitutionGRAShared fieldCritical infrastructure
- Payments and Market InfrastructureInstitutionGRAShared fieldCyber and digital resilience
- Financial Cyber and Operational ResilienceInstitutionGRAShared fieldCyber and digital resilience, Critical infrastructure
- Financial Crime and Fraud RiskInstitutionGRAShared fieldCyber and digital resilience
Where this page’s references lead.
The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 (NIST, 2024)
- Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, the Digital Operational Resilience Act, applying from January 2025
- Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on information and telecommunications in the context of international security (A/70/174, 2015)
- NIST FIPS 203, 204 and 205 (NIST, 2024)
- Nexus Standards, the proposed NS series (nexustandards.com)
Pages in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience.
Mandate and publisher
PageField overview
PageResearch and evidence
PageInnovation and practical technology
PageProgrammes and projects
PageData and technical methods
PageSpecialist community
PageLearning and professional development
PageEvents and technical dialogues
PageResearch and publications
PageParticipation paths
PageContact the specialist team
PageTrust, rights and status
PageSTEM foundation of Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
PageHow work moves in this field
PageBuild in Foundry
PageTest in Universe
PagePublish in Reports
PageThe same field across the Consortium
PageTopics
Where this page leads across the Consortium.
Questions and answers.
Who publishes Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience?
Is Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience active?
How can I contribute?
Where are findings published?
Which values on this platform are real?
How do I report an error?
Can the platform help with an active cyber incident?
Does the platform publish vulnerabilities or exploits?
Contribute evidence from this page.
Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
- EmailGateway GW-GCRISend it from this pageEvidence, a correction, a case, a method, a review, a translation or profile input. It arrives tagged with this page, so the editor who owns it receives it.
- ZenodoOpen depositDeposit it and submit to the communityPublish your own record on Zenodo with your ORCID iD, then submit it to the Reports community there. Curators review it; the DOI stays yours.
- ReportsGCRISee every way to contributeThe contribution types, how each is reviewed, what credit you receive, the licence and what is never accepted.
Never send personal data, sensitive infrastructure detail or anything you have no right to share. A contribution is reviewed before use; sending it confers no authorship or editorial rights, and sponsorship never buys a finding.
How Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience works.
Choose a view and press Play to follow the platform’s process, its programme year, the standards it applies and how its findings are published. The outline shows how the work is designed to run, not the status of any decision.
Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience
How Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience works
Platforms · Programme year · Standards · Reports
A platform joins a field to named methods, labelled evidence and the outputs it publishes, without becoming the authority it serves.
01 Scope
- 01Field and familiesStart · The platform leadThe home states the field, its families and who it serves.
- 02Topic dossiersRecord · Platform authorsTopics explain the subject with labelled evidence.
02 Evidence
- 03Evidence labelsRecord · GCRIEach value is labelled: observed, published statistics, estimated, modelled, scenario or unknown.
- 04MethodsStep · Method ownersMethods come from the STEM Commons, each with one canonical page.
03 Work
- 05Scenarios on the systemsModel · Foundry pillarScenarios run on the Nexus systems, labelled as scenario.
- 06Standards that applyRecord · Nexus StandardsThe platform names the standards that apply. A validator report is evidence for review.
04 Publish
- 07EditionsRecord · ReportsFindings are published through Reports with their limits.
- 08Authority decidesOutcome · The competent authorityDecisions and execution stay with the government, operator or licensed institution.
Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience home · Platforms · Shared methodsAn outline of how the work is designed to run; it does not report the status of any decision or record.
Take part in Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience.
Start from who you are. Answer an open call. Or form and lead a competence cell on the Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience platform.
National institutions
Ministries, statistics offices and agencies: a national desk and chapter, and a seat in the working groups. National chapters
Sectors and professions
Operators, regulators, banks, insurers and professional bodies whose work touches Cybersecurity and Digital Resilience. Participate
Learning
Courses and practice, with a record of every course completed. Free to study. Open learning
Standards
Draft, review and adopt the methods and data standards with the working groups. Working groups
Communities and research
Universities, civil society and individual experts: projects, data and review. Write to the team
| Open call | Seeks | Closes |
|---|---|---|
| Founding call for experts to the working groups CALL-FOUNDING-EXPERTS | expert, editor, chair | 2026-12-15 |
| Open nomination for the three independent expert seats of the Global Standards Council CALL-GSC-IND | council-member | 2026-12-01 |
| Nominations of interim regional members (applies only if the transitional provision is decided) CALL-GSC-REG | council-member | 2026-12-15 |
| Review of the wave-1 risk core outlines (C1, C2, C3, C4, C8, C10, C11) CALL-REVIEW-WAVE1 | contributor | 2027-01-31 |
| Experts for the core standards of risk science: uncertainty and evidence grading, scales, structured expert judgement, tolerability, extremes and compound events, catastrophic and existential risk, ethics and equity, units and measurement (NRS-C17 to NRS-C24) CALL-CORE-SCIENCE | expert, editor, chair | 2027-01-31 |
| Independent reviewers for the families of the hazard atlas, three from at least two regions for each family (NHS2-R19), priority families first CALL-ATLAS-REVIEW | expert | 2027-03-31 |
| Members of the interim Frontier Safety Review Panel and red-team reviewers (biosafety and biosecurity, AI safety and security, critical-infrastructure security); applications treated in confidence CALL-FRONTIER-SAFETY-REVIEW | expert | 2026-11-30 |
| Experts in ontology, metrology, software verification and conformity assessment for the requirement register, the NHS-2 machine representation, the conformance test suites and the conformity assessment scheme CALL-CONFORMANCE-ONTOLOGY | expert, editor | 2027-01-31 |
Calls past their closing date are hidden automatically. Every call, proposal and route: open areas and calls.
Gather the cell
Bring together three to seven people with complementary skills: data, field practice, policy and communication.
Register it
Write to the team with the cell’s name, members, area and region. You receive a reference and a contact. Write to the team
Choose a charter
Pick one focus: research and evidence, data and maps, standards review, or community preparedness.
Learn together
Follow shared study paths at Risk Academy, with practice and a record of every course completed. Hazards and resilience
Lead and report
Hold regular sessions. Publish what the cell learns through Reports. Bring findings to the working groups. Working groups
What a national team or a local community can do on The Global Risks Index (NXS-GRX) today.
Your country’s profile
Open risk profiles for 195 countries, with sources and licences on every value. Open the Index
Correct or reply
Correct a value or reply for your country. The change is logged with its effect. Open the Index
Offer data
Offer a dataset. It enters through the licence gate, with your credit. Open the Index
Every figure on this page is indexed: cyber, technology, infrastructure, Europe.
The Index is the Consortium’s indexing system for risk data. Every indicator, hazard, series and country profile carries its Nexus Standards identifier, its source and its licence, so what this page shows can be traced, corrected and reused.
- 01 · Sources205 registered sourcesEvery value keeps its source and licence; withheld values are counted.Data and licences
- 02 · Nexus StandardsNIS-1 and NHS-1451 indicators, 905 hazards; every record carries a UNI.Nexus Standards
- 03 · The Index54 series, 195 country profilesComputed on the standards; no value is published until an edition is released.The Global Risks Index
- 04 · This pageCybersecurity and Digital ResilienceMaps, figures and feeds read the Index in the context of cyber, technology, infrastructure and Europe.Public API
Series in this context cyber, technology, infrastructure
- GLBGlobal SystemsThe state of interdependent global risk: the twenty domain indices aggregated to the world, the five core systems (water, energy, food, health, biodiversity) and their couplings, the global tail register and the gap…NXS-GRX-AR-000002Infrastructure · Cyber · Technology
- XTEarth observation and space systemsDependency on satellites for navigation, communications and observation; orbital congestion, debris and space-weather exposure.NXS-GRX-AR-000094Space · Technology · Infrastructure
- GSGlobal Cyber and digitalCyber capability and threat exposure, digital dependency, connectivity resilience and the cyber-physical channels into essential services.NXS-GRX-AR-000071Cyber · Technology · Infrastructure
- SRDigital public infrastructureIdentity, payments and data-exchange infrastructure as public goods, and their concentration, cyber and continuity risk.NXS-GRX-AR-000083Cyber · Technology · Infrastructure
Country profiles Europe
Every country profile carries the source and licence of each value. Correct a value or reply
Hazard domains NHS-1
- Space and near-EarthNXS-GRX-AR-000139
- Frontier and exponential technologyNXS-GRX-AR-000146
Geodata and API open
Open layers on an equal-area hexagon grid, shown as densities per km² or as symbols: People · GHSL 2025People · WorldPop 2025Built-up areaPortsAirportsRoadsRailwaysRivers and lake centrelines
/api/v1/public/grix · https://nexustandards.com/uni/{uni}
Developers · Data · Made with Natural Earth, Public domain; GHSL and WorldPop, CC BY 4.0
Snapshot of the Index registries pinned 2026-10-23 · 22c6eed. Research and risk-analytics information: not a rating, an official classification, a warning, a benchmark or advice.
Bring a method, a dataset or a question.
Information and enquiries are open today. An enquiry receives a reference and names the next step; applications, payments, compute allocations and registrations open only when their team, terms and review capacity exist.
Legal documents.
Maps, data and figures on this site are shown for context and general information. They are not advice, forecasts or warnings; the limits of the information are set out in the Disclaimers and Data Notices.