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Climate technology is infrastructure with a measurement problem

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.

6 min read2 figures1 table9 notesNR-XTECH-CLIMATETECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Climate technology is infrastructure with a measurement problem
    1. 1.1 The questions this part answers
    2. 1.2 The argument
    3. 1.3 Twenty couplings between five systems
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Planned storage outruns delivered storage
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is climate technology risk concentrated?
  • Which couplings carry climate technology shocks into other systems?
  • Which climate technology capabilities hold under compound stress?
  • What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Five footprint and governance chapters
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • Scenario
  • Three lenses
  • Portfolio

1.2The argument

Climate technology is usually discussed as a list of devices. The 2026 evidence reads it as infrastructure: plants, ships, wells, solar farms and grids that need power, materials, permits and people, and that are paid for only where rules and prices allow61317.

The climate state sets the stakes. The year 2025 was 1.47 degrees C above pre-industrial, and the remaining budget for 1.5 degrees C was about four years of emissions123.

Clean power is scaling. Solar generation grew 30% in 2025 and fossil generation fell slightly5. Capture and removal are small beside the need: 68 Mtpa of operating capture capacity6, and novel removal of about 2 MtCO2 per year against 2.2 GtCO2 of mostly land-based removal in total1.

The least measured parts are the physical inputs and the outcomes. Energy and water per tonne are not bound here, design capacity is not actual capture6, and registry counts differ by basis121.

Figure 1.1How large is novel carbon removal beside conventional removal? MtCO2 per year

Novel removal is about a thousand times smaller than conventional removal, and it has grown about 40% per year. Biochar and bioenergy with capture and storage account for almost all of it, and only about 20% of planned novel capacity has been built1.

ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
Conventional removal, mostly land based (about)2200
Novel removal, all methods (about)2

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.

Figure ID FIG-XTECH-CLIMATETECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003

2.2GtCO2 per year

total removal, 20251

≈2MtCO2 per year

novel removal, 20251

40%

novel growth per year1

20%

planned novel capacity built1

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The climate technology-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their climate technology content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings between the five systems

Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.

  • Strong
  • Moderate
  • Weak

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT Water·WEAK
hydropower and cooling, undocumented
WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
ENE EnergyMODERATE
cooling and process water for capture plants, not yet quantified
·WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
FOO FoodWEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
·WEAK
no documented link
WEAK
no documented link
HLT HealthWEAK
workforce
WEAK
workforce
WEAK
no documented link
·WEAK
no documented link
BIO BiodiversityWEAK
no documented link
MODERATE
biomass feedstock for bioenergy with capture, reported as a main novel method [1]
WEAK
land competition, undocumented here
WEAK
no documented link
·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    FIN → INF

    Carbon prices and offtake fund capture and storage build-out.

    Reported pricing revenue and removal market1320

  2. 02

    ENE → INF

    Power and heat availability set where capture plants can run.

    Inferred power generation trends5

  3. 03

    INF → CLI

    Capture and storage remove a small share of emissions at present.

    Reported capture capacity and removal inventory61

  4. 04

    DAT → FIN

    Registry and measurement rules decide what is paid for.

    Inferred removal data basis121

  5. 05

    GOV → TRD

    Border pricing links imports to embedded emissions.

    Reported EU carbon border mechanism17

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 6Global CCS Institute (ed.), Global Status of CCS 2026 (status page: 113 commercial CCS projects in operation and 68 Mtpa operating capture capacity as at 31 July 2026; capacity is not the same as actual annual capture). Global CCS Institute, Melbourne. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 13World Bank (ed.), Direct carbon pricing covers nearly one third of global emissions (press release on State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026, 19 May 2026; about 29% coverage; revenue above USD 107 billion in 2025; 87 instruments; average price near USD 21 per tonne). World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 17European Commission (ed.), Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (page; transitional phase 2023 to 2025; definitive period from 1 January 2026; six sectors). Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, Brussels. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 12Copernicus Climate Change Service and ECMWF (eds.), 2025 was the third-warmest year on record (news item, 14 January 2026; 1.47 degrees C above pre-industrial; 2023 to 2025 average above 1.5 degrees C). ECMWF, Reading. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 3Global Carbon Project (ed.), Global Carbon Budget 2025 release (news page dated 13 November 2025; fossil CO2 up 1.1% in 2025; total emissions 42.2 GtCO2; remaining 1.5 degrees C budget 170 GtCO2; CO2 425.7 ppm). Global Carbon Project, Tsukuba. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 5Ember (ed.), Global Electricity Review 2026 (2025 data: solar generation 2,778 TWh, up 636 TWh or 30%; fossil generation down 38 TWh; renewables 33.8% of generation). Ember, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 1Smith, S.M. et al. (eds.), The State of Carbon Dioxide Removal, third edition (report and data portal, 2 June 2026; total removal 2.2 GtCO2 per year; novel removal about 2 MtCO2 per year; pledge gaps of 0.3, 1.2 and 5.2 GtCO2 per year in 2030, 2035 and 2050). Opened as the downloaded PDF. University of Oxford and partners, Oxford. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 21CDR.fyi (ed.), CDR.fyi public dashboard (headline metrics: 50.6 million tonnes contracted, 1.7 million tonnes delivered, weighted average price USD 340 per tonne; no as-of date on the page; dashboard, weak evidence). CDR.fyi, online. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 20Frontier Climate (ed.), Frontier home page (advance market commitment of USD 1.8 billion of permanent carbon removal by 2040; buyer group page, weak evidence for market size). Frontier Climate, San Francisco. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 1: Climate technology is infrastructure with a measurement problem. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Climate Technologies and Carbon Management (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-CLIMATETECH-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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