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Advanced nuclear is firm infrastructure and a delivery test

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.

6 min read2 figures1 table11 notesNR-XTECH-FISSION-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Advanced nuclear is firm infrastructure and a delivery test
    1. 1.1 The questions this part answers
    2. 1.2 The argument
    3. 1.3 Twenty couplings between five systems
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Fuel supply gap while first-of-a-kind units are delayed
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is advanced nuclear risk concentrated?
  • Which couplings carry advanced nuclear shocks into other systems?
  • Which advanced nuclear capabilities hold under compound stress?
  • What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Five footprint and governance chapters
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • Scenario
  • Three lenses
  • Portfolio

1.2The argument

Advanced nuclear is usually discussed as a technology race. The 2026 evidence reads it as two things at once: a physical infrastructure that needs fuel, sites, cooling and waste routes, and a test of how fast a regulated industry can deliver designs that have not yet run commercially1811.

The fleet is the base. In 2025 there were 443 operable reactors with 405,667 MWe, about 9% of world electricity, and 80 reactors under construction1. Next-generation designs are small beside it. Four test reactors reached zero-power criticality by 4 July 2026, and one sodium-cooled power reactor holds a construction permit78.

Policy and licensing are moving. Executive orders of May 2025 set a goal of 400 GW of US capacity by 20503, and the NRC published a final Part 53 rule in 202610. Goals are intentions, not capacity.

Fuel, cost and waste are the least settled parts. HALEU demand is an estimate against a small current supply11, enrichment capacity is concentrated12, recent large units ran far over cost1517, and peer-reviewed studies of small reactors on cost and waste are model-based and contested2527.

Figure 1.1How concentrated is world enrichment capacity? Million SWU a year, 2025

Four operators hold nearly all enrichment capacity, and one holds about 43% of the 2025 total. The China figure is an estimate that assumes enough capacity is built for its own fleet. Capacity is not output12.

ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
Rosatom29.133
Urenco17.3
CNNC (estimate)13.789
Orano7.5
Other (INB, JNFL)0.355

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2025.

Figure ID FIG-XTECH-FISSION-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003

68.076million SWU

world capacity, 202512

42.8%

Rosatom share, derived12

77.784million SWU

projected capacity, 203012

2024August

start of the US ban on Russian low-enriched uranium12

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The advanced nuclear-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their advanced nuclear content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings between the five systems

Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.

  • Strong
  • Moderate
  • Weak

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT Water·WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link
ENE EnergyWEAK
reactor cooling, not quantified		·WEAK
process heat, undocumented		WEAK
isotope supply, undocumented		WEAK
no documented link
FOO FoodWEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		·WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link
HLT HealthWEAK
no documented link		WEAK
workforce		WEAK
no documented link		·WEAK
no documented link
BIO BiodiversityWEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		WEAK
no documented link		·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    TRD → MIN → ENE

    Concentrated enrichment and fuel supply limit new reactor fuel.

    Reported enrichment table and HALEU page1112

  2. 02

    FIN → INF

    Cost overruns and financing terms set the pace of construction.

    Reported Vogtle and Hinkley Point C records1517

  3. 03

    GOV → INF

    Licensing frameworks and goals shape what is permitted and built.

    Reported Part 53 and executive orders310

  4. 04

    INF → ENE

    Delivered units add firm capacity only after first power.

    Inferred fleet and construction counts1

  5. 05

    ENE → WAT

    Siting and cooling tie plants to water sources.

    Inferred not quantified in sources opened

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 1World Nuclear Association (ed.), Nuclear Power in the World Today (information library page; 443 operable reactors, 405,667 MWe net, about 9% of world electricity, 80 under construction with 87,813 MWe gross; electricity data for 2025). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 8US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (ed.), NRC Issues Construction Permit for TerraPower’s Natrium Advanced Reactor (article, 9 March 2026; 345 MWe sodium-cooled fast reactor, storage lifts output to 500 MW; Kemmerer Unit 1, Wyoming; operating licence separate). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 11US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (ed.), What is high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU)? (article of 3 December 2024; enrichment 5% to less than 20% U-235; demand could reach 50 metric tons a year by 2035; Piketon more than 100 kg enriched). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 7US Department of Energy (ed.), Department of Energy Celebrates Fourth Criticality Ahead of July 4th Goal (press release, 6 July 2026; Aalo-X, Mark-0, Ward 250 and Unity; zero-power fueled criticality; agency announcement). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 3The White House (ed.), Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Executive Order 14300, 23 May 2025 (goal of 400 GW by 2050 from about 100 GW in 2024; 18-month limit for new reactor decisions; 1-year limit for continued operation). The White House, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 10US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (ed.), 10 CFR Part 53 rulemaking page (final rule 91 FR 15696; risk-informed, performance-based, technology-inclusive framework; background in NEIMA and the ADVANCE Act). US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 12World Nuclear Association (ed.), Uranium Enrichment (information library page; capacity table from the WNA Nuclear Fuel Report 2025: 68.076 million SWU in 2025, Rosatom 29.133, Urenco 17.300, CNNC 13.789 estimated, Orano 7.500; US ban on Russian low-enriched uranium from August 2024). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 15World Nuclear Association (ed.), Nuclear Power in the USA (country profile; 94 operable reactors, 96,952 MWe; Vogtle 3 and 4 cost estimates; Kemmerer permit March 2026; Clinch River construction licence September 2026; Palisades and Crane restart status; page states three reactors critical by July 2026). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 17World Nuclear Association (ed.), Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom (country profile, first 100,000 characters read; Rolls-Royce SMR delivery contract April 2026 for three Wylfa units with up to GBP 599 million loan financing; Hinkley Point C GBP 35 billion in 2015 prices, February 2026; Sizewell C). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 25Steigerwald, B., Weibezahn, J., Slowik, M. and von Hirschhausen, C., Uncertainties in estimating production costs of future nuclear technologies: a model-based analysis of small modular reactors, Energy 281, 128204, 2023 (abstract page read). Elsevier, Amsterdam. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 27Krall, L.M., Macfarlane, A.M. and Ewing, R.C., Nuclear waste from small modular reactors, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119(23), e2111833119, 2022 (open-access full text, abstract and conclusions read; waste volume factors of 2 to 30; three designs). National Academy of Sciences, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 1: Advanced nuclear is firm infrastructure and a delivery test. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Advanced Nuclear and Next-Generation Fission (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-FISSION-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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