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Risks and capability

Four advanced nuclear risk objects open the portfolio. Order carries no rank. Each is read across driver, exposure, vulnerability, capacity, cascade and consequence.

5 min read0 figures1 table15 notesNR-XTECH-FISSION-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Advanced nuclear is firm infrastructure and a delivery test
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
    1. 4.1 Risk objects
    2. 4.2 Capability ladder
  7. 5Fuel supply gap while first-of-a-kind units are delayed
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

4.1Risk objects

Each risk is read across the chain from hazard to consequence, with its status and evidence-quality level.

  1. InferredEQL 4RSK-XT15-MIN-001

    Fuel supply chokepoint

    Driver
    HALEU demand estimates and concentrated enrichment1112
    Exposure
    designs that need HALEU; reactor developers
    Vulnerability
    few suppliers; restrictions on Russian imports
    Capacity
    Piketon output and recovery of existing material11
    Cascade
    MIN → ENE → FIN
    Horizon
    1 to 5 years

  2. InferredEQL 4RSK-XT15-FIN-002

    First-of-a-kind cost and delay

    Driver
    cost and schedule records of recent large units151720
    Exposure
    owners, ratepayers and lenders
    Vulnerability
    fixed-price assumptions that rest on modelled costs25
    Capacity
    standardised design and repeat builds
    Cascade
    FIN → INF → ENE
    Horizon
    1 to 10 years

  3. InferredEQL 3RSK-XT15-WAS-003

    Waste and disposal readiness

    Driver
    waste volumes and fuel chemistry of new designs27
    Exposure
    storage sites and repository programmes
    Vulnerability
    long repository lead times22
    Capacity
    first operating licence for used-fuel disposal in Finland21
    Cascade
    WAS → GOV → FIN
    Horizon
    5 to 10 years

  4. Expert inputEQL 3RSK-XT15-GOV-004

    Goals outrun delivery

    Driver
    capacity goals and licensing deadlines34
    Exposure
    planning assumptions of grid operators and governments
    Vulnerability
    dependence on a few first units
    Capacity
    licensing reform and demonstration programmes710
    Cascade
    GOV → INF → ENE
    Horizon
    1 to 10 years

4.2Capability ladder

Existence is not readiness. Each of the fifteen capability functions is placed on the ladder by the strongest public evidence for advanced nuclear at the global level.

Table 4.1Capabilities on the ladder of evidence: listed, exists, demonstrated, tested
FunctionRungLevelStrongest public evidence at baseline
Prevention and mitigationEXISTSlicensing frameworks and a technology-inclusive rule published10
Monitoring and observationLISTEDno common tracker of delivered units against announced schedules
Early warningLISTEDno consolidated warning of fuel supply shortfalls
Preparedness and planningEXISTSnational goals and demonstration programmes37
Redundancy and reservesLISTEDHALEU and enrichment reserves are not documented11
ResponseLISTEDno tested response to a fuel supply interruption
Continuity of critical servicesLISTEDnot applicable to advanced units at baseline
RecoveryLISTEDnot applicable at baseline; no event to recover from
AdaptationLISTEDdesign change across first-of-a-kind units is not reported
Social protectionLISTEDnot applicable at baseline
Finance and insuranceLISTEDpublic support reported for individual projects; no consolidated figure817
Institutional coordinationEXISTSregulators, agencies and executive orders3410
Technical infrastructureEXISTSa large operating fleet and a first non-light-water construction permit18
WorkforceLISTEDskills gaps are likely but no figure was bound
Research capacityADEQUATEnational laboratories and peer-reviewed studies2527
A capability listed in policy is not a tested one; each rung is the strongest public evidence at baseline.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 11US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (ed.), What is high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU)? (article of 3 December 2024; enrichment 5% to less than 20% U-235; demand could reach 50 metric tons a year by 2035; Piketon more than 100 kg enriched). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 12World Nuclear Association (ed.), Uranium Enrichment (information library page; capacity table from the WNA Nuclear Fuel Report 2025: 68.076 million SWU in 2025, Rosatom 29.133, Urenco 17.300, CNNC 13.789 estimated, Orano 7.500; US ban on Russian low-enriched uranium from August 2024). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 15World Nuclear Association (ed.), Nuclear Power in the USA (country profile; 94 operable reactors, 96,952 MWe; Vogtle 3 and 4 cost estimates; Kemmerer permit March 2026; Clinch River construction licence September 2026; Palisades and Crane restart status; page states three reactors critical by July 2026). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 17World Nuclear Association (ed.), Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom (country profile, first 100,000 characters read; Rolls-Royce SMR delivery contract April 2026 for three Wylfa units with up to GBP 599 million loan financing; Hinkley Point C GBP 35 billion in 2015 prices, February 2026; Sizewell C). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 20World Nuclear Association (ed.), Nuclear Power in France (country profile, first 100,000 characters read; 57 operable reactors; EPR2 six units, EUR 72.8 billion estimate of December 2025; Flamanville 3 grid connection December 2024, EUR 13.2 billion estimate of December 2022). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 25Steigerwald, B., Weibezahn, J., Slowik, M. and von Hirschhausen, C., Uncertainties in estimating production costs of future nuclear technologies: a model-based analysis of small modular reactors, Energy 281, 128204, 2023 (abstract page read). Elsevier, Amsterdam. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 27Krall, L.M., Macfarlane, A.M. and Ewing, R.C., Nuclear waste from small modular reactors, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119(23), e2111833119, 2022 (open-access full text, abstract and conclusions read; waste volume factors of 2 to 30; three designs). National Academy of Sciences, Washington. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 22World Nuclear Association (ed.), Storage and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (information library page; Finland, Sweden, France and US repository milestones; Cigéo commissioning planned for 2050; Yucca Mountain suspended). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 21POST-CLOSE, context only: World Nuclear Association (ed.), Nuclear Power in Finland (country profile; Olkiluoto 3 contract of EUR 3.2 billion for mid-2009, regular production April 2023; Onkalo operating licence granted October 2026 valid to the end of 2070, after the 30 September evidence close). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 3The White House (ed.), Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Executive Order 14300, 23 May 2025 (goal of 400 GW by 2050 from about 100 GW in 2024; 18-month limit for new reactor decisions; 1-year limit for continued operation). The White House, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 4The White House (ed.), Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base, Executive Order 14302, 23 May 2025 (5 GW of uprates; 10 new large reactors with complete designs under construction by 2030; fuel, enrichment and spent fuel directions). The White House, Washington. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 7US Department of Energy (ed.), Department of Energy Celebrates Fourth Criticality Ahead of July 4th Goal (press release, 6 July 2026; Aalo-X, Mark-0, Ward 250 and Unity; zero-power fueled criticality; agency announcement). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 10US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (ed.), 10 CFR Part 53 rulemaking page (final rule 91 FR 15696; risk-informed, performance-based, technology-inclusive framework; background in NEIMA and the ADVANCE Act). US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 8US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (ed.), NRC Issues Construction Permit for TerraPower’s Natrium Advanced Reactor (article, 9 March 2026; 345 MWe sodium-cooled fast reactor, storage lifts output to 500 MW; Kemmerer Unit 1, Wyoming; operating licence separate). US Department of Energy, Washington. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 1World Nuclear Association (ed.), Nuclear Power in the World Today (information library page; 443 operable reactors, 405,667 MWe net, about 9% of world electricity, 80 under construction with 87,813 MWe gross; electricity data for 2025). World Nuclear Association, London. Observation year 2025. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 4: Risks and capability. In Exponential Technology Report 2026: Advanced Nuclear and Next-Generation Fission (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-XTECH-FISSION-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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