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Infrastructure is what the other systems travel on

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It ranks no country or operator and assesses no authority.

6 min read2 figures1 table15 notesNR-SECTOR-INFRASTRUCTURE-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1Infrastructure is what the other systems travel on
    1. 1.1 The questions this part answers
    2. 1.2 The argument
    3. 1.3 Twenty couplings between five systems
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Chokepoint closure with port downtime and a cyber incident
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is infrastructure and logistics risk concentrated?
  • Which couplings carry infrastructure and logistics shocks into other systems?
  • Which infrastructure and logistics capabilities hold under compound stress?
  • What must 2027 evidence measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Five coupling chapters
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • Scenario
  • Three lenses
  • Portfolio

1.2The argument

Infrastructure is usually reported as assets: ports, roads, rail, cables. The 2026 evidence reads it as the route by which almost every other system’s shock arrives. Fuel, fertiliser, food, medicines and data all move on networks whose failure is felt downstream21014.

The load is growing and the routes are lengthening. Seaborne trade reached 12,720 million tons in 2024 and the average haul grew by about 9% from 20181. Container ports handled 913 million TEU6. Infrastructure also shapes the Sustainable Development Goals: it influences 72% of the targets19.

Chokepoints are the sharpest pressure. Daily transits through the Strait of Hormuz fell by 97% in early March 20262, while Suez tonnage stayed 70% below its 2023 average in 20251. Neither is a container story first: Hormuz carried an estimated 3% of container trade and 38% of crude oil volumes2.

Hazards and neglect are the slower risk. About 27% of road and rail assets are exposed to a hazard15, most ports face several17, and the Key Bridge collapse showed how a missing vulnerability assessment can turn one failure into many22. The investment evidence is dated, and the 2017 outlook is the latest global need estimate found21.

Figure 1.1How exposed are the world’s transport assets? Share exposed to hazards (%)

Exposure is common and loss is concentrated. Global expected damage to road and rail is small against world output at about 0.02% of GDP, but in some countries it reaches 0.5 to 1% of GDP a year, the same order as national transport budgets15. Small island economies carry the highest trade risk at ports1718.

ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
Ports exposed to more than three hazards86
Road and rail assets exposed to at least one hazard27
Road and rail assets exposed to a 1-in-100-year flood7.5

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2023.

Figure ID FIG-SECTOR-INFRASTRUCTURE-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE-01-003

3.1 to 22USD billion

expected annual damage to road and rail15

7.5USD billion

port-specific risk a year, multi-hazard17

63.1USD billion

trade at risk a year, multi-hazard17

81USD billion

trade at risk a year, climate-related downtime16

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The infrastructure and logistics-centred matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems, read for their infrastructure and logistics content. Strengths are Nexus estimates (ESTIMATED) from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the graph that 2027 evidence will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings between the five systems

Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.

  • Strong
  • Moderate
  • Weak

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT Water·STRONG
river and canal freight of fuel · cooling		MODERATE
inland freight of grain		WEAK
services at stations and ports		MODERATE
dredging · canal works
ENE EnergyMODERATE
pumping · lock operation		·STRONG
haulage fuel · cold chain power		STRONG
fuel and power for clinics and ambulances		WEAK
fuel spills · port emissions
FOO FoodWEAK
freight on waterways		WEAK
biofuel shipping		·MODERATE
shared cold chain and roads		WEAK
land for corridors
HLT HealthWEAK
workforce		WEAK
workforce		WEAK
labour		·WEAK
waste
BIO BiodiversityWEAK
siltation		WEAK
biomass freight		MODERATE
pests carried by trade		MODERATE
pathogens along routes		·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    ENE → FOO

    Fuel and fertiliser freight is interrupted at a chokepoint and reaches farms and food prices.

    Reported 2026 Hormuz disruption23

  2. 02

    CLI → INF → TRD

    Storms and heat close ports and routes, and delay trade.

    Reported port downtime studies1617

  3. 03

    INF → HLT

    A failed link cuts access to care and supplies, and crashes injure people.

    Reported Key Bridge 202422; road deaths11

  4. 04

    TRD → FIN

    A chokepoint closure lifts freight, fuel and insurance costs for importers.

    Reported 2026 bunker and war-risk costs2

  5. 05

    DAT → INF

    A cyber incident halts operations at ports, rail or airlines.

    Reported 2021 to 2022 incidents23

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 2UNCTAD (ed.), Strait of Hormuz Disruptions: Implications for Global Trade and Development, rapid analysis dated 10 March 2026, from Clarksons Research, EIA, LSEG, Kpler and other data. UN Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  2. 10ITU (ed.), Measuring digital development: Facts and Figures 2026 (publication page with key findings). International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  3. 14Hallegatte, S., Rentschler, J. and Rozenberg, J., Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity. World Bank, Washington, 2019 (full report PDF). Observation year 2019 (analysis of earlier data). Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  4. 1UNCTAD (ed.), Review of Maritime Transport 2025: Staying the course in turbulent waters (full report and overview). UN Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  5. 6DATA VINTAGE AFTER CLOSE: World Bank (ed.), World Development Indicators, container port traffic (TEU), series IS.SHP.GOOD.TU, API read, database last updated 2026-10-08. World Bank, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  6. 19Thacker, S. et al., Infrastructure for sustainable development, Nature Sustainability 2, 324 to 331, 2019 (abstract opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  7. 15Koks, E.E. et al., A global multi-hazard risk analysis of road and railway infrastructure assets, Nature Communications 10, 2677, 2019 (abstract via Crossref). Springer Nature. Observation year 2019. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  8. 17Verschuur, J., Koks, E.E., Hall, J.W. et al., Multi-hazard risk to global port infrastructure and resulting trade and logistics losses, Communications Earth and Environment 4, 2023 (abstract opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  9. 22NTSB (ed.), Contact of Containership Dali with Francis Scott Key Bridge and Subsequent Bridge Collapse, investigation page with probable cause and recommendations. National Transportation Safety Board, Washington. Observation year 2024. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  10. 21Global Infrastructure Hub (ed.), Global Infrastructure Outlook, press release of 25 July 2017 (USD 94 trillion need to 2040, USD 97 trillion with SDG access targets, USD 18 trillion unfunded). Global Infrastructure Hub, Sydney. Observation year 2017. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  11. 18Verschuur, J., Koks, E.E. and Hall, J.W., Ports’ criticality in international trade and global supply-chains, Nature Communications 13, 2022 (abstract opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  12. 16Verschuur, J., Koks, E.E. and Hall, J.W., Systemic risks from climate-related disruptions at ports, Nature Climate Change 13, 804 to 806, 2023 (abstract and introduction opened). Springer Nature. Observation year 2023. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  13. 3UNCTAD (ed.), Hormuz shipping disruptions raise risks for energy, fertilisers and vulnerable economies, media alert UNCTAD/PRESS/MA/2026/003, Geneva, 10 March 2026. UN Trade and Development, Geneva. Observation year 2026. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  14. 11WHO (ed.), Global status report on road safety 2023, Geneva, 13 December 2023 (publication page). World Health Organization, Geneva. Observation year 2021. Accessed 2026-11-03.back
  15. 23ENISA (ed.), ENISA Transport Threat Landscape, March 2023 (publication page and report PDF; incidents January 2021 to October 2022). European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Athens. Observation year 2022. Accessed 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 1: Infrastructure is what the other systems travel on. In Global Infrastructure and Logistics Risk and Resilience Report 2026: Baseline Edition, The State of the World’s Infrastructure, Transport and Logistics. (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-SECTOR-INFRASTRUCTURE-GLOBAL-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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