GCRI · Teknolojiyên kuantûmê
Krîptografiya piştî kuantûmê
Post-quantum cryptography replaces public-key algorithms that a future quantum computer could break with new classical algorithms designed to resist it. NIST has published standards, protocols are being updated, and organisations face a long migration across software, hardware and certificates. This page sets out the new algorithms, how migration is planned and measured, and what evidence serves the organisations and agencies carrying it out.
Post quantum cryptography on the record.
Post quantum cryptography: how the risk develops.
Transition security and algorithm standards. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
New hard problems
Post-quantum algorithms rely on mathematical problems, such as those on lattices or hash functions, for which no efficient quantum attack is known.
Larger keys and signatures
Many post-quantum schemes use larger keys or signatures than current ones, affecting bandwidth, storage and constrained devices.
Hybrid modes hedge risk
Combining a classical and a post-quantum algorithm keeps security if one is later broken, a common choice during transition.
Agility eases future change
Pergal designed to swap algorithms easily reduce the cost of this migration and the next one.
Şopînerê koçberiya piştî kuantûmê.
The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.
Şopînerê koçberiya piştî kuantûmê
Post quantum cryptography · Crypto inventory · Wave 3
Koçberî
- Envanterhemû krîpto
- Pêşîn biketemenê daneyê
- Hilbijêrealgorîtmayên standard
- Bicihkirina hîbrîdklasîk û PQC
- Ceribandinhevgirtî
- Veguhestinteqawît bike
Pergal li gorî pêşînî
| Îmzekirina arşîvê | RSA-2048 | 29 | ML-DSA hîbrîd | Pilotkirin |
| Dergehê VPN | ECDH | 8 | ML-KEM hîbrîd | Plankirî |
| HSM ya dayînê | RSA-3072 | 11 | Nexşeya rê ya pêşkêşker | Hatiye asteng kirin |
| Web TLS | ECDHE | 2 | Danûstendina kilîtan a hîbrîd | Qediya |
Pêşveçûn
Every domain that keeps secrets for decades must migrate.
- TenduristîGirêdanPatient data has long confidentiality lifetimes.What to watchInventory of vulnerable algorithms
- EnerjîGirêdanLong-lived grid devices need upgradable cryptography.What to watchCrypto-agility of devices
- XwarinGirêdanTrade and payment systems rely on public-key infrastructure.What to watchPKI migration plans
Migration findings are designed for the Foresight Outlook series. NIST published FIPS 203, 204 and 205 in 2024 and selected HQC as an additional algorithm in 2025.
- Inventory and migration lessons.
- Interoperability test results.
How post quantum cryptography is modelled, measured and tested.
Model, texmînên wî, daneyên wî û nediyariya wî, bi şeweyê ku zanyar an endezyar kontrol bike. Avahî rêbazên weşandî dişopînin. Nirxên hatine xêzkirin nimûneyî ne, ne encam in.
Modela pergalê
The couplings between the systems in post quantum cryptography: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
What is measured, and how well.
Each indicator carries its unit, its cadence, the kind of source behind it and the evidence label a value would carry. No values are shown: a programme supplies them under its own authority.
| Indicator | Unit | Cadence | Source type | Nîşan |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Standardised post-quantum algorithms | count | per standard release | NIST and other standards bodies | Statîstîkên weşandî |
| Protocols with post-quantum support specified | count | per assessment | IETF and other standards | Statîstîkên weşandî |
| Web traffic using post-quantum key agreement | percent of connections | monthly | Network measurements | ÇAVDÊRÎKIRÎ |
| Organisations with migration plans | percent of surveyed organisations | per survey | Surveys | REPORTED |
| Cryptanalysis results against candidate schemes | count of significant attacks | per review | Cryptographic literature | REPORTED |
| Validated implementations | count | annual | Cryptographic module validation lists | Statîstîkên weşandî |
Where the evidence comes from.
Named public datasets and institutional records, each with its licence class. Sources by agreement are used only under their terms and never republished.
| Çavkanî | What it gives | Licence class |
|---|---|---|
| NIST post-quantum cryptography project and FIPS 203, 204 and 205 | Standards, documentation and additional selections | Public domain, US government |
| IETF post-quantum and hybrid protocol work | Integration into TLS, SSH and other protocols | Open, IETF Trust terms |
| National cyber agency migration guidance | Timelines and priorities | Public, terms per agency |
| Open Quantum Safe project | Open-source implementations for testing | Open source, MIT licence |
| Cloudflare Radar and similar measurements | Adoption in web traffic | Public, terms per provider (to check) |
Who decides, and what the evidence serves.
Quantum Technologies prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| Kî biryarê dide | The question | Evidence this page serves |
|---|---|---|
| Organisations and security teams | Kîjan pergalan to migrate first and how | Planning guides; performance comparisons |
| Standards bodies | Which algorithms and parameters to standardise | Cryptanalysis evidence |
| Vendors | When and how to ship post-quantum support | Adoption and protocol evidence |
Outputs this topic produces
- Migration planning guides with inventory and prioritisation steps
- Performance comparisons of standard algorithms
- Adoption tracking summaries
- Evidence notes on cryptanalysis of new schemes
What experts ask.
Migration questions start with an inventory.
- Where does an organisation use public-key cryptography, in which pergalan, protocols, devices and suppliers?
- Which data must remain confidential long enough to be at risk from future decryption?
- Which post-quantum algorithms are standardised, and what are their performance and size trade-offs?
- Should systems combine classical and post-quantum algorithms during the transition?
- Can systems change algorithms easily in future, a property known as crypto-agility?
Mechanisms and drivers.
Today’s public-key cryptography rests on mathematical problems, such as factoring large numbers, that are hard for classical computers but could be solved efficiently by a large quantum computer running known algorithms. Symmetric encryption and hash functions are much less affected and can be strengthened by using longer keys. The urgent problem is therefore key exchange and digital signatures.
Two pressures drive timing. The harvest-now, decrypt-later threat means confidential data intercepted today could be read once a capable machine exists. Migration time is long: cryptography is embedded in hardware, firmware, protocols and supply chains, and some devices stay in service for decades. If the time data must stay secret plus the time migration takes exceeds the time until a capable quantum computer exists, data is already at risk.
How it is studied, and where the methods stop.
| Method or data | What it shows | Sînor |
|---|---|---|
| Cryptographic inventory and discovery tools | Where vulnerable algorithms are used | Embedded and third-party cryptography is easily missed |
| Cryptanalysis of candidate algorithms | Confidence in algorithm security | New algorithms have less analysis history; some candidates were broken during evaluation |
| Performance and interoperability testing | Key sizes, speed and protocol fit | Results vary with hardware and implementation |
| Risk-based migration planning | Priorities by data lifetime and system criticality | Depends on uncertain quantum timelines |
How it is studied, and what the methods cannot say.
- 01Ewlehiya sîber û kriptografîCryptographic inventory · Migration prioritisation · QKD implementation reviewApplied here
- 02Hesabkirina kuantûmê, hestkirin û ragihandinComparable benchmarking · Technology readiness assessment · Security implications trackingApplied here
- 03Îhtîmal û statîstîkFidelity estimation · Testing advantage claims · Analysing patent and investment dataApplied here
Where this page’s references lead.
Sazî û belgeyên ku ev rûpel li hember wan tê xwendin. Rewş û çap diguherin; her girêdan diçe ba saziya derxistinê.
Ev rûpel li ser Konsorsiyûmê te ber bi kû ve dibe.
Pirs û bersiv.
What did NIST standardise?
Is post-quantum cryptography quantum technology?
Why use hybrid schemes?
Do we need quantum computers to use post-quantum cryptography?
What is a hybrid approach?
Is the platform’s Universe mission theme on migration readiness active?
Ji vê rûpelê delîl bidin.
rêzeya Pergalên Stratejîk is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
- E-nameDergeh GW-GCRIJi vê rûpelê bişîninDelîl, rastkirin, doz, rêbaz, nirxandin, wergerandin an têketina profîlê. Bi nîşana vê rûpelê digihîje, ji ber vê yekê edîtorê xwediyê wê wê bistîne.
- ZenodoDepoya vekirîWê razînin û ji civakê re bişîninTomara xwe li Zenodo bi ORCID iD ya xwe biweşînin, paşê wê li wir ji civaka Reports re bişînin. Kurator wê vedikolin; DOI ya we dimîne.
- rêzeya Pergalên StratejîkGCRIHemû rêyên beşdariyê bibîneCureyên beşdariyê, her yek çawa tê nirxandin, tu çi navlêkirinê distînî, lîsans û tiştê ku qet nayê qebûlkirin.
Tu carî daneyên şexsî, hûrgiliyên binesaza hesas an tiştekî ku mafê we yê parvekirinê tune ne neşînin. Beşdarî berî bikaranînê tê nirxandin; şandina wê nivîskarî an mafên edîtorî nade û sponsorî tu carî encamekê nakire.
Rêbazek, danehevek an pirsek bîne.
Agahî û pirs îro vekirî ne. Pirsek referansekê distîne û gava piştî wê dide nasîn; serlêdan, drav, veqetandina hesabkirinê û tomarkirin tenê dema ku tîm, mercên wê û kapasîteya vekolînê hebin vedibin.
Belgeyên hiqûqî.
Nexşe, dane û jimarên vê malperê ji bo çarçoveyê û agahiyên giştî têne nîşandan. Ew ne şîret, ne pêşbînî û ne hişyarî ne; sînorên agahiyê di Daxuyaniyên Berpirsiyariyê û Daxuyaniyên Daneyê de hatine diyarkirin.