GCRI · 量子技术
后量子密码学
Post-quantum cryptography replaces public-key algorithms that a future quantum computer could break with new classical algorithms designed to resist it. NIST has published standards, protocols are being updated, and organisations face a long migration across software, hardware and certificates. This page sets out the new algorithms, how migration is planned and measured, and what evidence serves the organisations and agencies carrying it out.
Post quantum cryptography: how the risk develops.
Transition security and algorithm standards. The dossier below sets out how the risk develops, what is measured, where the data come from, how it is modelled and who decides.
New hard problems
Post-quantum algorithms rely on mathematical problems, such as those on lattices or hash functions, for which no efficient quantum attack is known.
Larger keys and signatures
Many post-quantum schemes use larger keys or signatures than current ones, affecting bandwidth, storage and constrained devices.
Hybrid modes hedge risk
Combining a classical and a post-quantum algorithm keeps security if one is later broken, a common choice during transition.
Agility eases future change
系统 designed to swap algorithms easily reduce the cost of this migration and the next one.
后量子迁移追踪器。
团队跟踪该主题时会使用的界面：其指标、状态与决策。名称为示例，数值仅作示意。
后量子迁移跟踪器
Post quantum cryptography · Crypto inventory · Wave 3
移民
- 清单所有加密算法
- 确定优先次序数据寿命
- 选择标准算法
- 混合部署经典算法与后量子密码
- 检验互操作性
- 切换退役
按优先级排列的系统
| 存档签名 | RSA-2048 | 29 | ML-DSA 混合 | 试点 |
| VPN 网关 | ECDH | 8 | ML-KEM 混合方案 | 已计划 |
| 支付 HSM | RSA-3072 | 11 | 供应商路线图 | 已阻止 |
| Web TLS | ECDHE | 2 | 混合密钥交换 | 已完成 |
进度
Every domain that keeps secrets for decades must migrate.
Migration findings are designed for the 前瞻展望系列. NIST published FIPS 203, 204 and 205 in 2024 and selected HQC as an additional algorithm in 2025.
- Inventory and migration lessons.
- Interoperability test results.
How post quantum cryptography is modelled, measured and tested.
模型、其假设、数据和不确定性，以科学家或工程师会核查的形式呈现。结构遵循已发表的方法。所取数值仅为示意，不是研究发现。
系统模型
The couplings between the systems in post quantum cryptography: signs of influence, a reinforcing and a balancing loop, and cross-links where stress jumps.
衡量什么，以及衡量得如何。
每个指标都注明其单位、频率、背后的来源类型以及数值将附带的证据标签。此处不显示数值：数值由计划依据其自身权限提供。
| 指标 | 单位 | 节奏 | 来源类型 | 标签 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Standardised post-quantum algorithms | 计数 | per standard release | NIST and other standards bodies | 已发布统计 |
| Protocols with post-quantum support specified | 计数 | 每次评估 | IETF and other standards | 已发布统计 |
| Web traffic using post-quantum key agreement | percent of connections | 每月 | Network measurements | 观测 |
| Organisations with migration plans | percent of surveyed organisations | per survey | Surveys | 已报告 |
| Cryptanalysis results against candidate schemes | count of significant attacks | 每次审查 | Cryptographic literature | 已报告 |
| Validated implementations | 计数 | 年度 | Cryptographic module validation lists | 已发布统计 |
证据来自何处。
具名公共数据集与机构记录，各自注明许可类别。依协议获得的来源仅按其条款使用，绝不再次发布。
| 来源 | 它提供什么 | 许可类别 |
|---|---|---|
| NIST post-quantum cryptography project and FIPS 203, 204 and 205 | Standards, documentation and additional selections | Public domain, US government |
| IETF post-quantum and hybrid protocol work | Integration into TLS, SSH and other protocols | Open, IETF Trust terms |
| National cyber agency migration guidance | Timelines and priorities | Public, terms per agency |
| Open Quantum Safe project | Open-source implementations for testing | Open source, MIT licence |
| Cloudflare Radar and similar measurements | Adoption in web traffic | Public, terms per provider (to check) |
由谁决定，以及证据服务于什么。
Quantum Technologies prepares evidence. The decisions below are taken by the authorities named, under their own rules, and never by the platform.
| 谁来决定 | 问题 | 本页面服务的证据 |
|---|---|---|
| Organisations and security teams | 哪些 系统 to migrate first and how | Planning guides; performance comparisons |
| 标准机构 | Which algorithms and parameters to standardise | Cryptanalysis evidence |
| Vendors | When and how to ship post-quantum support | Adoption and protocol evidence |
该主题产生的产出
- Migration planning guides with inventory and prioritisation steps
- Performance comparisons of standard algorithms
- Adoption tracking summaries
- Evidence notes on cryptanalysis of new schemes
专家提出的问题。
Migration questions start with an inventory.
- Where does an organisation use public-key cryptography, in which 系统, protocols, devices and suppliers?
- Which data must remain confidential long enough to be at risk from future decryption?
- Which post-quantum algorithms are standardised, and what are their performance and size trade-offs?
- Should systems combine classical and post-quantum algorithms during the transition?
- Can systems change algorithms easily in future, a property known as crypto-agility?
机制与驱动因素。
Today’s public-key cryptography rests on mathematical problems, such as factoring large numbers, that are hard for classical computers but could be solved efficiently by a large quantum computer running known algorithms. Symmetric encryption and hash functions are much less affected and can be strengthened by using longer keys. The urgent problem is therefore key exchange and digital signatures.
Two pressures drive timing. The harvest-now, decrypt-later threat means confidential data intercepted today could be read once a capable machine exists. Migration time is long: cryptography is embedded in hardware, firmware, protocols and supply chains, and some devices stay in service for decades. If the time data must stay secret plus the time migration takes exceeds the time until a capable quantum computer exists, data is already at risk.
如何研究，以及方法止于何处。
| 方法或数据 | 显示内容 | 局限 |
|---|---|---|
| Cryptographic inventory and discovery tools | Where vulnerable algorithms are used | Embedded and third-party cryptography is easily missed |
| Cryptanalysis of candidate algorithms | Confidence in algorithm security | New algorithms have less analysis history; some candidates were broken during evaluation |
| Performance and interoperability testing | Key sizes, speed and protocol fit | Results vary with hardware and implementation |
| Risk-based migration planning | Priorities by data lifetime and system criticality | Depends on uncertain quantum timelines |
Where this page’s references lead.
阅读本页时所对照的机构和文件。状态和版本会变化；每个链接都指向发布机构。
问题与解答。
What did NIST standardise?
Is post-quantum cryptography quantum technology?
Why use hybrid schemes?
Do we need quantum computers to use post-quantum cryptography?
What is a hybrid approach?
Is the platform’s Universe mission theme on migration readiness active?
从本页贡献证据。
报告 is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.
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法律文件。
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