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GCRI · バイオテクノロジーとバイオセキュリティ

デュアルユースと倫理

Much life sciences research is dual use: knowledge, materials and technologies developed for beneficial purposes could also be misused to cause harm. This topic, studied at Biotechnology and Biosecurity, a platform of The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), examines how research of concern is identified, how responsibility is shared between researchers, institutions, funders and publishers, and how concerns are escalated, alongside the wider ethical questions biotechnology raises.

02中核となる問い

専門家が問うこと。

  • How can research of concern be identified early, without discouraging beneficial science?
  • What responsibilities do researchers, institutions, funders and publishers each hold?
  • How should concerns be raised and escalated, and how are those who raise them protected?
  • How should the publication of sensitive findings be handled?
  • How do ethical questions of consent, equity and benefit sharing apply to biotechnology?
03監視

監督と能力の登録簿。

このテーマを追跡するためにチームが使う画面:その指標、状態、決定。名前は例であり、値はイメージです。

監督と能力の登録簿

Dual use and ethics · National committee · Review year 2

  • 委員会を持つ機関、%
    61注視
  • 研修を受けた職員、%
    64平常
  • 完了したレビュー
    55今年
  • 提出されたインシデント報告
    13情報
能力と監督のみGCRI・バイオテクノロジーとバイオセキュリティ

機関の監督

機関 A有効Q487現行
研究キャンパス有効Q482監査期限
バイオ製造拠点形成中なし46支援
診断ネットワーク有効Q381現行

範囲の説明

対象
ガバナンス、研修、審査体制
対象外
技術的手法とエージェント
権限
国の監督機関
ラベル
SURVEY
Oversight and capacity register: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Dual use and ethics.例示の名称と説明用の値です。設計であり、記録でも稼働中のシステムでもありません。
04分野を横断して

Dual-use governance applies wherever life-science research touches the domains.

Governance analyses are designed for the Exponential Technology series. The WHO framework (2022) and the Biological Weapons Convention set the frame; GCRI publishes governance analysis, never methods of concern.

  • Governance comparisons.
  • Ethics review lessons.
05手法とエビデンス

How dual use and ethics is modelled, measured and tested.

モデル、その仮定、データ、不確実性を、科学者やエンジニアが確認する形で示します。構造は公表された手法に従っています。描かれた値は例示であり、知見ではありません。

不確実性の幅

How far the outlook for dual use and ethics could spread, shown as ranges rather than a single line.

現在+5+10+15+20+25+30 y高低可能性が非常に高い範囲可能性が高い範囲
中央推定値
アンサンブルの中央値
範囲
IPCC の較正された表現における「可能性が高い」と「可能性が非常に高い」
アンサンブル
メンバー、シナリオ、初期条件を明示
あわせて読む
各入力に対する結果の感度
指標スケール上の説明用アンサンブルの広がりで、形式は IPCC の不確実性ガイダンスに従っています。予測ではありません。
FAIR 原則・GO FAIR と FORCE11W3C PROV・World Wide Web Consortium不確実性の一貫した扱いに関するガイダンス・IPCCCEOS 解析即応データ・地球観測衛星委員会
06メカニズム

要因と動態。

Dual-use concerns arise because the same experiments that reveal how biological システム work can, in rare cases, produce knowledge or materials that could be misused. Policies in several countries define categories of research that require additional review, and funders and journals have developed processes for assessing sensitive work. These processes depend heavily on the judgement and awareness of researchers themselves.

Ethics in biotechnology extends beyond misuse: consent for the use of genetic data, equitable access to benefits, fair sharing of benefits from genetic resources, and respect for communities and ecosystems. A culture of responsibility, in which researchers consider consequences and feel able to raise concerns, is widely regarded as the foundation of effective governance. The platform works at the level of governance, evaluation and risk methods. It publishes no protocols, techniques or information that would increase anyone’s capacity to cause harm.

07手法と限界

How it is studied.

  1. 01

    Policy analysis

    Comparative studies of dual-use review policies, funder conditions and publication practices.

  2. 02

    Ethics frameworks

    Structured approaches for weighing benefits, risks and responsibilities in research decisions.

  3. 03

    Education research

    Studies of how training and culture influence awareness and reporting.

  4. 04

    限界

    Misuse potential is hard to judge in advance, review processes vary in rigour, and discussions of risk must avoid creating the hazards they seek to prevent.

08決定

What it informs and who decides.

This evidence informs institutional review processes, funder and publisher policies, training and national oversight frameworks. Researchers, institutional review committees, funders, publishers and regulators decide within their roles. Governance dialogue is convened by Global Risks Forum(GRF)の保健・バイオセキュリティのガバナンス. Concerns can be raised through 訂正と懸念. Related topics are 実験室のバイオセーフティとバイオセキュリティ, synthetic biology and biological threats; methods sit on molecular and life sciences.

Published analysis on this topic is designed to carry a named subject reviewer, its references and the views of independent specialists, including biosafety professionals and those who disagree.

09出典

Where this page’s references lead.

このページの読解の基準となる機関と文書。状態と版は変わります。各リンクは発行機関へ移動します。

10質問

質問と回答。

Does dual use mean research should stop?
No. Most research has great benefit. The aim is to identify the small share that needs additional care and to manage it responsibly.
Who is responsible for identifying research of concern?
Responsibility is shared: researchers first, then institutions, funders, publishers and regulators.
How can I raise a concern about research?
Through your institution’s procedures, or write to 誠実性に関する懸念のフォームに送ることができる。受領通知には参照番号と次のステップが示される。
このトピックの扱いは誰がレビューするのですか?
Published analysis is designed to be reviewed by a named subject reviewer with relevant expertise, to cite its references and to include independent specialist voices. Where specialists disagree, the disagreement is reported rather than resolved by omission.
報告書貢献する

このページからエビデンスを提供する。

報告書 is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

GCRIバイオテクノロジーとバイオセキュリティ指数関数的テクノロジーエビデンス・ブリーフ
バイオテクノロジーとバイオセキュリティ

手法、データセット、または問いを持ち込んでください。

情報提供と問い合わせは本日から受け付けています。問い合わせには参照番号が付き、次の手順が示されます。申請、支払い、計算資源の割り当て、登録は、担当チーム、規約、審査体制が整ってから開始します。