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GCRI · Biotechnology and Biosecurity

Dual use and ethics

Much life sciences research is dual use: knowledge, materials and technologies developed for beneficial purposes could also be misused to cause harm. This topic, studied at Biotechnology and Biosecurity, a platform of The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI), examines how research of concern is identified, how responsibility is shared between researchers, institutions, funders and publishers, and how concerns are escalated, alongside the wider ethical questions biotechnology raises.

02Core questions

What experts ask.

  • How can research of concern be identified early, without discouraging beneficial science?
  • What responsibilities do researchers, institutions, funders and publishers each hold?
  • How should concerns be raised and escalated, and how are those who raise them protected?
  • How should the publication of sensitive findings be handled?
  • How do ethical questions of consent, equity and benefit sharing apply to biotechnology?
03Monitor

Oversight and capacity register.

The screen a team would use to follow this subject: its measures, states and decisions. Names are examples and values are illustrative.

Oversight and capacity register

Dual use and ethics · National committee · Review year 2

  • Institutions with a committee, %
    61Watch
  • Staff trained, %
    64Normal
  • Reviews completed
    55this year
  • Incident reports filed
    13Info
Capacity and oversight onlyGCRI · Biotechnology and Biosecurity

Institutional oversight

Institution AActiveQ487Current
Research campusActiveQ482Audit due
Biomanufacturing siteFormingnone46Support
Diagnostic networkActiveQ381Current

Scope note

Covers
governance, training, review capacity
Excludes
technical methods and agents
Authority
national oversight body
Label
SURVEY
Oversight and capacity register: the screen’s structure, terms and states for Dual use and ethics.Example names and illustrative values; a design, not a record or a live system.
04Across the domains

Dual-use governance applies wherever life-science research touches the domains.

Governance analyses are designed for the Exponential Technology series. The WHO framework (2022) and the Biological Weapons Convention set the frame; GCRI publishes governance analysis, never methods of concern.

  • Governance comparisons.
  • Ethics review lessons.
05Methods and evidence

How dual use and ethics is modelled, measured and tested.

The model, its assumptions, its data and its uncertainty, in the form a scientist or engineer would check. Structures follow published methods. The values drawn are illustrative, not findings.

Uncertainty bands

How far the outlook for dual use and ethics could spread, shown as ranges rather than a single line.

Now+5+10+15+20+25+30 yhighlowvery likely rangelikely range
Central estimate
median of the ensemble
Ranges
likely and very likely, in IPCC calibrated language
Ensemble
members, scenarios and initial conditions stated
Read with
the sensitivity of the result to each input
Illustrative ensemble spread on an index scale; the form follows IPCC uncertainty guidance. Not a projection.
FAIR guiding principles · GO FAIR and FORCE11W3C PROV · World Wide Web ConsortiumGuidance on consistent treatment of uncertainties · IPCCCEOS Analysis Ready Data · Committee on Earth Observation Satellites
06Mechanisms

Drivers and dynamics.

Dual-use concerns arise because the same experiments that reveal how biological systems work can, in rare cases, produce knowledge or materials that could be misused. Policies in several countries define categories of research that require additional review, and funders and journals have developed processes for assessing sensitive work. These processes depend heavily on the judgement and awareness of researchers themselves.

Ethics in biotechnology extends beyond misuse: consent for the use of genetic data, equitable access to benefits, fair sharing of benefits from genetic resources, and respect for communities and ecosystems. A culture of responsibility, in which researchers consider consequences and feel able to raise concerns, is widely regarded as the foundation of effective governance. The platform works at the level of governance, evaluation and risk methods. It publishes no protocols, techniques or information that would increase anyone’s capacity to cause harm.

07Methods and limits

How it is studied.

  1. 01

    Policy analysis

    Comparative studies of dual-use review policies, funder conditions and publication practices.

  2. 02

    Ethics frameworks

    Structured approaches for weighing benefits, risks and responsibilities in research decisions.

  3. 03

    Education research

    Studies of how training and culture influence awareness and reporting.

  4. 04

    Limits

    Misuse potential is hard to judge in advance, review processes vary in rigour, and discussions of risk must avoid creating the hazards they seek to prevent.

08Decisions

What it informs and who decides.

This evidence informs institutional review processes, funder and publisher policies, training and national oversight frameworks. Researchers, institutional review committees, funders, publishers and regulators decide within their roles. Governance dialogue is convened by Health and Biosecurity Governance at The Global Risks Forum (GRF). Concerns can be raised through corrections and concerns. Related topics are laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, synthetic biology and biological threats; methods sit on molecular and life sciences.

Published analysis on this topic is designed to carry a named subject reviewer, its references and the views of independent specialists, including biosafety professionals and those who disagree.

09Sources

Where this page’s references lead.

The bodies and documents this page is read against. Status and editions change; each link goes to the issuing body.

10Questions

Questions and answers.

Does dual use mean research should stop?
No. Most research has great benefit. The aim is to identify the small share that needs additional care and to manage it responsibly.
Who is responsible for identifying research of concern?
Responsibility is shared: researchers first, then institutions, funders, publishers and regulators.
How can I raise a concern about research?
Through your institution’s procedures, or write to the integrity concern form. The acknowledgement gives a reference and names the next step.
Who reviews coverage of this topic?
Published analysis is designed to be reviewed by a named subject reviewer with relevant expertise, to cite its references and to include independent specialist voices. Where specialists disagree, the disagreement is reported rather than resolved by omission.
ReportsContribute

Contribute evidence from this page.

Reports is the Consortium’s quarterly publication. What you know about this subject can become evidence, a case or a correction in the next edition, credited to you and published under CC BY 4.0 where it is your own work.

GCRIBiotechnology and BiosecurityExponential TechnologyEvidence Brief
Biotechnology and Biosecurity

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