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The Union’s risk is shared across borders and unevenly insured

Part I describes systems and their couplings. It assesses no authority and ranks no member state.

7 min read2 figures2 tables19 notesNR-COUNTRY-EU-2026-BASELINE

Contents
  1. ·Edition home
  2. ·Executive summary
  3. 1The Union’s risk is shared across borders and unevenly insured
    1. 1.1 The questions this part answers
    2. 1.2 The argument
    3. 1.3 Twenty couplings between five systems
    4. 1.4 Reinforcing loops
  4. 2Key findings
  5. 3Systems and sectors at baseline
  6. 4Risks and capability
  7. 5Compound summer of heat, drought and fire
  8. 6Readings from the other desks
  9. 7The 2027 agenda
  10. 8Systems in depth
  11. AMethodology
  12. BData appendix
  13. CReferences and record
  14. ·Complete edition, for print

1.1The questions this part answers

Key questions

  • Where is the European Union’s risk concentrated, and in which systems?
  • Which couplings carry shocks from one system to the next?
  • Which capabilities hold under compound stress, and which are only documented?
  • What must the 2027 programme measure first?

In this part

  • Narrative
  • Headline finding
  • Lead figure
  • Five system chapters
  • Twelve-domain reading
  • Sector screens
  • Dependency matrix
  • Risk objects
  • Capability ladder
  • Scenario
  • Three lenses
  • Portfolio

1.2The argument

The European Union is a single market, a shared energy system and a set of river basins, coasts and forests that no member state holds alone. This baseline reads its exposure as three forces acting together: a warming climate that intensifies heat, drought and fire, an energy system that still imports most of what it burns, and an older population that is more exposed to heat.

The climate layer is rising. 2024 was the warmest year on record for Europe, and in 2025 at least 95% of the continent was above average, with Europe warming more than twice as fast as the global average1516. A study models 62,775 heat-related deaths in 32 European countries in summer 202417, and the EU burnt a record 1,079,538 hectares in 202522.

The energy layer is changing fast. Net domestic emissions were 40% below 1990 in 2024, and renewables supplied 25.2% of final energy17. Imports still cover 57% of energy needs, and the Russian share of EU gas imports fell from 45% to 12% in 202589. A regulation to phase out Russian gas has applied since February 2026, with long-term LNG contracts ending on 1 January 202710.

The demographic layer shapes who is hurt. 22.0% of the population was 65 or over in 2025, and deaths have exceeded births since 2012, so population growth now depends on migration1314. Older residents are the most exposed to heat, and 33.2% of farm managers are 65 or over1731.

Beneath these sits finance. Weather and climate extremes caused about EUR 822 billion of losses from 1980 to 2024, a quarter of it in 2021 to 2024, and less than 20% was privately insured23. EIOPA and the ECB have proposed an EU-level scheme to narrow the gap; it is a proposal, not law26.

This edition therefore reads the Union’s risk as a property of the couplings between these forces. The matrix, risk objects, capability ladder and scenario that follow ask the same two questions: where does a shock travel next, and who holds the capability to stop it?

Figure 1.1How far has the EU cut emissions, and how far is left? Net emissions as a share of 1990 (%)

Net emissions on the target basis stood at 63% of the 1990 level in 2024 (derived from a 37% cut). The 2030 target leaves 45% and the 2040 target 10%245.

ItemBar, scaled to the largest valueValue
1990 base100
2024, 2030 target basis63
2030 target45
2040 target10

Source: as cited in the note to this figure. Year 2024.

Figure ID FIG-COUNTRY-EU-2026-BASELINE-01-003

40%

net domestic cut since 1990, 20241

58%

fall in power and heat emissions since 19901

54%

cut expected by 2030 with planned measures2

90%

net cut legislated for 20404

1.3Twenty couplings between five systems

The European Union matrix types the twenty couplings between the five core systems. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events; they set the starting graph that the Q1 2027 Foundry cut will test.

Figure 1.2Couplings between the five systems

Each line is one coupling from one system to another, drawn by the strength the edition assigns. Strengths are Nexus estimates from the cited evidence and analogue events.

  • Strong
  • Moderate
  • Weak

Source: this edition’s coupling matrix (Table 1.1); status Estimated.

Table 1.1Coupling matrix: from the row system to the column system
From, toWATENEFOOHLTBIO
WAT Water·STRONG
nuclear cooling · hydro		STRONG
irrigation · rain-fed yield		MODERATE
drinking water		STRONG
flows · wetlands
ENE EnergyMODERATE
pumping · treatment		·STRONG
fuel · fertiliser · cold chain		STRONG
facility power · cooling		MODERATE
reservoirs · land use
FOO FoodMODERATE
withdrawals · nutrients		WEAK
biofuel feedstock		·STRONG
nutrition · food safety		STRONG
land conversion
HLT HealthWEAK
workforce		WEAK
workforce		MODERATE
labour · disease		·WEAK
residues
BIO BiodiversitySTRONG
regulation · filtration		MODERATE
fire on lines · biomass		STRONG
pollination · soils		MODERATE
zoonoses · smoke		·
Strength: strong, moderate or weak; a Nexus estimate (status Estimated) from cited evidence and analogue events. The scale is defined in Annex A.

Transmission paths

  1. 01

    CLI → HLT

    Heat raises deaths, mainly among older people.

    Reported summer 202417

  2. 02

    CLI → BIO

    Heat and drought feed wildfire that burns protected sites.

    Reported fires 202522

  3. 03

    CLI → HLT

    Warmer seasons let mosquito-borne disease spread locally.

    Reported chikungunya 202533

  4. 04

    CLI → WAT → FOO

    Drought and heat cut water for crops and rivers.

    Inferred scarcity 202319

  5. 05

    TRD → ENE → FOO

    Gas and fertiliser supply shocks pass into food costs.

    Inferred import dependence8

1.4Reinforcing loops

A shock entering either system of a loop can return amplified through the other.

Table 1.2Pairs of systems where both directions are rated strong
LoopFirst directionSecond direction
WAT and BIOWater to biodiversity: flows · wetlandsBiodiversity to water: regulation · filtration
FOO and BIOFood to biodiversity: land conversionBiodiversity to food: pollination · soils
A causal-loop reading of the matrix (Sterman, Business Dynamics, 2000): structural, from estimated strengths, not a measured feedback.

Notes

Numbers are the edition’s reference numbers, so a note reads the same in every chapter. The full list, with every source and its licence, is in Annex C. Annex C, references

  1. 15Copernicus Climate Change Service and World Meteorological Organization (eds.), European State of the Climate 2025. ECMWF, Bonn, 29 April 2026, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  2. 16Copernicus Climate Change Service and World Meteorological Organization (eds.), European State of the Climate 2024. ECMWF, Bonn, 15 April 2025.back
  3. 17T. Janoš, M. Quijal-Zamorano, N. Shartova et al., “Heat-related mortality in Europe during 2024 and health emergency forecasting to reduce preventable deaths,” Nature Medicine, September 2025. doi:10.1038/s41591-025-03954-7. doi:10.1038/s41591-025-03954-7back
  4. 22Joint Research Centre (ed.), “2025 was the EU’s most destructive wildfire season on record.” News, European Commission, Ispra, 31 March 2026, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  5. 1European Environment Agency (ed.), Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990 to 2024 and inventory document 2026, EEA Report 04/2026. EEA, Copenhagen, 17 April 2026, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  6. 7Eurostat (ed.), “25.2% of energy EU used in 2024 came from renewables.” News article, Eurostat, Luxembourg, 18 December 2025, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  7. 8Eurostat (ed.), “Energy in Europe: imports dependency.” News article, Eurostat, Luxembourg, 18 March 2026, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  8. 9European Commission, DG Energy (ed.), REPowerEU roadmap: ending dependence on Russian energy. European Commission, Brussels, page read 2026-11-03.back
  9. 10European Parliament and Council (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2026/261 on the phase-out of Russian natural gas imports. Official Journal of the European Union, 2 February 2026.back
  10. 13Eurostat (ed.), “EU population continued to grow in 2025.” News article, Eurostat, Luxembourg, 10 July 2026, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  11. 14Eurostat (ed.), Demography of Europe, 2026 edition. Interactive publication, Eurostat, Luxembourg, May 2026, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  12. 31Eurostat (ed.), Regions in Europe, 2025 edition. Interactive publication, Eurostat, Luxembourg, 2025, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  13. 23European Environment Agency (ed.), “Economic losses from weather- and climate-related extremes in Europe.” Indicator, EEA, Copenhagen, 14 October 2025, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  14. 26European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and European Central Bank (eds.), Towards a European system for natural catastrophe risk management. Joint paper, Frankfurt, 18 December 2024.back
  15. 2European Environment Agency (ed.), Trends and projections in Europe 2025, EEA Report 08/2025. EEA, Copenhagen, 6 November 2025, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  16. 4European Parliament and Council (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2026/667 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 (2040 target). Official Journal of the European Union, 18 March 2026.back
  17. 5European Parliament and Council (eds.), Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality (European Climate Law). Official Journal of the European Union, 2021.back
  18. 33European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ed.), Seasonal surveillance of chikungunya virus disease in the EU/EEA, 2025, data submitted to 31 December 2025. ECDC, Stockholm, retrieved 2026-11-03.back
  19. 19European Environment Agency (ed.), “Water scarcity conditions in Europe (Water exploitation index plus).” Indicator, EEA, Copenhagen, 28 November 2025, retrieved 2026-11-03.back

Cite this chapter

Valadbaygi, S. (Ed.). (2026). Chapter 1: The Union’s risk is shared across borders and unevenly insured. In European Union Systems Risk and Resilience Report 2026: The State of the European Union’s Interdependent Systems (Baseline Edition 2026, Report No. NR-COUNTRY-EU-2026-BASELINE) [Draft under review]. The Global Centre for Risk and Innovation (GCRI).

Every citation form of the whole report, BibTeX and RIS included, is on the edition home. Cite this report

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